Issues: (i) Whether the demand under Rule 6 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 could be sustained by applying the percentage reversal mechanism where the assessee had availed only proportionate credit and capital goods credit; (ii) whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked in the absence of suppression or wilful misstatement.

Issue (i): Whether the demand under Rule 6 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 could be sustained by applying the percentage reversal mechanism where the assessee had availed only proportionate credit and capital goods credit.

Analysis: The credit taken on capital goods formed the major part of the disputed amount. Rule 6(4) permits capital goods credit unless such goods are used exclusively for exempted services, and therefore common use does not by itself justify denial of credit. The remaining credit was shown to be only proportionate credit relatable to taxable output services, which is permissible under Rule 6(3)(ii) and the procedure under Rule 6(3A). The percentage-based demand on the entire exempted turnover was therefore inconsistent with the statutory scheme.

Conclusion: The demand on merits was unsustainable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked in the absence of suppression or wilful misstatement.

Analysis: The assessee was registered, filing ST-3 returns, and the relevant credit pattern was reflected in the records. The controversy arose from interpretation of the applicable Rule 6 framework rather than from any concealment of material facts. Since the Department did not establish any positive act of suppression with intent to evade tax, invocation of the extended period was not justified.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demand and penalty could not survive either on merits or on limitation, and the appeal succeeded with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee has taken only proportionate Cenvat credit and the capital goods credit is not hit by the exclusivity bar under Rule 6(4), a blanket percentage demand on exempted turnover is impermissible; in the absence of suppression or wilful misstatement, the extended period cannot be invoked.

Issues: Whether the Revenue could recover dues of the company from the personal bank account of its director under the post-GST recovery provisions, and whether the lien could be continued beyond the director's own penalty liability.

Analysis: The recovery machinery under Section 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 authorises recovery from money owing to the person against whom the liability exists and permits a garnishee type recovery from third parties, but it does not create a personal liability against a director for the company's tax dues. Section 174(2)(e) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 preserves recovery of crystallised liabilities under the repealed regime, but only to the extent such liability legally exists. The director's liability in the present case was confined to the penalty imposed under Section 78A of the Finance Act, 1994, and that amount had already been paid. In these circumstances, continued attachment of the director's personal account for the company's remaining dues was beyond the permissible scope of recovery.

Conclusion: The recovery notice and the balance lien against the petitioner's personal bank account were unsustainable, and the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner could be proceeded against only for his own admitted penalty liability, which having been discharged, no further recovery from his personal assets for the company's dues could be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A director's personal bank account cannot be attached for recovery of company dues unless a specific personal liability is established by law; recovery provisions preserving old liabilities do not enlarge that liability beyond what is legally crystallised.

Issues: (i) Whether interest income earned from investments with co-operative banks was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (ii) Whether hoarding charges received for permitting display of hoardings on the society's wall were assessable under the head "Income from House Property" with deduction under section 24(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether interest income earned from investments with co-operative banks was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Deduction under section 80P(2)(d) applies to interest or dividend income received by a co-operative society from another co-operative society. The issue was governed by the settled legal position that a co-operative bank is a co-operative society for the purpose of section 80P(2)(d), and the restriction in section 80P(4) does not deny the benefit where the recipient income is otherwise covered by section 80P(2)(d). The income in question was only from co-operative banks, and the contrary view taken by the revenue authorities was not applicable on the facts.

Conclusion: The deduction under section 80P(2)(d) was allowable and the addition was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether hoarding charges received for permitting display of hoardings on the society's wall were assessable under the head "Income from House Property" with deduction under section 24(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The receipts were held to arise from letting of the property rights associated with the wall/structure and not as income from other sources. Following the binding coordinate-bench view in the assessee's own case, such receipts were assessable as income from house property, and the assessee was entitled to the statutory deduction under section 24(a).

Conclusion: The hoarding charges were assessable as income from house property and consequential deduction under section 24(a) was allowable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both additions were deleted and the assessee's appeals succeeded in full.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a co-operative society earns interest from another co-operative society, the benefit of section 80P(2)(d) is available notwithstanding section 80P(4); and receipts from permitting hoardings on the property are taxable as income from house property when they arise from exploitation of the property itself.

