Issues: Whether criminal prosecution for cheating and use of forged documents could be continued after the loan account was settled through an approved compromise recorded by the Debts Recovery Tribunal.

Analysis: The dispute arose out of a banking transaction that culminated in a negotiated compromise approved by the bank's competent authority, followed by payment of the settlement amount, issuance of a no dues certificate, and withdrawal of the recovery proceedings by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The governing principles on quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 permit interference where the dispute is overwhelmingly civil in nature, the possibility of conviction is remote, and continuation of prosecution would amount to abuse of process. The Court distinguished cases involving special-statute offences and held that a belated criminal prosecution initiated after full settlement, despite the bank having earlier accepted the compromise and recorded that no documentation lapse was found, was oppressive and inconsistent with the settlement's judicial imprimatur.

Conclusion: Criminal prosecution was not permitted to continue and the quashing relief was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the High Court order was set aside, and the chargesheet as well as the charge-framing order were quashed because the criminal case could not be sustained after a duly approved and implemented compromise of the banking dispute.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a commercial banking dispute has been fully and finally settled through a compromise endorsed by the competent authority and recorded by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, belated criminal proceedings arising from the same transaction may be quashed if their continuance would be an abuse of process and the prospect of conviction is remote and bleak.

Issues: (i) Whether the inordinate delay in filing the revision petitions deserved condonation. (ii) Whether the appellate court's one-line dismissal of the criminal appeals, without appointing amicus curiae or examining the merits, was sustainable, and whether the appeals were liable to be revived for fresh hearing.

Issue (i): Whether the inordinate delay in filing the revision petitions deserved condonation.

Analysis: The revision petitions were filed after an unexplained delay of more than 2100 days. The accused had not appeared either at the time of sentence or before the appellate court, had not disclosed their whereabouts for years, and had remained outside the process of law after conviction. The explanation offered for the delay was found wholly insufficient, and discretionary relief was held to be unavailable to litigants who had shown disregard for the judicial process.

Conclusion: The delay was not condoned.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate court's one-line dismissal of the criminal appeals, without appointing amicus curiae or examining the merits, was sustainable, and whether the appeals were liable to be revived for fresh hearing.

Analysis: A criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for non-prosecution simpliciter and must be decided on merits after scrutiny of the record. Where the accused does not appear, the Court ought to appoint amicus curiae before proceeding with the hearing. The appellate court, despite noting the grounds of appeal, dismissed the matter without any real discussion, without testing the trial court's reasoning against the record, and without securing assistance through amicus curiae. That approach was held to be vague, unspecific, and contrary to the governing principles of criminal appellate adjudication.

Conclusion: The appellate orders were set aside and the appeals were revived for fresh hearing on merits.

Final Conclusion: The revision petitions resulted in revival of the criminal appeals and a direction for de novo appellate consideration, while the request for condonation of the extraordinary delay was rejected. Ancillary directions for deposit and costs were also imposed, and the matter was disposed of accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: A criminal appeal cannot be terminated for want of appearance without a merits-based scrutiny of the record, and where the accused is absent, the appellate court should appoint amicus curiae before deciding the appeal.

Issues: Whether the notice under Section 148A(b), the order under Section 148A(d), and the consequential notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were barred by limitation where the show-cause notice granted time to reply beyond the limitation date.

Analysis: The Court held that the time granted to the assessee for filing a reply under Section 148A(b) is to be excluded while computing limitation under the fifth proviso to Section 149(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It further held that once the reply was filed, the Assessing Officer had only seven days, as contemplated by the sixth proviso to Section 149(1), to pass an order under Section 148A(d) and issue notice under Section 148. The period between the notice under Section 148A(b) and the filing of reply was thus excluded, and the remaining period had to be reckoned thereafter.

Conclusion: The impugned notice under Section 148 and the order under Section 148A(d), both dated 30.04.2024, were held to be beyond limitation and invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit denied for invoices lacking prescribed particulars and unsupported documents could be sustained, and whether the matter required remand for fresh verification; (ii) Whether credit on the disputed input services was admissible under the post-amendment definition of input service, and whether the adjudication could travel beyond the show cause notice.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit denied for invoices lacking prescribed particulars and unsupported documents could be sustained, and whether the matter required remand for fresh verification?

