Issues: Whether the order rejecting the revision application under section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, without granting personal hearing and without dealing with the assessee's contentions by a reasoned order, was liable to be set aside and the matter remanded.

Analysis: The Assessing Officer had indicated that the assessee could pursue a revision under section 264, and the assessee accordingly filed the application and requested a personal hearing. The rejection was made without granting such hearing and the objections raised in the reply were dealt with cursorily. The decision was founded only on the view that the mere reference to section 264 in the assessment order could not justify acceptance of the revision application.

Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed and set aside, and the matter was remanded to the competent authority to reconsider the revision application after dealing with all contentions by a reasoned order and, if considered necessary, after affording an opportunity of hearing. The writ petition was partly allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A revision application under section 264 cannot be rejected without a fair opportunity of hearing and a reasoned consideration of the contentions raised.

Issues: Whether gain computed under section 50 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on transfer of a depreciable asset can be treated as short-term capital gain for all purposes so as to deny set-off of current year's and brought forward long-term capital losses under section 74.

Analysis: Section 50 is a special computation provision for depreciable assets and creates a legal fiction only for the mode of computing capital gains under sections 48 and 49. The fiction is confined to the computation of the gain and does not convert the underlying long-term capital asset into a short-term capital asset. Where the transferred asset is admittedly a long-term capital asset, the character of the asset remains relevant for section 74, and the deeming provision cannot be expanded beyond its intended purpose. The binding jurisdictional precedent holds that section 50 does not alter the intrinsic nature of the asset and cannot be used to deny statutory set-off otherwise available under the Act.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to set off current year's and brought forward long-term capital losses against the gain arising from transfer of the depreciable asset, and the Revenue's objection was rejected.

Issues: Whether the challenge to the constitutional validity of provisions of the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 warranted issuance of rule, and whether interim protection against coercive action was to be granted pending the petition.

Analysis: The petition raised a constitutional challenge to provisions of the Black Money Act. Noting that similar writ petitions involving the same or similar issues were already pending with rule issued and interim relief granted, the Court issued rule in the present matter. On interim relief, the Court permitted the appeal already filed before the CIT(A) to proceed, while protecting the petitioner from coercive steps, including prosecution and penalty, until hearing and final disposal of the writ petition.

Outcome: Rule issued and interim protection granted against coercive action, while the connected appellate proceedings were permitted to continue.

Issues: Whether the company dispute should be referred to arbitration by consent of the parties and the orders of the National Company Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal should be set aside.

Analysis: The parties jointly sought disposal of the matter on consent terms and placed draft minutes of consent order on record. The Court accepted the consensus that the disputes were better suited for arbitral adjudication, appointed a sole arbitrator, fixed the seat of arbitration at Delhi, and left the arbitrator's fee to be settled in consultation with the parties. The earlier orders relating to maintainability before the tribunals were expressly set aside, and all contentions were kept open.

Conclusion: The dispute was referred to arbitration by consent, the impugned tribunal orders were set aside, and the appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Issues: (i) whether a winding up proceeding pending before the High Court could be transferred to the National Company Law Tribunal without a formal application by a party; and (ii) whether the winding up proceeding had reached an irreversible or irretrievable stage so as to preclude transfer.

Issue (i): whether a winding up proceeding pending before the High Court could be transferred to the National Company Law Tribunal without a formal application by a party.

Analysis: Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 contemplates transfer of pending winding up proceedings, while its last proviso permits a party to seek transfer where the proceeding has not already been transferred. Rule 5 of the Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 regulates the transfer of pending winding up matters, but does not exclude transfer by the Company Court where the issue is before it. The earlier authorities on transfer of winding up proceedings were read as recognising judicial discretion and did not make a party application an inflexible precondition in every case.

Conclusion: transfer was not dependent on a mandatory party application and could be directed by the Company Court.

Issue (ii): whether the winding up proceeding had reached an irreversible or irretrievable stage so as to preclude transfer.

