Issues: (i) Whether reassessment proceedings under the Income-tax Act could be sustained when the foundation for reopening, namely the GST cancellation, had already been set aside by the appellate authority and the appellate order was not considered by the assessing authority.

Analysis: The reopening was founded on allegations arising from GST proceedings concerning ineligible input tax credit and cancellation of registration. The GST appellate authority had subsequently restored the registration and specifically found that there was no fraudulent ITC claim or violation under the relevant GST provisions. That appellate order was a material circumstance directly bearing on the alleged escapement of income. The reassessing authority proceeded under Section 148A and issued notice under Section 148 without dealing with that decisive material, and no other independent material was shown to justify the reopening.

Conclusion: The reopening was unsustainable, and the impugned order under Section 148A(3) and the notice under Section 148 were quashed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded because the reassessment proceedings were initiated on a basis that had already been negatived in GST appellate proceedings and the relevant appellate findings were ignored.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment cannot be founded solely on allegations that have been conclusively negated in prior appellate proceedings, and material exculpatory findings directly bearing on escapement of income must be considered before issuing notice for reopening.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice and consequential reassessment were valid when the Assessing Officer relied only on investigation information without independent enquiry and, after expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year, failed to record a live nexus showing failure by the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts.

Analysis: Reassessment under section 147 requires reason to believe based on tangible material having a rational nexus with escapement of income, and not on suspicion or a mechanical acceptance of third-party information. Where the original assessment was completed under section 143(3) and the notice was issued beyond four years, the first proviso to section 147 applies, placing a further burden on the Revenue to show a specific failure by the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of all material facts. The recorded reasons merely relied on the investigation report, did not independently verify the material, did not establish the nature of the receipt in question, and effectively sought to conduct a fishing and roving enquiry. The relevant transaction had already been disclosed in the original assessment proceedings, and no adverse inference had been drawn at that stage. In such circumstances, the statutory jurisdictional conditions for reopening were not satisfied.

Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid and was quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment cannot be sustained on borrowed information or for fishing enquiries; where reopening beyond four years follows an assessment under section 143(3), the Assessing Officer must record cogent material showing both escapement of income and the assessee's failure to fully and truly disclose material facts.

Issues: Whether, for the purpose of section 50C, the stamp duty valuation as on the date of registration of the sale deeds or the stamp duty valuation as on the date of the agreement to sell should be adopted where the entire sale consideration had already been received through banking channels on the date of the agreement.

Analysis: The assessee transferred the lands under an agreement to sell executed on 31.12.2007 and received the entire consideration through banking channels on that date, while the sale deeds were registered later in January and February 2008. On these facts, the relevant valuation date for section 50C was held to be the date of the agreement to sell, not the later registration date. The amendment to section 50C was treated as curative in nature, and the valuation on the date of registration was held not to represent the full value of consideration for computation of capital gains in the assessee's hands.

Conclusion: The addition made by adopting the stamp valuation as on the registration date was deleted and the assessee succeeded on the section 50C issue.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the petitioner's application under Section 128A of the CGST Act, 2017 was sustainable when the summary assessment proceedings erroneously reflected the demand as penalty alone instead of tax, interest and penalty.

Analysis: The original assessment order disclosed components of tax, interest and penalty, and the error in the summary assessment proceedings could be identified from the record itself. A mistaken description in the summary proceedings could not be allowed to govern the consideration of the waiver application. The authority was required to examine the correctness of the demand and decide the application on its own merits under the Scheme.

Conclusion: The rejection of the waiver application was unsustainable. The matter was remanded to the first respondent for fresh consideration, and the demand was directed to be treated as tax, interest and penalty for the purpose of the Scheme.

Issues: Whether, on the Assessing Officer's failure to pass an assessment order within the limitation period prescribed under Section 153 after remand by the Tribunal, the return of income for the relevant assessment year was required to be accepted as filed.

