Issues: (i) Whether gears, gear boxes, gear housings, bevel sets, spur gears and side gears are classifiable under CETH 8483 or under CETH 8432/8433; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation was justified.

Issue (i): Whether gears, gear boxes, gear housings, bevel sets, spur gears and side gears are classifiable under CETH 8483 or under CETH 8432/8433.

Analysis: Classification was governed by the tariff headings and the relevant Section and Chapter Notes. Parts which are goods specifically covered by Chapter 84, including transmission shafts, gears, gearing and gear boxes, fall in their own heading under Note 2(a) to Section XVI. The goods in question, even if specially designed for rotavators and agricultural machinery, remained items expressly covered by Heading 8483 and were not displaced by their end use. The specific heading prevailed over the more general claim to parts of agricultural machinery.

Conclusion: The goods were held classifiable under CETH 8483, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation was justified.

Analysis: The demand was raised beyond the normal period by invoking the proviso to Section 11A. The record showed regular ER-1 returns, a bona fide interpretational dispute, and prior departmental action on similar facts. In the absence of deliberate suppression of facts with intent to evade duty, the extended period could not be sustained. Mere non-acceptance of the assessee's classification claim did not establish the necessary mens rea for extended limitation.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was held unjustified, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The classification view of the department was sustained, but the entire demand failed on limitation and the appeal succeeded on that ground.

Ratio Decidendi: Goods specifically covered by a tariff entry in Chapter 84 must be classified under that entry notwithstanding their specific use, and the extended period of limitation applies only where deliberate suppression of facts with intent to evade duty is proved.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit on erection, commissioning, installation and allied services used for expansion of an existing manufacturing facility is admissible post-01.04.2011 despite deletion of the phrase "setting up of a factory" from Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004; (ii) whether the demand is barred by limitation; and (iii) whether penalty under Rule 15(1) is sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit on erection, commissioning, installation and allied services used for expansion of an existing manufacturing facility is admissible post-01.04.2011 despite deletion of the phrase "setting up of a factory" from Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004?

Analysis: The services were used for expansion of an already functioning factory and for installation and operationalisation of plant and machinery in the expanded facility. The main limb of the definition of input service retained wide amplitude and continued to cover services used directly or indirectly in or in relation to manufacture of final products. Deletion of the phrase "setting up of a factory" from the inclusive portion did not curtail that substantive width. The services in dispute did not fall within the specific exclusions relating to construction of building or civil structure or laying of foundation for support of capital goods.

Conclusion: Credit on the disputed services was admissible on merits and denial solely on the basis of deletion of the phrase "setting up of a factory" was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand is barred by limitation?

Analysis: The credit pertained to October 2014 to June 2015 and the notice was issued on 02.11.2016. The normal period then applicable was one year, and the notice did not invoke the extended period or allege suppression, fraud or wilful misstatement with intent to evade duty. The period for taking credit was to be reckoned from the date of availment of credit, and the later amendment extending limitation could not revive a time-barred demand. The dispute was interpretational and did not justify extended limitation.

Conclusion: The demand was barred by limitation, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under Rule 15(1) is sustainable?

Analysis: Once the demand failed on merits and limitation, the foundation for penalty and the consequential interest demand did not survive. No independent basis remained for sustaining penalty.

Conclusion: Penalty was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The credit was held admissible, the demand was held time-barred, and the penalty and interest did not survive, resulting in setting aside of the impugned order and allowance of the appeal with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Services integrally connected with manufacture in an existing facility remain eligible as input services under the broad main limb of Rule 2(l), and exclusion clauses must be strictly construed; where no suppression or extended-period ground is established, limitation runs from the date of availment of credit and penalty cannot stand if the demand itself fails.

Issues: Whether the final assessment order was barred by limitation under Section 144C(13) where the Dispute Resolution Panel directions were uploaded on the ITBA portal on 29.05.2024 but the final order was passed on 29.07.2024.

Analysis: Section 144C(13) requires completion of assessment in conformity with the Dispute Resolution Panel directions within one month from the end of the month in which those directions are received. The directions, digitally signed and uploaded on the ITBA portal on 29.05.2024, were held to be accessible to the Faceless Assessing Officer on that date. Internal system processes, non-receipt assertions, or differing user functionalities cannot postpone commencement of the statutory limitation. The final assessment order was consequently required to be passed by 30.06.2024. Passing an order without receipt of the directions would also fail to satisfy the requirement that the assessment be completed in conformity with those directions.

