Issues: Whether the default for Section 7 purposes was confined to the interest demand of Rs. 29,72,29,959/- or whether the entire debenture amount could be treated as in default; whether debt and default were proved; whether subsequent payment during pendency cured the default; whether project-wise insolvency is permissible in a real estate matter; whether the debenture trust deed and securities were project-specific; and whether CIRP had to be confined to the particular project.

Issue: Whether the default for Section 7 purposes was confined to the interest demand of Rs. 29,72,29,959/- or whether the entire debenture amount could be treated as in default

Analysis: The debenture trust deed extended the principal redemption date to 30.06.2024, so the principal amount was not due when the Section 7 application was filed. The default notice of 29.12.2023 demanded only overdue quarterly interest of Rs. 29,72,29,959/- and granted a cure period. The claim in Part IV of the Section 7 application wrongly included the principal amount of Rs. 146 crore, which had not yet become payable and had not been recalled by any subsequent notice.

Conclusion: The default could be treated only as the unpaid interest of Rs. 29,72,29,959/- and not the entire debenture amount; the larger claim was incorrect.

Issue: Whether debt and default were proved and whether subsequent payment during pendency cured the default

Analysis: The record showed repeated non-payment of quarterly coupon interest from 15.03.2022 onward, the demand notice of 29.12.2023, and authentication of the default amount through the information utility certificate. The payments made during pendency did not wipe out the established default and were insufficient to negate the insolvency trigger already in existence on the date of filing.

Conclusion: Debt and default were proved, and the subsequent payment did not cure the default.

Issue: Whether project-wise insolvency is permissible in a real estate matter

Analysis: The binding legal position recognises that real estate insolvency should ordinarily proceed on a project-specific basis to protect solvent projects and stakeholders of other projects. The statutory framework under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and the CIRP Regulations permits project-wise resolution through the resolution process, and does not justify clubbing unrelated projects at the admission stage.

Conclusion: Project-wise insolvency, in the sense of confining CIRP to the concerned project in appropriate real estate cases, is permissible in law.

Issue: Whether the debenture trust deed and securities were project-specific

Analysis: The debenture trust deed identified a specific parcel of land, the project, escrow mechanisms, mortgage, hypothecation, and project monitoring rights. The debenture security, covenants, and no-objection requirements showed that the funds and security package were tied to the identified real estate project and its receivables, later registered as the project in question.

Conclusion: The debenture financing and securities were project-specific.

Issue: Whether CIRP had to be confined to the particular project

Analysis: Since the financing and security related to the identified project, and since project-wise resolution is the governing approach for real estate insolvency, the CIRP could not be allowed to engulf the corporate debtor's unrelated projects. The admission order therefore required modification to limit the insolvency process to the concerned project alone while preserving the insolvency commencement date.

Conclusion: CIRP was required to be confined to the concerned project and not extended to other projects.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded to the extent that the insolvency process was restricted to the identified real estate project, while the admission of CIRP on proof of debt and default was otherwise sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: In a real estate financing arrangement where the debt, security and contractual rights are project-specific, CIRP may be confined to that project and should not extend to unrelated projects of the same corporate debtor; a Section 7 claim must also reflect only the debt that had actually become due and payable on the filing date.

Issues: (i) Whether the application filed by the Resolution Professional seeking eviction of the Appellant from the Corporate Debtor's premises was maintainable and within the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority; (ii) Whether the Appellant proved any tenancy, leasehold right, or licence in respect of the premises; (iii) Whether the interim order of the City Civil Court precluded the Adjudicating Authority from passing the impugned eviction order.

Issue (i): Whether the application filed by the Resolution Professional seeking eviction of the Appellant from the Corporate Debtor's premises was maintainable and within the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority.

Analysis: The Resolution Professional is duty-bound to take control, custody, preserve, and protect the assets of the corporate debtor. Where the premises admittedly belong to the corporate debtor and are in the occupation of a third party claimed to be unlawful, the application for recovery of possession has a direct nexus with the insolvency process. The Adjudicating Authority's jurisdiction under the Code extends to such relief, and the need to avoid delay in the insolvency process supports adjudication before that forum rather than by a separate civil suit.

