Issues: (i) whether the alleged business plan submitted by the successful bidder, and the stipulations concerning third-party, subsidiary, joint venture and associate assets, were approved so as to bind the liquidation process; (ii) whether the request for extension of time to pay the balance sale consideration was liable to be allowed; (iii) whether cancellation of the bid and forfeiture of the amount deposited could be sustained.

Issue (i): whether the alleged business plan submitted by the successful bidder, and the stipulations concerning third-party, subsidiary, joint venture and associate assets, were approved so as to bind the liquidation process.

Analysis: The bidding document invited participation only for sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern on an as-is, where-is, whatever-there-is and no-recourse basis. The record of the stakeholders' consultations and the orders passed earlier were read as fixing only the payment schedule and not as approving any expanded entitlement over the assets of subsidiaries or other third parties. The liquidation estate under section 36 excludes assets of Indian or foreign subsidiaries, and the scope of the auction could not be enlarged beyond the terms of the bid documents or the liquidation framework.

Conclusion: The alleged business plan was not approved as a binding enlargement of the auction subject-matter, and the bidder could not inclusion of subsidiary or third-party assets in the sale.

Issue (ii): whether the request for extension of time to pay the balance sale consideration was liable to be allowed.

Analysis: The earlier order had already fixed the balance payment schedule in instalments with interest for delay. The subsequent applications were treated as attempts to reopen that concluded arrangement. In the absence of any legal basis to alter the settled schedule, and in view of the bidder's acceptance of the auction terms and the payment direction already operating, no further extension was warranted.

Conclusion: The request for extension of time was rejected.

Issue (iii): whether cancellation of the bid and forfeiture of the amount deposited could be sustained.

Analysis: The majority view held that once the bidder failed to comply with the payment schedule, the liquidation conditions permitting cancellation stood attracted and the challenge to cancellation did not merit interference. The dissenting view held that, although the bid cancellation was justified, forfeiture of the entire amount deposited was not warranted and refund ought to follow. Because of this difference of opinion, the forfeiture question was referred for appropriate nomination.

Conclusion: The cancellation challenge failed, but the issue of forfeiture did not attain a final majority determination and was referred.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of by sustaining the rejection of the claims for broader rights over subsidiary assets and for further time to pay, while the forfeiture aspect remained unresolved and stood referred for decision.

Ratio Decidendi: In a liquidation auction governed by the bid document and the insolvency framework, the successful bidder cannot expand the subject-matter of sale beyond what was expressly offered, and an unapproved business plan cannot override the auction terms or the statutory exclusion of subsidiary assets from the liquidation estate.

Issues: Whether the review petition disclosed any error apparent on the face of the record in the earlier judgment granting benefit under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019.

Analysis: The challenge was found to be an attempt to reargue the matter on merits, which is impermissible in review. The Court considered the scope of Clause viii of Circular No. 1074/07/2019-CX dated 12th December, 2019 and Section 121 of the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019, and held that the reference to expiry of the appeal period was in the context of an appeal by the declarant, not the Department. The Court also noted that the Order-in-Original and the declaration were both dated 14.01.2020, so it could not be said that the Department's process of deciding whether to prefer an appeal had commenced by then. The observation on limitation for appeal was not treated as the basis of the earlier judgment and, even if assumed inaccurate, did not affect the result. The review jurisdiction, being limited, could not be invoked on these grounds.

Conclusion: No error apparent on the face of the record was made out and the review petition was dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The earlier judgment remained undisturbed and the request to reopen the matter was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: Review cannot be used to reargue the case on merits or to correct an observation that does not form the basis of the decision; only an error apparent on the face of the record can justify interference.

Issues: (i) whether continuation of arbitration against the petitioners despite interim moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was sustainable; (ii) whether refusal to permit cross-examination of the Bank's witness vitiated the awards; (iii) whether the arbitral findings on proof of claim, stamp duty, membership and discharge of guarantor called for interference under Section 34; and (iv) whether the directions enforcing mortgage-related reliefs were arbitrable.

Issue (i): whether continuation of arbitration against the petitioners despite interim moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was sustainable.