Issues: Whether the petitioner should be relegated to the appellate remedy against the order-in-original and the rejection of benefit under Section 128A, and whether coercive action pursuant to the garnishee notice should be kept in abeyance for the period granted to file the appeal.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to approach the appellate authority within two weeks with a delay condonation application and statutory pre-deposit, and no coercive steps were to be taken for that period.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the GST assessment order should be entertained in the face of the statutory appellate remedy, and whether the petitioner should be permitted to pursue the appeal subject to pre-deposit.

Analysis: The impugned order related to confirmation of tax, interest, and penalty under the GST law. The petition was filed after expiry of the statutory period for appeal, and the order records that the petitioner had not availed the statutory reliefs available under section 74 of the GST enactment. In these circumstances, the petition was not examined on merits in writ jurisdiction. Instead, liberty was granted to approach the appellate authority with a pre-deposit of 25% of the disputed tax amount, and any amount already recovered was directed to be adjusted towards the pre-deposit. Consequential directions were also issued regarding consideration of the appeal on merits and lifting of bank attachment upon compliance.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained on merits, but the petitioner was given liberty to file a statutory appeal subject to pre-deposit and compliance with the stated conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an effective statutory appellate remedy exists and the writ petition is filed beyond the appeal period, the Court may decline merits adjudication and direct the petitioner to pursue the appellate remedy subject to pre-deposit and other compliance conditions.

Issues: Whether the impugned order deserved to be quashed and the matter remitted to the authority for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The writ petition was disposed of in terms of the earlier order relied upon by the Court. The impugned order was quashed as against the petitioner, and the petitioner was relegated to submit a reply to the show-cause notice. The authority was directed to consider the reply and pass orders in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside insofar as the petitioner was concerned, and the matter was remanded to the authority for consideration of the petitioner's reply and for fresh orders in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail in a prosecution alleging fraudulent generation and use of fake input tax credit and bogus invoices under the CGST Act, 2017.

Analysis: The allegations related to documentary material, no custodial remand had been taken, the applicant had no criminal antecedents, the maximum punishment was up to five years, and the co-accused had already been granted bail. The Court also noted that the applicant had been in custody since 18.02.2026 and had undertaken to cooperate in the proceedings.

Conclusion: The applicant was found fit to be enlarged on bail, and bail was granted on parity and other attending circumstances.

Issues: (i) whether the time limits in section 129(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for issuing notice and passing the penalty order are mandatory or directory; (ii) whether, on the facts, the detention and penalty proceedings warranted interference and release of goods and vehicle against security.

Issue (i): whether the time limits in section 129(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for issuing notice and passing the penalty order are mandatory or directory.

Analysis: The statutory text was read in the light of settled principles that the use of the word "shall" is not conclusive. The decisive factors were the object of the amendment, the absence of any express consequence for breach, and the procedural nature of the prescription. The provision was held to be intended to secure expedition and discipline in detention proceedings, not to create an inflexible jurisdictional bar. Non-compliance may invite administrative or judicial scrutiny, but it does not by itself render the proceedings time barred.

Conclusion: The time limits in section 129(3) are directory and not mandatory.

Issue (ii): whether, on the facts, the detention and penalty proceedings warranted interference and release of goods and vehicle against security.

Analysis: The notice was issued within seven days of interception, and the order was passed on the eighth day after notice. That was treated as substantial compliance with the directory timeline. On the merits, the goods were traceable to a registered dealer and the petitioner was held entitled to release of the goods and vehicle against deposit of an amount equal to the penalty under protest, leaving other statutory remedies open.

Conclusion: Interference with the proceedings on limitation was declined, but relief for release of the goods and vehicle against security was granted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The proceedings under section 129 were not invalidated for breach of the seven-day timeline, yet the petitioner obtained conditional release of the goods and vehicle, so the writ petition was allowed only in part.