Analysis: The Tribunal had remanded only one issue for fresh adjudication, and the undisputed position was that no assessment order pursuant to the remand was passed within the extended limitation under Section 153(3) read with Section 153(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In such circumstances, the Court held that the inaction could not keep the assessment alive or permit a demand to be raised contrary to the statutory time limit. Reliance was placed on the principle that where a fresh assessment cannot be lawfully made after setting aside or remand, the return already furnished stands accepted and no further demand can be enforced. The Court also noted that the limitation failure did not revive any power to disturb the returned income.

Conclusion: The return of income had to be accepted as filed, and the writ petition was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessment is remanded or set aside and the Assessing Officer fails to complete the fresh assessment within the limitation period prescribed by law, the return of income is deemed accepted and no further demand can be raised on that basis.

Issues: Whether, after the expiry of the limitation period prescribed under Section 153(3) read with Section 153(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for passing a fresh assessment order pursuant to remand by the Tribunal, the returned income must be accepted as final.

Analysis: The assessment had been set aside in part by the Tribunal and the revenue did not pass a fresh assessment order within the extended limitation period. The Court held that where the Assessing Officer fails to complete the assessment within the statutory time limit after remand, the consequence is that the return filed by the assessee cannot be disturbed. Reliance was placed on the principle that failure to make a fresh assessment after the earlier assessment is set aside amounts to deemed acceptance of the return and no further demand can be raised. The Court also noted that the revenue could not avoid the statutory consequence of its own inaction.

Conclusion: The returned income for the assessment year in question was required to be accepted as such, and the writ petition was allowed.

Final Conclusion: The Court granted mandamus directing acceptance of the assessee's returned income because the statutory time limit for passing a fresh assessment order had expired without any such order being passed.

Ratio Decidendi: If a fresh assessment order is not passed within the limitation period prescribed after remand, the assessee's return is deemed accepted and the revenue cannot raise a further demand on the basis of the time-barred assessment proceedings.

Issues: Whether penalties under the Customs Act were leviable on the customs broker, its director, and employees when the export consignments were factory-sealed, the KYC documents were genuine, and there was no evidence that they had knowledge of the contraband goods.

Analysis: The consignments were exported through a valid customs broker on the basis of genuine KYC documents, including IEC, PAN, bank account, Aadhaar card, and self-sealing permission. The seals were found intact at the time of investigation. The record did not establish that the customs broker or its director had knowledge of the red sanders being concealed in the consignment. The proceedings initiated under the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 had also been dropped, which supported the absence of culpability. In these circumstances, the necessary foundation for penal action was not made out.

Conclusion: Penalties were not imposable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty on a customs broker under the Customs Act cannot be sustained in the absence of evidence of knowledge or involvement in the export of contraband, particularly where the consignments were factory-sealed and the documentary verification was genuine.

Issues: Whether penalties under the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable against the customs broker and connected appellants in the absence of evidence showing knowledge of contraband export and where the consignment was factory-sealed and the relevant broker proceedings had already been dropped.

Analysis: The consignment was exported in factory-sealed condition, the seals were found intact, and the exporter's KYC particulars and self-sealing permission were obtained and found genuine. On these facts, no material was brought on record to show that the customs broker, its director, or the connected employees had knowledge that red sanders logs were being exported as contraband goods. The earlier proceedings under the Customs Broker Regulations had also been dropped. In the absence of evidence establishing knowledge or culpability, the foundation for penalty was not made out.

Conclusion: The penalties under the Customs Act, 1962 were not imposable and were set aside in favour of the appellants.

Issues: Whether, for reassessment proceedings relating to Assessment Year 2016-17 initiated under the substituted reassessment regime, prior approval for the order under Section 148A(d) and consequential notice under Section 148 could validly be obtained from the Principal Commissioner, or whether approval from the higher authority specified for cases beyond three years from the end of the assessment year was mandatory.

Analysis: The substituted regime requires prior approval of the specified authority at the relevant stage, and the authority is linked to the elapsed time from the end of the assessment year. Where more than three years have elapsed, approval must be taken from the higher authority contemplated by Section 151(ii). The period of three years from the end of Assessment Year 2016-17 fell within the TOLA window, but the extension operated only up to 30.06.2021. The impugned order dated 30.07.2022 was passed after that period and approval was taken from the Principal Commissioner, who was not the authority prescribed under Section 151(ii).

