Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 5 days in filing the cross-objection deserved condonation. (ii) Whether the notice issued under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by an officer lacking the prescribed pecuniary jurisdiction was valid, and whether the consequential assessment order could survive.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 5 days in filing the cross-objection deserved condonation.

Analysis: The explanation for the short delay was supported by affidavit and showed that the cross-objection was filed after change of counsel and on advice raising legal grounds going to the root of the matter. The delay was neither deliberate nor mala fide, and no dilatory intent was found. In the interests of justice, a brief and satisfactorily explained delay merited liberal consideration.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the cross-objection was admitted.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice issued under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by an officer lacking the prescribed pecuniary jurisdiction was valid, and whether the consequential assessment order could survive.

Analysis: The returned income placed the case within the jurisdiction of the Assistant/Deputy Commissioner level under CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011 dated 31.01.2011, whereas the scrutiny notice was issued by an Income-tax Officer who lacked the requisite jurisdiction. For a scrutiny assessment under section 143(3), a valid notice under section 143(2) is a condition precedent, and a notice issued by an lacking jurisdiction is a foundational defect. The subsequent framing of assessment could not cure the absence of jurisdiction at the stage of initiation.

Conclusion: The notice under section 143(2) was invalid and the consequential assessment order was quashed.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on the jurisdictional challenge, the revenue's appeal did not survive, and the assessment was annulled.

Ratio Decidendi: A scrutiny assessment is vitiated where the notice under section 143(2) is issued by an officer who lacks the prescribed pecuniary jurisdiction, because valid initiation of proceedings is a jurisdictional precondition and not a curable irregularity.

Issues: Whether exemption under Section 54 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be denied merely because the assessee did not deposit the unutilised capital gain in the Capital Gain Deposit Scheme by the due date under Section 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, when the new residential house was purchased within the prescribed period.

Analysis: The assessee had sold a residential house and reinvested the sale consideration in a new residential house within the period permitted by Section 54. The only objection was non-deposit of the unutilised amount in the Capital Gain Deposit Scheme before the due date for filing the return under Section 139(1). The requirement of deposit was treated as a procedural condition meant to regulate utilisation of unutilised capital gains and not as a condition overriding the substantive requirement of investment within the stipulated period. The exemption provision was applied as a beneficial provision, and denial on a purely procedural lapse was held unsustainable.

Conclusion: The exemption under Section 54 could not be denied on the ground of non-deposit in the Capital Gain Deposit Scheme before the due date under Section 139(1); the disallowance was set aside and deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee has made the qualifying investment within the statutory period, the exemption under Section 54 cannot be refused solely for failure to deposit the unutilised capital gain in the prescribed scheme by the return-filing due date, since the deposit requirement is procedural and the substantive entitlement prevails.

Issues: Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was barred by limitation and liable to be rejected without examination on merits.

Analysis: The appeal against the order-in-original was found to have been filed after a delay of more than 20 months from the date of acknowledged receipt of the order. Under the applicable limitation scheme for service tax appeals, the appellate authority could condone delay only up to the statutorily permitted period, and no power existed to condone delay beyond that period. The Tribunal also found that the plea of later receipt was unsupported in view of the acknowledgement on record, and held that the appellant had not approached the forum with clean hands.

Conclusion: The appeal was rightly held to be time barred and was not maintainable before the Commissioner (Appeals), with no relief available on merits.

Final Conclusion: The dismissal of the appeal is sustained on the ground of inordinate and non-condonable delay, leaving the adjudication on tax demand and penalty undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute prescribes a fixed outer limit for condonation of delay, the appellate authority cannot entertain an appeal filed beyond that limit, and the dispute must fail at the threshold on limitation.

Issues: Whether waste and residual products such as wet bhoosi, chilka, dundli and malt sprouts are exigible to excise duty and whether Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 applies so as to require reversal or payment of an amount on their clearance.

Analysis: The dispute turned on the character of the impugned by-products/residuals arising during manufacture. The Tribunal noted that the question was already settled by the Supreme Court in relation to similar residual products, where such waste was held not to be a manufactured product and, therefore, outside the reach of Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. The Tribunal also noted that the same issue stood covered in the respondent's own case by the High Court. In view of these settled principles, the demand for reversal/payment on clearance of the residual products could not survive.

Conclusion: The residual products were not liable to excise duty in the manner alleged, and Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 did not apply. The Department's appeal was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order dropping the demand was affirmed and the revenue challenge failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Waste or residual products arising incidentally in the course of manufacture, which are not themselves manufactured products, do not attract Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 merely because they are sold or arise during the manufacturing process.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings initiated under sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were valid when the material relied upon for reopening was not furnished to the assessee and no effective opportunity of rebuttal or cross-examination was granted.