Ratio Decidendi: A procedural time-limit in a fiscal detention provision, where no consequence of non-compliance is expressly provided, is ordinarily directory and breach of that timeline does not automatically nullify the proceedings.

Issues: Whether rejection of registration under section 12A(1)(ac)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was justified on the ground that the assessee had not established genuineness of activities and the charitable nature of its objects.

Analysis: At the stage of registration, the enquiry is confined to a prima facie examination of the objects of the trust and the genuineness of its activities. The assessee's objects were not doubted. The denial of registration rested mainly on alleged insufficiency of evidence, certain bank transactions, and non-filing of return, but there was no cogent material to show that the activities were ingenuine or non-charitable. The record showed organisation of a medical conference and workshops, supported by photographs, invoices, and activity details. Such educational and awareness-oriented activities fall within the ambit of charity, and the mere presence of surplus or expenditure on venue and related services does not by itself establish a profit motive or warrant denial of registration. Procedural lapses and bank transactions are matters for assessment and do not conclude the registration enquiry.

Conclusion: The rejection of registration was not justified and the assessee was entitled to registration.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and registration under section 12A was directed to be granted from the specified effective date, resulting in success for the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For registration under section 12A, the authority must confine itself to a prima facie assessment of the charitable objects and genuineness of activities, and registration cannot be refused merely on procedural deficiencies or accounting transactions absent material showing that the activities are non-genuine or non-charitable.

Issues: (i) Whether the cash deposits of Rs. 63,00,000 made during the demonetisation period could be treated as unexplained income; (ii) Whether the disallowance of Rs. 14,96,530 under section 40A(3) required deletion or fresh verification.

Issue (i): Whether the cash deposits of Rs. 63,00,000 made during the demonetisation period could be treated as unexplained income.

Analysis: The assessee maintained that cash sales were a regular feature of its jewellery business and produced month-wise cash sales figures for the current year and the preceding year. The cash sales in the relevant year were substantially lower than those in the preceding year, and the higher sales in October were consistent with the festive season pattern in the business. No independent evidence was brought to discredit the cash sales or to show that the deposits were unsupported by business receipts.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 63,00,000 was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the disallowance of Rs. 14,96,530 under section 40A(3) required deletion or fresh verification.

Analysis: The cash vouchers reflected clubbed entries for payments made to different persons on the same day, and the individual payments under each voucher were below the statutory limit. At the same time, the vouchers did not contain complete particulars of the recipients or the nature of expenditure, and the authenticity of the expenses had also been doubted. Fresh verification was therefore necessary on genuineness and supporting evidence.

Conclusion: The matter was set aside to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination and the issue was allowed for statistical purposes.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on the cash-deposit addition and was restored for verification on the cash-expense disallowance, resulting in a partly favourable outcome for the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where cash deposits are supported by regular business cash sales and no contrary evidence discredits the sales, the deposits cannot be treated as unexplained; and where cash payments are made to multiple persons under a common voucher, the applicability of section 40A(3) depends on the individual payments and the genuineness of the underlying expenditure.

Issues: Whether the order-in-appeal was liable to be set aside for want of proper notice of hearing and whether the appeal should be remitted for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The record disclosed repeated hearing dates, but it could not be ascertained with certainty that the intimations had actually been served on the assessee. In view of this uncertainty, the dispute whether notice was in fact served was not gone into in depth. The appellate order had proceeded on the assumption that hearing opportunities were served, yet the uncertainty surrounding service meant that the assessee may have been deprived of an effective opportunity to present its case. In such circumstances, adherence to the principles of natural justice required that the matter be reopened and heard afresh by the appellate authority.

Conclusion: The order-in-appeal was set aside and the appeal was restored to the file of the appellate authority for fresh adjudication after affording due opportunity of hearing.

Final Conclusion: The assessee obtained a remand on the ground of denial of effective hearing, and the appellate authority was directed to decide the appeal afresh by a reasoned order within the stipulated time.

Ratio Decidendi: Where service of hearing notice is uncertain and effective opportunity of hearing is not established, an appellate order decided ex parte cannot be sustained and the matter must be remanded for fresh decision after hearing the assessee.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to concessional tax treatment in the absence of timely production of original C and F Forms, and whether the rejection of the claim for want of such forms was sustainable.

