Issues: Whether the rejection of the application for restoration of the company's name in the register was justified on the grounds that the company was allegedly inactive, had not shown sufficient proof of business operations, and had not made out a case for restoration under the statutory scheme.

Analysis: The application for restoration was examined in the context of the power to strike off and restore a company's name under the Companies Act, 2013. The record included balance sheets and other material relied upon to show that the company had assets and was carrying on business, while the objection from the Registrar proceeded on the basis of non-compliance and alleged absence of statutory filings. The impugned order was found to rest on a misappreciation of the material and a vague conclusion that the company was not operational. The statutory approach to restoration was treated as one that should favour revival where the circumstances and documents support continuation of the company's existence and operations.

Conclusion: The refusal to restore the company's name was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration of the restoration application in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether a lessor can recover possession of leased premises occupied by the corporate debtor during moratorium under Section 14(1)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, even where the lease was terminated before commencement of CIRP.

Analysis: Section 14(1)(d) bars recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or in the possession of the corporate debtor. The protection is directed to the existing possession of the corporate debtor on the insolvency commencement date and is reinforced by the treatment of amounts due to affected persons as CIRP costs under Regulation 31(b) of the CIRP Regulations. The premises in question continued to be in the possession of the resolution professional for use by the corporate debtor, and the record showed that the premises were critical to the corporate debtor's operations as a going concern. The prior termination notice did not, by itself, permit restoration of possession to the lessor during moratorium.

Conclusion: The appellant was not entitled to recovery of possession during the moratorium, and the claim for delivery of the leased premises was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed on the central question of restoration of possession during CIRP, and the moratorium protection under the insolvency code continued to bar eviction of the corporate debtor from the leased premises.

Ratio Decidendi: During moratorium, Section 14(1)(d) protects the corporate debtor's actual possession or occupation of property, and a lawful pre-CIRP termination of the lease does not by itself permit the lessor to recover such property while the premises remain in the corporate debtor's possession.

Issues: Whether the eviction order could be sustained while the application concerning the lease deed and the appellant's possession remained pending.

Analysis: The pending application centered on the legitimacy of the lease deed and the appellant's claimed possession over the property. Since that application had not yet been decided, a conclusion that the appellant was an encroacher could not be reached conclusively. Eviction during the pendency of that related proceeding would be inconsistent with the unresolved question regarding the appellant's right to occupy the property. The dispute over possession was therefore required to be examined together with the pending application.

Conclusion: The eviction order was set aside and the matter was remanded for consideration along with the pending application, with the appellant's possession to continue until those proceedings are decided.

Issues: (i) Whether the materials on record established a pre-existing dispute sufficient to defeat the petition under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. (ii) Whether the impugned order rejecting the petition could be sustained in the absence of complete documentary material and a sufficiently reasoned finding.

Issue (i): Whether the materials on record established a pre-existing dispute sufficient to defeat the petition under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The reply to the demand notice and the accompanying record disclosed allegations of supply of sub-standard material, failure of machines, lab testing, and communications said to have been made before the notice under Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The record also indicated contemporaneous WhatsApp communications and a later debit note relevant to the disputed supplies. On the material placed before the appellate forum, the dispute was not shown to be a mere afterthought.

Conclusion: The existence of a prior dispute was not negatived on the available record.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned order rejecting the petition could be sustained in the absence of complete documentary material and a sufficiently reasoned finding.

Analysis: The appellate forum found the impugned order cryptic and noted that certain crucial documents referred to by the parties, including the alleged communication and the lab report, were not available on the record. In the absence of those documents, a final adjudication on the controversy was considered unsafe, and the appropriate course was to remit the matter for fresh consideration with opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh decision.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the rejection of the insolvency petition did not stand, and the proceedings were sent back for reconsideration by the adjudicating authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the record before the appellate forum is incomplete on material aspects bearing on a Section 9 insolvency dispute, and the impugned order is not supported by a sufficiently reasoned evaluation of the controversy, the proper course is to set aside the order and remit the matter for fresh adjudication.

Issues: (i) Whether the applications under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against the corporate guarantors were barred by limitation or liable to be rejected for want of a stated date of default. (ii) Whether the existence of DRT orders and recovery certificates, together with CIRP proceedings against the principal borrower, was sufficient to sustain the Section 7 applications against the corporate guarantors.