Analysis: The reopening was founded on information from the Investigation Wing alleging payment of on-money in connection with purchase of property. In response to the notice under section 148A(b), the assessee specifically sought copies of the statements, seized material and other documents forming the basis of the proposed reopening, and also requested cross-examination of the concerned persons. The record did not show that the relied upon material was furnished or that the requested cross-examination was provided. The reopening therefore suffered from breach of the procedural safeguards under section 148A and from violation of principles of natural justice, as effective rebuttal was denied. Following the cited precedents, non-supply of the foundational material vitiated the assumption of jurisdiction for reassessment.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings, including the order under section 148A(d), the notice under section 148 and the assessment under section 147 read with section 144B, were held unsustainable and were quashed.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 for the relevant assessment year was barred by limitation and whether the consequent reassessment was invalid.

Analysis: The notice under section 148 was issued on 28.04.2022 for assessment year 2015-16. The applicable limitation under section 149(1)(b) required issuance within six years from the end of the assessment year, that is, on or before 31.03.2022. Since the notice was issued after the expiry of that period, it was time-barred. Once the notice itself was invalid, the reassessment proceedings founded on it could not survive.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 was barred by limitation and the consequent reassessment order was invalid. The appeal was therefore allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether penalty under section 271(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for non-compliance with notices under section 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained when an additional ground relating to limitation of notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was raised, and whether the penalty for three defaults could be treated as one default.

Analysis: The penalty proceedings were held to be independent of the validity or limitation of the notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the consequential assessment. The non-compliance issue had to be examined on its own footing, with the relevant consideration being the assessee's failure to respond to the notices under section 142(1) and the absence of a demonstrated reasonable cause under section 273B. At the same time, on a lenient view, the three notices were treated as giving rise to one default for the purpose of penalty computation.

Conclusion: The penalty was sustained in principle, but the quantum was reduced from Rs. 30,000/- to Rs. 10,000/-.

Final Conclusion: The assessee obtained partial relief, while the penalty order was upheld only to the extent of the reduced amount.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty for non-compliance with statutory notices is to be adjudicated independently of collateral challenges to other proceedings, and where the defaults are identical in nature, a reduced consolidated penalty may be imposed on a lenient view.

Issues: (i) Whether cash is property; (ii) Whether a benami transaction requires three parties; (iii) Whether Section 2(9)(D) can be invoked in the absence of investigation regarding ownership of cash; (iv) Whether the PBPT Act is inapplicable because the appellant was ready to file income tax return for the seized amount.

Issue (i): Whether cash is property.

Analysis: Property was treated as including movable and immovable assets, and cash was held to be tangible movable property. The object of the PBPT Act was also noted to be the curbing of black money and benami dealings. Cash found without a satisfactory explanation was held capable of falling within the statutory concept of property and benami property.

Conclusion: Yes. Cash is property and can fall within the ambit of benami property.

Issue (ii): Whether a benami transaction requires three parties.

Analysis: The definitions of benami property, benamidar, and beneficial owner were applied to hold that the statutory scheme contemplates the person in whose name the property is held and the person for whose benefit it is held. The tribunal rejected the contention that a third party is essential for constituting a benami transaction.

Conclusion: No. Only the benamidar and the beneficial owner are necessary.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 2(9)(D) can be invoked in the absence of investigation regarding ownership of cash.

Analysis: The appellant had not substantiated the source of the cash, had not disclosed the alleged contributors, and had accepted ownership of the seized cash in the recorded statement. On those facts, the inability to trace the person providing consideration attracted the statutory definition of benami transaction under Section 2(9)(D).

Conclusion: No. Section 2(9)(D) was rightly invoked.

Issue (iv): Whether the PBPT Act is inapplicable because the appellant was ready to file income tax return for the seized amount.

Analysis: The tribunal held that filing or proposing to file an income tax return does not exclude the application of the PBPT Act. The two enactments operate in different fields, and the PBPT Act is not displaced by a self-declaration of income under the Income-tax Act.

Conclusion: No. Readiness to file income tax return did not bar proceedings under the PBPT Act.

Final Conclusion: The seizure and attachment were sustained, and the appeal failed on all substantive issues, resulting in dismissal.

Ratio Decidendi: Unexplained cash can constitute property under the PBPT Act, and where the source of consideration is not traceable, the transaction may be treated as benami notwithstanding any parallel or proposed income-tax declaration.

