Issues: Whether assessment orders passed by the National Faceless Assessment Centre before 29.03.2022 were valid when its authority to conduct faceless assessment of income escaping assessment became effective only from that date.

Analysis: The assessment orders for both assessment years were passed by the National Faceless Assessment Centre on 08.03.2022. The notification conferring power upon the National Faceless Assessment Centre to pass such assessment orders became effective on 29.03.2022. Consequently, the Centre lacked jurisdiction on the date of the impugned orders.

Conclusion: The assessment orders were without jurisdiction and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether, in view of the retrospective insertion of section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the order annulling the reassessment on the ground that notice under section 148 was without jurisdiction should be set aside and the matter remanded for fresh adjudication on merits.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that section 147A had been inserted with retrospective effect from 01.04.2021 and clarifies the meaning of "Assessing Officer" for the purposes of sections 148 and 148A. The order under appeal had allowed the assessee's appeal only on the jurisdictional issue and had not examined the merits of the addition. In that situation, and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal found it appropriate to restore the matter to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision after granting opportunity of hearing to both sides and, if required, compliance with rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

Conclusion: The jurisdiction-based annulment was not sustained as a final determination, and the matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for reconsideration on merits.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was disposed of by setting aside the first appellate order and restoring the matter for fresh adjudication, with the Revenue obtaining a partial procedural success and the substantive issues remaining open.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a jurisdictional annulment rests only on the legal validity of notice and the governing law is retrospectively amended, the appellate order may be set aside and the matter remanded for decision on merits after hearing the parties.

Issues: Whether the assessee, a non-government retired employee, was entitled to exemption on leave encashment beyond Rs. 3,00,000 under Section 10(10AA) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in view of the CBDT notification enhancing the limit to Rs. 25,00,000.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that the controversy stood covered by earlier co-ordinate bench decisions holding that the notification dated 24.05.2023 enhanced the limit for leave encashment exemption to Rs. 25,00,000 and was to be applied retrospectively from 01.04.2023. The Tribunal followed the earlier view that the revised limit applied to private employees as well, and that the restriction to Rs. 3,00,000 was no longer sustainable.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to exemption of the leave encashment amount under Section 10(10AA) within the revised limit, and the disallowance made by the lower authorities was deleted.

Issues: Whether uploading show-cause notices only in the portal's additional-notices window constituted valid service and complied with the requirements of natural justice.

Analysis: The show-cause notices were uploaded only in the additional-notices window, with the result that the petitioner could not access them and submit a reply. This mode of communication was treated as non-compliant with the statutory service requirement and as causing a denial of a meaningful opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: Service of the show-cause notices was invalid and resulted in a violation of the principles of natural justice; the assessment was consequently set aside to that extent, with an opportunity to reply and a fresh assessment to follow.

Issues: Whether the claim for refund of excess Dividend Distribution Tax by applying the lower dividend-tax rate under the India-Switzerland tax treaty required adjudication.

Analysis: The claim for treaty-based refund of excess Dividend Distribution Tax had been placed before the Assessing Officer and raised in the statement of facts before the appellate authority, but neither authority adjudicated it on merits. The failure to consider the claim warranted restoration to the Assessing Officer for examination in accordance with law after affording adequate opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The claim was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication; this is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the indexed cost of acquisition of inherited property should be computed by adopting its fair market value as on 01.04.1981; (ii) Whether the assessee's claimed cost of improvement could be accepted where the Assessing Officer made an unsupported estimate without a valuation reference; (iii) Whether deduction for investment in a new residential property under Section 54 is available where the investment was made by the extended return-filing date under Section 139(4), though not deposited in the Capital Gains Account Scheme by the due date under Section 139(1).

Issue (i): Whether the indexed cost of acquisition of inherited property should be computed by adopting its fair market value as on 01.04.1981.

Analysis: For an asset acquired through inheritance or settlement, Section 55(2)(b) permits substitution of the fair market value as on 01.04.1981 as the cost of acquisition. The Revenue produced no material contradicting the claimed fair market value of the assessee's share.

Conclusion: The fair market value of the assessee's share as on 01.04.1981 shall be adopted as the cost of acquisition. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee's claimed cost of improvement could be accepted where the Assessing Officer made an unsupported estimate without a valuation reference.

Analysis: The estimated improvement cost based on limited plinth-area rates lacked support from a proper valuation exercise. No reference under Section 55A was made, and the valuation of the property at settlement indicated that substantial construction expenditure had been incurred. The claimed amount was found fair and reasonable.