Analysis: Rule 9 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 places the burden of proving admissibility of credit on the claimant and permits credit only on prescribed documents, subject to satisfaction of the proper officer in limited cases where core particulars are available. At the same time, the record showed a dispute as to invoice verification, partial acceptance of documents, and inconsistency regarding the documents said to have been produced. The absence of the verification report to the appellant also weighed in favour of further examination and reconciliation before a final determination on the disputed invoices.

Conclusion: The denial of credit on the invoice-defect issue was not finally sustained; the matter was remanded for fresh verification and a reasoned decision after giving the appellant a last opportunity to produce the documents.

Issue (ii): Whether credit on the disputed input services was admissible under the post-amendment definition of input service, and whether the adjudication could travel beyond the show cause notice?

Analysis: The amended Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 was applied on the footing that input service credit survives where there is a real and sufficient nexus with the output service and the services are not for personal use or consumption of employees. On that basis, the disputed services were treated as having a functional and commercial nexus with the assessee's output services. The demand confirmed in respect of courier charges, bank charges, telecommunication charges, and consultancy services was also held unsustainable because the adjudication cannot go beyond the show cause notice.

Conclusion: Credit on the disputed input services was allowed and the corresponding demand was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded in substantial part: the service-credit dispute was decided for the assessee, while the invoice-verification dispute was sent back for reconsideration after fresh document verification.

Issues: (i) whether reimbursable expenses recovered from customers formed part of the taxable value for service tax prior to 14.05.2015; (ii) whether the demand under reverse charge for alleged Goods Transport Agency service could survive in the absence of evidence of consignment notes; and (iii) whether the demand relating to services provided to SEZ units could be sustained when the tax had already been paid.

Issue (i): whether reimbursable expenses recovered from customers formed part of the taxable value for service tax prior to 14.05.2015.

Analysis: For the relevant period, reimbursable expenditure could not be included in the taxable value merely by applying Rule 5 of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006. The binding position was that reimbursements were not part of the gross amount charged before the amendment to Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 with effect from 14.05.2015.

Conclusion: The demand on reimbursable expenses was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether the demand under reverse charge for alleged Goods Transport Agency service could survive in the absence of evidence of consignment notes.

Analysis: Transportation of goods falls within the negative list except where the service is rendered by a Goods Transport Agency. The essential feature of such agency is issuance of a consignment note. In the absence of material showing issuance of a consignment note, the service could not be treated as GTA service for the purpose of levy.

Conclusion: The reverse charge demand on the alleged GTA service was not sustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): whether the demand relating to services provided to SEZ units could be sustained when the tax had already been paid.

Analysis: The liability for the relevant period was not disputed; the dispute was only whether the same amount had already been discharged. Since the record showed payment of tax for the relevant period, a second demand for the same liability could not be confirmed.

Conclusion: The demand relating to services provided to SEZ units was not sustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was annulled and the appellant obtained complete relief in the appeal.

Issues: Whether the one-year limitation for refund of unutilised CENVAT credit under Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, read with Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, in the case of quarterly refund claims relating to export of services, is to be computed from the date of export invoice or from the end of the quarter in which foreign exchange is received.

Analysis: The refund scheme under Rule 5 operates subject to the conditions and time limit prescribed under Section 11B. For export of services, the statutory definition of relevant date does not directly fit the manner in which such services are completed, and the receipt of foreign exchange is therefore a material reference point. The Tribunal followed the Larger Bench view in Span Infotech, which held that for quarterly refund claims the limitation may be reckoned from the end of the quarter in which the Foreign Inward Remittance Certificate is received. The subsequent notification dated 01.03.2016, which linked limitation to receipt of payment in convertible foreign exchange, was treated as prospective and not as a basis to deny claims for earlier periods.