Analysis: The record showed that the Official Liquidator had taken possession, but the immovable properties remained unsold and no irreversible step had been completed. The Company Court had called for and considered the status report before directing transfer. On those facts, the proceeding had not reached the stage at which transfer would be impermissible under the governing principles relating to transfer of admitted winding up proceedings.

Conclusion: the proceeding had not reached an irreversible or irretrievable stage, and the transfer order was sustainable.

Final Conclusion: the transfer of the winding up proceeding to the National Company Law Tribunal was upheld and the appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: a pending winding up proceeding may be transferred to the National Company Law Tribunal on judicial consideration even without a prior application by a party, unless the proceeding has progressed to an irreversible or irretrievable stage.

Issues: Whether the order-in-original passed under Section 73 of the Telangana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for the tax period April 2019 to March 2020 was barred by limitation and therefore without jurisdiction.

Analysis: The order was dated and uploaded after the statutory cut-off date for passing orders for the relevant tax period. The explanation that the delay occurred because of administrative pressure and the later submissions on merits did not cure the defect, since limitation affected the very authority to impose tax liability. The appellate order also failed to address this jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The order-in-original and the order-in-appeal were unsustainable and were set aside. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment or adjudication order passed beyond the statutory limitation period is without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained, irrespective of subsequent explanations on merits.

Issues: Whether the petitioner, accused in a case alleging fraudulent availment and passing of input tax credit under the GST law, was entitled to regular bail under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Analysis: The petitioner was in judicial custody since 10.04.2026. The allegations related to facilitation of ITC without actual business transactions and involvement in issuance of fake invoices. The Court noted the period of incarceration, the nature of the allegations, and that the investigation and complaint status were relevant considerations while assessing bail.

Conclusion: Regular bail was granted to the petitioner subject to conditions, including execution of bond and sureties, periodic appearance before the investigating authorities, and compliance with statutory bail conditions.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns could be revisited and restoration directed where the registered person undertakes to furnish all pending returns and pay the tax dues, interest and late fee in terms of the proviso to Rule 22(4) of the CGST Rules, 2017.

Analysis: Cancellation of registration under Section 29(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on the ground of continuous non-filing of returns carries serious civil consequences. The proviso to Rule 22(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 provides that where the person, instead of merely replying to the show-cause notice, furnishes all pending returns and makes full payment of the tax dues along with applicable interest and late fee, the proper officer shall drop the proceedings and pass the prescribed order. On the facts, the petitioner had already regularised the defaults and sought the same relief as had been granted in a similar case.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to seek restoration of GST registration, and the concerned authority was required to consider the application in accordance with law upon compliance with the stipulated conditions.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by granting conditional liberty to pursue restoration of the cancelled GST registration and by directing compliance with the arrears and return-filing requirements before the authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Where GST registration is cancelled for non-filing of returns, the proper officer must consider restoration and may drop the proceedings if the registered person furnishes all pending returns and pays the tax dues, interest and late fee as contemplated by the proviso to Rule 22(4) of the CGST Rules, 2017.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns could be followed by restoration on the petitioner furnishing pending returns and making payment of tax dues, interest and late fee under the proviso to Rule 22(4) of the CGST Rules, 2017; and whether similar relief was warranted on the facts of the case.

Analysis: The cancellation had been made for non-filing of returns for a continuous period of six months under Section 29(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The proviso to Rule 22(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits the proper officer to drop cancellation proceedings and pass the prescribed order where the person, instead of merely replying to the notice, furnishes all pending returns and makes full payment of tax dues along with applicable interest and late fee. As the case was covered by an earlier coordinate bench decision on similar facts, the Court applied the same approach and granted an opportunity to seek restoration on compliance with the prescribed conditions.

Conclusion: The petitioner was directed to approach the concerned authority within 60 days for restoration of GST registration, and upon compliance with the proviso to Rule 22(4), the authority was to consider and take necessary steps for restoration in accordance with law. The petitioner was also required to pay the arrears of tax, penalty, interest and late fees.

Final Conclusion: The order grants conditional relief enabling restoration of the cancelled GST registration, subject to filing of pending returns and payment of statutory dues, while leaving the authority to act in accordance with law upon such compliance.

