Issues: Whether assets of the corporate debtor discovered after approval of a resolution plan and not disclosed in the information memorandum (specifically fixed deposit receipts held as margin money) belong to the successful resolution applicant who implemented the plan or to the erstwhile committee of creditors.

Analysis: Regulation 36 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 requires the information memorandum to contain assets and liabilities including contingent liabilities, but does not expressly require disclosure of contingent assets. Regulations 37-39 set out the permissible content and obligations in a resolution plan and the approval process, without imposing a rule that assets omitted from the information memorandum vest outside the corporate debtor post-approval. The decision in Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Pvt Ltd v. Edelweiss ARC establishes that claims not part of an approved resolution plan stand extinguished and the claims provided in the resolution plan stand frozen. Prior appellate authority recognises that margin money deposited as fixed deposits reverts to the borrower if bank guarantees expire uninvoked. Applying these principles, assets of the corporate debtor that pre-existed the insolvency commencement date but were not included in the information memorandum (such as fixed deposit receipts held as margin money against expired bank guarantees) are properly characterised as assets of the corporate debtor rather than property of the banks that had adjusted or retained them post-approval. The absence of disclosure in the information memorandum does not, by itself, operate to divest the successful resolution applicant of title in assets of the corporate debtor acquired upon implementation of the approved resolution plan. Fraudulent conduct or deliberate concealment to prejudice creditors remains actionable and will not sustain retention of such assets by third parties.

Conclusion: Assets of the corporate debtor discovered after approval and implementation of the resolution plan, which were created by the corporate debtor (including fixed deposit receipts held as margin money for bank guarantees that have expired), belong to the corporate debtor and, following implementation of the resolution plan, to the successful resolution applicant; respondent banks have no right to adjust or retain those amounts post-implementation. The impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Adjudicating Authority for further proceedings consistent with this conclusion.

Issues: (i) Whether delay in disbursal of working capital loan or alleged shortcomings in the lending arrangement barred initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process under Section 7. (ii) Whether rejection of one-time settlement and pendency of arbitration required pause or restraint on admission of the Section 7 application. (iii) Whether the application was hit by Section 10A and whether non-mentioning of the exact date of default was fatal. (iv) Whether the proceedings were merely recovery proceedings or a valid insolvency action based on established default.

Issue (i): Whether delay in disbursal of working capital loan or alleged shortcomings in the lending arrangement barred initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process under Section 7.

Analysis: The defaulting borrower's grievance that working capital was released belatedly was held not to be a valid answer to an established default. Once material showed persistent inability to service the debt, the adjudicating authority was not required to re-open the commercial reasons behind the default or treat alleged fault in disbursal as a bar to insolvency resolution.

Conclusion: The alleged delay in disbursal did not bar the Section 7 proceeding.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of one-time settlement and pendency of arbitration required pause or restraint on admission of the Section 7 application.

Analysis: One-time settlement was treated as a matter within the lender's commercial discretion, and the borrower had no vested right to insist upon acceptance on its own terms. Rejection of settlement did not extinguish the creditor's right to pursue insolvency once debt and default were established. The pending arbitration was also not treated as crystallized relief capable of displacing the demonstrated debt default.

Conclusion: Rejection of the settlement proposal and pending arbitration did not prevent admission of the insolvency application.

Issue (iii): Whether the application was hit by Section 10A and whether non-mentioning of the exact date of default was fatal.

Analysis: The default dates were found to fall outside the protected Section 10A window. The record showed multiple loan facilities and revised repayment dates, with the latest default occurring after the relevant excluded period. Non-disclosure of the exact default date in the application was held not to be fatal where default otherwise stood established on the material before the authority.

Conclusion: The application was not barred by Section 10A, and omission to state the date of default did not invalidate it.

Issue (iv): Whether the proceedings were merely recovery proceedings or a valid insolvency action based on established default.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that the account had become NPA, stood restructured, and continued to show default despite subsequent concessions and restructuring. In such circumstances, the filing of a Section 7 application was consistent with the insolvency framework and not a mere recovery measure. The statutory consequence of established default was admission unless the application was incomplete.

Conclusion: The proceedings were a valid insolvency action and not impermissible recovery proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The impugned admission order was sustained because debt and default were established, no statutory bar was made out, and the appellants' objections did not displace the creditor's entitlement to invoke insolvency resolution.