Conclusion: The application was maintainable and the Adjudicating Authority had jurisdiction to entertain it.

Issue (ii): Whether the Appellant proved any tenancy, leasehold right, or licence in respect of the premises.

Analysis: The only material relied upon was a letter permitting the Appellant to stock marble at the premises. There was no written lease, no proof of rent, no rent receipts, and no adequate pleading or evidence showing creation of an oral tenancy or any subsisting licence or leasehold right. The Appellant's own pleadings indicated permission to occupy only for business convenience, and the record did not establish any legally enforceable interest in the immovable property.

Conclusion: No tenancy, leasehold right, or licence was proved, and the Appellant was in unauthorised occupation.

Issue (iii): Whether the interim order of the City Civil Court precluded the Adjudicating Authority from passing the impugned eviction order.

Analysis: The interim order protected possession only until the next date and expressly preserved eviction in accordance with due process of law. Proceedings concerning possession of the corporate debtor's asset fell within the Adjudicating Authority's domain under the Code, and the civil court could not bar such adjudication. The interim order therefore did not obstruct the impugned directions.

Conclusion: The City Civil Court's interim order did not bar the Adjudicating Authority from passing the eviction order.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed on all substantive grounds, and the direction to vacate the premises was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where premises owned by the corporate debtor are in unauthorised occupation, the Resolution Professional may seek recovery of possession before the Adjudicating Authority as part of the duty to preserve and protect the corporate debtor's assets, and a civil court's interim protection does not override that jurisdiction when relief is sought in accordance with due process of law.

Issues: Whether a Section 95 application filed by a financial creditor during the subsistence of an interim moratorium triggered by an earlier Section 95 application remained non-maintainable even after the earlier application was later withdrawn.

Analysis: Interim moratorium under Section 96 commences on the date of filing of an application under Section 95 and stays pending proceedings while prohibiting initiation of fresh proceedings by creditors in respect of the same debt. The earlier application filed by another creditor had already triggered interim moratorium when the subsequent Section 95 applications were filed. The later withdrawal of the earlier application ended the moratorium prospectively, but it did not cure the legal defect attaching to proceedings instituted during the currency of the moratorium. An application initiated in breach of the statutory bar was non est when filed and could not be validated retrospectively by the later withdrawal of the prior proceeding.

Conclusion: The subsequent Section 95 applications were not maintainable and the admission orders could not stand. The issue was decided in favour of the appellants.

Issues: (i) Whether the provisional attachment could be invalidated for want of a clear invocation of the statutory basis and by applying the rule against supplementation of reasons; (ii) Whether property allegedly acquired before the scheduled offence could be attached as proceeds of crime or as property of equivalent value under the Act.

Issue (i): Whether the provisional attachment could be invalidated for want of a clear invocation of the statutory basis and by applying the rule against supplementation of reasons.

Analysis: The provisional attachment order itself recorded that the immovable property was being treated as value of proceeds of crime under the statutory definition and was liable for immediate attachment under the attachment provision. On that basis, the challenge founded on the rule against post hoc supplementation of reasons was not accepted.

Conclusion: The objection based on absence of reasons failed.

Issue (ii): Whether property allegedly acquired before the scheduled offence could be attached as proceeds of crime or as property of equivalent value under the Act.

Analysis: The statutory definition of proceeds of crime requires a connection with criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The attachment power is confined to property derived or obtained from such activity or to the value of such property, and unconnected property cannot be attached merely because the accused is involved in crime. The Court reconciled the authorities to hold that property with no nexus to the scheduled offence is not attachable, but the present case involved a factual dispute as to when the property was actually acquired and registered, which required evidence.