Issue (i): Whether the applications under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against the corporate guarantors were barred by limitation or liable to be rejected for want of a stated date of default.

Analysis: The applications were founded on final adjudication by the DRT and the consequential recovery certificates. Liability arising out of a recovery certificate constitutes a financial debt, and the holder of such certificate is entitled to initiate CIRP within three years from the date of issuance of the recovery certificate. The applications also referred to the DRT orders and the dates on which they were passed, which was sufficient to identify the relevant date of default for insolvency purposes. The omission to set out a separate standalone date of default in the form did not justify rejection when the substance of the application disclosed the debt, default, and the basis of liability.

Conclusion: The applications were not barred by limitation and were not liable to be rejected merely because a separate date of default was not pleaded in express terms.

Issue (ii): Whether the existence of DRT orders and recovery certificates, together with CIRP proceedings against the principal borrower, was sufficient to sustain the Section 7 applications against the corporate guarantors.

Analysis: The principal borrower had already been admitted into CIRP and subsequently liquidation on the same underlying debt. The corporate guarantors were jointly liable under the guarantee arrangements, and the DRT orders had already determined the liability and default. In such circumstances, the Adjudicating Authority's view that there was no material to show debt or default was contrary to the record. The impugned orders proceeded on an incorrect appreciation of the Section 7 application and overlooked the legal effect of the recovery certificates and the established default.

Conclusion: The Section 7 applications were maintainable on the basis of the adjudicated debt and recovery certificates, and the dismissal orders could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The dismissal orders were set aside and the insolvency applications were sent back for fresh consideration on their own merits without treating limitation or the absence of a separately pleaded date of default as a ground for rejection.

Ratio Decidendi: A liability crystallised by a recovery certificate is a financial debt, and a Section 7 application based on such certificate is maintainable if filed within three years from the certificate date; the absence of a separately pleaded date of default in the application does not defeat maintainability where the record otherwise discloses the debt and default.

Issues: (i) Whether the findings of professional misconduct recorded against the Resolution Professional and the consequential reference to the insolvency regulator called for interference in appeal.

Analysis: The impugned findings were based on the Resolution Professional's handling of the CIRP, including the manner in which a resolution applicant was treated as an investor and later sought to be brought in as a co-applicant, the alleged failure to ensure compliance with the statutory eligibility requirements for a valid resolution plan, and the fact that disciplinary proceedings had already culminated in a finding of contravention and imposition of penalty. The appellate forum also noted that the foundational order relied upon had already been affirmed by the Supreme Court, and that it would not be appropriate to take a contrary view on the same conduct once the misconduct had been established in disciplinary proceedings.

Conclusion: No interference was warranted with the adverse findings or the consequential reference for investigation. The appeal failed.

Final Conclusion: The appellate challenge to the remarks and findings against the Resolution Professional was rejected, and the dismissal of the appeal left the impugned findings and consequences undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where alleged professional misconduct is supported by prior binding findings and disciplinary action has already established the contravention, the appellate forum will not interfere with the consequential adverse observations or investigation reference.

Issues: Whether a subcontractor providing exempt works contract services for construction of roads and canals to a main contractor, who is ultimately serving governmental authorities, is denied exemption merely because the consideration was received from the sister concern of the main contractor instead of the service recipient.

Analysis: The admitted facts showed that the appellant was a subcontractor executing canal and road works for the main contractors, whose own services were exempt when supplied to governmental authorities. Entry 12 and entry 29(h) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST extended the exemption to such exempt works contract services and to subcontractors providing works contract services to a main contractor. Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 defines service as an activity carried out for another for consideration, and does not require that consideration must necessarily come directly from the service recipient. The record contained a certificate from M/s Jain Irrigation Systems Limited confirming that the work was awarded to the appellant and that its sister concern, M/s ECP Housing (India) Private Limited, was authorised to make payments. No contrary evidence was produced by the Department, and the certificate was accepted as reliable proof of the payment arrangement and the exempt nature of the service.