Conclusion: The claimed cost of improvement shall be accepted for recomputation of indexed cost. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether deduction for investment in a new residential property under Section 54 is available where the investment was made by the extended return-filing date under Section 139(4), though not deposited in the Capital Gains Account Scheme by the due date under Section 139(1).

Analysis: The entire investment towards purchase and construction was made within the extended time available for filing the return under Section 139(4). Actual utilisation of capital gains for the specified residential investment within the statutory period prevails over non-compliance with the procedural requirement of deposit under Section 54(2). The expression "due date" for this purpose includes the extended period under Section 139(4).

Conclusion: Deduction under Section 54 is allowable for the entire investment made up to the due date under Section 139(4), notwithstanding that the amount was not routed through the Capital Gains Account Scheme. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The capital-gains computation must be revised by applying the substituted acquisition value, the accepted improvement cost, and the full residential-investment deduction.

Ratio Decidendi: Where capital gains are actually utilised for purchase or construction of a residential house within the extended return-filing period under Section 139(4), exemption under Section 54 cannot be denied merely because the amount was not deposited in the Capital Gains Account Scheme by the due date under Section 139(1).

Issues: Whether assessments of persons other than the searched person under Section 153C could be sustained on satisfaction notes that did not identify year-wise incriminating material or explain its bearing on determination of total income.

Analysis: The satisfaction notes merely referred generally to seized digital data and stated that it related to the assessees and had a bearing on their total income. They neither identified incriminating material for the relevant assessment years nor recorded the proposed undisclosed income or how the seized material bore upon the assessees' total income. Such omnibus satisfaction notes failed the jurisdictional requirements for initiating proceedings against a person other than the searched person.

Conclusion: The satisfaction notes were invalid and the assessments under Section 153C were quashed, in favour of the assessees.

Issues: (i) Whether the refund claim under the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004 could be rejected for want of documents not required by the refund rule; (ii) Whether the limitation period in Rule 35(4) of the Tripura Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 could bar the refund claim; (iii) Whether an alternative remedy of appeal under Section 69 of the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004 made the writ petition non-maintainable.

Issue (i): Whether the refund claim under the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004 could be rejected for want of documents not required by the refund rule.

Analysis: Section 43 of the Act provides for refund of tax paid in excess, and Rule 35 of the Rules prescribes the particulars and manner of the refund application. The application filed by the petitioner contained the particulars required by Rule 35(1), and the authority could not insist on additional documents not contemplated by that rule as a ground to refuse refund. The materials said to be missing had already been filed along with monthly returns and were annexed to the writ petition.

Conclusion: The refusal of refund on the ground of non-production of additional documents was unsustainable and is against the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the limitation period in Rule 35(4) of the Tripura Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 could bar the refund claim.

Analysis: The Act does not prescribe a limitation period for refund claims in Section 43, while Section 87 empowers rules only for carrying out the purposes of the Act and for prescribing the manner of refund. A rule framed under delegated legislation cannot impose a limitation that takes away a substantive right where the parent statute has not done so. The limitation clause in Rule 35(4) was therefore not accepted as a valid bar to the refund claim.

Conclusion: The limitation objection failed and is against the Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether an alternative remedy of appeal under Section 69 of the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004 made the writ petition non-maintainable.

Analysis: Section 69 provides an appeal against an order of assessment or penalty, not against an order refusing refund. The remedy suggested by the respondents was therefore not an effective alternative remedy for the impugned refund refusal.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable and this objection is against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The refund rejection order was set aside and the refund application was directed to be reconsidered afresh in accordance with law, with interest to follow if the refund is ultimately found admissible.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the parent statute confers a refund right without prescribing a limitation, subordinate legislation cannot impose a time bar that extinguishes that right, and a refund authority cannot add document requirements beyond those expressly prescribed by the refund rule.

Issues: (i) whether expenditure incurred by a general insurance company for outsourcing-related payments was disallowable under Explanation 1 to section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that it was in breach of the Insurance Act, 1938 or regulatory directions; (ii) whether disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 was applicable to an insurance company whose income is computed under section 44 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with the First Schedule.

Issue (i): Whether expenditure incurred by a general insurance company for outsourcing-related payments was disallowable under Explanation 1 to section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that it was in breach of the Insurance Act, 1938 or regulatory directions.

Analysis: The disallowance under Explanation 1 to section 37(1) requires material showing that the expenditure was incurred for an offence or for an act prohibited by law. The record did not show any punitive or penal action by the competent insurance regulator or other authority for the alleged violation. The issue was also covered by the Tribunal's earlier decision in the assessee's own case, and no distinguishing feature or contrary binding authority was shown.

Conclusion: The expenditure was held allowable and the disallowance under section 37(1) was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 was applicable to an insurance company whose income is computed under section 44 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with the First Schedule.