Analysis: The interim moratorium under Section 96 operates in respect of the debt and not merely against the individual applicant. Once the moratorium came into force on the applications filed by some guarantors, the debt itself was kept in abeyance. Continuation of the arbitral proceedings against the remaining guarantors, while the same debt was under statutory interdiction, disregarded binding legal principles and amounted to enforcement of an unenforceable debt.

Conclusion: The continuation of the proceedings against the petitioners was unsustainable and the awards were liable to be set aside on this ground.

Issue (ii): whether refusal to permit cross-examination of the Bank's witness vitiated the awards.

Analysis: The Bank led evidence by affidavit and the arbitral tribunal relied upon that evidence to hold the claim proved. The petitioners had disputed execution of the guarantee and related documents and sought cross-examination of the witness. In such a contested factual situation, denial of cross-examination impaired the equal treatment of parties and the full opportunity to present the case, offending the requirements of natural justice under Sections 18 and 24.

Conclusion: The refusal to permit cross-examination constituted a breach of natural justice and furnished a ground for setting aside the awards.

Issue (iii): whether the arbitral findings on proof of claim, stamp duty, membership and discharge of guarantor called for interference under Section 34.

Analysis: The challenge regarding sufficiency of stamp duty, the principal instrument, the petitioners' membership of the Bank, and the effect of contractual clauses on the guarantor's liability involved factual appraisal and scrutiny of the terms of the instruments. Those matters did not justify re-appreciation of evidence in Section 34 proceedings. The finding that the guarantee permitted variation and restructuring, and the finding that the petitioners were members of the Bank, were not interfered with on merits. However, the finding that the Bank's claim stood proved was rendered vulnerable because it rested on evidence that ought to have been tested by cross-examination.

Conclusion: No interference was warranted on the stamp duty, membership and contractual discharge issues, but the finding on proof of claim could not be sustained in view of the procedural infirmity.

Issue (iv): whether the directions enforcing mortgage-related reliefs were arbitrable.

Analysis: The award contained directions declaring the Bank's charge, permitting disposal of mortgaged property, restraining third-party rights and directing attachment till sale and realisation. Such reliefs amount to enforcement of a mortgage, which is a right in rem and falls outside arbitral jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The mortgage-enforcement directions were non-arbitrable and could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The awards were set aside on substantive and procedural grounds, namely the statutory moratorium, denial of cross-examination, patent illegality in the proof of claim, and the grant of non-arbitrable mortgage-enforcement reliefs.

Ratio Decidendi: Interim moratorium under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code stays the debt itself, refusal of cross-examination in a contested evidentiary arbitration violates natural justice, and mortgage enforcement remains outside arbitral jurisdiction as a right in rem.

Issues: Whether the consolidated show cause notice and the consequential order covering multiple financial years under the GST regime were without jurisdiction, and whether availability of a statutory remedy barred writ interference where the impugned action was alleged to be void.

Analysis: The Court applied the GST scheme as interpreted in prior decisions to hold that assessment and demand proceedings must relate to distinct tax periods and that there is no scope for clubbing multiple financial years into one consolidated notice or order. It further held that proceedings issued in breach of this statutory framework are beyond jurisdiction and, therefore, void ab initio. On that basis, the Court held that the existence of an alternate statutory remedy could not prevent exercise of writ jurisdiction against an order that was a nullity. The petitioner's request for installment payment did not validate jurisdictionally defective proceedings.

Conclusion: The consolidated show cause notice, the adjudication order, and the consequential recovery notice were held unsustainable and were quashed, with liberty reserved to proceed afresh, if permissible, separately for each financial year in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the transfer of the assessee's file under Section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was validly made after affording a fair opportunity of hearing and recording reasons; (ii) Whether the revisional order under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable in the facts of the case, including the timing and manner of completion of proceedings during the COVID period.

Issue (i): Whether the transfer of the assessee's file under Section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was validly made after affording a fair opportunity of hearing and recording reasons.

Analysis: The record showed that a show cause notice was issued and objections were filed, but the proceedings were carried through in a hurried manner during the peak COVID period. The Bench found no satisfactory explanation for the course adopted and treated the transfer proceedings as having been concluded without a fair and reasonable opportunity in the circumstances.

Conclusion: The transfer order under Section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was held unsustainable and was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the revisional order under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable in the facts of the case, including the timing and manner of completion of proceedings during the COVID period.