Conclusion: The appellant remained eligible for exemption notwithstanding receipt of consideration from the sister concern of the main contractor, and the demand was unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether statements recorded under Section 14 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 could be relied upon without compliance with Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and denial of cross-examination; (ii) Whether the alleged clandestine procurement of raw tobacco and clandestine manufacture and clearance of finished goods were established on the evidence; (iii) Whether penalty under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 could be imposed in the absence of a finding that the goods were liable to confiscation.

Issue (i): Whether statements recorded under Section 14 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 could be relied upon without compliance with Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and denial of cross-examination.

Analysis: Section 9D makes statements recorded during inquiry relevant only when the statutory procedure is followed. The person whose statement is relied upon must be examined as a witness before the adjudicating authority, and an opinion must be formed that the statement should be admitted in evidence in the interests of justice. Only thereafter can cross-examination arise. Since the department did not follow this procedure, the statements recorded under Section 14 could not be treated as admissible evidence for proving the allegations.

Conclusion: The reliance on such statements was impermissible and the challenge on this ground succeeded.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged clandestine procurement of raw tobacco and clandestine manufacture and clearance of finished goods were established on the evidence.

Analysis: A charge of clandestine removal must rest on tangible and corroborative evidence, not on suspicion, assumptions, or untested statements. The record did not disclose reliable documentary support showing unaccounted procurement, excess production, excess consumption of inputs, or actual unrecorded removals. The alleged check-post discrepancies were explained as data-entry errors, and no excess stock or other independent material was found to substantiate clandestine manufacture or clearance.

Conclusion: The allegations of clandestine procurement and clandestine removal were not proved.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 could be imposed in the absence of a finding that the goods were liable to confiscation.

Analysis: Rule 26 applies only where a person deals with excisable goods knowing or having reason to believe that they are liable to confiscation. The impugned order did not record a substantive finding that the goods were liable to confiscation, and such liability cannot be inferred only while imposing penalty. Without that foundational finding, the precondition for Rule 26 penalty was absent.

Conclusion: The penalty under Rule 26 was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The demand of duty and the penalties were set aside, and the connected appeals were allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Statements recorded during excise investigation are not admissible to prove the truth of their contents unless the mandatory procedure under Section 9D is followed, and penalty under Rule 26 cannot be sustained without a prior finding that the goods were liable to confiscation.

Issues: (i) Whether the panchnamas drawn at the searched premises were reliable and could be acted upon; (ii) Whether statements recorded under section 14 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 were admissible and could be relied upon without compliance with section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and without cross-examination; (iii) Whether the appellant was proved to be the manufacturer of the alleged clandestinely manufactured pan masala and gutkha, and whether the demand of duty, interest, penalty and confiscation could survive.

Issue (i): Whether the panchnamas drawn at the searched premises were reliable and could be acted upon.

Analysis: The search witnesses were not inhabitants of the locality in which the premises were situated, and the panchnamas did not record any reason why local respectable inhabitants were not available or unwilling to witness the search. The witnesses were also not examined, though their cross-examination was sought. The search procedure was held not to be in accordance with section 18 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with section 100(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In these circumstances, the panchnamas were found unreliable and excluded from consideration.

Conclusion: The panchnamas were held to be unreliable and incapable of supporting the demand against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether statements recorded under section 14 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 were admissible and could be relied upon without compliance with section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and without cross-examination.

Analysis: The statements were recorded during inquiry, but the persons who made them were not examined before the adjudicating authority as required by section 9D. The statutory procedure under section 9D was treated as mandatory, and the absence of examination and cross-examination rendered those statements inadmissible for proving the truth of their contents. The private diary also could not independently sustain the case once the foundational statements were excluded.

Conclusion: The statements were held to be inadmissible and incapable of being relied upon against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellant was proved to be the manufacturer of the alleged clandestinely manufactured pan masala and gutkha, and whether the demand of duty, interest, penalty and confiscation could survive.

Analysis: After excluding the panchnamas and the statements, there remained no reliable evidence establishing that the appellant financed, owned, controlled, or manufactured the goods at the unregistered premises. The material on record did not prove manufacture by the appellant within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Once the foundational evidence failed, the demand of duty, the consequential interest, the penalty, and the confiscation could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The appellant was not proved to be the manufacturer, and the demand, interest, penalty, and confiscation were set aside.