Analysis: The special computation scheme for insurance business under section 44 operates through a non-obstante clause and overrides the general computation provisions. On that basis, section 14A, being part of the general disallowance regime, was held inapplicable to an assessee engaged in insurance business. The issue was found covered by settled judicial precedents and by the Tribunal's earlier order in the assessee's own case.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was held not sustainable and was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The additions were deleted on merits, and the challenge to reassessment was not examined because it became academic.

Ratio Decidendi: For an insurance company, expenditure is disallowable under Explanation 1 to section 37(1) only when a competent authority has found an offence or prohibition by law, and section 14A does not apply where income is computed under section 44 read with the First Schedule.

Issues: Whether the petitioner's arrest and subsequent remand were illegal for want of supply of the grounds of arrest along with the arrest memo, and whether the remand order was liable to be set aside.

Analysis: The Court found that the grounds of arrest were not supplied to the petitioner contemporaneously with the arrest memo and were subsequently brought on record with the counter-affidavit bearing a CBIC-DIN. In view of the governing law on communication of grounds of arrest and the requirement of transparency in tax administration, the arrest and the remand based on it were held to be unlawful.

Conclusion: The arrest and remand were held illegal, and the remand order was set aside. The petitioner was directed to be released forthwith.

Issues: Whether the assessment order and the appellate order were liable to be set aside for failure to grant a personal hearing as contemplated by the statutory scheme under the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and whether the matter should be remitted for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The notice issued in the proceedings under Section 73 did not specify the date, time, or venue of personal hearing, and the record did not show that the petitioner had waived the right to be heard. Section 75(4) requires an opportunity of hearing where an adverse decision is contemplated, and the omission to provide such hearing amounted to a breach of the mandatory procedure and the principles of natural justice. The appellate rejection on limitation did not cure the underlying procedural defect in the original adjudication. The decision was therefore aligned with the view that an order passed without the statutorily required hearing cannot be sustained and must be sent back for a fresh decision.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment and appellate orders were set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the petitioner's arrest, detention and remand were illegal and unconstitutional on account of defects in the arrest memo, non-mention of the place of arrest, and non-compliance with the requirement of proper grounds of arrest and DIN generation.

Analysis: The arrest memo was examined against the constitutional safeguards governing arrest and detention. The Court found that the grounds of arrest supplied to the petitioner were not reflected as an annexure to the arrest memo, the place of arrest was not shown, and the DIN particulars on the grounds of arrest were prima facie suspicious and not system generated in the manner expected for transparent tax administration. In these circumstances, the Court held that there was violation of the safeguards recognised in the governing constitutional and binding judicial precedents.

Conclusion: The petitioner's arrest, detention and remand were held to be illegal and unconstitutional, and the remand order was quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition made by treating the difference between the stamp duty value and the agreement value of the property as income under section 56(2)(vii)(b) was sustainable; (ii) whether the indexed cost of acquisition of the under-construction flat was to be computed from the date of agreement/allotment or from the dates of actual instalment payments; (iii) whether the addition of Rs. 4,99,944 as unexplained investment under section 69 required deletion or fresh verification.

Issue (i): Whether the addition made by treating the difference between the stamp duty value and the agreement value of the property as income under section 56(2)(vii)(b) was sustainable.

Analysis: The difference between the stamp duty value and the consideration was only about 2.3%. The Tribunal held that the tolerance band of 10% was applicable even for the relevant year, relying on the principle that a curative amendment intended to remove hardship operates retrospectively. As the difference fell within the permissible tolerance limit, the deeming addition was not justified.

Conclusion: The addition under section 56(2)(vii)(b) was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the indexed cost of acquisition of the under-construction flat was to be computed from the date of agreement/allotment or from the dates of actual instalment payments.

Analysis: The Tribunal accepted the view that, for capital gains computation, the relevant date for indexation is the date on which the capital asset right is acquired through the agreement/allotment, and not the dates on which instalments are actually paid. The assessee's claim was supported by earlier coordinate bench rulings, which were followed.

Conclusion: The addition on account of recomputation of indexed cost was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the addition of Rs. 4,99,944 as unexplained investment under section 69 required deletion or fresh verification.

Analysis: The dispute turned on factual reconciliation of the payment evidence and the correct purchase documents. The Tribunal found that the controversy required verification of the documentary record and that the matter had not been properly examined on the correct factual footing. In the interests of justice, the issue was sent back for factual verification after granting adequate opportunity to the assessee.

