Issues: Whether the ex parte adjudication orders passed on the basis of non-filing of reply and alleged discrepancies in GSTR-3B and GSTR-1, including excess claim of input tax credit, should be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The orders were passed without the petitioner filing a reply, and the adjudication proceeded solely on the material available before the authority. The petitioner asserted readiness to meet the show cause notice grounds and place supporting material if given an opportunity. In these circumstances, the orders were treated as ex parte in nature and the absence of participation was considered sufficient to warrant reopening of the proceedings so that the petitioner could answer the allegations on merits.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and the matter was remitted to the stage of reply to the show cause notice, with costs imposed on the petitioner.

Issues: Whether section 56(2)(viib) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied to the conversion of CCDs into equity shares when no fresh consideration was received in the relevant previous year, and whether the valuation for issue of shares at premium was to be made with reference to the balance sheet as on 31.03.2016 or 31.03.2017.

Analysis: The provision applies where a company receives, in any previous year, consideration for issue of shares in excess of their fair market value. In the present case, the funds had been received earlier on issue of CCDs and the conversion into equity during the year did not bring in fresh consideration. On that basis, the addition under section 56(2)(viib) could not survive. On valuation, Rule 11U(b) and Rule 11UA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 require the balance sheet drawn up on the valuation date, and if it is not available, the balance sheet drawn up as on the date immediately preceding the valuation date. As the relevant consideration had been received in the earlier year, the valuer was justified in adopting the last drawn audited balance sheet as on 31.03.2016 for NAV valuation.

Conclusion: The addition under section 56(2)(viib) was not sustainable, and the valuation adopted by the assessee was accepted.

Outcome: Delay condoned. The special leave petitions were dismissed. Liberty was reserved to apply before the High Court in case of alleged breach of bail conditions.

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to bail in view of the stage of trial, the period of custody, and parity with co-accused.

Analysis: The appellant had been in custody for a considerable period, the complaint had been filed but charges were yet to be framed, and the prosecution proposed to examine a large number of witnesses, indicating that the trial would take time to conclude. The appellant also stood on the same footing as co-accused who had already been granted bail. Taking an overall view of these circumstances, continued incarceration was not considered justified for the purpose of bail.

Conclusion: Bail was granted to the appellant, subject to furnishing bail bonds and compliance with the conditions imposed by the trial court.

Issues: Whether the order rejecting the refund claim was liable to be quashed for being a non-speaking order passed without considering the assessee's reply and without recording specific findings, and whether the matter should be remanded for fresh adjudication after hearing.

Analysis: The refund claim arose under the GST refund regime for export of services. The order under challenge was found to contain no specific finding on the refund claim and to have merely reproduced clauses of the service agreement, without dealing with the assessee's detailed reply or the core contention that the recipient was a distinct person and that the services constituted export of services. In these circumstances, the rejection of refund was held to suffer from non-application of mind and from the vice of a non-speaking order. The proper course was to require a reasoned and speaking determination after affording an effective opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The order rejecting refund was quashed and the matter was remanded for de novo consideration with a fresh speaking order after hearing the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The refund dispute was not decided on merits, and the authority was directed to reconsider the claim afresh in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund rejection that records no specific finding on the claim and does not consider the assessee's reply is liable to be set aside, and the matter must be reconsidered by passing a reasoned speaking order after affording a proper hearing.

Issues: Whether the appellate order dismissing the appeal for alleged non-compliance with the pre-deposit requirement could stand when the appellant had deposited the amount in its cash ledger but had not debited it in the prescribed manner, and whether the appellant ought to have been given notice and time to cure the procedural defect before the appeal was rejected.

Analysis: The appeal was not rejected on merits but only for alleged non-compliance with the mandatory pre-deposit under Section 107(6) of the CGST Act, 2017. The material showed that the appellant had made a deposit and had expressed an intention to satisfy the pre-deposit requirement, though there may have been a procedural lapse in the manner of debit from the cash ledger under the electronic regime. In such circumstances, the principles of natural justice and fair play required that the appellant be put to notice of the defect and afforded a reasonable opportunity to cure it, especially where the consequence was denial of the valuable right of appeal. The Court held that procedure and form had been elevated over substance.

