Issues: (i) Whether training services provided by an MSDE/NSDC affiliated training partner conducting NSQF-aligned digital marketing courses are exempt from GST under Sl. No. 69 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate); (ii) whether the amendment omitting NSDC-approved training partners and the subsequent circular permit exemption for the intervening period from 10.10.2024 to 15.01.2025.

Issue (i): Whether training services provided by an MSDE/NSDC affiliated training partner conducting NSQF-aligned digital marketing courses are exempt from GST under Sl. No. 69 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).

Analysis: The entry grants exemption to services provided by a training partner approved by the National Skill Development Corporation or the Sector Skill Council, when the services are in relation to the National Skill Development Programme, a vocational skill development course under the National Skill Certification and Monetary Reward Scheme, or any other scheme implemented by NSDC. The applicant was found to be an NSDC-approved training partner, and the digital marketing course was accredited by NSDC and mapped to the relevant skill framework. The services were treated as falling within the exempt entry.

Conclusion: The services were exempt from GST under Sl. No. 69 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).

Issue (ii): Whether the amendment omitting NSDC-approved training partners and the subsequent circular permit exemption for the intervening period from 10.10.2024 to 15.01.2025.

Analysis: The amended entry temporarily removed the express reference to training partners approved by NSDC and restricted the exemption to training bodies accredited with an awarding body recognised by NCVET. The later notification restored the NSDC route from 16.01.2025. The circular then regularized GST payment for the intervening period on an "as is where is" basis, meaning the past position would stand as regularized according to whether tax had been paid or not.

Conclusion: No exemption was available for the intervening period, but the liability for that period stood regularized on an "as is where is" basis.

Final Conclusion: The applicant's training services were held exempt generally, while the temporary withdrawal period was separately dealt with through regularization under the circular, resulting in only partial relief for that interval.

Issues: Whether input tax credit is admissible on input services used for construction of foundation and structural support for plant and machinery installed within the factory for manufacture of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients, in view of the restriction under section 17(5)(c) of the CGST Act, 2017.

Analysis: The applicant's manufacturing activity required installation of reactors, filters, dryers, condensers, boilers, and allied equipment on RCC and steel structures to ensure stability, alignment, and vibration control. Such equipment and the supporting foundation and structural works were held to be integral to the business of manufacturing APIs and therefore connected with the course or furtherance of business under section 16 of the CGST Act, 2017. The restriction in section 17(5)(c) applies to works contract services used for construction of immovable property, but the Explanation to section 17 specifically includes foundation and structural support within the expression "plant and machinery" and excludes only land, building, other civil structures, telecommunication towers, and pipelines laid outside the factory premises. Applying this definition, the supporting foundations and structural works for the machinery were treated as part of plant and machinery and not as disallowed civil structures. Reliance was also placed on the engineering report and the CBIC clarification concerning components integral to a functional plant network.

Conclusion: Input tax credit on the input services used for construction of foundation and structural support for the plant and machinery was held to be admissible and not hit by section 17(5)(c) of the CGST Act, 2017.

Ratio Decidendi: Foundation and structural support forming an integral part of plant and machinery, and used for making outward supply, fall within the statutory definition of plant and machinery and are not barred by the works contract restriction under section 17(5)(c).

Issues: Whether input tax credit is admissible on input services used for construction of foundation and structural support for plant and machinery installed within the factory for recovery of solvents and treatment of wastewater in API manufacture.

Analysis: The registered person was found to be using the solvent recovery and effluent treatment plants in the course of its business of manufacturing and supplying APIs, so the related construction services were business inputs. The restriction in Section 17(5)(c) applies to works contract services used for construction of immovable property, but the Explanation to Section 17 defines plant and machinery to include apparatus, equipment and machinery fixed to earth by foundation or structural support, and also includes such foundation and structural support while excluding only land, building, other civil structures, telecommunication towers and pipelines laid outside the factory premises. The foundations and supporting structures were treated as integral to the machinery, not as excluded civil structures, and the supporting evidence showed that the machinery required such structures for stability, vibration control and proper functioning.

Conclusion: Input tax credit on the input services used for construction of foundation and structural support for the plant and machinery is admissible and is not blocked by Section 17(5)(c) of the CGST Act, 2017.

Ratio Decidendi: Foundation and structural support that are integral to plant and machinery fall within the statutory definition of plant and machinery under the Explanation to Section 17, and works contract services used for such construction are not hit by the block under Section 17(5)(c).