Conclusion: The appellant did not establish, at this stage, that the attached property was acquired before the crime so as to exclude attachment.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the disputed factual question regarding the date of acquisition of the property had not been proved in the appellant's favour, and the attachment was not set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Property can be provisionally attached only if it bears a nexus to proceeds of crime as defined under the Act, but where the date of acquisition is itself disputed and remains unproved, the attachment will not be interfered with in appeal.

Issues: Whether the appeal filed before the Tribunal was barred by limitation in view of the Supreme Court's Covid-19 limitation directions and the statutory scheme under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: The statutory appeal under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 prescribed a period of 60 days, with a further condonable period of 30 days on sufficient cause. The Supreme Court's directions excluded the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 for limitation purposes and provided that where limitation had expired during that period, a further 90 days from 01.03.2022 would be available. The appeal was filed on 30.05.2022, and the court held that the Tribunal had read the Supreme Court's directions too narrowly by denying the benefit of the 90-day period. It was further noted that 28.05.2022 was a Saturday and 29.05.2022 was a Sunday.

Conclusion: The dismissal of the appeal as time-barred was unsustainable, and the appeal was within limitation.

Issues: (i) whether the addition made under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the bank credits was sustainable, and (ii) whether the penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the sustained amount was liable to be maintained.

Issue (i): whether the addition made under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the bank credits was sustainable.

Analysis: The bank account showed a transaction pattern indicating routing of funds and provision of accommodation entries. The explanation based on trading of fabrics was found unconvincing in the absence of supporting dispatch and delivery records. The credits were treated as unexplained because the account was used for beneficiary routing and the material on record did not establish genuine trading corresponding to the disputed entries. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in restricting the addition to alleged commission income and that the full addition made by the Assessing Officer was justified.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustained in full and the issue was decided in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): whether the penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the sustained amount was liable to be maintained.

Analysis: Since the substantive addition was upheld, the basis for the penalty also survived. The Tribunal therefore found no reason to interfere with the penalty order once the underlying concealment-related addition was confirmed.

Conclusion: The penalty was upheld and the issue was decided in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: Both revenue appeals succeeded, the substantive addition was restored, and the associated penalty order was also sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where bank credits are found to represent accommodation entry routing and the assessee fails to establish genuine delivery-backed business transactions, the credits may be treated as unexplained income, and a penalty predicated on the sustained addition can also be maintained.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition made under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of the unsecured loan received from the sister concern was sustainable; (ii) Whether the addition made under section 56(2)(viib) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on account of share premium valuation was sustainable; (iii) Whether the addition made under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of cash deposits in the bank account was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the addition made under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of the unsecured loan received from the sister concern was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee supported the loan transaction with PAN details, audited financial statements, bank statements, and confirmation from the lender. The lender also responded to notice under section 133(6) and confirmed the transaction. The material on record established the identity of the lender, its creditworthiness, and the genuineness of the transaction, and the Revenue did not rebut these findings with contrary evidence.

Conclusion: The addition under section 68 in respect of the unsecured loan was rightly deleted and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition made under section 56(2)(viib) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on account of share premium valuation was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee had adopted the book value method for valuation of shares and obtained a report accordingly. The requirement of a merchant banker report was held to arise in the context of the discounted free cash flow method, and the later notification relied upon by the Revenue was found inapplicable to the year in question. The valuation adopted by the assessee was therefore accepted as valid.

Conclusion: The addition under section 56(2)(viib) was rightly deleted and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the addition made under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of cash deposits in the bank account was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee demonstrated, through cash books, bank statements, and audited records, that the cash deposits were sourced from earlier cash withdrawals and were linked to the business needs of a construction concern. The Revenue did not bring cogent evidence to dislodge the documentary trail or the explanation of cash availability.

Conclusion: The addition under section 68 in respect of cash deposits was rightly deleted and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's challenge failed on all three substantive additions, and the appellate order deleting the additions was sustained in full.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee substantiates a cash credit or loan with primary documentary evidence establishing identity, creditworthiness, genuineness, and corroborating confirmations, an addition under section 68 cannot be sustained in the absence of rebuttal evidence; similarly, share valuation must be examined with reference to the applicable valuation method and governing rule for the relevant year.