Ratio Decidendi: Once default under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is established and the application is otherwise complete, the adjudicating authority must admit the matter; alleged lending shortcomings, rejection of one-time settlement, or pendency of collateral proceedings do not by themselves defeat insolvency initiation, and non-mention of the exact default date is not fatal if default is otherwise clear.

Issues: Whether, after the firm's liability under FEMA had been set aside and attained finality, the penalty and confiscatory consequences could continue against a partner invoking Section 42 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.

Analysis: Section 42 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 applies the principle of deemed liability to a firm and to the persons in charge of its business, but only where contravention by the firm is first established. The Tribunal noted that the earlier appellate order had quashed the impugned order against the firm and other noticees and that the High Court had dismissed the further appeals, rendering that decision final. On that footing, the partner's liability could not survive independently when the firm itself had been exonerated on the same set of allegations. The Tribunal therefore treated the impugned penalties and confiscation orders against the appellant as unsustainable.

Conclusion: The penalty and confiscation imposed on the appellant were quashed and the seized amounts and pre-deposit were directed to be released in his favour.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, and the appellant was relieved from the penalties and confiscatory consequences arising from the impugned order.

Ratio Decidendi: Liability under Section 42 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 is contingent on a proved contravention by the firm or company, and once the principal entity's contravention is finally set aside, the derivative liability of the partner or person in charge cannot be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether the attached property, though claimed to have been purchased earlier and financed as a loan arrangement, could still be treated as proceeds of crime and subjected to provisional attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. (ii) Whether the competent authority had material to form the requisite reason to believe under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and whether the appellant discharged the burden of showing that the property was not involved in money laundering.

Issue (i): Whether the attached property, though claimed to have been purchased earlier and financed as a loan arrangement, could still be treated as proceeds of crime and subjected to provisional attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The property was held liable to attachment because the record showed substantial transfers from the account of the person behind the scheduled offence to the appellant's accounts, and those transfers were found to be linked to cash proceeds generated from the unlawful fundraising activity. The plea that the amounts were mere loans was not supported by credible documentary evidence. Even if the property had originally been acquired earlier, infusion of tainted funds into the property or its upkeep was sufficient to attract the definition of proceeds of crime, which covers property derived directly or indirectly from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The fact that the appellant was not named as an accused did not prevent attachment.

Conclusion: The property was rightly treated as proceeds of crime and the attachment was valid.

Issue (ii): Whether the competent authority had material to form the requisite reason to believe under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and whether the appellant discharged the burden of showing that the property was not involved in money laundering.

Analysis: The authority recorded reasons based on investigation material, including statements and banking trail, showing the generation, layering and routing of tainted funds and the likelihood of concealment or transfer if the property was not attached. That material had a rational nexus with the belief formed, and the sufficiency of the material was not open to challenge at this stage. Once such material was produced, the burden shifted to the possessor of the property to establish that it was untainted. The appellant did not discharge that burden because the alleged loan explanation and source-of-funds explanation were not proved convincingly.

Conclusion: The requisite reason to believe existed, and the appellant failed to rebut the statutory burden.

Final Conclusion: The provisional attachment and its confirmation were sustained, and the appeal failed in full.

Ratio Decidendi: Property may be provisionally attached under the money-laundering law if material shows a rational nexus between the property and proceeds of crime, including indirect derivation or infusion of tainted funds, and the attachment is not confined to persons named as accused in the scheduled offence; once such material is produced, the possessor must prove that the property is untainted.

Issues: Whether the appellants could seek release of the attached property after settlement of the investors' dues and whether the appeals should be disposed of with liberty to approach the Special Court.

Analysis: The attachment related to property treated as proceeds of crime under the PMLA. The order noted the existing mechanism for settlement of investors' claims and recorded that, after such settlement, the concerned party may invoke the statutory remedy before the Special Court for release of property. The Tribunal also relied on the connected order granting similar liberty in comparable matters.

Conclusion: The appellants were permitted to move the Special Court under Section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 for release of the property remaining after settlement of investors' dues.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of without disturbing the attachment, while preserving the statutory remedy for release after settlement of dues.

Ratio Decidendi: Where attached property is alleged to be proceeds of crime, the person aggrieved may seek release before the Special Court after settlement of investors' dues under the statutory scheme of the PMLA.