Issues: (i) whether the challenge to the removal from directorship and dilution of shareholding was barred by limitation; (ii) whether the valuation directions issued by the Tribunal called for interference in appeal.

Issue (i): whether the challenge to the removal from directorship and dilution of shareholding was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The impugned acts complained of related to 2012 and 2013, whereas the company petition was filed in 2018. The appellant's own notice of 05.01.2013 showed awareness of the retirement/removal, and the record also supported knowledge of the share allotment. A continuing cause of action was not accepted on these facts, and the Tribunal held that stale claims could not be revived by re-characterising them as continuing oppression. The appellate forum also declined to entertain a fresh challenge to the alleged illegality of removal from directorship, since the point had not been urged before the Tribunal below.

Conclusion: The challenge was barred by limitation and the appellant was not entitled to relief on this issue.

Issue (ii): whether the valuation directions issued by the Tribunal called for interference in appeal.

Analysis: The Tribunal had directed valuation by an independent registered valuer with the share price to be determined as on the specified date, and the acquisition of M/s Orvi Design Studio was excluded for the limited purpose of valuation. The appellant had opportunities to participate before the valuer and before the Tribunal, but did not avail them. No substantive infirmity in the valuation mechanism or the resulting exercise was shown to justify appellate interference.

Conclusion: The valuation directions did not warrant interference and were upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed on the principal challenges and the Tribunal's order was left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A claim of oppression and mismanagement based on acts known to the petitioner cannot be revived as a continuing wrong to avoid limitation, and an appellate forum will not interfere with a reasoned independent valuation direction absent a demonstrable legal infirmity.

Issues: Whether the cashback or reward incentive received on use of a commercial credit card amounted to consideration for a declared service, so as to attract service tax.

Analysis: The arrangement between the assessee and the banks showed no obligation on the assessee to promote the banks' business or to perform any other service in return for the incentive. Mere use of the credit card for making payments did not, by itself, constitute a service rendered to the banks. The alleged promotional activity was not supported by the show-cause notice or by the record. The incentive was only a bank-funded cashback scheme designed to encourage card usage and increase the bank's own business, and therefore lacked the essential nexus between an activity and consideration required for taxation as a service. The Circular issued by the Board also recognised that taxability under the declared service provision depends on a specific agreement to do, refrain from, or tolerate an act, together with flow of consideration for that activity.

Conclusion: The cashback incentive was not consideration for any taxable service, and no service tax was leviable on the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 could be imposed on a body corporate; (ii) Whether the goods were liable to confiscation so as to sustain invocation of Rule 26.

Issue (i): Whether penalty under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 could be imposed on a body corporate.

Analysis: Rule 26 uses the expression "any person". The expression is not defined in the Central Excise Act or the Rules, so the ordinary meaning aided by the General Clauses Act applies. The provision is concerned with penalising persons who deal with excisable goods knowing or having reason to believe that such goods are liable to confiscation. The Tribunal held that the expression is wide enough to include a juristic person. The reliance placed on earlier decisions excluding corporate entities under erstwhile Rule 209A was not accepted as decisive, since the statutory expression and the interpretive approach support inclusion of a body corporate.

Conclusion: Penalty under Rule 26 can be imposed on a body corporate, and this objection failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the goods were liable to confiscation so as to sustain invocation of Rule 26.

Analysis: Rule 25 makes goods liable to confiscation where excisable goods are removed in contravention of the Rules with intent to evade duty. The undervaluation and consequent duty short-payment had already been established against the manufacturer, and those findings had attained finality. The Tribunal held that actual confiscation is not a precondition for invoking Rule 26 if the goods are otherwise confiscable. On the facts, the appellant was aware that the assessable value adopted was not legally correct and that the goods were being cleared in a manner exposing them to confiscation.

Conclusion: The goods were liable to confiscation and Rule 26 was rightly invoked.

Final Conclusion: The penalty imposed on the appellant under Rule 26 was sustained, and the appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: The expression "any person" in Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 includes a body corporate, and penalty is sustainable where the goods are otherwise confiscable and the person dealt with them knowing or having reason to believe that they were liable to confiscation.

Issues: (i) Whether the printouts and WhatsApp chats taken from electronic devices were admissible in evidence in the absence of the statutory certificate; (ii) Whether the rejection of country of origin certificates and the re-determination of value and duty demand were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the printouts and WhatsApp chats taken from electronic devices were admissible in evidence in the absence of the statutory certificate.