Conclusion: The refund claims could not be rejected by reckoning limitation from the date of export invoice alone, and the disallowance on limitation was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was modified by removing the limitation-based rejection, while the undisputedly abandoned component was left undisturbed, and the appeals were disposed of with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: For quarterly refund claims of unutilised CENVAT credit relating to export of services, the limitation under Section 11B is to be applied by taking the end of the quarter in which foreign exchange is received as the relevant reference point, and a later amendment cannot be used retrospectively to defeat earlier claims.

Issues: (i) Whether persistent delay in pronouncing reserved High Court judgments requires binding uniform safeguards; (ii) Whether delayed uploading of reasoned judgments after pronouncement of operative orders requires binding timelines and transparency measures.

Issue (i): Whether persistent delay in pronouncing reserved High Court judgments requires binding uniform safeguards.

Analysis: Delay after final hearing leaves litigants, particularly persons in custody, without a decision affecting their liberty and remedies. The protection of life and personal liberty under Article 21 extends to every stage of judicial proceedings, including timely pronouncement of reserved judgments. Existing directions did not sufficiently address widespread and prolonged delays. Exercising jurisdiction under Article 142, a comprehensive framework was formulated for prompt pronouncement, enhanced priority for matters of personal liberty, administrative monitoring, reassignment after continued default, and remedies enabling litigants to seek early judgment or transfer for fresh hearing.

Conclusion: Binding directions were issued requiring High Courts to endeavour to pronounce reasoned reserved judgments within three months, with specified accountability measures and litigant remedies where delay persists.

Issue (ii): Whether delayed uploading of reasoned judgments after pronouncement of operative orders requires binding timelines and transparency measures.

Analysis: Pronouncement of only an operative part without timely availability of reasons undermines transparency and may affect parties whose rights or status are immediately altered. A reasoned judgment ordinarily must be uploaded within 24 hours of open-court pronouncement; where urgent circumstances warrant an operative order, reasons must be uploaded within seven days, extendable to fifteen days for practical difficulty. The framework also requires website status updates, automated communication to advocates, administrative escalation, and a remedy for parties if reasons remain unavailable.

Conclusion: High Courts must ensure prompt uploading and transparent disclosure of reasoned judgments, with mandatory monitoring and corrective measures where reasons are not uploaded within the prescribed period.

Final Conclusion: A nationwide, enforceable framework was established to secure timely, reasoned, and transparent High Court adjudication while preserving the deliberative quality of judicial decision-making.

Ratio Decidendi: The guarantee of life and personal liberty includes protection against unreasonable delay in pronouncement of reserved judgments, justifying binding procedural safeguards for timely delivery and publication of reasoned decisions.

Issues: (i) Whether the petition invoking inherent and supervisory jurisdiction was maintainable despite the availability of revision; (ii) Whether the arrest and pre-cognizance remands were illegal for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure; (iii) Whether cognizance of the prosecution complaint could be taken without affording the accused a hearing under Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; (iv) Whether remands exceeding fifteen days warranted release on bail.

Issue (i): Whether the petition invoking inherent and supervisory jurisdiction was maintainable despite the availability of revision.

Analysis: The availability of a revisional remedy does not create an absolute bar to inherent jurisdiction. The nomenclature of proceedings is not decisive, and inherent powers may be exercised where required to address exceptional circumstances affecting fundamental rights and personal liberty.

Conclusion: The petition was maintainable, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the arrest and pre-cognizance remands were illegal for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure.

Analysis: The chronology established that the petitioner was formally arrested during authorised jail examination, produced within twenty-four hours before the Duty Magistrate, and thereafter produced before the Special Court. The procedure under Section 302 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was treated as complied with.

Conclusion: The arrest and consequent pre-cognizance remands were not illegal, against the petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether cognizance of the prosecution complaint could be taken without affording the accused a hearing under Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Analysis: Sections 44, 46 and 65 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 apply the criminal procedure law to proceedings before the Special Court. For a complaint filed after the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 came into force, Chapter XVI, including Section 223, applies to a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of that Act. The proviso to Section 223(1) prohibits cognizance without an opportunity of hearing to the accused.