Analysis: The Bench noted the issuance of multiple show cause notices with inconsistent hearing dates, the short span in which the revision was finalised, and the restrictions prevailing during the pandemic. It held that the revision had been concluded in undue haste and without affording a fair and reasonable opportunity of defence, amounting to breach of natural justice.

Conclusion: The revisional order under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was held unsustainable and was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded in challenging both the transfer and revisional orders, and the Court left it open to the authorities to commence fresh proceedings in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Administrative tax orders affecting jurisdiction or revision must be preceded by a fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing and cannot be sustained when concluded in undue haste in circumstances showing denial of natural justice.

Issues: Whether the petitioner should be permitted to amend the writ petition to challenge the vires of Section 147A and Section 292BC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without production of the original petition, and whether reverification should be dispensed with.

Analysis: The petition was stated to have been e-filed, the original papers were not traceable, and the matter had already been remanded for consideration. In the peculiar facts and circumstances, the Court permitted the amendment sought in the schedule annexed to the praecipe and directed that the Registry should not insist on production of the original writ petition for allowing the amendment. Since the amendment confined the challenge to the vires of the stated provisions, reverification was also dispensed with.

Outcome: Permission to amend the writ petition was granted and reverification was dispensed with.

Issues: Whether the proposed CKD kits of motherboards are classifiable under CTH 8473 30 20 as motherboards by applying Rule 2(a) of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, and Section XVI Note 2.

Analysis: The imported goods were found to consist of numerous discrete electronic and electromechanical components, including a bare PCB, which required extensive post-importation manufacturing operations such as SMT programming, component loading, soldering, integration, inspection, testing and quality validation before a functional motherboard would emerge. Rule 2(a) applies only where, at the time of importation, the goods either possess the essential character of the finished article or are complete articles presented unassembled or disassembled. The components here were independently identifiable, marketable and, in many cases, separately classifiable goods, and did not present as a motherboard in incomplete or unassembled form. Section XVI Note 2 also required components covered by specific headings to be classified in their own headings.

Conclusion: The CKD kits do not possess the essential character of a motherboard and cannot be classified as motherboards under CTH 8473 30 20.

Issues: Whether the draft assessment order and corrigendum were unsustainable where the return of income had in fact been filed, and whether the assessment proceedings required reconsideration in the circumstances.

Analysis: The notice under Section 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 called upon the petitioner to file the return of income for assessment year 2018-19, and the return was filed before the draft assessment order was passed. The draft order proceeded on the incorrect premise that no return had been filed. The subsequent corrigendum only noted the filing of the return but otherwise retained the same conclusions. In these circumstances, the assessment could not proceed on the basis of non-filing of return, and the matter required reconsideration. The Court also noted the limitation position under Section 153(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and observed that the time spent in prosecuting the writ petition would be liable to exclusion while computing limitation.

Conclusion: The draft assessment order and the corrigendum were set aside, and the Income-tax Department was permitted to proceed afresh in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded to the extent that the impugned assessment action was annulled, but the revenue was left free to recommence proceedings lawfully after taking note of the Court's observations.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment founded on an incorrect assumption that no return of income was filed cannot be sustained once the return has in fact been filed and brought on record.

Issues: Whether the assessee's receipts were to be assessed under the presumptive scheme for business income or as professional income on the basis of tax deduction under section 194J, and whether the matter required fresh consideration.

Analysis: The addition was made by treating the receipts as professional fees only because tax had been deducted at source under section 194J. Such deduction by the payer was not binding on the assessing authority, and the nature of the receipts had to be independently examined on the material available on record. At the same time, the assessee had not cooperated in the assessment proceedings and had not furnished supporting explanation despite opportunities, so the controversy could not be finally resolved on the existing record.

Conclusion: The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication by passing a de novo assessment after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

Issues: Whether an inadvertent wrong selection in the return of income affecting the computation of long-term capital gains could be rectified under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, when the supporting material showed that the assets were acquired before the relevant cut-off date.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that the expression "record" for the purpose of section 154 is not confined narrowly to the impugned intimation or order, but includes the material available to the Assessing Officer relating to the assessee. On the facts, the assessee produced evidence showing that the mutual fund units were acquired before the cut-off date, and the wrong date selection in Schedule 112A was an inadvertent error resulting in an incorrect computation of capital gains. Since the mistake was apparent from the return and the supporting record, rectification was warranted and the Assessing Officer was required to recompute the capital gains on the basis of the correct acquisition date.