Conclusion: The addition was not finally deleted at this stage and the matter was remanded for fresh factual verification.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on the substantive tax additions concerning deemed value difference and indexation, while the unexplained investment issue was restored for verification; the appeal was thus disposed of in the assessee's favour to the extent of the deletions granted.

Ratio Decidendi: A curative amendment removing hardship may apply retrospectively, and for indexation the relevant date is the date of acquisition of the capital asset right, not the dates of subsequent instalment payments; where the factual basis of an addition is not properly verified, the matter may be remanded for fresh examination.

Issues: Whether the demand and penalty could be sustained solely for non-production of the Export Obligation Discharge Certificate, and whether the matter required remand for consideration of the certificate to be issued by the licensing authority.

Analysis: The appellant claimed to have fulfilled the export obligation and stated that it was pursuing the matter before the licensing authority for issue of the Export Obligation Discharge Certificate. The Tribunal noted that the dispute centered on non-production of that certificate and that the relevant circular permitted consideration of the case on the basis of the certificate as and when issued. In these circumstances, the matter did not call for final rejection on the existing record and required reconsideration by the adjudicating authority.

Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed by way of remand for fresh decision on the basis of the Export Obligation Discharge Certificate when produced.

Ratio Decidendi: Where fulfillment of export obligation is claimed and the discharge certificate is still awaited from the licensing authority, the adjudicating authority should decide the matter on the basis of the certificate as and when issued rather than sustain the demand merely for non-production at that stage.

Issues: Whether the writ petition should be entertained against the order-in-original and DRC-07 when the petitioner is to avail the statutory appellate remedy, and whether interim protection should be granted to enable filing of the appeal.

Analysis: The petitioner chose to pursue the statutory appellate remedy and sought liberty to file an appeal with the requisite pre-deposit along with a delay condonation application. The Court did not examine the merits of the challenge and left all factual and legal grounds open for consideration by the appellate authority. It also directed that the question of delay be considered by the appellate authority in accordance with law. To preserve the efficacy of the statutory remedy, the Court restrained coercive action for the limited period allowed for filing the appeal.

Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by granting liberty to approach the appellate authority within two weeks with statutory pre-deposit and a delay condonation application, and by directing that no coercive steps be taken meanwhile.

Issues: (i) Whether the Fan Drive Assembly is classifiable under Heading 8483.60 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 as a clutch and shaft coupling, (ii) whether the said goods fall under Sl. No. 369A of Schedule III of Notification No. 1/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 as amended, and (iii) whether the individual parts and components of the Fan Drive Assembly, when procured separately, are classifiable under Heading 8483.60.90.

Issue (i): Whether the Fan Drive Assembly is classifiable under Heading 8483.60 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 as a clutch and shaft coupling.

Analysis: The product was found to operate on viscous fluid coupling principles and not as a conventional friction clutch. Its function was identified as torque modulation through fluid dynamics, with the assembly described as a self-contained unit having the characteristics of a fluid coupling. Applying the tariff description in Heading 8483 and the principle that a specific description prevails over a general one, the article was treated as falling within the clutches and shaft couplings entry. The exclusion in Note 2 to Section XVII also supported classification outside Chapter 87.

Conclusion: The Fan Drive Assembly is classifiable under Heading 8483.60 as a fluid coupling falling within clutches and shaft couplings.

Issue (ii): Whether the said goods fall under Sl. No. 369A of Schedule III of Notification No. 1/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 as amended.

Analysis: Once the goods were held classifiable under Heading 8483.60, the corresponding rate entry under Sl. No. 369A of Schedule III, as substituted by the amending notification, became applicable. The classification entry covered the relevant heading description for clutches and shaft couplings, attracting GST at 18%.

Conclusion: The Fan Drive Assembly is covered under Sl. No. 369A of Schedule III of Notification No. 1/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 as amended.

Issue (iii): Whether the individual parts and components of the Fan Drive Assembly, when procured separately, are classifiable under Heading 8483.60.90.

Analysis: The separate parts and components were examined in the context of the tariff structure for clutches and shaft couplings. As no specific sub-heading for parts of fluid couplings was identified within Heading 8483.60, the residual sub-heading for other goods under that entry was considered appropriate.

Conclusion: The individual parts and components of the Fan Drive Assembly are classifiable under Heading 8483.60.90 under the other category.

Final Conclusion: The ruling accepted the applicant's classification of the Fan Drive Assembly within Heading 8483 and extended the corresponding GST treatment, including the residual classification for separately procured parts.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a product has the essential character of a fluid coupling and is specifically covered by Heading 8483, it must be classified under that specific tariff entry rather than as a general motor vehicle part under Chapter 87.