Conclusion: The cognizance order made without a pre-cognizance hearing was legally unsustainable and was set aside, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (iv): Whether remands exceeding fifteen days warranted release on bail.

Analysis: Upon setting aside cognizance, custody was governed by Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. A remand for two months at one time contravened the statutory fifteen-day limit. However, the petitioner had not objected at the relevant times, had suffered no demonstrated prejudice, and continued to be in judicial custody without any bail order. Bail in a money-laundering case requires consideration under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Conclusion: The excess-period remand did not entitle the petitioner to immediate release; the petitioner may seek bail before the competent court, against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The cognizance process must recommence only after affording the petitioner the mandatory pre-cognizance hearing, while custody and any claim for bail remain to be addressed in accordance with the applicable statutory procedure.

Ratio Decidendi: A prosecution complaint under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 filed after commencement of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 requires a pre-cognizance hearing under the proviso to Section 223(1).

Issues: (i) Whether deletion of clauses (ii) and (iv) of the Explanation to Section 21(1) affects the landlord's right to seek rent enhancement under the proviso to Section 21(8); (ii) Whether the High Court could, in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, itself determine and enhance rent without supporting material on record.

Issue (i): Whether deletion of clauses (ii) and (iv) of the Explanation to Section 21(1) affects the landlord's right to seek rent enhancement under the proviso to Section 21(8).

Analysis: Section 21(8) excludes the bona fide requirement ground against specified public tenants, while its proviso provides an independent mechanism for enhancement of rent. Following the omission of the two exceptional grounds formerly contained in the Explanation, the landlord cannot seek release on those grounds; however, the statutory rent-enhancement remedy remains operative. Construing the proviso as inoperative would leave the landlord without either a means of recovery of possession or financial recompense.

Conclusion: Deletion of clauses (ii) and (iv) does not affect the operation of the proviso to Section 21(8), and an application for enhancement of rent under that proviso is maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court could, in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, itself determine and enhance rent without supporting material on record.

Analysis: Supervisory jurisdiction may be exercised in exceptional rent-control matters to correct jurisdictional excess, failure to exercise jurisdiction, or grave injustice, but it is not appellate power and cannot ordinarily substitute the High Court's determination for that of the statutory authority. The enhanced rate adopted by the High Court rested on an unsubstantiated assertion regarding rent of adjoining premises, without material establishing that rate.

Conclusion: The High Court could exercise Article 227 jurisdiction only exceptionally, but its enhancement of rent on the material available was unsustainable; the rent determination requires fresh adjudication by the Rent Control Authority.

Final Conclusion: The statutory remedy for rent enhancement remains available to the landlord, while the quantum of rent must be determined afresh by the competent authority on an evidentiary basis, with effect from the original application date.

Ratio Decidendi: Omission of statutory exceptions concerning release of premises does not impliedly extinguish an independent proviso authorising rent enhancement, and Article 227 cannot be used to supplant a statutory authority's fact-dependent determination without evidentiary foundation.

Issues: Whether the demand, penalties and late fee required reconsideration in remand on the basis of additional documents and the claimed nature of services, including entitlement to abatement and reverse charge benefit.

Analysis: The appellant produced Form 26AS, work orders and related documents to support the stand that the services were works contract and manpower supply services, and contended that these materials had not been properly considered by the lower authorities. The order records that the disputed demand had been worked out mainly from income-tax data and that the claim for abatement and reverse charge was rejected below for want of supporting documents. In these circumstances, and since the documents were stated to go to the root of the dispute, the matter was found fit for reconsideration by the original authority after allowing the appellant an opportunity to rely upon the documents and the relied upon records.

Conclusion: The matter was remanded to the original authority for fresh decision after considering all relevant documents, including Form 26AS, and permitting the appellant to produce evidence in defence.

Issues: (i) Whether the objection regarding misclassification of the imported gloves could justify denial of provisional release. (ii) Whether alleged non-compliance with labelling requirements and absence of NOC from CDSCO could sustain detention of the goods. (iii) Whether import through the alleged non-notified port attracted Rule 43A so as to defeat provisional release.