Analysis: The relevant assessment years were 2015-16, 2016-17 and 2017-18. Rule 12(1) of the CST Rules required C and F Forms to be furnished within three months. The forms were not produced before the adjudicating authority, the first appellate authority, the Tribunal, or the Court, and remained absent from the record. The governing principle is that production of the original forms is mandatory and not a mere technicality. Strict compliance is required for claiming concessional treatment under the CST regime.

Conclusion: The rejection of the assessee's claim for want of C and F Forms was upheld, and the issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The revision petition failed because the statutory condition for concessional treatment was not satisfied on the record.

Ratio Decidendi: A dealer cannot claim concessional tax treatment under the CST framework without strict compliance with the requirement to furnish the original statutory forms within the prescribed time.

Issues: Whether the appeal dismissed by the first appellate authority as time barred required condonation of delay where the levy of late fee under section 234E was itself under challenge, and whether the matter should be restored for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The appeal was dismissed ex parte only on the ground of delay without examination of the jurisdictional challenge to the levy of late fee. The Tribunal followed the view that where the validity of the levy itself is questioned, delay in pursuing the appeal should not defeat consideration on merits. It accepted that the objection to levy under section 234E, in the context of processing under section 200A, warranted condonation of delay and fresh adjudication by the first appellate authority. The Tribunal therefore declined to enter into the merits of the fee demand and directed reconsideration after granting opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The delay was to be condoned, the ex parte dismissal was set aside, and the matter was restored to the first appellate authority for de novo decision. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: When the levy itself is assailed on jurisdictional grounds, dismissal of the appeal solely for delay is unjustified and the appellate authority should condone the delay and decide the matter on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the composition of the Adjudicating Authority under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 was invalid because the impugned order was passed by a single-member Bench; (ii) Whether the order retaining seized materials and confirming the provisional attachment was barred by limitation under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002; (iii) Whether the impugned orders were supported by material showing that the attached properties were proceeds of crime.

Issue (i): Whether the composition of the Adjudicating Authority under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 was invalid because the impugned order was passed by a single-member Bench?

Analysis: Section 6(2) contemplates the constitution of the Adjudicating Authority with a Chairperson and Members, but Section 6(5)(b) empowers the Chairperson to constitute Benches with one or two Members. Read together, the scheme permits adjudication by a single-member Bench and does not make a multi-member Bench mandatory in every case. The challenge based on coram non judice therefore fails, particularly when no lack of jurisdiction, qualification, or prejudice is demonstrated.

Conclusion: The composition of the Adjudicating Authority was valid and the challenge on this ground was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the order retaining seized materials and confirming the provisional attachment was barred by limitation under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002?

Analysis: The period of limitation had to be computed by excluding the COVID-19 suspension of limitation granted by the Supreme Court. The adjudicating authority had recorded reasons for computation after exclusion of the affected period, and the petitioners did not show any demonstrable error or prejudice. A mere procedural irregularity in computation, without miscarriage of justice, does not invalidate the order.

Conclusion: The limitation challenge failed and the orders were not liable to be set aside on that ground.

Issue (iii): Whether the impugned orders were supported by material showing that the attached properties were proceeds of crime?

Analysis: At the stage of provisional attachment and its confirmation, the authority is required to reach only a prima facie satisfaction on the basis of material on record. The circumstances noted in the order, including the smuggling-linked background, the movement of property into the petitioners' names, the call detail records, and the failure to establish a credible source of funds, were treated as sufficient to indicate a link with proceeds of crime. The petitioners also failed to satisfactorily explain the source of the funds, justifying adverse inference and confirmation of the attachment.

Conclusion: The findings were supported by material and the attached properties were treated as prima facie proceeds of crime.

Final Conclusion: All three writ petitions were rejected, and the impugned orders retaining the seized materials and confirming the provisional attachment were upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 6(5)(b) permits adjudication by a single-member Bench, limitation under the Act must account for the COVID-related exclusion period, and at the attachment stage a prima facie link between the property and proceeds of crime is sufficient to sustain confirmation.