Final Conclusion: The adjudication order could not be sustained on the evidence relied upon, and the appellant succeeded while the departmental challenge failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where search witnesses are not local inhabitants without recorded justification and the witnesses to relied-upon statements are not examined in accordance with the mandatory statutory procedure, the resulting panchnama and statements lose evidentiary value and cannot form the basis of a demand for duty, interest, penalty, or confiscation.

Issues: Whether excise duty on goods manufactured by the contract manufacturer on job-work basis was recoverable from the appellant, who supplied raw materials and tools but did not itself undertake the manufacturing activity.

Analysis: The manufacturing activity was carried out by the contract manufacturer at its own premises with its own labour, machinery and resources, while the appellant merely supplied inputs and certain tools. The agreement described the parties as independent contractors, showing that the relationship was not one of agent and principal. Under the scheme of central excise, duty attaches to the person who actually undertakes manufacture, and ownership of the goods is not decisive. The relied upon notifications did not shift the duty liability to the supplier of raw materials in the absence of manufacture by that supplier. The precedents applied by the Tribunal consistently held that, in a genuine job-work arrangement, the job worker is the manufacturer and the duty liability remains on the job worker unless a valid statutory mechanism transfers that liability.

Conclusion: Excise duty was not recoverable from the appellant; the contract manufacturer was liable, and the demand against the appellant was unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: In a bona fide job-work arrangement, central excise duty is payable by the person who actually manufactures the goods, and mere supply of raw materials or ownership of the goods does not make the principal manufacturer liable.

Issues: (i) Whether existing State money-lending laws remain enforceable against unlicensed private money lending pending the anticipated legislation of States and Union Territories; (ii) Whether civil or criminal proceedings and investigation concerning unlicensed money lending must await that legislation.

Issue (i): Whether existing State money-lending laws remain enforceable against unlicensed private money lending pending the anticipated legislation of States and Union Territories.

Analysis: State money-lending laws already impose a statutory bar on unlicensed lending against promissory notes, whether or not supported by cheques, title deeds, or other security. Such laws also incorporate the Dam Dupat restriction against interest exceeding the principal disbursed, disable enforcement of loans advanced by unlicensed lenders, and make unlicensed money lending punishable. Proceedings instituted by a private lender should be stopped at the threshold unless the lender produces a money-lending licence or establishes that the money was not advanced at interest.

Conclusion: Existing State money-lending laws remain operative and enforceable against unlicensed money lenders notwithstanding anticipated future legislation.

Issue (ii): Whether civil or criminal proceedings and investigation concerning unlicensed money lending must await that legislation.

Analysis: The expectation of fresh legislation does not suspend available corrective or appellate remedies in individual matters. It also does not defer commencement of investigation into offences under State money-lending laws or applicable criminal law.

Conclusion: Civil and criminal enforcement, including investigation of offences by unlicensed money lenders, need not await the anticipated legislation.

Final Conclusion: The clarification preserves the immediate operation of existing State money-lending safeguards and remedies pending any future legislative measures.

Ratio Decidendi: Existing statutory restrictions and enforcement mechanisms against unlicensed money lending cannot be kept in abeyance merely because further legislation is anticipated.

Issues: Whether rejection of approval under Section 80G(5) was sustainable without determining whether expenditure on religious activities exceeded five per cent of the trust's total income under Section 80G(5-B).

Analysis: Section 80G(5-B) deems an institution or fund that incurs religious expenditure not exceeding five per cent of its total income to be one to which the provision applies. The rejection proceeded on the trust having religious objects, but contained no reasons or analysis establishing that its expenditure towards religious activities exceeded the statutory threshold.

Conclusion: The direction for examination within the scope of Section 80G(5-B) warranted no interference, and no substantial question of law arose.

Issues: Whether the Revenue's challenge to approval under Section 80G(5B) could be entertained where the assessee had not been issued notice before rejection of its application.

Analysis: The finding that the Commissioner (Exemption) rejected the application without issuing any notice to the assessee was undisputed. The absence of notice rendered the rejection procedurally infirm and supported the Tribunal's view that the assessee was entitled to approval.