Conclusion: The dismissal of the appeal for alleged non-compliance with the pre-deposit requirement could not be sustained. The impugned order was quashed and the matter was remanded to the Appellate Authority for decision on merits after the defect was cured and the pre-deposit amount was secured.

Final Conclusion: The appellant was restored to the appellate forum, and the controversy on merits was left for consideration by the Appellate Authority in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee has made a bona fide attempt to comply with a mandatory pre-deposit requirement, a purely procedural defect should not result in dismissal of the appeal without prior notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition challenging the show cause notice was liable to be entertained or whether the petitioner should pursue the proceedings before the authority concerned.

Analysis: The notice was only a show cause notice proposing cancellation of GST registration, and the petitioner had already submitted replies before the department. The Court noted that no final order had yet been passed on the notice and relied on the earlier Division Bench view that the proper course is for the authority to consider the replies and take a decision in accordance with law. The Court also noticed that the challenge to an analogous order had not succeeded before the Supreme Court.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained on merits and the petitioner was left to the statutory process before the authority.

Final Conclusion: The proceedings were closed with a direction to the respondent authority to take a decision on the show cause notice within the stipulated time.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ petition ordinarily will not be entertained at the stage of a show cause notice when the authority is yet to decide the matter and the proper course is for the noticee's reply to be considered and a reasoned decision taken by the competent authority.

Issues: Whether the orders rejecting the petitioner's claim for refund relating to zero-rated supplies were liable to be set aside and the matter remanded for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The dispute was identical to an earlier batch involving the same assessee, where the High Court had already set aside the adverse orders and remanded the matter to the original authority. In view of that earlier decision, and since the parties did not dispute the identity of the issue, the Court followed the same course without entering into a fresh merits determination. The matter was directed to be reconsidered by the original authority in accordance with law after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and the refund matters were remanded for fresh decision after hearing the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded to the extent of securing a remand for reconsideration of the refund claims, leaving the substantive entitlement open before the original authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an identical refund dispute has already been remanded in a prior batch and the parties do not dispute parity of facts, the same course of remand and fresh adjudication after hearing should follow.

Issues: Whether the writ petition was maintainable when the petitioner had already invoked the statutory appellate remedy before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and a stay application was pending.

Analysis: The petitioner had already filed an appeal and a stay application before the Tribunal. The Tribunal was in seisin of the dispute and was stated to be functional. In these circumstances, bypassing the statutory forum and invoking writ jurisdiction was not warranted. No exceptional ground was made out to justify interference, and the pendency of proceedings before a competent statutory forum weighed against entertaining the writ petition.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable and was dismissed in view of the available statutory appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner was relegated to the pending proceedings before the Tribunal, with an expectation that the stay application would be decided expeditiously.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an efficacious statutory appellate remedy is already invoked and is pending before a competent forum, writ jurisdiction will ordinarily not be exercised to bypass that remedy absent exceptional circumstances.

Issues: Whether the notices issued under section 148 for the relevant assessment years were barred by limitation, and whether the consequent reassessment proceedings could survive.

Analysis: The notices were examined against the extended timelines arising from the substituted reassessment regime, the transitional relaxation under TOLA, and the time allowed after the deemed notice and supply of material in terms of the Supreme Court directions. On the facts recorded, the notices dated 26.07.2022 and 30.07.2022 were issued beyond the surviving limitation period. Once the notices were found to be invalid in law, the reassessment proceedings based on them could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The notices under section 148 were held to be time-barred and invalid, and the reassessment proceedings were quashed in all the appeals.

Issues: Whether the assessee's additional evidence and revised segmental accounts relating to transfer pricing benchmarking should be admitted and the international transactions, including the internal comparable uncontrolled price, should be re-examined by the Assessing Officer/Transfer Pricing Officer.