Analysis: The electronic records relied upon by the Revenue were taken from a hard disk and mobile devices, but the statutory requirements for admissibility of electronic evidence were not satisfied. Mere seizure, panchnama, or subsequent reference to the printouts did not substitute the mandatory certificate contemplated by the governing provision. The statements of the director and the third-party statement were also not supported by independent corroboration and could not, by themselves, prove the allegations when the electronic material itself was inadmissible.

Conclusion: The electronic printouts and chats were held to be inadmissible, and the Revenue could not rely on them to sustain the demand.

Issue (ii): Whether the rejection of country of origin certificates and the re-determination of value and duty demand were sustainable.

Analysis: The country of origin certificates were not shown to be fake or invalid through any verification from the issuing authorities, and no legally sufficient basis was established to disregard them. The alleged Chinese origin was inferred mainly from inadmissible electronic material and uncorroborated statements. The enhancement of value was also unsupported, as no contemporaneous import data or evidence of extra consideration was produced, and the re-determination was based on proforma invoices rather than legally reliable valuation material. Penalty could not survive once the demand itself failed.

Conclusion: The rejection of origin certificates, the re-determination of value, the duty demand, and the penalties were unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded in full, with the impugned order set aside and consequential relief granted according to law.

Ratio Decidendi: Electronic records used in customs adjudication must satisfy the mandatory statutory certificate requirement, and unsupported statements or unverified material cannot override valid country of origin certificates or justify enhancement of value without reliable corroboration.

Issues: Whether extraordinary writ jurisdiction should be exercised to examine factual objections to additions made in an assessment order when an appellate remedy is available.

Analysis: The challenge required appreciation of facts, evidence and the relevance of transactions to the assessment year. Such matters fall within the jurisdiction of the statutory appellate authority and do not warrant exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: Extraordinary writ jurisdiction was not invoked; the petitioner was relegated to the appellate remedy, with the appellate authority directed to consider an appeal filed within two weeks without objection on limitation.

Issues: Whether the applicants' repatriation from Shillong to their original zones pursuant to the revised inter-commissionerate transfer policy and the establishment order was liable to be interfered with.

Analysis: Transfer and posting are matters within the employer's administrative prerogative and are incidents of service. An employee holding a transferable post has no vested right to continue at a particular station. Judicial interference is warranted only where a transfer order is vitiated by mala fides or contravenes a mandatory statutory rule. The applicants did not establish discrimination, mala fides, or violation of a binding statutory restriction in their repatriation under the policy applicable to all concerned employees.

Conclusion: The repatriation order was not liable to be quashed; the challenge was decided against the applicants.

Issues: Whether penalties for underreporting of income as a consequence of misreporting could be sustained where excess refund arising from incorrect deductions was repaid with interest before issuance of reassessment notice and the penalty proceedings did not identify the specific statutory limb of misreporting.

Analysis: The excess deductions and house-property loss had been claimed in the original returns on the advice of a tax consultant. On discovering the error, the assessee repaid the excess refund with interest before the reassessment notices were issued and furnished returns disclosing the correct income, which were accepted. The applicable coordinate-bench decisions treated the failure to specify the particular clause under section 270A(9) as fatal to the penalty, particularly where the correct tax had been paid before detection by the Revenue.

Conclusion: The penalties under section 270A were unsustainable and were directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the statutory period for giving effect to the appellate order had expired.

Analysis: The limitation contention under Section 153(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, including the asserted consequence of expiry of time for giving appeal effect, was placed before the Court. The Court sought instructions from the Assessing Officer regarding that issue.

Outcome: Matter directed to be listed for further hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) could be denied in full to a co-operative society registered under the State co-operative law merely because it had nominal or associate members with restricted rights; (ii) whether the assessee was entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) on income enhanced by disallowance of provision for interest payable on members' deposits.

Issue (i): Whether deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) could be denied in full to a co-operative society registered under the State co-operative law merely because it had nominal or associate members with restricted rights.

Analysis: The expression "member" for purposes of section 80P(2)(a)(i) has to be understood with reference to the co-operative law under which the society is registered, since the Income-tax Act does not define the term. Where the State law recognises nominal or associate members as members, the mere fact that such members do not enjoy identical rights with regular members does not make them strangers or non-members. The denial of deduction cannot rest only on the presence of different classes of membership. The earlier decision in Citizen Co-operative Society Ltd. cannot be applied mechanically without examining the governing State law and the actual factual matrix. On the facts, the claimed associate membership was not shown to be beyond the permissible framework in a manner warranting blanket denial of deduction.