Conclusion: The proposed questions concerning eligibility for approval under Section 80G(5B) were not entertained; the rejection of the application without prior notice could not be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether the manufacturing-segment margin requires reconsideration regarding idle-capacity and customs-duty adjustments, reversal of provisions, miscellaneous receipts, AE/non-AE segmentation and Elecon Engineering comparability; (ii) Whether business support service income and corresponding costs are operating items of the manufacturing segment; (iii) Whether Allsec Technologies Ltd. is excludable as a persistent loss-making comparable in the shared-services segment; (iv) Whether the marketing-support-services adjustment was made in breach of natural justice and could include parts sales; (v) Whether provision for obsolescence of inventory is deductible and whether corresponding stock valuation requires recomputation; (vi) Whether foreign-exchange gain is operating income in its entirety; (vii) Whether application-software licences qualify for depreciation at the higher rate; and (viii) Whether reimbursement of seconded employees' costs attracts disallowance as fees for technical services.

Issue (i): Whether the manufacturing-segment margin requires reconsideration regarding idle-capacity and customs-duty adjustments, reversal of provisions, miscellaneous receipts, AE/non-AE segmentation and Elecon Engineering comparability.

Analysis: Rule 10B(3) requires reasonably accurate adjustment for material differences affecting profits. Idle capacity is not confined to a start-up period and may arise from recession or industry conditions. The additional evidence concerning shutdown, demand conditions and capacity utilisation requires factual verification. The claimed customs-duty adjustment also requires examination. Reversal of a provision may be operating income only where it is established that the original provision was treated as an operating expense. Miscellaneous receipts require reconciliation before their operating character can be accepted. The AE/non-AE segmentation requires a rational allocation of foreign-exchange results and substantiation of cost allocation. Elecon Engineering's standalone business profile requires verification because a predominant business of manufacturing gears would make it functionally different from an earthmoving-equipment manufacturer.

Conclusion: These matters are remitted to the TPO for verification and fresh determination in accordance with the stated directions, with consequential relief to the assessee where the factual conditions are established.

Issue (ii): Whether business support service income and corresponding costs are operating items of the manufacturing segment.

Analysis: Business support services retain the character of service activity and do not become manufacturing activity merely because personnel or costs are recorded in the manufacturing segment. However, exclusion of service revenue requires exclusion of the corresponding expenditure on the principle of parity.

Conclusion: Business support service income is non-operating for the manufacturing segment, but the corresponding expenditure shall be excluded upon the assessee furnishing supporting details. The issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether Allsec Technologies Ltd. is excludable as a persistent loss-making comparable in the shared-services segment.

Analysis: The company earned profit in the financial year preceding the relevant year and was therefore not consistently loss-making. A company that does not incur persistent losses cannot be rejected solely under a persistent-loss filter.

Conclusion: Allsec Technologies Ltd. shall be included in the final set of comparables. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the marketing-support-services adjustment was made in breach of natural justice and could include parts sales.

Analysis: The material, data and basis relied upon for the adjustment were not shared with the assessee, preventing an effective response. Further, the approach concerning commission attribution must remain consistent with the treatment of machine and engine sales and cannot extend to parts sales.

Conclusion: The adjustment is remitted for fresh decision after disclosure of the relied-upon material and adequate opportunity; any commission attribution shall exclude parts sales. The issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether provision for obsolescence of inventory is deductible and whether corresponding stock valuation requires recomputation.

Analysis: A mere provision for old or obsolete stock does not establish an accrued loss; the loss is allowable when the stock is actually sold. Since such provisions were disallowed in the preceding and relevant assessment years, the opening and closing stock figures require consequential reworking.

Conclusion: The provision for obsolescence is not deductible, which is in favour of the Revenue; the Assessing Officer shall recompute opening and closing stock after accounting for the relevant disallowances.

Issue (vi): Whether foreign-exchange gain is operating income in its entirety.

Analysis: Foreign-exchange gain or loss arising from actual translation is an operating item for computing segmental margins. A notional or unrealised foreign-exchange gain does not have that character.

Conclusion: Only actual realised foreign-exchange gain shall be treated as operating income in the respective segments; unrealised gain shall not be treated as operating income. The issue is partly in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (vii): Whether application-software licences qualify for depreciation at the higher rate.

Analysis: Software licences that are in the nature of application software qualify for depreciation at the rate applicable to computer software, notwithstanding their accounting classification as intangible assets.