Issues: (i) Whether Cenvat credit of service tax paid on outward transportation from the place of removal for the period prior to 01.04.2008 is admissible; (ii) Whether Cenvat credit of service tax shown on transporter invoices for inward transportation is admissible; (iii) Whether penalty under Rule 15(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 is imposable where credit is questioned.

Issue (i): Whether Cenvat credit of service tax paid on outward transportation from the place of removal for the period prior to 01.04.2008 is admissible.

Analysis: The definition of "input service" as it stood prior to 01.04.2008 expressly included services used by the manufacturer in relation to "clearance of final products from the place of removal". The Court considered binding precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court (Andhra Sugars Ltd and Vasavdatta Cements Ltd) holding that "from the place of removal" covers outward transportation from the place of removal up to the depot or the customer's place for the period before the amendment effective 01.04.2008; subsequent amendment by Notification No. 10/2008-C.E. (N.T.) (effective 01.04.2008) altered this position prospectively. Tribunal decisions consistent with the Supreme Court and the statutory wording were applied to the facts.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit of Rs.4,26,427/- for outward transportation from the place of removal for the pre-01.04.2008 period is admissible in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Cenvat credit of service tax shown on transporter invoices for inward transportation is admissible.

Analysis: Subrule (f) of Rule 9 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 prescribes an invoice, bill or challan issued by a provider of input service on or after 10.09.2004 as an eligible document for availment of Cenvat credit. Notification No. 32/2004-ST (03.12.2004) exempts 75% of the gross amount for goods transport agencies subject to conditions applicable to the transporter; the restriction on credit of inputs/capital goods applies to the goods transport agency, not the recipient. There was no dispute about the transporter invoices as documents in this case.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit of Rs.75,407/- on transporter invoices is admissible in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under Rule 15(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 is imposable where credit is questioned.

Analysis: Penalty becomes irrelevant where the substantive demand is unsustainable on merits. Given that both contested credits were held admissible on merits and documents were in order, the precondition for imposing penalty under Rule 15(1) does not survive.

Conclusion: Penalty under Rule 15(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 is not imposable; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the impugned demand and penalty are set aside to the extent indicated and the assessee's availment of Cenvat credit is upheld, resulting in relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For the period prior to 01.04.2008 the statutory definition of "input service" which included services relating to "clearance of final products from the place of removal" permits Cenvat credit for outward transportation from the place of removal up to depot or customer, and valid transporter invoices meeting Rule 9 documentation requirements permit availment of credit notwithstanding Notification No.32/2004-ST conditions applicable to the goods transport agency.

Issues: Whether the Commissioner could refuse to exercise the power under Section 17(7) of the Odisha Entry Tax Act, 1999 to stay realization during pendency of the appeal on the ground that any consideration of the request would touch the merits of the appeal, and whether the impugned order was liable to be set aside for absence of reasons.

Analysis: Section 17(7) confers power on the Commissioner to stay realization of tax, interest or penalty, in whole or in part, while the appeal remains pending before the Tribunal. The power is meant to operate during the appellate stage and any observation made for deciding the stay application is only tentative and does not bind or prejudice the Tribunal in the merits of the appeal. Refusing to exercise the power merely because the appeal is pending, or because some reference to the issues may be made, defeats the statutory purpose. The impugned order, though lengthy, did not record the requisite reasons for declining relief and therefore did not satisfy the statutory requirement.

Conclusion: The refusal to consider the stay application on the stated ground was unsustainable, and the order was rightly set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute confers power to grant stay of realization during pendency of an appeal, the authority must decide the application on reasons germane to stay and cannot decline to exercise the power merely because the appeal is pending or because the order may incidentally refer to the merits.

Issues: Whether the petitioner, whose GST registration had been cancelled for non-filing of returns, was entitled to restoration of registration after filing the pending returns and making the requisite payments.

Analysis: The registration had been cancelled under the provision empowering cancellation for continued default in furnishing returns. Rule 22 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, particularly the proviso to sub-rule (4), permits the proper officer to drop cancellation proceedings where the person furnishes all pending returns and makes full payment of tax dues along with applicable interest and late fee. The record showed that the petitioner had filed the pending returns and deposited the penalty amount, and the respondents expressed no objection to grant of similar relief. On that basis, the matter was treated as fit for restoration of registration on compliance with the prescribed procedure.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to seek restoration of GST registration by filing an appropriate application, and the respondent authorities were directed to consider it in accordance with law and restore the registration upon verification and compliance.