Conclusion: The rectification application was maintainable and the assessee succeeded on the point that the apparent mistake in the return could be corrected under section 154, with a direction for recomputation of capital gains on verification of evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: For rectification under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the relevant "record" is not limited to the assessment intimation alone and an obvious clerical or inadvertent error in the return itself, when supported by the material on record, can be corrected as a mistake apparent from the record.

Issues: Whether, in respect of bogus purchases from an accommodation entry provider, the entire purchase amount could be added to income or only the profit element embedded in such purchases was taxable.

Analysis: The reassessment was made on account of purchases from an entity found to be part of an accommodation entry group. The appellate record reflected a consistent line of authority that in cases of bogus purchases, the taxable addition is ordinarily confined to the profit element embedded in the purchases and not the full purchase value. Applying that approach, the addition was held to be capable of reasonable estimation by reference to the assessee's normal profit rate, with a modest upward adjustment.

Conclusion: The entire purchase value could not be added as income; only the profit element embedded in the impugned purchases was to be estimated, and the matter was decided in favour of the assessee to that extent.

Issues: Whether the writ petition seeking re-export of Nepal-bound transit cargo disclosed a case for immediate interference despite the pending investigation and allegations of prohibited goods; and whether the petitioner should first be relegated to make a detailed representation before the customs authority.

Analysis: The petitioner asserted that the consignment suffered from a bona fide packing error and that the detention of the transit cargo was illegal under Section 53 of the Customs Act, 1962 and Clause 5A(i) of the Memorandum to the Protocol of the Treaty of Transit. The customs authorities relied on the pending investigation and the allegation that some goods were prohibited goods, contending that such circumstances constituted valid reasons to depart from the normal transit protection. The Court recorded a prima facie satisfaction in favour of the petitioner's grievance but declined to enter into the merits at that stage in view of the ongoing investigation and the seriousness of the allegations. The Court also invoked the requirements of natural justice and directed a fresh representation and reasoned consideration by the competent authority after hearing all concerned.

Outcome: The petition was disposed of without adjudication on the merits, with a direction to file a representation and for the authority to decide it by a reasoned order after hearing the parties.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked in a service tax demand arising from a CERA audit objection and whether the show cause notice was time-barred.

Analysis: The demand arose from an interpretational dispute regarding taxability of job-work activities under Business Auxiliary Service. The records showed that the issue originated from a CERA objection, was not accepted by the department at the relevant stage, and was kept in the call book. In such circumstances, the allegation of suppression of facts was not supported by a meaningful discussion showing deliberate non-disclosure. Limitation was treated as a jurisdictional matter, and a demand issued beyond the normal period could not be sustained in the absence of the ingredients needed to justify the extended period.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable and the show cause notice was time-barred. The demand and consequential penalties could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on the threshold issue of limitation, the impugned order was set aside, and consequential relief followed in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: The extended limitation period cannot be invoked unless suppression of facts is clearly established by reasoned findings of deliberate withholding of material facts; where the dispute is interpretational and stems from a departmental audit objection not accepted by the department itself, the notice is time-barred.

Issues: Whether the impugned GST adjudication was preceded by valid service of the show-cause notice and a meaningful opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: A prima facie case was found warranting examination of the alleged service of notice. The respondent authorities were directed to place proof of service on affidavit.

Outcome: Affidavit regarding service directed; coercive action restrained until the next hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether the civil court's jurisdiction over claims concerning guarantees, mortgages and pledged securities was barred because redemption of debentures could be pursued before the NCLT; (ii) Whether the suit was barred for non-compliance with pre-institution mediation requirements; (iii) Whether interim protection beyond restraint over the mortgaged properties and pledged securities was warranted.

Issue (i): Whether the civil court's jurisdiction over claims concerning guarantees, mortgages and pledged securities was barred because redemption of debentures could be pursued before the NCLT.