Conclusion: Higher depreciation is allowable where the software licence is application software. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (viii): Whether reimbursement of seconded employees' costs attracts disallowance as fees for technical services.

Analysis: The seconded personnel worked under the assessee's control and supervision, and tax was deducted from their remuneration. Reimbursement of their actual salaries to the associated enterprise contained no income element and could not be separately characterised as fees for technical services.

Conclusion: The reimbursement is not liable to disallowance under section 40(a)(i). The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transfer-pricing computation and related segmental margins require fresh determination on the remitted factual matters, while the corporate-tax treatment is governed by the determinations on obsolete inventory, software depreciation and employee secondment reimbursement.

Issues: (i) Whether ad hoc disallowance of professional fees was sustainable; (ii) Whether trade-incentive and brand-promotion expenditure was capital expenditure; (iii) Whether receipts for shared premises and third-party lettings were taxable as income from other sources, whether notional rent could be assessed, and whether related expenditure was deductible.

Issue (i): Whether ad hoc disallowance of professional fees was sustainable.

Analysis: Similar disallowances in earlier assessment years had been deleted. No particular item of professional expenditure was identified as not having been incurred wholly and exclusively for business, and the disallowance was made on an ad hoc basis.

Conclusion: The ad hoc disallowance of professional fees was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether trade-incentive and brand-promotion expenditure was capital expenditure.

Analysis: Trade incentives formed part of the assessee's business model for promotion and sale of its products. Expenditure on sales promotion and brand promotion does not become capital merely because it may yield an enduring or incidental brand benefit.

Conclusion: The trade-incentive and brand-promotion expenditure was revenue expenditure and the disallowance was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether receipts for shared premises and third-party lettings were taxable as income from other sources, whether notional rent could be assessed, and whether related expenditure was deductible.

Analysis: The jurisdictional High Court's prior determination that receipts from the shared premises were assessable under the head income from other sources was binding. The same treatment applied to actual receipts from the small portion let to third parties. Notional rent cannot be assessed under that head without evidence that income was received or had accrued as receivable. Expenditure wholly and exclusively incurred for earning income from other sources is deductible under Section 57(ii) and Section 57(iii).

Conclusion: Actual premises receipts were assessable as income from other sources; notional rent was not taxable, and the related building and common expenditure was allowable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The substantive domestic-tax claims for both assessment years succeeded, while the transfer-pricing grounds were not adjudicated on merits because they were not pressed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where premises-related receipts are assessable as income from other sources, notional rent cannot be charged without proof of receipt or accrual, and expenditure wholly and exclusively incurred to earn that income is deductible.

Issues: (i) Whether refund claims filed after introduction of GST for service tax paid under the earlier regime in respect of cancelled insurance policies and services not provided were barred by limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 when made under Section 142(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether such refund claims were hit by the principle of unjust enrichment where premium and tax had been received through financiers or agents and, on cancellation, the corresponding amounts were returned through the same channel.

Issue (i): Whether refund claims filed after introduction of GST for service tax paid under the earlier regime in respect of cancelled insurance policies and services not provided were barred by limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 when made under Section 142(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 142(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 governs post-GST claims for refund of tax paid under the existing law in respect of services not provided, while Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 recognizes adjustment or credit where consideration for a service not provided is returned. The statutory scheme was read to mean that where no service was ultimately rendered because the insurance policy stood cancelled and the premium with tax component was returned, the claim is to be processed under the existing law only to the extent contemplated by Section 11B(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The one-year limitation in Section 11B was not treated as a bar to such transitional refund claims concerning services not provided.

Conclusion: The refund claims were not barred by limitation; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether such refund claims were hit by the principle of unjust enrichment where premium and tax had been received through financiers or agents and, on cancellation, the corresponding amounts were returned through the same channel.

Analysis: Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 requires return of the amount to the person from whom it was received and does not mandate compliance with Section 64VB of the Insurance Act, 1938 as a separate condition for refund eligibility. The material on record showed that the premium had been received through financiers or agents, the cancellation amount along with the tax component had been remitted back to them, and the amount ultimately reached the insured by credit in the insured's account. In these circumstances, the incidence of tax had not been retained by the assessee and the bar of unjust enrichment was not attracted.