Issues: (i) Whether 60% of the vehicle-related expenses claimed against income under section 28(v) was allowable, and the balance 40% was disallowable for want of proof of exclusive business use. (ii) Whether the agricultural income of Rs. 1,75,200 was liable to be treated as income from other sources.

Issue (i): Whether 60% of the vehicle-related expenses claimed against income under section 28(v) was allowable, and the balance 40% was disallowable for want of proof of exclusive business use.

Analysis: The assessee claimed depreciation, interest, and insurance on a car owned in personal capacity against income taxed as business income under section 28(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The claim required proof that the expenditure was incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes. The assessee failed to establish exclusive business use, but the record also did not justify a complete disallowance. On a reasonable estimate, the vehicle was taken to have been used partly for business.

Conclusion: The vehicle-related expenditure was partly allowable, with 60% permitted and 40% disallowed.

Issue (ii): Whether the agricultural income of Rs. 1,75,200 was liable to be treated as income from other sources.

Analysis: The assessee produced material showing ownership of agricultural land, past return of comparable agricultural income in earlier years, and the claim that the land was leased for agricultural operations. In these circumstances, the income returned as agricultural income stood sufficiently supported, and there was no basis to reclassify it as income from other sources.

Conclusion: The addition by treating the agricultural income as income from other sources was deleted.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded in part, with relief granted on the agricultural income issue and only partial relief on the vehicle expense claim.

Ratio Decidendi: A deduction against income taxed as business income can be allowed only to the extent the assessee substantiates business nexus, while supported agricultural receipts cannot be recharacterised as income from other sources without contrary evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether the resolution plan was liable to be rejected for non-submission of earnest money deposit within the stipulated time and for being treated as non-responsive under the request for resolution plan. (ii) Whether the approval of the resolution plan and the scoring process were sustainable in the light of the objective of value maximisation and the treatment of secured and unsecured creditors. (iii) Whether the dissenting financial creditor had locus to challenge the approval of the resolution plan.

Issue (i): Whether the resolution plan was liable to be rejected for non-submission of earnest money deposit within the stipulated time and for being treated as non-responsive under the request for resolution plan.

Analysis: The request for resolution plan required the earnest money deposit to accompany the resolution plan within the stipulated time, and expressly provided that non-submission would render the plan non-responsive and liable to rejection or non-evaluation. Mere debit from the bidder's bank account on the due date did not amount to compliance when the amount was actually credited to the corporate debtor only after the deadline. The acceptance of the belated deposit was therefore contrary to the stipulated bid conditions.

Conclusion: The plan was non-responsive and ought not to have been accepted.

Issue (ii): Whether the approval of the resolution plan and the scoring process were sustainable in the light of the objective of value maximisation and the treatment of secured and unsecured creditors.

Analysis: The record showed that the majority committee relied heavily on faster recovery for secured creditors and gave inadequate consideration to unsecured and operational creditors. The deliberations did not sufficiently explain why higher-value plans were not preferred or why the evaluation matrix resulted in anomalous scoring that elevated the selected applicant. In the circumstances, the decision-making process did not reflect a proper application of value maximisation consistent with the insolvency framework.

Conclusion: The approval process was unsustainable.

Issue (iii): Whether the dissenting financial creditor had locus to challenge the approval of the resolution plan.

Analysis: A dissenting financial creditor with a stake in the insolvency process is not barred from raising grievances where alleged illegality, non-compliance, and procedural unfairness are asserted. The objections had been raised before the committee and were not mere afterthoughts. The challenge was therefore maintainable.

Conclusion: The appellant had locus to maintain the challenge.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside, the approved resolution plan was invalidated, and the matter was directed to proceed afresh in accordance with law with consideration of the remaining resolution plans.

Ratio Decidendi: A resolution plan that does not comply with mandatory bid conditions and is accepted in disregard of the prescribed eligibility requirements cannot be sustained merely on the basis of majority approval or commercial wisdom; where the process also fails to properly address creditor treatment and value maximisation, the plan and its approval are liable to be interfered with.

Issues: (i) Whether Service Tax demand confirmed solely on the basis of CBDT data and Form 26AS, without independent verification or corroborative evidence, was sustainable; (ii) whether the extended period of limitation and consequential interest and penalty could be invoked on the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether Service Tax demand confirmed solely on the basis of CBDT data and Form 26AS, without independent verification or corroborative evidence, was sustainable.