Conclusion: The approval was invalid, the order under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under Section 148 were vitiated, and the proceedings were liable to be quashed.

Issues: Whether the petitioner's arrest and subsequent remand were illegal for alleged violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, and whether the grounds of arrest were unsupported by material collected during investigation.

Analysis: The arrest followed a search authorised under the GST law, repeated summons, recording of statements, and collection of material showing the petitioner's alleged role in an organised online gaming and tax evasion syndicate. The Court accepted the respondents' chronology that the search concluded in the early hours of 27.02.2026 and that the petitioner was arrested at 5:50 am the same day. The contention that arrest commenced earlier, from the time officials entered the premises, was rejected. On that basis, production before the Magistrate at 8:30 pm on 27.02.2026 was held to be within the 24-hour requirement. The Court also held that the grounds of arrest disclosed sufficient material connecting the petitioner with the alleged offences and that the case involved economic offences where investigative coercive steps could be justified on the facts placed before the Court.

Conclusion: The arrest and remand were not held illegal, and no violation of Article 22(2) was made out.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition failed, and the challenge to the arrest and remand was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: In a GST investigation involving economic offences, arrest is not invalid merely because officers were present at the premises earlier; the relevant point is the actual arrest, and production before the Magistrate within 24 hours from that arrest satisfies Article 22(2) if supported by recorded investigative material and lawful authorisation.

Issues: Whether the Appellate Tribunal's order directing partial pre-deposit of penalty under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 called for interference, and whether the pre-deposit condition required modification.

Analysis: The second proviso to Section 19 permits dispensation of penalty pre-deposit only in a particular case where undue hardship is shown, subject to conditions the Appellate Tribunal considers fit. The record showed that the Tribunal had already exercised that discretion and granted substantial relief by reducing the deposit requirement to 10% of the penalty. The challenge to the petitioners' prima facie case was not sufficient to dislodge the Tribunal's assessment, and the scope of interference under Article 227 remained narrow. At the same time, the Court found no infirmity in the Tribunal's exercise of discretion, but considered it appropriate in the interests of justice to further reduce the deposit requirement.

Conclusion: The Tribunal's order was sustained in principle, but the pre-deposit condition was modified from 10% to 5% of the penalty amount, with the balance to be secured by bank guarantee or surety to the satisfaction of the Appellate Tribunal.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to have its claim for GST budgetary support benefit considered in light of Notification No. 20/2007 and the clarification dated 22-02-2023, and whether, on verification, it should receive the same benefit as similarly situated units covered by the earlier coordinate Bench order.

Analysis: The petitioner's unit had commenced commercial production after modernization on 30-03-2017, which brought the claim within the temporal scope of the notification relied upon. The earlier coordinate Bench had already held, on the basis of the clarification dated 22-02-2023, that units who had paid tax dues under the earlier exemption arrangement through CENVAT credit, but had not yet reached the stage of cash payment, were to be treated as having availed the benefit of the exemption notification. In view of that precedent and the parties' consensus, the present claim required verification only to ascertain whether the petitioner was similarly situated.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not granted an unconditional direction for release of benefit, but was entitled to verification of its claim and, if found similarly situated, to the same benefits as those granted in the coordinate Bench decision.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction for verification and consequential extension of benefits upon satisfaction of the similarity test.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a later clarification and an earlier coordinate Bench ruling treat certain industrial units as having availed exemption benefits, a similarly situated unit is entitled to verification and consequential extension of the same benefits.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to submit a detailed representation with supporting documents, and the respondent authority was directed to consider it in accordance with law within a reasonable time. No opinion on the merits was expressed.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant could appropriate the security deposit made in lieu of letter of credit after commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process towards pre-CIRP dues; (ii) Whether the deposit could be treated as a bank guarantee or letter of credit so as to permit set-off or enforcement notwithstanding the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant could appropriate the security deposit made in lieu of letter of credit after commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process towards pre-CIRP dues.