Conclusion: The refund claims were not hit by unjust enrichment; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Transitional refund of service tax paid on cancelled insurance policies was legally admissible in cash where no service was ultimately provided and the tax burden had been passed back through the financing chain to the insured; the departmental challenge failed on both limitation and unjust enrichment, and the remand order was unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund claim filed after the appointed day under Section 142(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for tax paid under the earlier service tax regime on services not provided is not rejectable on limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and is not barred by unjust enrichment where the consideration and tax component have been returned to the person from whom received so that the incidence of tax does not remain with the assessee.

Issues: Whether input tax credit of GST paid on long-term lease rental for land taken from the Government for construction of a factory is barred under Section 17(5)(d), including for the periods before and after construction, for vacant portions of the leased land, and for repairs, maintenance and renovation of the factory building.

Analysis: The restriction in Section 17(5)(d) is framed with a non obstante clause overriding Section 16 and blocks credit on goods or services received for construction of an immovable property on own account, including where such supplies are used in the course or furtherance of business. The expression "for construction" was construed by the Authority and affirmed here according to its ordinary purposive meaning, and the credit bar was held to apply to services received for the purpose of constructing the factory on leased land. The distinction between upfront premium and periodic lease rent was accepted, but it was held immaterial to eligibility because the tax treatment followed the statutory character of the lease service and the intended construction use of the land. The explanation to Section 17(5) extends "construction" to reconstruction, renovation, additions, alterations and repairs, so the same restriction applies to lease rental linked with repair and renovation activity. The vacant or green-belt portion of the land was also treated as part of the leased land devoted to the factory project, and the periodic timing of payment before or after construction was held not to change the statutory bar. Reliance on business-purpose credit under Section 16, on a restrictive reading of "for", and on differential treatment based on payment periodicity was rejected.

Conclusion: Input tax credit on GST paid on the lease rental was held to be inadmissible in all the situations raised, and the credit block under Section 17(5)(d) was applied against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The impugned advance ruling was affirmed, and the appeal was rejected because the lease rental was treated as blocked credit under the statutory restriction governing construction of immovable property.

Ratio Decidendi: GST paid on a lease rental for land taken for constructing an immovable property is blocked by Section 17(5)(d) when the lease service is received for the purpose of such construction, and the timing of payment or the existence of vacant or repair-related use does not remove the statutory bar.

Issues: (i) whether the release of the amount withheld for non-achievement of milestones was liable to be upheld and whether the milestones ought to have been rescheduled; (ii) whether interest could be granted on the amount withheld for non-achievement of milestones; (iii) whether the award relating to the final bill and the claim for three percent difference between the post-GST and pre-GST period could stand; (iv) whether damages awarded for prolongation of the contract under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the allied reliefs could be sustained.

Issue (i): whether the release of the amount withheld for non-achievement of milestones was liable to be upheld and whether the milestones ought to have been rescheduled.

Analysis: The contract contemplated both extension of time and rescheduling of milestones. The contractor had in fact sought rescheduling, the request was forwarded, and clause 5.4 made clear that absence of a formal application was not a bar to rescheduling. Repeated extension of time without corresponding rescheduling of milestones rendered the withholding for milestone failure unsustainable on the petitioner's challenge.

Conclusion: The direction for release of the amount withheld for non-achievement of milestones was upheld.

Issue (ii): whether interest could be granted on the amount withheld for non-achievement of milestones.

Analysis: The award contained no reasoning on this head. Clause 2 of the contract provided for automatic withholding and expressly negatived payment of any interest on the withheld amount. In the absence of any contractual exception, the grant of interest conflicted with the bargain between the parties.

Conclusion: The award of interest on the withheld amount was set aside.

Issue (iii): whether the award relating to the final bill and the claim for three percent difference between the post-GST and pre-GST period could stand.

Analysis: The admitted clerical error in the amount relating to the final bill was capable of correction and the figure was reduced to the admitted due amount. On the GST-related claim, the contractual clauses provided reimbursement only for tax actually paid and for future levy properly proved. No evidence established payment of the claimed differential, and the reasoning treating part of the post-GST work as service tax was found untenable.

Conclusion: The final-bill amount was corrected to Rs. 54,44,112/-, and the award of the three percent GST-related difference was set aside.