Analysis: The demand was founded only on comparison of income-tax data with ST-3 returns. No independent enquiry was undertaken to ascertain the nature of the services rendered or to establish that the receipts represented taxable service turnover under the Finance Act, 1994. Mechanical reliance on Form 26AS and ITR figures, without proof of rendition of taxable service, was held to be impermissible. The Tribunal followed its earlier decisions holding that income-tax data by itself cannot sustain a service tax demand unless supported by corroborative material.

Conclusion: The demand on this basis was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation and consequential interest and penalty could be invoked on the facts of the case.

Analysis: Since the demand itself rested only on income-tax data and no independent investigation established suppression with intent to evade tax, the ingredients for invoking the extended period were not satisfied. The Tribunal also accepted that the non-response to departmental letters issued during the peak of the COVID-19 period could not, by itself, justify invocation of the extended period. Once the demand failed, the foundation for interest and penalty also disappeared.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invokable, and the interest and penalty were also unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demand, along with interest and penalty, was annulled and the appeal was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A Service Tax demand cannot be sustained merely on the basis of income-tax data or Form 26AS unless the Revenue independently verifies and establishes rendition of taxable service; in the absence of proved suppression with intent to evade tax, the extended period of limitation is not invokable.

Issues: Whether delay in filing the statement required under Para 4(a) or Para 5(d) of Notification No. 01/2010-CE dated 06.02.2010 was a procedural lapse that could not justify denial of refund or exemption benefit.

Analysis: The filing of the statement within the prescribed time was treated as a procedural requirement under the exemption notification. The substantive conditions of the notification were found to have been complied with, and the delay in filing the statement was not regarded as fatal to the claim. The decision followed earlier Tribunal rulings on the same notification, which had held that delayed compliance with the filing requirement did not defeat the benefit where the underlying entitlement was otherwise established.

Conclusion: The delayed filing did not invalidate the claim, and denial of refund on that ground was unsustainable. The benefit under the notification was held admissible to the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the refund denial based solely on belated filing was set aside, with consequential relief as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: Delay in complying with a procedural requirement under an exemption notification does not defeat the exemption where the substantive conditions of the notification are satisfied.

Issues: (i) Whether the supplier derived and retained benefit of additional input tax credit in the post-GST period thereby engaging in profiteering under Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether penalty and interest are exigible for such profiteering and, if so, the applicable quantification and temporal scope.

Issue (i): Whether the supplier derived and retained benefit of additional input tax credit in the post-GST period thereby engaging in profiteering under Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Comparative computation of ratio of credit availed to purchase value for pre-GST and post-GST periods shows an increase of 4.41 percentage points. Applying that increase to the post-GST purchase value and prorating over the sold area produced a quantified excess realization. Documentary evidence and statutory auditor-certified computations supporting the figures were uncontroverted, and the supplier unqualifiedly accepted the quantified finding and produced evidence of refunds to buyers.

Conclusion: The supplier engaged in profiteering by retaining the benefit of additional input tax credit; the profiteered amount pending to be passed on is quantified as Rs. 6,53,861 (inclusive of GST).

Issue (ii): Whether penalty and interest are exigible for such profiteering and, if so, the applicable quantification and temporal scope.

Analysis: Section 171(3A) prescribes penalty for failure to pass on benefit but contains a proviso exempting penalty where the amount is deposited within thirty days of the determination order; the relevant period of contravention is July 1, 2017 to December 31, 2019. Rule 133(3)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 prescribes return of the not-passed-on amount with interest at 18% per annum from date of collection until date of refund. The supplier has refunded the amount to eligible buyers; the computations of interest are guided by Rule 133(3)(b) as compensatory restitution for the time value of money.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 171(3A) is not imposable in view of compliance with the proviso (deposit/refund within the statutory period), but interest at 18% per annum is payable from the respective dates of collection until the date of refund in accordance with Rule 133(3)(b).

Final Conclusion: The determination that profiteering occurred and the quantified restitutive obligation, together with the direction to refund the outstanding profiteered amount with interest at 18% per annum to eligible buyers, is confirmed; penalty is not imposed due to compliance with the statutory proviso.