Conclusion: The final assessment order dated 29.07.2024 was time-barred and was annulled, in favour of the assessee. The remaining grounds on merits were left open.

Issues: Whether income of a deceased person's estate administered by executors is taxable at normal slab rates or at the maximum marginal rate applicable to an association of persons.

Analysis: Section 168(1) governs assessment of income from the estate of a deceased person in the hands of the executor. The adopted authorities establish that, even where executors are treated as an association of persons for statistical purposes, the estate's income is to be charged at normal slab rates rather than at the maximum marginal rate.

Conclusion: The estate is taxable at normal slab rates and not at the maximum marginal rate; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the assessment framed under section 143(3) read with section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid when the reopening was based on seized material found in the course of search in the case of a third party, requiring invocation of section 153C instead.

Analysis: The reopening reasons expressly referred to information received from the Central Circle along with specific seized material and page references, showing that the foundation of the proceedings was search material belonging to another person. Section 153C provides the specific mechanism for assessment where seized documents or assets belong to or pertain to a person other than the searched person. The issue was held to be jurisdictional in nature and therefore capable of being raised at any stage. Following the binding jurisdictional precedent and coordinate bench view, recourse to section 147 on these facts was held impermissible.

Conclusion: The assessment framed under section 143(3) read with section 147 was held invalid and bad in law, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether Foreign Tax Credit could be denied for delay in filing Form No. 67 under Rule 128(9) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, and whether the relevant DTAA entitled the assessee to credit of tax paid in Malaysia notwithstanding such procedural default.

Analysis: The claim for Foreign Tax Credit was supported by tax deducted in Malaysia on the same salary income that was offered to tax in India. The Tribunal noted that the DTAA entitlement to relief was not disputed on merits and that Rule 128(9) did not provide for disallowance of Foreign Tax Credit merely because Form No. 67 was filed belatedly. It further relied on the settled principle that a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement prevails over the Act and the Rules to the extent it is more beneficial to the assessee. The contrary view taken by the lower authority was held to be unsustainable, and the earlier reasoning treating the filing requirement as mandatory was not accepted.

Conclusion: Foreign Tax Credit could not be denied solely on account of delayed filing of Form No. 67, and the issue was remanded to the Assessing Officer for verification of the supporting documents and reconsideration in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where treaty-based Foreign Tax Credit is otherwise allowable, delay in filing Form No. 67 under Rule 128(9) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 is a directory procedural lapse and cannot, by itself, defeat the substantive DTAA relief.

Issues: (i) whether mining carried on through job work, where the assessee remained the lessee of the captive mine, disentitled the assessee from input tax credit; (ii) whether explosives used in the mining operation qualified as capital goods for the purpose of input tax credit under Section 18 of the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003; (iii) whether mining and manufacturing formed an integral process so as to support the claim for input tax credit.

Issue (i): whether mining carried on through job work, where the assessee remained the lessee of the captive mine, disentitled the assessee from input tax credit.

Analysis: The decisive fact was that the assessee itself held the mining licence for the captive mine. The material excavated was not purchased from any third party after mining, but was got excavated for the assessee. The circumstance that the excavation was carried out on job work basis did not change the legal character of the mining activity for the assessee, because the assessee remained the lessee and beneficiary of the mining operation.

Conclusion: The job-work arrangement did not defeat the claim to input tax credit and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether explosives used in the mining operation qualified as capital goods for the purpose of input tax credit under Section 18 of the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Analysis: The explosives were purchased for use in the actual mining operation and not for some subsequent or independent activity after mining. On that footing, the goods were treated as falling within the scope of the relevant entitlement for credit, and the objection that they were merely consumables used in mining did not prevail on the facts found.

Conclusion: The explosives qualified for input tax credit and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): whether mining and manufacturing formed an integral process so as to support the claim for input tax credit.

Analysis: The excavated iron ore and limestone were used in the manufacturing of iron ore pellets and cement. The mining operation and the manufacturing activity were treated as inter-dependent parts of a single commercial process, consistent with the controlling principle applied from the earlier binding decision relied upon in the order.