Issues: Whether penalty under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained when the notice and penalty order proceeded on under-reporting of income but did not specify the exact limb of misreporting under section 270A(9), and whether the assessee's disclosure in the return negatived the levy.

Analysis: Penalty under section 270A operates on distinct limbs, namely under-reporting and misreporting, with different consequences under sub-sections (7) and (8). The notice issued in the case proceeded on under-reporting, while the penalty was ultimately imposed at the higher rate applicable to misreporting, without specifying the particular clause of section 270A(9) said to be attracted. The absence of a clear and specific limb in the notice and penalty order rendered the proceedings unsustainable. It was also found that the assessee had already disclosed the relevant income particulars in the return, and the record did not establish misreporting or any actionable under-reporting justifying penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not maintainable and was deleted; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment-related concealment allegation did not justify the penal levy, and the appeal succeeded with the impugned penalty set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be sustained unless the notice and order clearly specify the exact statutory limb and the material ingredients of the alleged default, and a higher penalty for misreporting cannot be imposed on a vague or unspecified basis.

Issues: Whether, for the assessment year under consideration, tax deduction at source under section 194-IA was attracted where the immovable property was purchased from multiple co-owners and the consideration attributable to each co-owner was below the statutory threshold, and whether the consequent demand under section 201(1) and interest under section 201(1A) could survive.

Analysis: The consideration attributable to each transferor was below Rs. 50 lakhs. The provision as applicable to the relevant year did not provide for aggregation of consideration in the case of multiple transferors. The amendment introducing aggregation was inserted by the Finance Act, 2024 with effect from 01.04.2024 and operated prospectively. The cited coordinate bench decisions consistently held that, for periods prior to that amendment, the threshold had to be tested transferor-wise and not on the aggregate sale consideration.

Conclusion: Section 194-IA was not attracted on the facts. The assessee could not be treated as an assessee in default under section 201(1), and the interest levied under section 201(1A) also failed.

Issues: Whether the cash deposits made during the demonetisation period were unexplained so as to justify addition under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, or whether the assessee's explanation that the cash originated from sale of silver bullion disclosed under the Income Disclosure Scheme, 2016 was acceptable.

Analysis: The assessee produced evidence of disclosure and taxation of 131.442 kgs of silver bullion under the Income Disclosure Scheme, 2016 and showed that the bullion was sold in tranches during the year, with the resulting cash deposited in the bank account. The explanation was supported by the disclosure form and the computation of short-term capital gains. The fact that the assessee was not engaged in bullion trading did not, by itself, render the sale unbelievable, since ownership of bullion is sufficient to effect a sale. On these facts, the explanation for the cash deposits was found to be reasonable and the basis for treating the deposits as unexplained was rejected.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 57 lakhs as unexplained cash deposit was deleted, and the short-term capital gains offered by the assessee were directed to be taxed on substantive basis.

Issues: Whether foreign tax credit under the treaty framework could be denied solely because Form No. 67 was filed after the due date prescribed for filing the return of income.

Analysis: The assessee had offered foreign income to tax in India and claimed foreign tax credit, but Form No. 67 was filed belatedly. The Tribunal held that Rule 128(9) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 prescribes the manner and time for furnishing Form No. 67, but does not provide that delayed filing results in forfeiture of the credit. It accepted the view that filing of Form No. 67 is a procedural requirement and not a mandatory condition that extinguishes the substantive entitlement to foreign tax credit. The Tribunal further held that the treaty entitlement to relief under section 90 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be curtailed by a procedural rule, and that the delay did not justify denial of the claim on merits.

Conclusion: Foreign tax credit could not be denied merely because Form No. 67 was filed after the due date, and the assessee was held entitled to the credit.