Issues: (i) whether cash deposits of specified bank notes during demonetisation were liable to be treated as unexplained money under section 69A; (ii) whether the assessee's claim of agricultural income could be disallowed in full or the income had to be accepted as declared; and (iii) whether rejection of books under section 145(3) and estimation of business profit was justified, and if so, at what rate.

Issue (i): whether cash deposits of specified bank notes during demonetisation were liable to be treated as unexplained money under section 69A.

Analysis: The assessee did not produce audited books, bills, vouchers, or corroborative material to establish that the deposits represented genuine sales receipts. The records called for from the agricultural market channels were not furnished in support of the explanation. In these circumstances, the explanation for the source and nature of the cash deposits remained unproved, and adverse inference was permissible.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69A was rightly restored and the deletion by the first appellate authority was reversed, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): whether the assessee's claim of agricultural income could be disallowed in full or the income had to be accepted as declared.

Analysis: The assessee's agricultural source was accepted, but the authorities below adopted inconsistent and ad hoc approaches to quantify the income without adequate factual or empirical basis. The Revenue did not establish a sustainable basis to deny the agricultural source altogether, and the assessee's claim could not be varied merely on a conjectural estimation of yield.

Conclusion: The declared agricultural income was directed to be accepted without variation for the year, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): whether rejection of books under section 145(3) and estimation of business profit was justified, and if so, at what rate.

Analysis: Non-production of books, stock records, vouchers, and invoices, coupled with inconsistencies in the audit report, justified rejection of books and resort to best judgment estimation. However, the estimation at 10% was held to be ad hoc and unsupported by material. A reasonable estimate had to be made on the facts and the nature of business, leading to a moderated rate.

Conclusion: Rejection of books and estimation of profit were upheld, but the profit rate was reduced to 8%, resulting in partial relief to Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue succeeded on the unexplained cash deposit issue, the assessee succeeded on the agricultural income issue, and the business profit addition was sustained only to a reduced extent, so the appeal was partly allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee withholds primary books and corroborative evidence, adverse inference may be drawn and income may be determined on best judgment, but the estimate must still rest on a reasonable and fact-based basis rather than an ad hoc rate.

Issues: Whether the addition made on account of alleged unexplained stock under section 69B could be sustained without properly examining the assessee's claim of melting loss and the supporting evidence.

Analysis: The excess stock was found during survey and the assessee had offered the amount in the return, but the dispute remained whether the resulting difference represented unexplained investment or a business-related melting loss arising from conversion of old jewellery into refined gold. The explanation required examination of the contemporaneous vouchers, refinery receipts, and other documentary material relied upon to show the weight reduction attributable to melting and refining. As the explanation of the alleged huge melting loss was not satisfactorily verified on the existing record, the matter required fresh factual examination by the Assessing Officer.

Conclusion: The addition was not finally upheld or deleted on merits and the issue was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after giving the assessee an opportunity to produce further evidence.

Final Conclusion: The assessee obtained a remand and the appeal was treated as allowed for statistical purposes, leaving the substantive tax issue open for reconsideration.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the explanation for an alleged stock discrepancy depends on a claimed melting loss supported by documentary evidence, the issue cannot be conclusively decided without fresh verification of the underlying facts.

Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority was bound to direct reconsideration of the repayment plan under section 114(3) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, after the Committee of Creditors rejected the plan by the requisite voting majority.

Analysis: The repayment plan proposed by the personal guarantor was for a sum far below the admitted dues of the financial creditor. The plan was placed before the Committee of Creditors and was rejected by the creditor holding 71.22% voting share, and the plan did not secure the minimum required voting support. Section 114(1) requires the Adjudicating Authority to act on the basis of the report of the meeting of creditors, while section 114(3) confers only an enabling discretion to direct reconsideration where the Authority forms an opinion that modification is required. Such power is not automatic and can be exercised only when the record discloses sufficient circumstances justifying modification.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority was not obliged to direct reconsideration of the repayment plan, and no interference with the order accepting the rejection of the plan was warranted.

Outcome: Delay condoned. The special leave petition was dismissed and the interlocutory application(s), if any, stood disposed of.

Issues: (i) Whether the methodology adopted for examining profiteering in a real estate project, by comparing the ratio of credit to purchase value and computing project-wise savings per square foot, was valid; (ii) whether the benefit of input tax credit had been passed on to the complainant and other homebuyers; (iii) whether the EPC contractor's input tax credit flow required separate verification for determining profiteering by the respondent; and (iv) whether the treatment of ITC reversal, unsold units, and the difference between the earlier and later reports affected the conclusion under section 171.