Conclusion: Mining and manufacturing were held to be integral, and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The revision petitions succeeded, the adverse appellate orders were set aside, and the assessee companies were held entitled to input tax credit on the relevant purchases for the assessment years concerned.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee remains the lessee of a captive mine and the extracted material is used in an integrated mining-and-manufacturing process, goods purchased for use in the actual mining operation, including explosives, may qualify for input tax credit under the governing value added tax provision.

Issues: (i) Whether the ex parte dismissal of the six appeals by the first appellate authority warranted restoration for fresh adjudication; (ii) Whether an assessment under section 143(3) can stand where the notice under section 143(2) was issued before the return of income and no valid notice was issued thereafter.

Issue (i): Whether the ex parte dismissal of the six appeals by the first appellate authority warranted restoration for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The assessee's non-participation was attributed to advanced age, medical ailments, personal circumstances and disruption during the Covid-19 period. Since the matters involved search assessments and substantial additions, and the assessee undertook to cooperate in fresh proceedings, a further opportunity was considered appropriate. The revenue would not be prejudiced by a de novo hearing, subject to payment of costs and cooperation by the assessee.

Conclusion: The six appeals were restored to the first appellate authority for de novo adjudication after affording opportunity of hearing, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an assessment under section 143(3) can stand where the notice under section 143(2) was issued before the return of income and no valid notice was issued thereafter.

Analysis: The admitted position was that the return was filed on 21.12.2015, whereas the notice under section 143(2) had been issued on 18.09.2015, with no subsequent notice. A notice under section 143(2) issued before filing of the return is non est and cannot confer jurisdiction for a scrutiny assessment. Section 292BB cures defects in service of a notice that has emanated from the department, but does not cure complete absence of a valid statutory notice.

Conclusion: The assessment lacked jurisdiction for want of a valid notice under section 143(2) after the return; it was void ab initio and was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The search-year assessment was annulled, while the remaining assessment years require fresh first-appellate adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: A valid notice under section 143(2), issued after filing of the return, is an indispensable jurisdictional condition for an assessment under section 143(3), and its complete absence is not cured by section 292BB.

Issues: Whether the impugned tender, though styled as a works contract for setting up an in-house manufacturing unit with raw materials supplied by the respondent, ively amounted to procurement of an item reserved for exclusive purchase from micro and small enterprises, thereby violating Section 11 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 and the Public Procurement Policy for Micro and Small Enterprises Order, 2012.

Analysis: Section 11 empowers the Government to notify preference policies for procurement of goods and services from micro and small enterprises. Clause 3 of the 2012 Order mandates procurement targets, and Serial No. 209 in the annexure reserves plastic blow moulded containers upto 20 litre for procurement from micro and small enterprises. The tender was found to be a device to obtain the same reserved product through a different contractual label, because the bidder was to set up and operate the manufacturing unit within the respondent's premises, using the respondent's raw material and workforce of the bidder. The Court held that the policy cannot be defeated by converting reserved procurement into a works contract, and that the decision was contrary to the statutory procurement mandate.

Conclusion: The impugned tender was held to be contrary to the procurement policy and violative of Section 11 of the MSMED Act. The writ petitions were allowed, and the respondents were directed not to extend the tender to non-MSEs and to follow the mandated procurement policy.

Issues: Whether the respondent authorities were bound to give effect to the directions issued by the High Court of Bombay in respect of the impugned sale deeds and agreements, and whether a writ of mandamus was liable to be issued.

Analysis: The Court held that Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India enables the exercise of writ jurisdiction where a part of the cause of action arises within the territorial limits of the Court, and that the efficacy of judicial directions is not confined by State boundaries when implementation is required elsewhere. It noted that the registering authorities are statutory functionaries performing a ministerial duty, and cannot sit in appeal over, ignore, or refuse to implement binding directions issued by a Constitutional Court. The Court further found that the insolvency proceedings and the subsequent alienation of secured assets formed part of the same chain of cause of action, making the Bombay High Court's directions enforceable against the Karnataka registering authorities.

Conclusion: The respondent authorities were bound to implement the directions issued by the High Court of Bombay, and mandamus was warranted to compel compliance.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded, and the Court directed implementation of the Bombay High Court's directions with consequential recording of entries and ancillary reliefs.

Ratio Decidendi: Orders of a Constitutional Court, once passed within valid territorial jurisdiction on a part of the cause of action, are binding and enforceable on statutory authorities required to implement them, and such authorities cannot decline compliance on the ground of territorial location.