Issue (iv): whether damages awarded for prolongation of the contract under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the allied reliefs could be sustained.

Analysis: Damages under Section 73 required proof of actual loss or damage, or a legally sustainable basis for reasonable assessment where proof was not possible. The only material was a chartered accountant's certificate, which did not establish actual loss suffered because of prolongation. The quantified award rested on assumptions and was therefore unsustainable. By contrast, the penalty refund concerning the sample flat was upheld because the absence of proved loss made the contractual penalty unenforceable on the facts found. The interest and costs, except to the extent specifically interfered with, were left undisturbed.

Conclusion: The damages for prolongation were set aside, while the refund of penalty for delay in the sample flat was upheld and the remaining interest and costs were sustained to the extent not interfered with.

Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded only in part. The award was severed and interfered with only to the extent of interest on withheld milestone amounts, the GST-related differential claim, the damages for prolongation, and the clerical correction in the final-bill figure, while the remaining reliefs were left intact.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a severable part of an arbitral award may be set aside, but damages under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 must rest on proof of actual loss or on a legally sustainable basis for estimation, and contractual terms expressly barring interest on withheld sums must be enforced.

Issues: Whether the petitioner's detention, arrest and remand were vitiated by illegal custody, non-compliance with mandatory procedural safeguards, and failure to produce him before the competent Magistrate within the prescribed time.

Analysis: The Court found that the petitioner was taken into custody on 29.01.2026, the arrest memo was prepared only on 30.01.2026, the place of arrest was not clearly mentioned, the grounds of arrest were not properly annexed or acknowledged, no transit remand was obtained, and the petitioner was produced before the remand Magistrate only on 31.01.2026. The Court held that these defects showed clear violation of the safeguards governing arrest and production of an arrestee, and that the remand order was passed without proper judicial application of mind.

Conclusion: The detention, arrest and remand were held illegal, the remand order was quashed, and the petitioner was directed to be released forthwith.

Final Conclusion: The custody was held to be unlawful for breach of mandatory arrest and remand safeguards, and the habeas corpus petition was allowed with liberty to proceed afresh in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Arrest and remand under fiscal statutes must strictly comply with mandatory procedural safeguards, including clear disclosure of the arrest particulars and timely production before the competent Magistrate; failure to do so renders the custody unlawful.

Issues: (i) Whether the detention, arrest, remand and custody of the petitioner were illegal for clubbing the allegation of undervaluation with the offence of clandestine removal under the GST law. (ii) Whether the arrest procedure, including supply of grounds of arrest, intimation to relatives or friends, place of arrest, and generation of DIN, complied with the mandatory safeguards.

Issue (i): Whether the detention, arrest, remand and custody of the petitioner were illegal for clubbing the allegation of undervaluation with the offence of clandestine removal under the GST law.

Analysis: The Court found that the respondents did not adequately explain why undervaluation, which was linked to Section 122(1)(i) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and required determination under Section 74 of that Act, was treated as part of the offence under Section 132(1)(a). The first remand application had separated the two heads of evasion, while the second remand application mixed them together. The Court held that the two allegations were not shown to be legally interchangeable and that the remand order was passed mechanically without proper consideration of the defence objections.

Conclusion: The clubbing of undervaluation with clandestine removal was not justified, and the arrest, remand and custody were held illegal.

Issue (ii): Whether the arrest procedure, including supply of grounds of arrest, intimation to relatives or friends, place of arrest, and generation of DIN, complied with the mandatory safeguards.

Analysis: The Court found violations in the manner of arrest, including non-compliance with the requirement of supplying grounds of arrest in the manner prescribed, failure to properly intimate a relative or friend, absence of the place of arrest in the arrest memo, and non-compliance with the circular and instructions relating to DIN generation. The Court also noted that the safeguards recognised in the governing law and binding precedent were not followed.

Conclusion: The arrest procedure was held to be non-compliant with mandatory legal safeguards.

Final Conclusion: The remand order and all consequential proceedings were quashed, and the petition succeeded, while leaving it open to the respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where allegations under distinct GST provisions are unlawfully clubbed and mandatory arrest safeguards are not complied with, the resulting arrest and remand are liable to be quashed as illegal.