Analysis: The deposit of Rs. 108.44 crores remained the property of the corporate debtor till a lawful adjustment was made. Once the insolvency commencement date was reached, the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 barred unilateral appropriation of amounts towards dues that had arisen before commencement of the CIRP. The claimed amount had already been part of the insolvency claim process, and the unilateral post-commencement adjustment against pre-CIRP bills was contrary to the scheme of insolvency resolution and the pari passu treatment of claims.

Conclusion: The appropriation towards pre-CIRP dues was impermissible and was rightly disallowed.

Issue (ii): Whether the deposit could be treated as a bank guarantee or letter of credit so as to permit set-off or enforcement notwithstanding the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The record showed a security deposit made in lieu of a letter of credit, not an independent bank guarantee or a security interest created in favour of the appellant. The authorities on bank guarantees and letters of credit did not assist the appellant because no such enforceable instrument existed in the present form, and even an equivalent enforcement after commencement of CIRP would conflict with the moratorium when directed against the corporate debtor for pre-CIRP liabilities. The appellant's plea of set-off also failed because there were no mutual cross-claims of the kind that justify set-off in insolvency, and the adjustment sought was inconsistent with the statutory scheme.

Conclusion: The deposit could not be treated as an enforceable bank guarantee or letter of credit permitting set-off against pre-CIRP dues.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were affirmed, and the appeal failed on the ground that the unilateral adjustment of the security deposit against pre-CIRP dues was inconsistent with the insolvency moratorium and the resolution process.

Ratio Decidendi: A security deposit retained by the corporate debtor cannot be unilaterally appropriated after commencement of CIRP towards pre-CIRP dues, and neither a claimed set-off nor an attempted enforcement of a non-equivalent security arrangement can override the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues: Whether the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be compounded after conviction on the basis of a post-conviction compromise and payment of the entire compensation amount.

Analysis: The petitioner was convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the conviction had already been affirmed in appeal and revision. The parties subsequently entered into a compromise, and the respondent acknowledged receipt of the entire compensation amount. The Court relied on the statutory power of compounding under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the settled principle that such compounding can be permitted even after conviction, as recognised in binding precedent. In view of the compromise and full satisfaction of the awarded amount, no impediment remained to grant relief.

Conclusion: The offence was held compoundable after conviction, and the petitioner was entitled to be acquitted on the basis of the compromise.

Issues: Whether pre-CIRP income tax and TDS demands could survive and be enforced after approval of the Resolution Plan under the insolvency process.

Analysis: The Resolution Plan had been approved by the Adjudicating Authority under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and the Court treated the legal position as settled that claims not forming part of the approved plan stand extinguished. On that basis, the Revenue could not continue to enforce demands relating to the period prior to approval of the Resolution Plan, whether appearing on the Income Tax Portal or the TDS portal. The Court also directed consequential recomputation of liability and refund after giving effect to the NCLT orders.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the assessee. The pre-Resolution Plan demands were held not to survive and the Revenue was directed to extinguish them and grant consequential relief.

Issues: Whether the declared transaction value of the imported goods could be discarded and the assessable value enhanced merely on the basis of NIDB data without complying with the valuation procedure under the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007.

Analysis: The declared invoice value is the starting point under Section 14(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. A departure from that value requires the proper officer to have a reasonable doubt about the truth or accuracy of the declared value and to follow the procedure under Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007 before moving sequentially to Rules 4 to 9. Mere reliance on higher values reflected in NIDB data does not by itself establish such reasonable doubt. The record did not show any independent inquiry or material indicating under-valuation, nor was the transaction value rejected in the manner required by the valuation rules.

Conclusion: The enhancement of value was unsustainable and the appeal was allowed.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant was entitled to refund of service tax paid on construction services provided to Military Engineering Services for non-commercial governmental buildings under the retrospective exemption framework. (ii) Whether the refund claim was barred by unjust enrichment and whether the matter required reconsideration with the service recipient impleaded as co-applicant.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant was entitled to refund of service tax paid on construction services provided to Military Engineering Services for non-commercial governmental buildings under the retrospective exemption framework.