Issues: Whether accrued interest on fixed deposits, kept under prohibitory orders in pending criminal proceedings and not credited to the assessee's account, could still be brought to tax merely because the assessee had earlier offered such interest on accrual basis and had subsequently shifted to receipt basis.

Analysis: The assessment years in question were governed by the Income-tax Act, 1961. The dispute centred on whether the interest on the fixed deposits had attained the character of real income in the assessee's hands. The fixed deposits remained subject to uncertainty because the underlying criminal proceedings were pending and the amounts were not credited to the assessee's account. In that situation, the Court treated the CBDT's clarification and the surrounding legal position as supporting the principle that uncertain income cannot be taxed on a notional basis merely because interest may accrue in a bookkeeping sense. The earlier practice of offering the interest to tax did not override the continuing uncertainty attaching to the deposits and the assessee's liability to pay tax was held to arise only upon final resolution of the pending proceedings.

Conclusion: The addition of accrued interest on fixed deposits was rightly deleted and the answer to the substantial questions was in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed on the core tax issue and the Tribunal's deletion of the interest addition was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Interest that remains uncertain because the underlying entitlement to the fixed deposits is sub judice does not constitute taxable real income merely on accrual, and cannot be brought to tax until the uncertainty is resolved.

Issues: Whether the assessment order warranted interference insofar as it treated the corporate guarantee transaction as taxable on the entire turnover, and whether the matter required remand for fresh consideration on the assessee's objection that only 1% of the turnover was liable to tax.

Analysis: The impugned order was an assessment under Section 73 of the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The Court found that the major part of the tax demand arose from the corporate guarantee issue, and the assessee's contention that only 1% of the turnover could be taxed was not seriously disputed. The assessee also relied on GST circulars and an earlier decision of the Court supporting its stand. In these circumstances, the Court considered it appropriate to set aside the assessment order to the extent it dealt with the corporate guarantee issue and to remit that issue for fresh consideration after giving the assessee an opportunity to file a reply and additional documents.

Conclusion: The assessment order was interfered with only on the corporate guarantee issue, and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication on that issue alone, while the remaining findings were left undisturbed.

Issues: Whether amendment of the bills of entry and correction of the classification of imported goods could be sought under Sections 149 and 154 of the Customs Act, 1962 without filing an appeal under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The dispute concerned an inadvertent classification error in the bills of entry. The governing framework permits the proper officer to authorise amendment of documents under Section 149 and to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors arising from accidental slip or omission under Section 154. The appeal reasoned that self-assessment is nonetheless an assessment, but modification of such assessment is not confined to appellate remedy under Section 128 and may also be achieved through the other statutory routes, including amendment of the bill of entry on the basis of documentary evidence already in existence at the time of clearance.

Conclusion: The rejection of the amendment request on the ground that no appeal had been filed under Section 128 was unsustainable, and the appellant was entitled to correction of the classification through the statutory amendment mechanism.

Issues: Whether reassessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid where the additions originated from search material relating to another person and the Revenue ought to have proceeded under section 153C of the Act.

Analysis: The search on a third party yielded material relating to the assessee. The reassessment was founded on that search-linked material rather than on an independent source of escapement information. In such a situation, the special scheme governing search-related action must be followed, and the general reassessment provision cannot be used to bypass the statutory route applicable to material emanating from a search. Where the Revenue relies exclusively on search material and does not adopt the special procedure contemplated for such material, the assumption of jurisdiction under section 147 is legally flawed.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings under section 147 were without jurisdiction and were quashed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where escaped income is sought to be assessed on the basis of incriminating material arising from a search, the Revenue must invoke the special statutory mechanism applicable to search material and cannot resort to section 147 as a substitute for that procedure.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the reassessment proceedings were valid when the approval was granted by the Principal Commissioner instead of the authority prescribed under section 151(1)(ii), and whether the consequential assessment could survive.

Analysis: The reassessment notice for assessment year 2017-18 was issued after the expiry of three years from the end of the assessment year. In such a case, the prescribed approval was that of the Principal Chief Commissioner or the equivalent higher authority. The record showed approval by the Principal Commissioner instead. Following the view that sanction by the wrong authority is not valid approval, the reassessment was treated as not in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 was held to be bad in law, and the consequential assessment order was declared void ab initio.

Issues: Whether the cash and credit entries aggregating to Rs. 1,70,53,900 credited in the assessee's bank accounts were assessable as unexplained money under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, or represented business receipts received in the course of agency activity for onward transfer.