Ratio Decidendi: Where GST registration has been cancelled for non-filing of returns, the proviso to Rule 22(4) authorises restoration-related relief if the registered person furnishes all pending returns and clears tax dues, interest and late fee.

Issues: Whether the petitioner, whose GST registration had been cancelled for non-filing of returns, was entitled to seek restoration of registration on furnishing pending returns and making full payment of the tax dues, interest and late fee under the proviso to Rule 22(4) of the CGST Rules, 2017.

Analysis: The cancellation was made under Section 29(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for continuous non-filing of returns. The Court followed the settled view that where the registered person is willing to furnish all pending returns and clear the entire tax liability together with applicable interest and late fee, the proper officer may drop the cancellation proceedings and consider restoration of registration. The Court found the case to be covered by the earlier coordinate bench decision and applied the same relief, subject to compliance with the prescribed requirements within the stipulated time.

Conclusion: The petitioner was permitted to approach the concerned authority within 60 days, and upon filing the pending returns and satisfying the requirements under the proviso to Rule 22(4), the authority was directed to consider restoration of GST registration in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether partners of a partnership firm, being persons other than the taxable person, can be proceeded against under Section 122(1A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether Section 122(1A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can be applied to transactions relating to the period prior to its commencement on 01.01.2021.

Issue (i): Whether partners of a partnership firm, being persons other than the taxable person, can be proceeded against under Section 122(1A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The expression "any person" in Section 122(1A) was construed in the light of the statutory definitions of "person", "taxable person" and "registered person". The provision was held to be targeted not merely at the taxable person, but at the person who retains the benefit of the prohibited transaction and at whose instance such transaction is conducted. On the facts found in the adjudication and appellate orders, the petitioners were found to have retained the benefit and to have been involved at whose instance the transactions were carried out.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the petitioners and in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 122(1A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can be applied to transactions relating to the period prior to its commencement on 01.01.2021.

Analysis: Section 122(1A) was treated as a provision that does not create a new substantive violation, but only identifies the person liable for penalty in relation to offences already covered by Section 122(1). The provision was held to be complementary to Section 122(1), and therefore its application was not considered to involve impermissible retrospectivity. Article 20(1) was distinguished on the footing that the liability was penal in the civil-adjudicatory sense and the provision could apply so long as it was in force when the show cause notice was issued.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the petitioners and in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the penalty under Section 122(1A) failed on both jurisdictional grounds, and the petitioners were left to pursue the statutory appellate remedy, with the factual findings on retention of benefit and instance remaining open for scrutiny before the appellate forum.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 122(1A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 applies to the person who retains the benefit of the transaction and at whose instance the offending transaction is conducted, and its operation is not retrospective merely because the underlying conduct commenced before the provision came into force, so long as the provision was in force when proceedings were initiated.

Issues: Whether the continuation of suspension of the appellant's approval as Customs Cargo Service Provider under Regulation 11(2) of the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009, and the prohibition on fresh receipt of import/export cargo, was legally sustainable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the scheme of the Customs Act, 1962 and the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009, particularly the distinction between the regular suspension/revocation process under Regulation 12 and the exceptional power of immediate suspension under Regulation 11(2). It held that immediate suspension can be sustained only where the authority establishes an appropriate exceptional case and the necessity for urgent preventive action pending or contemplated inquiry. On the record before it, the Tribunal found that the alleged lapses were based largely on preliminary investigation material and not on a completed inquiry report or a contemplated show cause process under Regulation 12. It also noted that the record did not satisfactorily establish inadequate security and access control through official inspection material, and that the appellant had furnished explanations and corrective steps. While the allegations concerning attempted removal of restricted goods were serious, the Tribunal found that indefinite continuation of suspension without substantiating the basis for invoking Regulation 11(2) was not in conformity with the regulatory scheme.

Conclusion: The continuation of suspension under Regulation 11(2) was not legally sustainable, and the impugned order was set aside. The appeal was allowed in favour of the appellant, without precluding the Commissioner from initiating regular proceedings under Regulation 12.