Issue (i): Whether the objection regarding misclassification of the imported gloves could justify denial of provisional release.

Analysis: The classification dispute was treated as incidental to the provisional release request. The goods were already assessed, no differential duty or further fiscal liability was shown, and the pending classification dispute was left to the adjudication stage in the show-cause proceedings. On the facts, the classification objection was found to be revenue neutral and not a ground to withhold release.

Conclusion: The misclassification objection did not justify refusal of provisional release and was not accepted as a ground against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether alleged non-compliance with labelling requirements and absence of NOC from CDSCO could sustain detention of the goods.

Analysis: The goods were found to be Class A devices and the relevant regulatory exemption was considered along with the importer's registration status. The record showed a re-examination of the consignment, and the panchnama recorded labels on the bulk packing. The test report relied upon by the department was not found sufficient to displace the later factual verification. The material on record did not establish any public health risk or a valid basis to continue withholding the goods for want of NOC.

Conclusion: The labelling objection and absence of NOC were held insufficient to deny provisional release.

Issue (iii): Whether import through the alleged non-notified port attracted Rule 43A so as to defeat provisional release.

Analysis: The goods entered India through Nhava Sheva, which was treated as the relevant port of import, while ICD Dadri was only the clearance point. The port restriction under Rule 43A was therefore not attracted on the facts. The port objection was held not to be a valid basis for refusing provisional release.

Conclusion: The alleged non-notified port objection was rejected and did not bar release of the goods.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order allowing provisional release was sustained, the departmental challenge failed, and the imported goods were directed to be released.

Ratio Decidendi: A dispute that is revenue neutral and unsupported by any demonstrated statutory violation or public health risk cannot justify withholding provisional release of imported goods where the factual record shows compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements.

Issues: Whether dismissal of the statutory appeal as time-barred was valid when the assessee's stated date of communication of the assessment order was unsupported by rebuttal material from the Revenue.

Analysis: The declared date of communication was 09.11.2025. The applicable principle was that, once a dealer states the date on which the order was communicated, the burden shifts to the Revenue to disprove that date through cogent material. In the absence of such material, limitation must be computed from the date declared by the dealer, rather than merely from the date on which the order was passed.

Conclusion: The appellate order dismissing the appeal solely on limitation was invalid and was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a penalty under section 271(1)(c) can be sustained where the penalty notice alleged concealment of income but the penalty order proceeded on furnishing inaccurate particulars of income, without framing a specific charge.

Analysis: The two statutory limbs-concealment of income and furnishing inaccurate particulars-are distinct and require the assessee to be clearly informed of the precise charge through the statutory notice. The penalty proceedings are independent of assessment proceedings, and a vague or omnibus notice cannot be cured by the assessment order or by a subsequently altered basis in the penalty order. The shift from concealment to furnishing inaccurate particulars demonstrated absence of a definite charge and invalidated the penalty proceedings.

Conclusion: The penalty notice and consequential penalty order were invalid for failure to specify and consistently maintain the applicable charge; the penalty was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether cash deposits made during demonetisation were unexplained; (ii) Whether the deletion of ad hoc disallowance of commission expenditure was justified; (iii) Whether the deletion of ad hoc disallowance of tour and travel expenditure was justified.

Issue (i): Whether cash deposits made during demonetisation were unexplained.

Analysis: The recorded cash-in-hand as on 07.11.2016 exceeded the deposits made during the demonetisation period. The assessee had produced its cash book, audited financial statements, borrower details and statements of cash receipts and deposits; no defect in those records was identified and the books were not rejected. Non-service of notices issued to certain borrowers under Section 133(6) did not, by itself, disprove the cash recoveries, particularly when the details of such unserved notices were not supplied to the assessee. Higher deposits during demonetisation were consistent with deposit of recorded specified bank notes.

Conclusion: The cash deposits were explained by recorded cash-in-hand; the deletion of the addition was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the deletion of ad hoc disallowance of commission expenditure was justified.