Issue (i): Whether the methodology adopted for examining profiteering in a real estate project, by comparing the ratio of credit to purchase value and computing project-wise savings per square foot, was valid.

Analysis: Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires any benefit of input tax credit to be passed on by commensurate reduction in prices. The methodology in real estate matters is not confined to a rigid formula, and the relevant exercise must reflect the peculiar facts of the project. The comparison of pre-GST and post-GST credit ratios to purchase value, as applied after the guidance in Reckitt Benckiser, was accepted as a fair method for the project under investigation because there is no direct correlation between turnover and ITC in a construction project.

Conclusion: The methodology was upheld and the objection to it failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the benefit of input tax credit had been passed on to the complainant and other homebuyers.

Analysis: The record included ledger entries and confirmation of adjustment of a quantified amount against the complainant's dues. The respondent also placed material showing that ITC benefit had been passed on to other homebuyers through credit notes, and confirmations were obtained from some recipients. The complainant did not displace this material with reliable evidence.

Conclusion: The objection that no ITC benefit was passed on was rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether the EPC contractor's input tax credit flow required separate verification for determining profiteering by the respondent.

Analysis: The EPC contractor supplied work contract services to the respondent and did not sell units to homebuyers. The investigation examined the contractor-related documents, but the liability under section 171 depended on the respondent's own supply position and whether any benefit accrued to it for onward passing. The contractor had no active role in the accrual of benefit to homebuyers for this purpose.

Conclusion: The objection regarding failure to examine the contractor's ITC flow was rejected.

Issue (iv): Whether the treatment of ITC reversal, unsold units, and the difference between the earlier and later reports affected the conclusion under section 171.

Analysis: Units sold after completion were excluded from the scope of taxable supply, and ITC relating to unsold units at the time of occupancy certificate had to be reversed. The net ITC position for the entire project was therefore relevant. The later report used the methodology approved after the earlier approach was found flawed, so the divergence from the earlier report did not undermine the final conclusion. The criticism that the data were selective or unverified was also rejected because the report showed independent checking against GSTR-9 and chartered accountant certifications.

Conclusion: The objections based on ITC reversal, unsold units, and alleged inconsistency in reports were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The report concluding that no contravention of section 171 was made out was accepted, and the anti-profiteering objections were rejected in full.

Ratio Decidendi: In real estate anti-profiteering matters, the existence of profiteering must be assessed on a project-wise basis by a fair and reasonable methodology that reflects the absence of a direct turnover-ITC correlation, and ITC relating to amounts not retained or to supplies outside the scope of tax cannot be treated as benefit available for passing on.

Outcome: Special Leave Petition dismissed on the ground of delay and on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the appeal before the first appellate authority stood excluded in view of the COVID-19 limitation orders. (ii) Whether the notice under section 143(2) was barred by limitation and issued without jurisdiction, rendering the assessment invalid.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the appeal before the first appellate authority stood excluded in view of the COVID-19 limitation orders.

Analysis: The assessment order and the filing of the appeal both fell within the period covered by the Supreme Court's suo motu extension of limitation during the COVID-19 period. In such circumstances, the delay counted by the first appellate authority could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The appeal before the first appellate authority was treated as valid and not time-barred.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice under section 143(2) was barred by limitation and issued without jurisdiction, rendering the assessment invalid.

Analysis: The return had been filed on 31.10.2019, while the notice under section 143(2) was issued after the prescribed limitation period. The notice was also found to have been issued before the transfer of jurisdiction became effective under section 127. On these facts, the notice suffered from both limitation and jurisdictional defects, which vitiated the assessment framed thereafter.

Conclusion: The notice under section 143(2) was invalid and the assessment order was quashed.

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional defect in the notice under section 143(2) succeeded, the assessment was annulled, and the assessee's appeal was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice issued under section 143(2) beyond the statutory time limit and before the acquiring of jurisdiction by the assessing authority is invalid, and the assessment founded on such notice cannot survive.

Issues: Whether the addition made under section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, treating the bitcoin investment as unexplained, was sustainable where the assessee claimed that the investment was disclosed and the transaction resulted in a loss.

Analysis: The record showed that the assessee had made an investment of Rs. 12.50 lakhs through banking channels and later received only compensatory amount under the settlement arrangement, while the material also indicated bitcoin transactions of a higher aggregate value. The authorities below treated the balance as unexplained investment, but the appellate record indicated that the original investment and the receipt of compensation were both disclosed. In these circumstances, the addition could not be sustained without proper verification of the loss claim and the transaction details. The matter required fresh examination by the Assessing Officer on the evidentiary basis of the alleged loss and the absence of taxable gain.