Issues: Whether the imported goods were correctly classifiable as rough dolomite blocks under CTI 2518 1000 or as rough marble blocks under CTI 2515 1210, and whether the consequent demand of duty, confiscation, redemption fine and penalties could be sustained.

Analysis: The representative samples of the impugned consignments were tested by the departmental laboratory and the reports described the goods as dolomite, composed of calcium and magnesium carbonates. The impugned reclassification was built mainly on test reports of similar goods imported by other importers and on collateral documents, while ignoring the test reports pertaining to the appellants' own consignments. In classification matters, the burden rests on the Revenue to establish the proposed tariff entry, and each consignment has to be examined on its own evidence. Where the record contained test reports of the very goods imported by the appellants, those reports could not be displaced by evidence relating to other importers' goods. The refusal of cross-examination and the reliance on material not directly linked to the appellants' consignments further weakened the adjudication.

Conclusion: The goods were held to be classifiable as dolomite blocks under CTI 2518 1000, and the findings on misdeclaration, duty demand, confiscation, redemption fine and penalties were not sustainable.

Issues: Whether the proper officer under Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could issue a consolidated show cause notice and pass a consolidated order covering different financial years.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Chapter XV does not expressly prohibit clubbing of multiple financial years in a single notice or order. Sections 73(1) and 74(1) confer jurisdiction to initiate proceedings when the statutory conditions are met, while Sections 73(2), 73(10), 74(2) and 74(10) control only the time limits for issuance of notice and passing of order. The references in Sections 73(3), 73(4), 74(3) and 74(4) to notices or statements for "such periods" support the view that a common proceeding can cover multiple periods. The Court also distinguished assessment under Chapter XII from adjudication under Sections 73 and 74, and applied the doctrine of severability to hold that if some periods are time-barred, the valid periods need not fail with them.

Conclusion: A consolidated show cause notice and consolidated order for different financial years are permissible under Sections 73 and 74, and the challenge to jurisdiction fails.

Issues: Whether the arrest, detention and remand of the petitioner were illegal for want of transit remand and for non-compliance with the mandatory requirements relating to the arrest memo and communication of grounds of arrest.

Analysis: The petitioner was arrested at Dehradun and produced before the remand Magistrate at Meerut, but no transit remand order was placed on record. The arrest memo did not disclose the place of arrest and did not annex the grounds of arrest, although the law requires the arrested person to be informed of the grounds and the arrest memo to contain the necessary particulars. The Court also noticed that the jama talashi was blank and that the respondents had not complied with their own circular requiring the grounds of arrest to be furnished in writing as an annexure to the arrest memo. In these circumstances, the remand and continued detention were held to be legally unsustainable.

Conclusion: The arrest, detention and remand were illegal and the petitioner was entitled to immediate release.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the consequent reassessment order could be sustained when the reopening was founded on a loose paper referring to an unrelated third party, showing non-agricultural land, whereas the petitioner had sold agricultural land, and no direct or indirect link with the petitioner was established.

Analysis: The reopening was based on a loose paper that did not bear the petitioner's name or signature and only mentioned a person unconnected with the petitioner. The recorded material also did not establish any connection between the petitioner and the entities referred to in the satisfaction note. The sale deed on record showed that the land had been sold as agricultural land, whereas the loose paper proceeded on the basis of non-agricultural land with a presumed rate. In these circumstances, the material lacked the necessary nexus with the petitioner and the reopening was founded on conjectural assumptions rather than legally sustainable material.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 and the consequential reassessment order were quashed and set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the additions made on account of cash deposits and unexplained credit entries in the bank accounts were sustainable when the assessee produced confirmations, PAN cards, land records and cash book entries showing the source of funds. (ii) Whether the addition made on account of difference in commission income was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the additions made on account of cash deposits and unexplained credit entries in the bank accounts were sustainable when the assessee produced confirmations, PAN cards, land records and cash book entries showing the source of funds.

Analysis: The assessee furnished details of the parties from whom cash was received and supporting documents showing agricultural activity, cash book entries, confirmations and land records. The source of the cash deposited in the bank accounts was explained through this material, and the additions were made only on conjectures without rejecting the documentary evidence.