Analysis: The assessee produced the authorisation from Airtel Payments Bank Ltd., bank statements, a detailed transaction chart, and material showing that the amounts collected from customers were transferred onward, leaving only commission income in its hands. The Tribunal accepted that the assessee functioned as a Business Correspondent Agent and that the deposited sums were not owned by the assessee but were received for transmission in the course of business. In these circumstances, the precondition for invoking section 69A, namely ownership of unexplained money by the assessee, was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 1,70,53,900 under section 69A was not sustainable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction under section 80IA(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of income from erection of road signages and foot-over bridges as part of alleged infrastructure development.

Analysis: Deduction under section 80IA(4) is available only where profits are derived from developing, operating or maintaining an eligible infrastructure facility, such as a road or bridge. Road signages, though useful for traffic management and safety, are ancillary works and do not themselves create, develop, expand or structurally improve a road or bridge. A composite work order does not automatically make the entire profit eligible for deduction; the assessee must segregate and prove that the profits claimed arise from qualifying infrastructure activity alone. The assessee failed to establish that the entire claim pertained exclusively to eligible works, and the earlier adverse decision in its own case remained operative as there was no stay of the Tribunal order.

Conclusion: The assessee was not entitled to deduction under section 80IA(4), and the disallowance was upheld in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The common issue was decided against the assessee, and all three appeals failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Ancillary works such as road signages do not constitute an eligible infrastructure facility under section 80IA(4), and deduction cannot be claimed on composite receipts unless the assessee proves that the profits are derived from qualifying infrastructure activity alone.

Issues: Whether revision under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could survive when the underlying assessment had been framed in the name of a deceased assessee and was therefore void.

Analysis: The assessment order was passed in the name of a deceased person without validly bringing the legal heir on record. Such an assessment is a nullity and void ab initio, creating a fundamental jurisdictional defect. Once the foundational assessment is non est, the Commissioner cannot revise it under section 263. The explanation regarding cash deposits was also found insufficient to justify an adverse inference, as the deposits were made on different dates and no cogent material was brought to disprove the assessee's explanation.

Conclusion: The revision order under section 263 could not be sustained and was invalid in law; the assessment being void, the revision proceedings failed.

Issues: (i) Whether the rejection of the books of account under section 145(3) was justified on account of discrepancies in the salary and wage records; (ii) Whether estimation of net profit at 8% of turnover was sustainable, and if not, what rate was .

Issue (i): Whether the rejection of the books of account under section 145(3) was justified on account of discrepancies in the salary and wage records.

Analysis: The authorities found serious defects in the wage and salary registers, including inconsistent signatures, identical handwriting in multiple signatures, different signatures against the same employee name, absence of names and addresses of workers, no dates of payment, and cash payments that could not be properly verified. These defects created doubt about the correctness and completeness of the accounts and the genuineness of the salary expenditure claimed.

Conclusion: The rejection of the books of account was upheld and this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether estimation of net profit at 8% of turnover was sustainable, and if not, what rate was .

Analysis: After rejecting the books, the profit had to be estimated on a reasonable basis. The adopted rate of 8% was found to be unsupported and arbitrary, particularly when the assessee's past net profit history was only about 1% to 2% and no material showed a higher comparable margin. On that factual basis, a 3% net profit rate was considered more appropriate.

Conclusion: The estimation at 8% was set aside and substituted with 3% of turnover, so this issue was decided in favour of the assessee in part.

Final Conclusion: The accounts were validly rejected, but the profit estimation was reduced to a reasonable level, resulting in partial relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: When defects in account records render them unreliable, income may be estimated, but the estimation must be based on a rational and non-arbitrary assessment of the facts and past results.

Issues: Whether penalty levied for alleged concealment of income and furnishing of inaccurate particulars under section 271(1)(c) was sustainable.

Analysis: The penalty was initiated with reference to additions made in assessment, but the order did not establish that the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars of income. The material on record did not show a clear basis for invoking the penalty provision in relation to the claimed loan and interest-related additions. In the absence of a demonstrated case of concealment or inaccurate particulars, the statutory requirements for penalty were not met.

Conclusion: The penalty was not sustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the penalty under section 271(1)(c) could not be maintained on the facts recorded.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under section 271(1)(c) cannot be sustained unless the revenue establishes concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income on the basis of clear findings.