Issues: (i) Whether the imported rutile goods were ores or concentrates under Chapter 26 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, and whether the exemption from additional duty was admissible; (ii) Whether the allegation of misdeclaration, the invocation of the extended period of limitation, and the consequential confiscation and penalty were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the imported rutile goods were ores or concentrates under Chapter 26 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, and whether the exemption from additional duty was admissible.

Analysis: Chapter Note 2 to Chapter 26 treats ores as minerals used in the metallurgical industry, and the HSN Explanatory Notes recognise that ores may undergo normal physical or mechanical processes such as crushing, screening, washing and gravity separation without losing their character as ores. Chapter Note 4 applies only where ores are in fact converted into concentrates. The record did not show roasting, leaching, calcination, acid treatment or any other special treatment altering the chemical composition or crystallographic structure of the goods. The contemporaneous import documents and the departmental test report supported the description as rutile ore or rutile sand, while general technical literature and high titanium dioxide content were held insufficient to override consignment-specific evidence.

Conclusion: The goods were ores and not concentrates, and the denial of exemption from additional duty was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the allegation of misdeclaration, the invocation of the extended period of limitation, and the consequential confiscation and penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: The declarations in the Bills of Entry matched the supplier documents and test certificates, and there was no contrary test report or material showing false description or suppression. In the absence of misdeclaration or wilful suppression with intent to evade duty, the extended period under the Customs Act, 1962 could not be invoked. Since confiscation under Section 111(m) depends on an established misdeclaration and penalty under Section 114A depends on wilful misstatement or suppression, both consequences necessarily failed once the factual foundation was absent.

Conclusion: The allegation of misdeclaration failed, the demand was time-barred, and the confiscation and penalty were unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded in full, with the impugned order set aside and consequential relief granted.

Ratio Decidendi: Mere physical or mechanical separation normal to ore preparation does not convert an ore into a concentrate unless special treatment is shown to have altered the nature of the mineral.

Issues: (i) Whether the imported bearing assemblies were classifiable under CTH 8482 or CTH 8708; (ii) whether penalty was imposable on the appellant.

Issue (i): Whether the imported bearing assemblies were classifiable under CTH 8482 or CTH 8708.

Analysis: The classification had to be determined first by the relevant section and chapter notes under the tariff, and only thereafter by the General Rules for Interpretation. The goods were found to be bearing assemblies used solely as parts of motor vehicles, and the exclusion and classification scheme under Section XVI and Section XVII, read with Note 3 to Section XVII, required application of the principal use test. Applying the settled approach to parts suitable solely or primarily for motor vehicles, the goods were treated as motor vehicle parts rather than as bearings for independent classification under CTH 8482.

Conclusion: The goods were classifiable under CTH 8708 and not under CTH 8482, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty was imposable on the appellant.

Analysis: The dispute turned on classification of the imported goods, and the adjudicating authorities had imposed penalty despite the issue being one of tariff interpretation. Since the classification dispute itself did not justify penalty on the facts recorded, and the non-imposition of penalty in one connected order reflected the same position, the penalty orders could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The penalties were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tariff classification was upheld for motor vehicle parts, but the penal consequence was deleted, resulting in partial relief to the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: Goods designed and used solely or principally as motor vehicle parts are classifiable under the motor vehicle heading by applying the section notes and principal use test, and a penalty cannot be sustained where the dispute is one of tariff interpretation alone.

Issues: (i) whether the appellants were importers under Section 2(26) of the Customs Act, 1962 and consequently liable to duty under Section 28; (ii) whether misdeclaration under Section 111(m) was established against them; (iii) whether confiscation and redemption fine were sustainable; and (iv) whether penalty under Section 112(a) was sustainable.

Issue (i): whether the appellants were importers under Section 2(26) of the Customs Act, 1962 and consequently liable to duty under Section 28

Analysis: The statutory scheme treats the person who files the Bill of Entry, subscribes the declaration and seeks clearance for home consumption as the importer for assessment and recovery purposes. On the facts, the Bills of Entry were filed and the declarations were subscribed by the clearing firms, while the appellants only furnished advance licences, end-use bonds and bank guarantees. Mere description as the account party and furnishing of supporting documents did not amount to filing the Bills of Entry or subscribing the statutory declarations.