Analysis: The first appellate findings deleting the disallowance were upheld. No defect in the accepted books or specific basis for disallowing the expenditure was established.

Conclusion: The deletion of the ad hoc commission-expenditure disallowance was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the deletion of ad hoc disallowance of tour and travel expenditure was justified.

Analysis: Travel was connected with the assessee's non-banking financial business, including loan recovery and field verification. A percentage-based disallowance without identifying any specific non-business or personal expenditure was impermissible where the books had been accepted.

Conclusion: The deletion of the ad hoc tour and travel expenditure disallowance was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appellate relief deleting the addition for cash deposits and the ad hoc expense disallowances remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Recorded cash deposits cannot be treated as unexplained where audited books establish sufficient cash-in-hand and the Revenue identifies no defect in those books; unserved third-party notices alone do not negate the recorded source.

Issues: Whether protective additions could survive after deletion of corresponding substantive additions on the same facts; and whether the assessments and protective additions were sustainable in the absence of reliable incriminating material and substantive evidence.

Issue (i): Whether protective additions could survive after deletion of corresponding substantive additions on the same facts.

Analysis: The substantive additions in the hands of the alleged real beneficiary had already been deleted and the assessment orders in that case quashed for all relevant assessment years. The protective additions against the assessee rested upon the identical facts, evidence and conclusions.

Conclusion: The protective additions could not be sustained. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessments and protective additions were sustainable in the absence of reliable incriminating material and substantive evidence.

Analysis: The appellate findings that the material lacked evidentiary value and did not establish the alleged commission receipts or the assessee's involvement were found to be based on due appreciation of the record. For assessment years 2014-15 and 2015-16, the jurisdictional precedent concerning the validity of the proceedings applied, and the Revenue did not establish any factual or legal basis to distinguish it.

Conclusion: The assessments and protective additions were unsustainable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The deletion of the corresponding substantive additions and absence of sustainable evidence precluded retention of the protective additions for all assessment years.

Ratio Decidendi: A protective addition founded on the same facts and material as a deleted substantive addition cannot survive, particularly where the material does not reliably establish the assessee's alleged receipt of income.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment was invalid because notice under section 143(2) was issued without prior administrative approval; (ii) Whether the sanction under section 151 and approval under section 148B were invalid for non-application of mind; (iii) Whether seized records from premises owned by third parties could be relied upon against the assessee; (iv) Whether separate additions for alleged on-money receipts could be sustained in the assessee's hands or required a unified peak-credit computation in the hands of another group entity.

Issue (i): Whether the assessment was invalid because notice under section 143(2) was issued without prior administrative approval.

Analysis: The record established that the administrative approval had been received by the Assessing Officer before issuance of the notice. Dispatch of correspondence through post after its official-email transmission did not establish that approval was subsequent to the notice.

Conclusion: The assessment was not invalid on account of the notice under section 143(2); this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the sanction under section 151 and approval under section 148B were invalid for non-application of mind.

Analysis: The approval under section 151 recorded the competent authority's satisfaction that reopening was fit, which was sufficient absent material demonstrating non-application of mind. The objection concerning approval under section 148B had not been raised before the first appellate authority, required factual verification, and was unsupported by evidence.

Conclusion: The sanction under section 151 was valid and the challenge to approval under section 148B failed; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether seized records from premises owned by third parties could be relied upon against the assessee.

Analysis: Statements of key group persons established that the premises were under the group's possession and control and were used for maintaining its records. The seized entries matched accounted group-bank transactions; the group accepted and deciphered the records and assisted in preparing the Digital Cash Book. Ownership of the premises by third parties did not displace the demonstrated nexus of the documents with the group.

Conclusion: The seized material was validly relied upon against the assessee and its group; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether separate additions for alleged on-money receipts could be sustained in the assessee's hands or required a unified peak-credit computation in the hands of another group entity.

Analysis: The handwritten and digital cash books represented a continuous common record of group cash transactions, including receipts, payments, unidentified entries, and alleged on-money transactions. Artificial segregation of entries among group entities could lead to taxation of the same rotating funds more than once. A single chronological cash ledger was required, with only the incremental annual peak being taxed. The unified peak was directed to be assessed entirely in the hands of the flagship group entity, Viraj Estates Pvt. Ltd.