Issues: Whether interest income earned on bank deposits by a co-operative credit society is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The dispute turned on whether the interest earned from temporary deposits of surplus business funds retained for safe custody retained the character of income attributable to the business of providing credit facilities to members. The reasoning accepted that Section 80P is a beneficial provision intended to promote co-operative societies and that the expression "attributable to" is wider than "derived from". It also distinguished interest earned from surplus funds parked temporarily from income arising from an activity wholly alien to the assessee's credit business, and declined to treat the deposit of such funds with a bank as destroying the business character of the receipts. The contrary view based on investment with a non-co-operative bank was rejected on the facts of the case.

Conclusion: The interest income from the bank deposits was held eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether, in the absence of rejection of the books of account or recorded defects therein, a reference to the District Valuation Officer under Section 142A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be made and the valuation report relied upon for addition under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 142A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits a reference to the Valuation Officer only for the purpose of making an assessment or reassessment where estimation of the value of an investment under Sections 69 or 69B, or bullion, jewellery or other valuable article under Sections 69A or 69B, is required. The reference must be based on some material showing that the assessee's declared estimate is not reliable, and it cannot be used as a device for gathering information to reopen concluded assessments. In the present case, the books of account were neither rejected nor found defective, and no specific defects were established in the materials, labour charges or supporting records. In such circumstances, the valuation report by itself could not justify the addition, and the settled principle is that where the books are accepted, the DVO's report cannot be the sole basis for an addition.

Conclusion: The reference to the Valuation Officer was not justified, the addition based solely on the valuation report was unsustainable, and the issue is answered in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue failed to establish any ground for interference, and the appellate order deleting the addition was affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: A reference under Section 142A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is valid only when made for assessment or reassessment on the basis of material indicating unreliability of the declared investment, and where the books of account are neither rejected nor shown defective, a valuation report cannot, by itself, sustain an addition under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether the restriction of royalty on export sales to 1% instead of the 2.51% paid to the associated enterprise was justified under transfer pricing principles; (ii) Whether the assessee's acceptance of the 1% royalty rate in subsequent assessment years could be relied upon to sustain the restriction for the assessment year in question.

Issue (i): Whether the restriction of royalty on export sales to 1% instead of the 2.51% paid to the associated enterprise was justified under transfer pricing principles.

Analysis: The transfer pricing provisions constitute a self-contained code for determining arm's length price of international transactions, and the exercise must be undertaken on the facts of each case. Regulatory approvals by the RBI or the Government of India do not establish arm's length price for income-tax purposes, as they serve different statutory objectives and only indicate permissible ceilings. Comparative material relied on by the assessee was found insufficient for comparability, since arm's length determination depends on functional analysis, benefits derived, and surrounding commercial circumstances. The authorities below had examined the material and concluded that 1% represented the arm's length price, and no perversity or legal infirmity in that finding was shown.

Conclusion: The restriction of royalty to 1% was upheld and the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee's acceptance of the 1% royalty rate in subsequent assessment years could be relied upon to sustain the restriction for the assessment year in question.

Analysis: Each assessment year must ordinarily be examined independently, but the reference to subsequent acceptance was treated as only a corroborative circumstance and not the sole basis of the decision. The conduct in later years was considered relevant to the commercial necessity of the higher royalty claim, and the explanation that the lower rate was accepted merely to reduce litigation was not accepted as convincing. This factor reinforced, rather than supplanted, the transfer pricing finding already reached on the merits.