Conclusion: The appellants were not importers within Section 2(26), and the duty demand under Section 28 was not sustainable.

Issue (ii): whether misdeclaration under Section 111(m) was established against them

Analysis: Liability for misdeclaration requires proof that the person concerned made or was responsible for the false description or valuation. The record showed that the filing firms handled the declaration and clearance, while the appellants were not shown to have instructed, participated in, or knowingly approved any false description of the goods. Furnishing licences and securities did not by itself establish participation in the alleged misdescription.

Conclusion: Misdeclaration under Section 111(m) was not established against the appellants.

Issue (iii): whether confiscation and redemption fine were sustainable

Analysis: Redemption fine can stand only where confiscation is otherwise legally sustainable. Since the appellants were not proved to be importers and misdeclaration was not proved against them, the foundation for confiscation in their hands under Sections 111(d), 111(m) and 111(o) failed. In the absence of a valid confiscation order against them, redemption fine could not survive.

Conclusion: The confiscation and redemption fine were unsustainable and were set aside.

Issue (iv): whether penalty under Section 112(a) was sustainable

Analysis: Penalty under Section 112(a) attaches where a person, by act or omission, renders goods liable to confiscation. The material showed that the appellants furnished non-transferable advance licences, executed end-use bonds and provided bank guarantees that enabled clearance under the exemption scheme and facilitated misuse of the scheme. Although misdeclaration was not proved against them, their conduct materially contributed to the improper clearance of the goods.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 112(a) was sustainable, and the penalty of Rs. 10,00,000 each was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appellants succeeded on the questions of importer status, duty liability, misdeclaration, confiscation and redemption fine, but failed on penalty, resulting in a partial relief with the monetary penalty remaining intact.

Ratio Decidendi: Mere furnishing of advance licences, bonds and bank guarantees, or being shown as the account party, does not make a person an importer for duty liability; however, facilitative conduct that enables improper clearance under a conditional exemption scheme can still attract penalty if it renders the goods liable to confiscation.

Issues: (i) Whether the liquidation and dissolution process was liable to be set aside on the ground that the operational creditor was allegedly a related party and that the corporate debtor's process stood vitiated by the shareholding and directorship of M.S. Balaji.

Analysis: The challenge rested on the assertion that Kasa Anlagen India Private Limited or M.S. Balaji held controlling shareholding and thereby rendered the insolvency process defective. The record, however, showed that the adjudicating authority had found that M.S. Balaji had resigned from the corporate debtor on 17.11.2018 and from the operational creditor on 01.04.2019, both well before admission of the insolvency application on 06.04.2022. The material placed by the appellant did not establish that the operational creditor was shown as a shareholder in the relevant annual returns, and the pleading regarding 27% shareholding was found to relate to Kasa rather than to M.S. Balaji personally. No factual or legal error was demonstrated to warrant interference with the liquidation or dissolution orders.

Conclusion: The objection to the liquidation and dissolution process failed, and the appeals were liable to be dismissed.

Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority could direct revival of a concession agreement that had been terminated before commencement of the CIRP, and whether the resolution plan could be enforced so as to compel such revival.

Analysis: The concession agreement had been terminated years before the CIRP commenced and had not been revived thereafter. A contract already terminated could not be treated as part of the CIRP in a manner that enabled the Adjudicating Authority to compel its revival. The direction in the impugned order requiring implementation of the resolution plan could not extend to issuing a mandate to revive the terminated concession agreement. At the same time, the parties were left free to pursue conciliation or arbitration in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The direction to revive the terminated concession agreement was held impermissible, and the appellant succeeded to that extent. The parties were permitted to take lawful steps for conciliation or arbitration, including consideration of any request for revival, but without any compulsory revival direction from the Tribunal.

Issues: Whether the application under Section 65 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was maintainable on the plea that the Section 7 proceedings were initiated fraudulently or with malicious intent because of non-issuance of no-objection certificates.