Conclusion: The addition was not finally upheld and the issue was remitted for verification by the Assessing Officer, resulting in relief to the assessee in part.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was leviable where the quantum appeal had been admitted by the High Court and the addition was therefore debatable.

Analysis: The admission of the quantum appeals by the High Court and the framing of substantial questions of law showed that the sustainability of the addition had not attained finality. In such a situation, the issue ceased to be clear-cut and became debatable. Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) can be sustained only where concealment of material particulars or furnishing of inaccurate particulars is established, and not where the underlying addition itself remains open to serious judicial scrutiny. The reasoning was consistent with the jurisdictional High Court decisions relied upon, which treat admission of a substantial question of law as a circumstance indicating that penalty is not warranted.

Conclusion: The deletion of penalty was upheld and the revenue's challenge failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a quantum addition is pending in appeal before the High Court on substantial questions of law, the addition is treated as debatable and penalty for concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is not leviable.

Issues: Whether the return could be treated as invalid for want of an audit report when the assessee claimed to have no income from business or profession and whether the matter required factual verification before denying rectification and refund-related relief.

Analysis: The assessee's consistent case was that it had earned income only from capital gains and other sources and, therefore, was not required to furnish an audit report. The lower authorities did not examine this core factual plea and instead shifted responsibility between the CPC and the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. The Tribunal held that the authorities were required to verify whether any business or professional income actually existed and, on that basis, determine whether an audit report was mandatory. The Tribunal also noted that a bona fide mistake in the return should not, by itself, prevent appropriate relief if the substantive claim is found correct.

Conclusion: The order of the CIT(A) was set aside and the matter was restored to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer for fresh examination of the assessee's claim, with consequential relief to follow if the claim is found correct.

Issues: (i) Whether reopening of assessment under sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid when it rested only on general information about a penny stock and did not show assessee-specific material or an independent nexus. (ii) Whether the additions made towards alleged unexplained sale consideration under section 69A, alleged commission under section 69C, and consequential interest addition could survive on merits.

Issue (i): Whether reopening of assessment under sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid when it rested only on general information about a penny stock and did not show assessee-specific material or an independent nexus.

Analysis: The reassessment was founded on information regarding manipulation in the scrip and on general allegations that beneficiaries had obtained bogus gains. The record did not show any specific material linking the assessee, his broker, or his transactions to the alleged accommodation entry network. The reasons recorded were based on borrowed satisfaction and lacked an independent formation of belief on the basis of material relatable to the assessee. In the absence of a live-link between the information and the assessee's case, the jurisdictional requirement for reopening was not met.

Conclusion: The reopening was invalid and bad in law, and the reassessment could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the additions made towards alleged unexplained sale consideration under section 69A, alleged commission under section 69C, and consequential interest addition could survive on merits.

Analysis: The addition of the entire sale consideration treated the share-sale proceeds as unexplained money without proving that the assessee's transactions were sham or that the assessee was part of any rigging scheme. No evidence showed receipt or payment of commission by the assessee, and the alleged commission addition was unsupported. Once the reassessment itself failed, the consequential interest addition also could not stand.

Conclusion: The additions under sections 69A and 69C, together with the consequential interest addition, were deleted.

Final Conclusion: The assessment reopening was quashed and all additions made in the reassessment were deleted, resulting in relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment cannot be sustained on the basis of general third-party information alone unless the Assessing Officer forms an independent belief, supported by material having a live-link with the assessee, that income has escaped assessment.

Issues: (i) Whether a show cause notice for recovery of customs duty could be issued without challenging the bill of entry or out-of-charge order; (ii) whether Boronated Calcium Nitrate imported by the appellant was entitled to the concessional benefit under Notification No. 50/2017-Cus. dated 30.06.2017.

Issue (i): Whether a show cause notice for recovery of customs duty could be issued without challenging the bill of entry or out-of-charge order.

Analysis: The relevant legal framework permitted recovery proceedings under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 for non-levy or short-levy of duty. The order records that assessment could be reviewed through statutory proceedings under Section 28, and that the absence of a separate challenge to the bill of entry or out-of-charge order did not bar issuance of notice. The appellant's reliance on finality of assessment was held not to assist it on this point.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellant and in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether Boronated Calcium Nitrate imported by the appellant was entitled to the concessional benefit under Notification No. 50/2017-Cus. dated 30.06.2017.