Ratio Decidendi: Where additional input tax credit results in a measurable increase in the credit-to-purchase-value ratio, the supplier must pass on the resultant benefit by commensurate reduction in price; failure to do so gives rise to a restitutive liability quantified by applying the differential credit ratio to the relevant base and, under Rule 133(3)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, attracts interest at 18% per annum from date of collection until refund, while penalty under Section 171(3A) is avoided if the amount is deposited within thirty days of the order of determination.

Issues: (i) Whether absence of a written loan agreement prevents a financial creditor (NBFC) from proving existence of a financial debt under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether withdrawal of a prior Section 7 petition without express liberty to file afresh bars the financial creditor from instituting a subsequent Section 7 petition on breach of the settlement; (iii) Whether the Section 7 petition should be admitted where records and acknowledgements establish debt and default.

Issue (i): Whether a written financial contract is a mandatory prerequisite to establish financial debt for the purposes of initiation of CIRP under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The legal framework under the Code and allied Rules and Regulations permits proving financial debt by reference to relevant documents and records evidencing disbursement and accrual of interest; the IBC has overriding effect over other instruments. Precedents of this Tribunal establish that written contract is not an indispensable pre-condition where the nature of the transaction is otherwise demonstrated by bank statements, acknowledgements, promissory notes, TDS on interest, post-dated cheques and ledger entries.

Conclusion: A written loan agreement is not mandatory; absence of a formal written contract does not preclude a financial creditor from proving financial debt where other evidentiary material establishes disbursement and time value of money.

Issue (ii): Whether withdrawal of an earlier Section 7 petition without express leave bars filing a fresh Section 7 petition on subsequent breach of the settlement giving rise to renewed cause of action.

Analysis: Withdrawal of the earlier petition wiped out the proceedings in that petition; where the corporate debtor breaches the settlement terms, such breach gives rise to a new cause of action. Principles invoked from suits and public-policy extensions are not automatically applicable to IBC proceedings to deny remedy where a bona fide breach occurs. Tribunal precedents recognize that permitting barring of fresh petitions on such technical grounds would incentivize sham settlements and defeat creditor rights.

Conclusion: Withdrawal of the earlier petition without liberty does not bar a fresh Section 7 petition founded on breach of the settlement; res judicata and related principles are inapplicable to prevent a new petition where a fresh cause of action has arisen.

Issue (iii): Whether the Section 7 petition should be admitted where records on file establish debt and default above the statutory threshold.

Analysis: Under the Code the Adjudicating Authority's limited task is to be satisfied on the existence of debt and default from records or evidence produced; where bank statements, acknowledgements, promissory notes, TDS entries and dishonoured post-dated cheques reflect disbursement, accrual of interest and acknowledgement by the corporate debtor, the prerequisites for admission are satisfied and the application cannot be rejected on technical grounds.

Conclusion: The material on record established debt and default and the Section 7 petition should be admitted.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted for admission of the Section 7 petition and further action in accordance with the Code.

Ratio Decidendi: For the purposes of admission under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, a financial debt may be proved by admissible records and acknowledgements evidencing disbursement and time value of money; a formal written loan agreement is not an absolute prerequisite, and a fresh Section 7 petition is maintainable upon breach of a settlement giving rise to a new cause of action despite prior withdrawal of a petition.

Issues: Whether the petitioners, accused of mobilising a violent mob, attacking investigating officials and obstructing investigation, are entitled to grant of bail pending further investigation and trial.

Analysis: The impugned order examines the material collected during investigation including call detail records indicating multiple calls in the relevant period, witness statements prima facie placing the petitioners at their premises and indicating they called persons to assemble, video footage suggesting presence of a mob, recovery of firearms kept by an associate, and complaints of threats and influence over witnesses. Investigation and charge-sheeting are in progress with further evidence and supplementary charges contemplated. While prolonged custody is recognised as a factor favouring bail, the assessment balances that factor against the incriminating material, the petitioners' alleged leadership role in mobilising a large violent crowd, the gravity of injuries to officials and damage to government property, and the real risk of tampering with evidence or intimidating witnesses if released. The co-accused released on bail were found not similarly circumstanced. The analysis treats delayed recording of some witness statements as an issue for trial, but finds the collected material sufficient for a prima facie case to refuse bail at this stage.

Conclusion: Bail applications of the petitioners are rejected; petitioners are not entitled to bail at this stage and the proceedings shall continue.