Analysis: The assessee produced additional material to support the segmental allocation of expenses and to benchmark the international transactions on the basis of details prepared in line with the later assessment year findings. The material was considered relevant for proper adjudication of the transfer pricing adjustments. In the interest of complete justice, the additional evidence was accepted and the matter was directed to be verified afresh. The Assessing Officer/Transfer Pricing Officer was also directed to examine the allocation of expenses, the revised segmental report, and the availability of an internal comparable uncontrolled price for the purchase of books from the associated enterprise, after giving the assessee a proper opportunity of being heard.

Conclusion: The issue was restored to the file of the Assessing Officer/Transfer Pricing Officer for fresh verification, and the assessee obtained relief on the transfer pricing grounds.

Ratio Decidendi: Where additional evidence is materially relevant to transfer pricing benchmarking and the existing record is incomplete, the authority may admit such evidence and remit the matter for fresh examination of arm's length price with due opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 from assessment year 2018-19 onwards and whether the Assessing Officer was bound to act accordingly.

Analysis: The assessee's entitlement to approval under section 10(23C)(vi) had already been determined in earlier proceedings in its own case for assessment year 2018-19. The Tribunal noted that the later administrative order did not correctly implement that direction and that, in view of the coordinate bench decision already operating in the assessee's favour, it was bound to follow the earlier ruling as a matter of judicial discipline.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee. The assessee was held entitled to exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) from assessment year 2018-19 onwards and the Assessing Officer was directed accordingly.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the assessee obtained the claimed exemption for the relevant assessment year.

Ratio Decidendi: A coordinate bench decision in the assessee's own case is binding on a later bench of the Tribunal unless distinguished or set aside, and the authorities must implement the entitlement already adjudicated.

Issues: Whether liquidity damages recovered under contractual delay clauses are liable to service tax as a declared service under section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The demand was raised by treating amounts collected as liquidity damages from suppliers or service providers as consideration for an act of tolerance under the declared service provision. The amounts were recovered only when there was delay in supply or performance beyond the contractual timeline, by deduction of a specified percentage of the contract value. The issue was held to be covered by coordinate bench decisions which had already concluded that liquidated damages are not receipts towards any service and therefore do not attract service tax as a declared service.

Conclusion: Liquidity damages are not liable to service tax under section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Final Conclusion: The demand and penalty based on treatment of liquidity damages as a taxable declared service were set aside, and the appeal succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: Amounts recovered as liquidated damages for contractual delay do not constitute consideration for a taxable service or an act of tolerance under the declared service provision.

Issues: Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed at the threshold on the grounds that the petitioner was not a party to the underlying settlement, the cheque was issued towards the liability of another person, and the defence that it was issued as part of a without prejudice arrangement or as a gift.

Analysis: Section 138 uses the expressions "any cheque" and "any debt or other liability", and Section 139 creates a presumption that the cheque was issued for discharge of a debt or other liability. The legal liability need not be confined to the drawer's own personal debt; a cheque drawn towards another legally enforceable liability can attract penal consequences if the statutory ingredients are otherwise satisfied. The petitioner's reliance on absence of privity, the terms of the family settlement, and the alleged without prejudice arrangement raised disputed factual questions and defence contentions. At the stage of quashing under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, such matters could not be finally examined, particularly when the complaint and accompanying documents disclosed a prima facie case and the presumptions under the Act remained unrebutted.

Conclusion: The challenge to the issuance of process failed. The complaint under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was not liable to be quashed against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the delay of 356 days in filing the statutory appeal should be condoned and the appeal directed to be heard on merits.

Analysis: The appeal was filed beyond the limitation prescribed under Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994, but the delay arose from circumstances stated to be beyond the petitioner's control. The Court followed its consistent view that, where sufficient cause is shown and refusal to condone delay would prevent adjudication on merits and cause prejudice, the appellate remedy should be preserved by condoning the delay.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the appellate authority was directed to entertain the appeal and decide it on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where sufficient cause is shown for delayed filing of an appeal under the statutory limitation regime, and denial of condonation would defeat adjudication on merits, the delay may be condoned to advance substantial justice.

Issues: Whether Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits issuance of a consolidated show cause notice and consequential order covering multiple financial years.