Analysis: The notification granted concessional duty only to calcium nitrate as a specified water-soluble fertilizer. The imported product was treated as Boronated Calcium Nitrate and was found to be a distinct product from calcium nitrate, with different composition and characteristics under the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1985. The exemption notification was required to be strictly construed, and the burden to establish eligibility rested on the claimant of exemption. Since the product did not squarely fall within the notified entry, the benefit could not be extended.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellant and in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were not maintainable on the appellant's exemption claim and the duty demand was sustained, resulting in dismissal of all connected appeals.

Ratio Decidendi: A customs exemption notification must be strictly construed, the claimant must prove clear entitlement to the concessional entry, and a product that is materially distinct from the notified commodity cannot claim the exemption by implication; recovery proceedings under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 may also proceed notwithstanding the absence of a separate challenge to the bill of entry or out-of-charge order.

Issues: (i) Whether the amount lying with the corporate debtor could be used for payment of gratuity dues of erstwhile employees if such claims were admitted. (ii) Whether the liquidator could utilise the corporate debtor's funds for prosecuting the arbitration against BSNL.

Issue (i): Whether the amount lying with the corporate debtor could be used for payment of gratuity dues of erstwhile employees if such claims were admitted.

Analysis: The appellant had given no objection for utilisation of the bank balance towards gratuity dues, but the liquidator stated that the claims received were belated and had not been admitted. The entitlement to payment therefore depended on whether such gratuity claims were accepted in liquidation.

Conclusion: The amount could be applied towards gratuity only if the claims were admitted; failing admission, the amount was to be made available to the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the liquidator could utilise the corporate debtor's funds for prosecuting the arbitration against BSNL.

Analysis: The sale notice provided that any proceeds from the BSNL arbitration would be distributed to creditors under the insolvency framework, but that did not prohibit the liquidator or the stakeholders' consultation committee from using the corporate debtor's funds to continue the arbitration.

Conclusion: The challenge on this ground was rejected and the liquidator was permitted to use the funds for prosecuting the arbitration.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was modified only to permit payment of gratuity if the claims were admitted, otherwise the amount was to be released to the appellant, while the refusal to restrain use of funds for the BSNL arbitration was sustained.

Issues: (i) whether the absence of confirmation of seizure under Section 37A of FEMA, and the competent authority's rejection of the seizure, extinguished the foundation for the show cause notice and adjudication proceedings; (ii) whether the High Court and the Adjudicating Authority were justified in treating Section 37A(4) of FEMA as permitting adjudication to proceed without awaiting the departmental appeal against the competent authority's order.

Issue (i): whether the absence of confirmation of seizure under Section 37A of FEMA, and the competent authority's rejection of the seizure, extinguished the foundation for the show cause notice and adjudication proceedings.

Analysis: Section 37A creates a preventive mechanism based on a tentative seizure supported by a reason to believe, but the competent authority's scrutiny under sub-sections (2) and (3) is a substantive check on whether the material can sustain even a prima facie inference of contravention. The refusal to confirm seizure, on a finding that no foreign security of value was shown to have been held and that the suspicion had no foundation, materially supported the appellants' challenge. In these peculiar facts, the show cause notice was not immune from writ scrutiny, because a notice may be interdicted where there is patent lack of jurisdiction, non-application of mind, or abuse of process.

Conclusion: the foundation for the show cause notice could not be treated as unaffected by the competent authority's order, and the challenge to the notice was maintainable.

Issue (ii): whether the High Court and the Adjudicating Authority were justified in treating Section 37A(4) of FEMA as permitting adjudication to proceed without awaiting the departmental appeal against the competent authority's order.

Analysis: Section 37A(4) operates where seizure is confirmed and continues till disposal of adjudication proceedings; it does not govern a case where seizure was not confirmed. By treating the interim seizure as having decisive bearing on the final adjudication, and by relying on the High Court's observations despite the pending statutory appeal against the competent authority's order, the adjudicating process effectively foreclosed the appellate remedy and ignored the legal effect of the un-reversed refusal to confirm seizure. The resulting adjudication was held to be contrary to law.

Conclusion: the High Court's dismissal of the writ challenges and the adjudicating authority's order could not stand, and the departmental appeal against the competent authority's order had to be decided first.

Final Conclusion: the impugned orders were set aside, the proceedings were revived from the stage of the show cause notice, and the departmental appeal against the competent authority's order was directed to be decided first before the show cause proceedings were carried forward.

Ratio Decidendi: a show cause notice and consequential adjudication under FEMA cannot be sustained on a footing inconsistent with a competent authority's un-reversed refusal to confirm seizure, and a statutory appeal against that refusal must be decided before the adjudication proceeds further where the later proceedings depend on the same foundational facts.