Issues: (i) Whether properties acquired before the alleged scheduled offence could still be attached as the value of proceeds of crime under the Act. (ii) Whether the absence of the appellants' names in the predicate FIR and the claim of ordinary commercial receipts defeated the attachment and confirmation order.

Issue (i): Whether properties acquired before the alleged scheduled offence could still be attached as the value of proceeds of crime under the Act.

Analysis: The statutory definition of proceeds of crime is not confined only to property directly derived from the scheduled offence. It also covers the value of such property. The attachment was upheld on the footing that, even if the attached assets were acquired earlier, they could still be proceeded against as equivalent value where the tainted assets were not available. The distinction drawn by the appellants on the basis of chronology was therefore rejected.

Conclusion: The contention that pre-offence acquisition by itself barred attachment was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the absence of the appellants' names in the predicate FIR and the claim of ordinary commercial receipts defeated the attachment and confirmation order.

Analysis: The absence of the appellants from the FIR was held to be immaterial because action under the Act can extend to any person in possession of proceeds of crime. On the facts accepted from the material on record, the receipts claimed to be commercial were found to be linked to funds routed through the foreign entity connected with the scheduled offence, and the appellant company was treated as a shell company through which funds were invested in properties and other assets. The burden cast on the appellants to show that the assets were not proceeds of crime was not discharged.

Conclusion: The attachment and its confirmation were sustained against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal found sufficient material to connect the attached assets with proceeds of crime or their equivalent value and held that the confirmation of provisional attachment did not call for interference.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the Act, attachment is maintainable not only against property directly derived from the scheduled offence but also against property of equivalent value, and the remedy is not confined to persons named in the predicate FIR if the material shows possession or use of proceeds of crime.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand of service tax for the period April 2014 to March 2015, as confirmed by the lower authorities by invoking the extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994, is sustainable; (ii) Whether the appellant is entitled to exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. and whether interest and penalties imposed under Sections 78(1) and 77(1)(c) of the Finance Act, 1994 survive if the demand is unsustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 is invokable to confirm the disputed demand.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the facts that the appellant was registered, filed ST-3 returns regularly, and the demand was computed by comparing Income Tax Returns/Form 26AS data with ST-3 returns without independent verification. The Department issued letters seeking information in January-February 2020 and issued the Show Cause Notice on 31.12.2020; no material established suppression with intent to evade tax. The Tribunal relied on precedent where demands based solely on income-tax portal data and information disclosed in returns were held not to attract the extended limitation period.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 is not invokable; the demand is barred by limitation and is unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant is entitled to exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. and whether interest and penalties under Sections 78(1) and 77(1)(c) of the Finance Act, 1994 can be sustained.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the appellant's entitlement to exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. for consulting engineer services related to road construction and noted that when the principal activity (road construction) is exempt, ancillary activities including consulting services are also exempt. Because the primary demand was held time-barred, the legal basis for levying interest and penalties was examined and found to fall with the demand; penalties and interest cannot survive independently where the tax demand is set aside for being barred by limitation.

Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. as applied, and the interest and penalties under Sections 78(1) and 77(1)(c) of the Finance Act, 1994 are dropped since the tax demand is set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the impugned order confirming the service tax demand, interest and penalties is set aside as the demand is barred by limitation and the appellant is entitled to consequential reliefs as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a demand is founded solely on data from Income Tax Returns/Form 26AS and the assessee has been regularly registered and filing statutory returns without evidence of suppression with intent to evade, the extended period of limitation under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 is not available to the Revenue and such demand is time-barred.

Issues: (i) Whether works contract services rendered to government authorities (including Gorkhaland Territorial Administration and Executive Engineer, Special Department) are exempt under Sl. No. 12A of Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012; (ii) Whether Service Tax liability for Goods Transport Agency services rendered to a body corporate (Gorkhaland Territorial Administration) is on the appellant or on the recipient under Rule 2(1)(d)(v) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994; (iii) Whether the demand confirmed invoking the extended period of limitation is sustainable in absence of suppression or wilful misstatement.

Issue (i): Whether works contract services rendered to government authorities are exempt under Sl. No. 12A of Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012.