Analysis: The Court followed its earlier decisions holding that there is no statutory prohibition against consolidating notices for multiple financial years under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. It noted that, in the context of alleged fraudulent availment or utilization of input tax credit, a consolidated notice may be permissible and may even be required to bring out the full transaction pattern. The Court also declined to depart from its consistent view merely because other High Courts had taken a different view.

Conclusion: Consolidation of show cause notices and orders for multiple financial years was held to be permissible, and the challenge to the impugned notice and order failed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were rejected as the impugned consolidation under Section 74 was upheld as legally permissible.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of a statutory prohibition, Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 does not bar a consolidated show cause notice or order covering multiple financial years, particularly where the alleged evasion pattern requires year-wise consolidation for determination.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the refund claim was liable to be quashed for being a non-speaking order passed without considering the petitioner's submissions and whether the matter required remand for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The refund rejection order contained no specific finding dealing with the petitioner's reply, documents, and hearing submissions. The impugned order proceeded on the premise that the petitioner was rendering intermediary services, without recording a reasoned determination on the nature of the services or addressing the contention that the supplies constituted export of services. In these circumstances, the order suffered from the vice of non-application of mind and did not meet the standard of a reasoned adjudication. Consistent with the settled approach applied in similar refund matters, the appropriate course was to set aside the order and require a fresh decision after granting a proper hearing.

Conclusion: The refund rejection was quashed and the matter was remanded to the adjudicating authority for de novo consideration and a fresh reasoned order, after affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner obtained relief against the impugned refund rejection, but the substantive refund claim was left to be determined afresh by the adjudicating authority.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund rejection order passed without considering the assessee's reply and without recording reasons on the material issue is a non-speaking order liable to be set aside, with the matter remitted for fresh adjudication after hearing the assessee.

Issues: Whether the orders cancelling and refusing to revoke GST registration were liable to be quashed for want of reasons and breach of natural justice, and whether the consequential proceedings could be set aside with a remand for fresh decision.

Analysis: The cancellation and revocation orders did not disclose reasons for the adverse action. The Court treated the requirement of recording reasons as a settled legal necessity in such matters and held that an assessee must be afforded a fair opportunity of hearing before registration is cancelled. Since the impugned orders were non-speaking and the challenge arose in the context of GST registration cancellation, the appropriate course was to set aside the orders, undo the consequential notice, and remit the matter for fresh adjudication after issuing a fresh notice and granting personal hearing.

Conclusion: The cancellation and revocation orders were quashed, the consequential notice was also set aside, and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration with opportunity of hearing.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner obtained substantive relief against the impugned cancellation process, but the tax authority was left free to proceed afresh in accordance with law after following due process.

Ratio Decidendi: An order cancelling GST registration must be a reasoned and speaking order passed after granting a meaningful opportunity of hearing, and a non-speaking cancellation order is liable to be set aside with remand for fresh adjudication.

Issues: Whether the impugned rectification order was liable to be quashed for failure to consider the petitioner's submissions and whether the matter should be remanded for de novo consideration.

Analysis: The impugned order did not advert to the petitioner's replies or the submissions made at the personal hearing, despite the earlier remand directing a fresh consideration. In the circumstances, the order was found to be non-speaking and unsustainable. As the respondents fairly accepted that the matter could be sent back, the appropriate course was to set aside the order and require a fresh adjudication after hearing the parties.

Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed and the proceedings were remanded for de novo consideration and a fresh reasoned order in accordance with law after hearing the parties.

Issues: Whether the petitioner's claim for input tax credit relating to financial year 2019-20 was filed within the extended time permitted under Section 16(5) of the GST law, and whether the rejection of the claim as time-barred was sustainable.

Analysis: The claims related to financial year 2019-20, which fell within the period covered by Section 16(5). That provision extended the time for taking input tax credit in returns filed up to 30 November 2021, notwithstanding the restriction in Section 16(4). Since the claims were filed in October 2020, they were within the extended statutory period and could not be rejected merely on the ground of delay.

Conclusion: The rejection of the input tax credit claims as time-barred was unsustainable, and the matter was required to be reconsidered by the authority in accordance with the statutory extension.