Conclusion: The additions were not sustainable and were deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition made on account of difference in commission income was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee furnished the relevant details relating to commission receipts, and the basis adopted for making the addition was not supported by the material on record.

Conclusion: The addition on account of commission income was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded in full and all impugned additions were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: When an assessee substantiates the source of bank credits with contemporaneous documentary evidence and the revenue does not dislodge that evidence, additions for unexplained credits cannot be sustained on mere conjecture.

Issues: (i) Whether deduction under section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be denied in respect of CSR expenditure not falling within the specific exclusions in section 80G(2); (ii) Whether disallowance under section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 was permissible when no exempt income was earned during the year.

Issue (i): Whether deduction under section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be denied in respect of CSR expenditure not falling within the specific exclusions in section 80G(2).

Analysis: CSR expenditure is disallowed as business expenditure under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by Explanation 2, but that restriction operates only while computing business income. Deduction under section 80G is claimed at the stage of computing total income under Chapter VI-A. The statutory bar in section 80G(2)(iiihk) and section 80G(2)(iiihl) applies only to specified CSR-linked donations, namely Swachh Bharat Kosh and Clean Ganga Fund. Where the donation does not fall within those exclusions and the statutory conditions for section 80G are otherwise satisfied, the benefit cannot be denied merely because the payment was made in discharge of CSR obligation.

Conclusion: The deduction under section 80G could not be denied on the ground that the payment was CSR expenditure; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether disallowance under section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 was permissible when no exempt income was earned during the year.

Analysis: Section 14A is attracted only where exempt income is earned or receivable for the relevant year, and the amendment inserted by the Finance Act, 2022 was held to be prospective. On the facts, no exempt income had been earned, and therefore no disallowance could survive under section 14A read with Rule 8D.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was deleted; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on the two adjudicated grounds, resulting in relief to the assessee on the CSR-related section 80G claim and on the section 14A disallowance, while the remaining grounds were not pressed.

Ratio Decidendi: CSR-linked donations are not barred from deduction under section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 unless they fall within a specific statutory exclusion, and section 14A cannot be invoked in the absence of exempt income for the relevant year.

Issues: Whether the assessment orders were invalid for failure to follow the mandatory procedure under section 144C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by effectively passing final orders in the garb of draft assessment orders.

Analysis: The Assessing Officer, while describing the orders as draft, had quantified tax, directed issuance of demand notices, adjusted prepaid taxes, and initiated penalty proceedings. The resulting notices and computation sheets showed that the assessment had been treated as complete at the draft stage itself. The procedure under section 144C(1) is mandatory and confers a substantive right on an eligible assessee to object before the Dispute Resolution Panel before finalisation of the assessment. Non-compliance with that procedure is not a mere irregularity and cannot be cured by later steps or by the assessee's participation in subsequent proceedings.

Conclusion: The assessment orders were held to be without jurisdiction and invalid for breach of section 144C(1), and the additional ground was allowed.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded on the jurisdictional challenge, the impugned assessment orders were quashed, and the remaining grounds were rendered academic.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Assessing Officer, in substance, completes the assessment and issues demand and penalty notices at the stage of a purported draft order, the mandatory procedure under section 144C is breached and the resulting assessment is void and unenforceable.

Issues: Whether the final assessment order was liable to be quashed for not being passed in conformity with the directions issued by the Dispute Resolution Panel under section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessment order was passed on the premise that the assessee's objections before the Dispute Resolution Panel had been rejected in full, but the record showed that the Transfer Pricing Officer had given effect to the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel and reduced the software development segment adjustment to nil, thereby granting partial relief. The resulting final assessment order did not reflect the actual effect of the Dispute Resolution Panel's directions. The statutory mandate under section 144C(13) requires the Assessing Officer to pass the final assessment order in conformity with those directions. The jurisdictional High Court decisions relied upon were followed as binding precedent.

Conclusion: The final assessment order was in violation of section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and was quashed in favour of the assessee.