Issues: Whether the impugned GST adjudication orders required interference and remand for fresh consideration on account of alleged non-consideration of the reply and the acceptance of a conditional pre-deposit arrangement.

Analysis: The petitioners had replied to the show cause notices, and the impugned orders were passed after further inspection. The challenge was founded on breach of natural justice and on the contention that the demand in the adjudication orders exceeded the proposal in the notices. The petitioners also expressed willingness to deposit 10% of the disputed tax, and the Court recorded that consent. On that basis, the matters were remitted for fresh adjudication on merits, with directions to file a further reply, make the stipulated pre-deposit, and have the tax demands reconsidered after notice and hearing.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside in effect and the matters were remanded for denovo adjudication, subject to the petitioners depositing 10% of the disputed tax and filing their reply within the stipulated time.

Final Conclusion: The petitions were disposed of by restoring the adjudicatory process to the respondent authority, while preserving the petitioners' opportunity to contest the demands on merits upon compliance with the directed conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an adjudication is alleged to have been passed without proper consideration of the reply, the matter may be remitted for fresh decision on merits with directions to secure compliance through a reasonable pre-deposit and a further opportunity of hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant, claiming coparcenary rights in the assets of one guarantor, was a necessary party entitled to intervene in insolvency proceedings under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which were directed only against another personal guarantor. (ii) Whether disputed succession and coparcenary claims over the assets of a deceased guarantor could be adjudicated within Section 95 proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant, claiming coparcenary rights in the assets of one guarantor, was a necessary party entitled to intervene in insolvency proceedings under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which were directed only against another personal guarantor.

Analysis: The proceedings under Section 95 were confined to the personal guarantor named in the petition. The appellant was not a party to the guarantee contract and claimed no right over the assets of the guarantor against whom the proceeding was actually initiated. A person can intervene only if his presence is necessary for effective adjudication. Since the application could be decided without the appellant, and the creditor was entitled to choose the respondents to the personal guarantor proceeding, no right of impleadment arose.

Conclusion: The appellant was not a necessary party and had no right to intervene in the Section 95 proceeding.

Issue (ii): Whether disputed succession and coparcenary claims over the assets of a deceased guarantor could be adjudicated within Section 95 proceedings.

Analysis: The proceeding under Section 95 is a special insolvency mechanism directed to the liability of a personal guarantor. It does not determine private succession disputes or coparcenary claims, which must be pursued in appropriate civil proceedings. The appellant had already instituted a civil partition suit, and no judicial determination had established any enforceable right in his favour over the assets of the deceased guarantor for the purpose of the insolvency case.

Conclusion: Such private claims could not be adjudicated in Section 95 proceedings, and they did not justify impleadment.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to rejection of intervention and the connected ancillary applications failed, as the insolvency proceeding remained confined to the personal guarantor named therein and required no participation by the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: Intervention in a Section 95 insolvency proceeding is maintainable only by a person whose presence is necessary for effective adjudication and whose rights arise from the very guarantee or liability in issue; collateral succession or coparcenary claims must be pursued in separate civil proceedings.

Issues: Whether the order condoning 36 days' delay in filing the company petition under the Companies Act, 2013 called for interference in appeal.

Analysis: The delay was condoned on the basis of medical documents supporting the pleaded ailment, and the appellate challenge that no opportunity was given to file a rejoinder did not dislodge the material considered by the Tribunal. The period of delay was not inordinate, and the power of condonation was treated as a discretionary one to advance adjudication on merits rather than defeat the proceeding on technical grounds. The objection regarding maintainability was kept open for consideration in the main proceedings and did not affect the order on delay.

Conclusion: The condonation order did not warrant interference, and the appeal was rightly dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The appellate challenge to condonation of delay failed, while the question of maintainability of the company petition remained open before the Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi: Condonation of a short delay may be sustained on a pragmatic and discretionary assessment of supporting material, and an appellate court will not interfere absent clear perversity or legal error.

Issues: Whether the addition under section 69A on account of cash payment towards credit card dues was sustainable in full when the assessee claimed that the cash came from family members and supported the claim with affidavits, income-tax returns and bank statements.

Analysis: The assessee produced affidavits and financial records of the father, mother and wife to show independent income and regular banking activity. The materials indicated that the wife had professional receipts, the mother had some recurring credits and income from small activities, and the father also had return filings and bank transactions suggesting some systematic activity. The explanation was accepted in part, but the available income and surrounding material did not justify the entire cash amount claimed as gifts. The explanation was therefore accepted only to the extent considered reasonable on the facts, and the balance was treated as unexplained.

Conclusion: The addition was deleted in part and sustained for the remaining amount; the assessee succeeded only partly on the issue.