Analysis: The application under Section 65 contained no specific pleadings or cogent material to establish fraudulent or malicious initiation of the insolvency process. The grievance regarding non-issuance of no-objection certificates was held to be a post-default issue and did not displace the statutory consequences of an admitted default. The availability of possession during CIRP and the operation of Regulation 4E of the Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons Regulations, 2016 also showed that the allottee-related grievance did not furnish a ground to invoke Section 65.

Conclusion: The challenge under Section 65 failed and the rejection of that application was sustained.

Final Conclusion: The decision upheld the insolvency admission process and declined to interfere with the finding that the Section 65 plea was unsupported on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: A Section 65 proceeding requires specific pleadings and cogent proof of fraudulent or malicious initiation, and a post-default contractual grievance does not by itself bar or invalidate a Section 7 insolvency petition.

Issues: (i) Whether raising invoices for sale of moulds without physical movement of moulds amounts to removal of capital goods under Rule 3(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004; (ii) Whether the appellant is required to reverse the CENVAT credit availed on such moulds; (iii) Whether the extended period of limitation has been correctly invoked; (iv) Whether the demand of interest and imposition of penalties are sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether raising invoices for sale of moulds without physical movement of moulds amounts to removal of capital goods under Rule 3(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: Rule 3(5) applies when inputs or capital goods on which credit has been taken are removed as such from the factory. The rule contemplates physical removal and does not create a deeming fiction based only on transfer of ownership or invoice issuance. The moulds remained in the factory and were used in manufacture, and the cited precedents supported the view that invoice entry alone does not amount to removal.

Conclusion: Raising invoices for mould cost without physical movement of the moulds does not amount to removal of capital goods under Rule 3(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant is required to reverse the CENVAT credit availed on such moulds.

Analysis: Once the moulds were found to have remained within the factory and to have been used in manufacture of final products, reversal under Rule 3(5) was not attracted. The eligibility of the moulds as capital goods was not disputed, and the cost of the moulds formed part of the production structure for dutiable final goods. The reasoning also supported the principle that the exercise was revenue neutral.

Conclusion: The appellant was not required to reverse the CENVAT credit availed on such moulds.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation has been correctly invoked.

Analysis: Extended limitation requires fraud, suppression, wilful misstatement, collusion, or intent to evade duty. The transactions were reflected in statutory records and returns, and the dispute turned on interpretation of the law rather than concealment of facts. On these facts, the jurisdictional basis for invoking the extended period was absent.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was not sustainable.

Issue (iv): Whether the demand of interest and imposition of penalties are sustainable.

Analysis: Interest was consequential to the duty demand, and penalty under the excise law required the presence of the necessary elements for penal liability. Since the underlying demand failed and the dispute was interpretational, the foundation for interest and penalty did not survive.

Conclusion: The demand of interest and the imposition of penalties were not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demand and consequential liabilities were set aside, and the appellant obtained relief on all substantive issues.

Ratio Decidendi: Mere issuance of an invoice for moulds, without their physical removal from the factory, does not constitute removal of capital goods for the purpose of reversal of CENVAT credit.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant's post-clearance sale of vehicles through Regional Sales Offices constituted trading amounting to exempted service under Rule 2(e) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004; (ii) whether Rule 6(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 applied so as to require reversal of credit or payment of amount; (iii) whether the demand in the first notice was hit by limitation and whether the penalties were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant's post-clearance sale of vehicles through Regional Sales Offices constituted trading amounting to exempted service under Rule 2(e) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: The arrangement showed that the appellant manufactured and assembled the vehicles on job work basis at its factory and cleared them on payment of excise duty under the valuation framework applicable to such manufacture. Mere subsequent sale or distribution of the same vehicles through Regional Sales Offices did not change the character of the activity from manufacture to trading. Trading, in the commercial sense, requires purchase and resale without manufacturing, and no material established that the appellant independently purchased finished vehicles for resale as a trader.