Analysis: Sl. No. 12A of Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012 provides exemption for works contract services rendered to the Government, a local authority or a governmental authority for civil structures or original works meant predominantly for use other than for commerce, industry or business; the entry was examined with reference to the nature of the recipients (Gorkhaland Territorial Administration and Executive Engineer, Special Department Engineering Division, Darjeeling) and the nature of the works (construction, erection, beautification, development of local haat). The recipients were found to qualify as government or governmental authorities under the notification and the works fall within the activities covered by the exemption entry.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. The works contract service demands of Rs.18,75,422 and Rs.1,25,873 confirmed under the impugned order are set aside as exempt under Sl. No. 12A of Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012.

Issue (ii): Whether Service Tax liability for Goods Transport Agency services rendered to a body corporate is on the appellant or on the recipient under Rule 2(1)(d)(v) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.

Analysis: Rule 2(1)(d)(v) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 places liability on the service recipient where the consignor or consignee falls within specified categories such as a body corporate. The recipient in this case, Gorkhaland Territorial Administration, qualifies as a body corporate; accordingly the liability to discharge Service Tax for GTA services received rests on the recipient and not on the service provider.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. The Goods Transport Agency demand of Rs.19,273 confirmed against the appellant is set aside since liability is on the recipient under Rule 2(1)(d)(v) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.

Issue (iii): Whether the demand confirmed invoking the extended period of limitation is sustainable in absence of suppression or wilful misstatement by the appellant.

Analysis: The record shows demands were raised based on ST-3 returns and Form 26AS without evidence of suppression or wilful mis-statement by the appellant. Conditions required for invocation of the extended period of limitation were not established by the Revenue.

Conclusion: In favour of Assessee. The invocation of the extended period of limitation is not sustainable and demands raised on that ground are set aside.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order confirming demands, interest and penalty is set aside in full and the appeal is allowed with consequential reliefs as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: Works contract services to government or governmental authorities falling within Sl. No. 12A of Notification No. 25/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012 are exempt from Service Tax; Goods Transport Agency services received by a body corporate attract liability on the recipient under Rule 2(1)(d)(v) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994; invocation of extended limitation requires proof of suppression or wilful misstatement which was absent.

Issues: Whether a notice of demand issued along with a draft assessment order under the procedure of Section 144C can be enforced where no final assessment order has been passed by the Assessing Officer within the time prescribed under Section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The petition raises a single substantive question concerning the operation of Section 144C(13) which mandates completion of the assessment in conformity with the Dispute Resolution Panel's directions within one month from the end of the month in which the directions are received. The factual matrix shows that directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel were received in September 2021 and therefore the Assessing Officer was statutorily required to pass the final assessment on or before October 31, 2021. No final assessment was passed within that period. The statutory prescription in Section 144C(13) operates notwithstanding Sections 153 and 153B, and is intended to be mandatory to ensure expeditious completion of assessments following DRP directions. Authoritative precedents have held that failure to complete assessment within the period under Section 144C(13) results in lapse of jurisdiction and that internal administrative difficulties or technical glitches in departmental systems cannot extend a statutory limitation. The respondents' explanation that ITBA technical errors prevented passing the final order does not furnish a statutory basis for extending the period prescribed by Section 144C(13). As the final assessment was not completed within the prescribed time, the draft order did not crystallize any enforceable tax liability and the notice of demand issued with the draft order lacked legal foundation.

Conclusion: The demand notice dated March 16, 2021 issued along with the draft assessment order and the penalty notice under Section 274 read with Section 270A are quashed and set aside; the petition is allowed and the decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the amendment by Finance Act, 2020 increasing the tolerance band to 10% for differences between actual consideration and stamp duty value is curative and retrospective such that no addition under Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is required where the difference is less than 10% of the consideration in Assessment Year 2017-18.

Analysis: Finance Act, 2020 raised the tolerance band for variations between stated consideration and stamp duty valuation to 10% for immovable property and that amendment addresses unintended hardships arising from deeming provisions concerning undervaluation. Prior tribunal decisions have treated the enhancement of the tolerance band as curative in nature and applicable retrospectively to the date when the related deeming provision took effect. On the facts of the appeal the difference between the actual consideration paid and the stamp duty value falls below the 10% tolerance band; accordingly, the anti-avoidance deeming provision under Section 56(2)(x) does not apply in these circumstances.

Conclusion: The amendment increasing the tolerance band to 10% is to be treated as curative and retrospective; since the difference is less than 10% of the consideration, the addition under Section 56(2)(x) is not sustainable and is deleted. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.