Conclusion: Deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) could not be denied in full on this ground, and the assessee succeeded on this issue.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) on income enhanced by disallowance of provision for interest payable on members' deposits.

Analysis: The disallowance was a computational adjustment to the profit of the eligible business of providing credit facilities to members. It did not change the character of the income or show that the amount arose from any non-eligible source. Where an addition only increases the business profit of an activity otherwise eligible for deduction, the deduction has to be computed on the enhanced profit, unless the addition is connected with an ineligible source of income.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) on the enhanced profit arising from the disallowance of the provision for interest.

Final Conclusion: The disallowance of deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) was set aside, and the assessee's claims succeeded for both assessment years.

Ratio Decidendi: For section 80P(2)(a)(i), the status of a person as a member must be determined by the governing State co-operative law, and a deduction cannot be denied in full merely because some categories of recognised members have restricted rights; any addition that only enhances eligible business profits remains deductible on the enhanced figure.

Issues: Whether a dispute regarding deduction and refund of BOCW cess, arising from a construction contract and turning on the applicability of the BOCW enactments and related rules, is arbitrable and fit for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: The controversy was held to be governed substantially by the statutory framework under the Building and Other Construction Workers enactments, including the question whether the work fell within the exclusion in the definition of building or other construction work. The deduction was made pursuant to statutory provisions, government notifications, and the contractual stipulation incorporated in the agreement, and the amount had already been deposited with the competent State authority. The Court held that disputes centred on statutory liability, levy, collection, and applicability of the cess are matters for the competent statutory mechanism and not a pure contractual dispute amenable to arbitration at the referral stage.

Conclusion: The request for appointment of a Sole Arbitrator was rejected, as the dispute was held not fit for reference under Section 11(6) and was required to be pursued before the statutory authority.

Issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff proved its monetary claim and entitlement to recover amounts against the defendants in the civil suit. (ii) Whether the acquittal in the prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be sustained when the cheque was issued towards an admitted liability and the defence was not proved.

Issue (i): Whether the plaintiff proved its monetary claim and entitlement to recover amounts against the defendants in the civil suit.

Analysis: The suit was founded on alleged joint business dealings, supply of yarn, job-work charges, and damages for non-delivery of garments. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to prove any joint business association among the defendants or any reliable entrustment of work and delivery of materials. The agreement relied on was found to be suspicious because the stamp paper post-dated the alleged execution. The documents said to connect the fifth defendant were held unreliable, and the evidence showed that the plaintiff had not established the claim by acceptable proof.

Conclusion: The civil claim was not proved and the decree of the trial court was set aside in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the acquittal in the prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be sustained when the cheque was issued towards an admitted liability and the defence was not proved.

Analysis: The Court held that the cheque was issued towards a legally enforceable debt, that the accused failed to rebut the statutory presumption, and that the defence based on alleged transactions and a purported agreement was unsupported and unreliable. The reversal of conviction by the appellate criminal court had been founded mainly on the civil decree, which no longer survived. The evidence also showed that the defence version did not displace the complainant's case of cheque dishonour.

Conclusion: The acquittal was unsustainable and the conviction and sentence were restored in favour of the complainant.

Final Conclusion: Both connected matters were allowed, with the civil decree set aside and the criminal acquittal reversed, resulting in restoration of the trial court's conviction and dismissal of the civil suit.

Ratio Decidendi: A cheque issued for an admitted liability attracts the statutory presumption under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the presumption is displaced only by credible rebuttal evidence; unsupported allegations and unreliable fabricated documents do not suffice. A civil monetary claim must also be proved by cogent evidence of the underlying transaction and liability.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the adjudication order under Section 73 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 warranted interference on the grounds of alleged notice of the adjournment hearing and alleged violation of Section 75(7), and whether the petitioner should be relegated to the appellate remedy.

Analysis: The dashboard entries showed the original show cause notice, subsequent reminders, and the adjournment notice dated 17.12.2025. On the material placed, the contention that the petitioner was unaware of the notice and hearing date was found unconvincing, and the objection based on natural justice was rejected on the ground of substantial compliance. The Court also noted that the proceedings were under Section 73 and that the supplementary notice was not time-barred, while the demand in the impugned order matched the proposed demand. Since the remaining objections involved disputed facts requiring appraisal of evidence, the Court held that the matter was better examined in appeal.

Outcome: The petitioner was relegated to the alternative appellate remedy, and the writ petition was disposed of with an observation that an appeal filed within three weeks should be entertained on merits without objection as to limitation.