Conclusion: No separate addition based on the seized cash-book entries, including the on-money addition, could be made in the assessee's hands; this issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional and evidentiary challenges fail, but the impugned substantive additions are to be removed from the assessee's assessment and income recomputed through a unified incremental peak-credit exercise in the designated group entity's assessment.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a single seized cash record reflects intermingled transactions and rotation of funds across group entities, separate entity-wise or gross-receipt additions must yield to a unified peak-credit computation to prevent double taxation.

Issues: Whether an ad hoc disallowance of transportation-related expenditure could be sustained after rejection of books under section 145(3), where reimbursements to agents were made through banking channels but complete primary vouchers were unavailable.

Analysis: The expenditure related to essential operational costs of a geographically dispersed transportation business and was incurred through local agents before reimbursement. Ledger accounts, reimbursement statements, sample supporting records and bank statements supported the payments, and the Revenue did not dispute the identity of agents, the movement of funds, or the actual transportation operations. No material established that the expenditure was bogus, inflated, routed through fictitious entities, or returned to the assessee.

Analysis: Rejection of books does not permit estimation founded on pure guesswork. The disallowance rates of 10% and 8% lacked support from comparable cases, past history, or a rational basis. The assessee's consistently followed business model and its net-profit ratio, which exceeded the average ratio of other years, did not support an inference of inflated expenditure. The Revenue cannot substitute its commercial judgment for the assessee's bona fide business arrangements absent evidence that they are sham or without business purpose.

Conclusion: The ad hoc disallowance of enroute, sundry, travelling and transportation expenses was unsustainable and was directed to be deleted.

Issues: Whether interim stay ought to be granted on the order admitting the corporate debtor into CIRP, in view of the alleged statutory restrictions under the Electricity Act and the WBERC Regulations, and the alleged invalidity of the corporate guarantee.

Analysis: One view held that the primacy of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code had already been affirmed in relation to the overriding clauses of the Electricity Act, that the challenge to the corporate guarantee did not, at this stage, justify suspension of the insolvency process, and that no interim protection was warranted. The differing view held that the case raised a distinct issue concerning the authority of a regulated electricity distribution licensee to execute the guarantee, the effect of the WBERC regime on the validity of that transaction, and the wider consequences of bringing a distribution licensee into CIRP without deeper scrutiny of those questions.

Outcome: There was a difference of opinion on the interim stay applications and the matter was directed to be placed before the Chairperson for appropriate reference.

Issues: Whether the assessee's application for approval under section 80G(5) was filed within the prescribed time limit after the amendment brought in by the Finance Act, 2024, and whether the rejection of the application as time-barred was sustainable.

Analysis: The amended framework under section 80G(5) was read as permitting an institution whose activities had already commenced to apply after commencement of such activities, and the time-limit in the earlier proviso was held not to control the assessee's application in the manner adopted by the Commissioner. The assessee had furnished the relevant documents, and the rejection was made only on the technical ground of limitation without examining the remaining eligibility conditions. On that construction, the application in Form 10AB was treated as having been filed within the statutory time and was held to be valid.

Conclusion: The rejection of the application as time-barred was set aside, and the Commissioner was directed to treat the application as filed within time and to examine the assessee's eligibility in accordance with law after granting an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether notional interest could be added to the assessee's income on loans and advances given to its subsidiary despite earlier consistent deletion of such addition in the assessee's own case.

Analysis: The addition was made on a presumptive basis under section 5 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the premise that interest ought to have accrued on the outstanding advances. The record showed that the same issue on identical facts had repeatedly been decided in favour of the assessee in earlier assessment years by the first appellate authority and the coordinate bench, and the appellate order for the year under consideration followed that consistent view. In these circumstances, the absence of actual accrual of interest and the principle of real income justified deletion of the notional addition.

Conclusion: The addition towards notional interest was rightly deleted and the Revenue's challenge failed.