Conclusion: The allegation of trading amounting to exempted service was not established and is rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether Rule 6(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 applied so as to require reversal of credit or payment of amount.

Analysis: Rule 6 applies only where an assessee is engaged in dutiable and exempted activities and common inputs or input services are used for both. The record did not show any independent exempted service or identify any specific input service used for the alleged trading activity. The demand was founded only on the premise that post-clearance sales amounted to trading, which was insufficient. The principle against artificial bifurcation of a single manufacturing activity to invoke credit reversal also supported the appellant's case.

Conclusion: Rule 6(3) was not applicable and the demand raised under it was unsustainable.

Issue (iii): Whether the demand in the first notice was hit by limitation and whether the penalties were sustainable.

Analysis: The transactions were reflected in statutory records, financial statements and annual reports, and the demand arose from audit scrutiny of those records. No evidence of suppression of facts or wilful misstatement was shown. In the absence of such ingredients, extended limitation could not be invoked. Since the demand itself failed on merits, the penalties based on that demand also could not survive.

Conclusion: The extended period was not justified and the penalties were not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders could not be sustained because the appellant was not shown to be engaged in taxable trading activity, the credit-reversal provision was inapplicable, and the time-bar invocation for the first notice failed; the appeals succeeded with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Post-clearance sale of goods manufactured on job work basis does not, by itself, constitute trading or exempted service for the purpose of Rule 6, unless an independent exempted activity and nexus with common input services are established.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit distributed through Input Service Distributor invoices could be denied to the recipient unit and whether proceedings could be initiated against it; (ii) whether courier services used for transportation of finished goods to customers qualified as input service under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004; (iii) whether the place of removal in the facts of the case was the factory gate or the buyer's premises; (iv) whether the extended period of limitation was invocable and whether interest and penalty could survive.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit distributed through Input Service Distributor invoices could be denied to the recipient unit and whether proceedings could be initiated against it.

Analysis: Credit passed through Input Service Distributor invoices does not confer immunity from scrutiny at the recipient unit. The admissibility of the credit must still be tested on merits with reference to the definition of input service and the facts surrounding the recipient's activity.

Conclusion: Proceedings against the recipient unit were not invalid merely because the credit came through Input Service Distributor invoices.

Issue (ii): Whether courier services used for transportation of finished goods to customers qualified as input service under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: The definition of input service covered services used for clearance of final products up to the place of removal. Where the contractual arrangement shows that delivery, installation, commissioning and acceptance at the customer's premises are integral to the supply, outward transportation up to that point falls within the scope of input service.

Conclusion: Courier services used for transportation up to the buyer's premises were capable of qualifying as input service, subject to the contractual terms governing the transaction.

Issue (iii): Whether the place of removal in the facts of the case was the factory gate or the buyer's premises.

Analysis: The contracts showed that commissioning was complete only upon acceptance by the buyer, installation was incomplete until full commissioning, and the supply itself was not treated as complete until installation, commissioning and acceptance. A printed invoice clause disclaiming transit risk could not override the substantive contractual terms. On those terms, property and completion of sale occurred only at the customer's site.

Conclusion: The place of removal was the buyer's premises where the ATMs were installed, commissioned and accepted.

Issue (iv): Whether the extended period of limitation was invocable and whether interest and penalty could survive.

Analysis: The assessee had disclosed the credit in statutory records and the dispute turned on interpretation of the input service definition and place of removal. In the absence of wilful suppression or intent to evade duty, the extended period could not be invoked. Once the demand was time-barred, the consequential demand of interest and penalty also could not stand.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable and the demand, interest and penalty were barred.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appellant obtained relief on the ground that the demand was not sustainable in law, particularly because the extended limitation period could not be applied.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the contract shows that delivery, installation, commissioning and acceptance at the buyer's premises are integral to the supply, the buyer's premises may constitute the place of removal for credit on outward transportation, and the extended period cannot be invoked without wilful suppression or intent to evade duty.