Analysis: The construction services were rendered to a department of the Ministry of Defence for infrastructure and civil structures not used for commerce, industry, or any business or profession. The exemption earlier available under Notification No. 25/2012-ST was withdrawn for a period and later reintroduced by Notification No. 09/2016-ST, while Section 102 of the Finance Act, 1994 created a retrospective exemption and refund mechanism for the interregnum. The Court treated the claim as covered by the exemption and the retrospective refund provision.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to refund on merits, subject to the refund being examined in accordance with the remand directions.

Issue (ii): Whether the refund claim was barred by unjust enrichment and whether the matter required reconsideration with the service recipient impleaded as co-applicant.

Analysis: The Court followed earlier decisions holding that, in such cases, the burden of tax was borne in the governmental chain of reimbursement and the recipient department could be the proper claimant. It also relied on the statutory scheme of Section 102 and the refund provisions under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 to hold that the claim should be reconsidered with the service recipient participating in the refund process. The order of rejection on unjust enrichment was not sustained.

Conclusion: The objection of unjust enrichment did not defeat the claim, but the refund was to be re-examined after impleading MES as co-applicant.

Final Conclusion: The impugned rejection was set aside and the matter was sent back for fresh decision on the refund claim in the light of the retrospective exemption and the participation of the service recipient.

Ratio Decidendi: Where construction services are rendered to a governmental department for non-commercial use, retrospective exemption and refund provisions apply, and the refund claim cannot be rejected on unjust enrichment alone when the tax burden is shown to have been borne within the governmental recipient chain.

Issues: Whether a contractual clause empowering the administration to treat its decision as final and barring court or arbitral challenge could exclude adjudication where the manning agent disputed liability, and whether the dispute was an excepted matter outside the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction.

Analysis: Clause 3.20 could not be read to permit one contracting party to conclusively decide whether the other had committed wilful omission, neglect, or negligence when liability itself was in dispute. Such an interpretation would offend the rule of law and the principle that no party can be a judge in its own cause. The clause had to be read harmoniously with the broad arbitration clause, and the restrictive language in Clause 3.20 could operate only in cases where liability was admitted and the administration merely quantified recovery. In a contested claim, the dispute fell within the arbitration clause and was not an excepted matter. A construction that shut out both court and arbitral remedy would also create an impermissible vacuum in legal remedies.

Conclusion: The dispute was arbitrable, the administration could not finally determine disputed liability, and the award was not without jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: A contractual term cannot make one party the final judge of disputed breach or liability, and where liability is contested a broadly worded arbitration clause will prevail so that the dispute remains subject to independent adjudication.

Issues: (i) whether a show cause notice under Section 74 of the Nagaland Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was valid without allegations of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts to evade tax; (ii) whether the impugned adjudication orders were sustainable when no opportunity of hearing was granted and the orders did not set out the relevant facts and basis of decision.

Issue (i): whether a show cause notice under Section 74 of the Nagaland Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was valid without allegations of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 74 can be invoked only where non-payment, short payment, erroneous refund, or wrongful availment or utilisation of input tax credit is attributable to fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts to evade tax. The notices issued to the petitioners merely referred to the remaining tax and interest liability and did not disclose the foundational ingredients required for invoking Section 74. In the absence of those jurisdictional assertions, the notices failed to satisfy the statutory threshold.

Conclusion: The show cause notices under Section 74 were invalid and could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): whether the impugned adjudication orders were sustainable when no opportunity of hearing was granted and the orders did not set out the relevant facts and basis of decision.

Analysis: Section 75 requires observance of the right of hearing when an adverse decision is contemplated and further mandates that the proper officer state the relevant facts and the basis of the decision in the order. The impugned orders were passed without affording a hearing and without recording the facts and reasons supporting the demand. The procedural safeguards under Section 75 were therefore not complied with.

Conclusion: The impugned adjudication orders were unsustainable and liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded, the notices and consequential orders were set aside, and the respondents were left at liberty to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Proceedings under Section 74 of the Nagaland Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are jurisdictionally valid only when the notice expressly discloses fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts to evade tax, and any adverse tax order must comply with the hearing requirement and reasoned-order mandate under Section 75.