Conclusion: The subsequent-year acceptance was held to support the restriction and the issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose, the transfer pricing determination was sustained, and the appeals were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Arm's length price in an international transaction must be determined independently on the facts of the particular year under the transfer pricing framework, and regulatory approvals or later-year acceptance do not by themselves establish or displace that determination.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition seeking refund and interest was maintainable without impleading the entity that had actually made the deposit and without first invoking the statutory refund mechanism under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962. (ii) Whether the writ petition was premature in view of the available statutory remedy and the pending time for availing appellate relief against the tribunal order.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition seeking refund and interest was maintainable without impleading the entity that had actually made the deposit and without first invoking the statutory refund mechanism under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The amounts in question were deposited through MMTC Ltd., which had not been impleaded in the writ proceedings, even though it was the entity shown to have made the payment. The tribunal had only indicated that the person who paid the duty or the person who bore the incidence of duty could seek refund by filing an appropriate application under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962 before the competent authority. No material was placed to show that such statutory procedure had been followed.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable for want of a necessary party and for non-compliance with the statutory refund procedure; the claim was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition was premature in view of the available statutory remedy and the pending time for availing appellate relief against the tribunal order.

Analysis: The tribunal order was recent, and the statute provided an appellate remedy within the prescribed period. Instead of pursuing the statutory course, the petitioners invoked writ jurisdiction directly. In these circumstances, the Court treated the writ remedy as having been invoked prematurely.

Conclusion: The writ petition was premature and liable to be dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The Court declined to grant refund-related relief in writ jurisdiction and left the petitioners to pursue the statutory remedy in the manner known to law.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ petition for refund and interest will not be entertained where the claimed deposit was made through another entity that is not before the Court and the statutory refund mechanism has not been invoked under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: (i) whether the alleged excess interim payments made to certain secured creditors could be treated as recoverable with interest without prior notice and determination; (ii) whether the amount to be kept aside for belated or pending claims should be the full claimed amount or only the proportionate share payable on the same basis as other secured creditors.

Issue (i): whether the alleged excess interim payments made to certain secured creditors could be treated as recoverable with interest without prior notice and determination

Analysis: The amount said to be in excess had not been determined after issuing notice to the affected creditors. The available material did not establish, on the record, the exact extent of excess payment or the basis on which interest could be imposed. Recovery could not be ordered merely at the stage of proposing a further interim dividend, particularly when the entitlement dispute required notice and opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The alleged excess amount and interest were not directed to be recovered forthwith, and any such liability was left to be determined by the Official Liquidator after notice to the concerned creditors.

Issue (ii): whether the amount to be kept aside for belated or pending claims should be the full claimed amount or only the proportionate share payable on the same basis as other secured creditors

Analysis: Keeping aside the entire claimed amount for creditors who had not yet regularised their claims was found to be unjust when other secured creditors were receiving only proportionate payments. The reserve for such pending claims had to be aligned with the same ratio applied to the admitted secured creditors, so that distribution remained equitable among all claimants in liquidation.

Conclusion: Only the proportionate amount was required to be set apart for belated or pending claims, and the third interim dividend was to be recomputed on that basis and disbursed uniformly to eligible secured creditors.

Final Conclusion: The applications were disposed of with directions for recomputation of the dividend, proportionate reservation for pending claims, and interim disbursement to secured creditors on an equal basis, while recovery of any alleged excess payment was deferred to determination after notice.

Ratio Decidendi: In liquidation distribution, alleged excess interim payments cannot be recovered with interest without prior notice and determination, and amounts reserved for pending claims must be kept only in the same proportion as the dividend payable to admitted creditors.

Issues: Entitlement to interest on the delayed refund of the amount collected from the assessee and entitlement to further interest on the unpaid interest amount.

Analysis: The amount had been collected from the assessee without authority and remained with the Revenue for several years before refund. Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 mandates interest on delayed refunds after expiry of the statutory period. The principle applied is that wrongful withholding of money by the Revenue requires compensation, and the absence of an express provision does not defeat relief where the assessee's money has been retained without legal justification. At the same time, further interest cannot be claimed for the period during which the matter remained pending before the Court, since the Revenue cannot be penalized for delay not attributable to it.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to interest on the delayed refund and to further interest on the unpaid interest amount up to the date of filing before the Court, but not beyond that date.

Ratio Decidendi: Where money is wrongfully retained by the Revenue, interest on delayed refund is payable under the statutory refund provision, and compensation may also extend to unpaid interest, but not for periods attributable to pendency before the Court.