Analysis: The statutory exclusion under the Companies Act is confined to matters capable of adjudication by the NCLT and must be strictly construed. Although a debenture trustee may seek redemption of debentures before the NCLT, the defendants did not establish that the NCLT could grant the declaratory reliefs, enforce independent guarantees, redeem mortgages, or determine rights under pledge arrangements sought in the suit.

Conclusion: The civil court's jurisdiction is not prima facie barred in respect of the composite civil reliefs claimed.

Issue (ii): Whether the suit was barred for non-compliance with pre-institution mediation requirements.

Analysis: The partnership firm impleaded as a defendant comprised entities that participated in the pre-institution mediation, which ended in a failure report before institution of the suit. The application also sought urgent protective relief, and the circumstances disclosed urgency from the plaintiff's standpoint.

Conclusion: The bar under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 does not apply to the suit.

Issue (iii): Whether interim protection beyond restraint over the mortgaged properties and pledged securities was warranted.

Analysis: Default and an unpaid debt were not seriously disputed, while the recall notice supported the claimed amount at the interim stage. The material did not show that the existing mortgages and securities were insufficient to secure the unpaid debt, so broader reliefs such as asset disclosure, deposit, attachment, or receivership were not justified. Persistent default and the possibility that alteration or restructuring of secured assets could defeat the claim justified preservation of the mortgaged properties and pledged securities.

Conclusion: A limited injunction restraining dealings with the mortgaged properties and pledged securities, unless the plaintiff gives prior written consent, is warranted; the remaining interim reliefs are refused.

Final Conclusion: The secured assets remain protected pending trial, while the plaintiff may separately pursue any legally permissible remedy before the NCLT for redemption of debentures.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory remedy before the NCLT for redemption of debentures does not oust civil jurisdiction over independent civil claims for enforcement of guarantees, mortgages and pledges unless those reliefs fall within the NCLT's express jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether the assessee's change from the mercantile system to the cash system of accounting for interest on loans advanced was bona fide and justified, so as to preclude assessment of unpaid accrued interest.

Analysis: A change in the method of accounting is permissible where it is bona fide, made for a legitimate purpose rather than tax avoidance, consistently followed thereafter, compliant with applicable income-computation standards, and properly disclosed. The borrower company's financial distress had resulted in non-payment of the interest, while taxing interest not actually received would adversely affect the assessee's cash flow. The Revenue produced no material disproving the legitimacy of the change, showing frequent switching of accounting methods, or establishing non-disclosure of the cash method.

Conclusion: The change to the cash system was valid and the unpaid interest was not taxable on accrual basis; the conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether input tax credit for December 2018 to March 2019 could be denied on the ground that the returns were filed beyond the time limit under Section 16(4).

Analysis: The returns for the relevant months were furnished in October and November 2019, before the cut-off date of 30.11.2021 prescribed under Section 16(5). The extended statutory entitlement under Section 16(5) therefore applied to the credit claimed for those periods.

Conclusion: Denial of input tax credit solely for delayed filing under Section 16(4) was unsustainable; the petitioner is entitled to consideration for credit under Section 16(5), subject to fulfilment of other requirements.

Issues: (i) Whether invocation of the extended limitation period and proceedings under Section 74 of the GST enactment were without jurisdiction; (ii) whether the assessment and penalty relating to excess input tax credit were sustainable; (iii) whether the turnover mismatch between GSTR-9 and GSTR-9C required fresh adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether invocation of the extended limitation period and proceedings under Section 74 of the GST enactment were without jurisdiction.

Analysis: Section 74 permits invocation of the extended limitation period where the statutory threshold for alleging evasion or wrongful availment is met. The admitted excess availment of input tax credit, coupled with the failure to substantiate the turnover reconciliation through relevant VAT and GST returns, supported invocation of the provision. The challenge to jurisdiction was therefore not sustainable.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended limitation period and proceedings under Section 74 were valid.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment and penalty relating to excess input tax credit were sustainable.

Analysis: The excess input tax credit availed in GSTR-3B over the credit reflected in the relevant records was admitted in part. Payment of tax alone did not discharge the statutory liability to pay interest under Section 50 and penalty under Section 74. As the penalty was not paid before or after issuance of the show cause notice or assessment order, the penalty imposed for the excess credit was not liable to be interfered with.

Conclusion: The assessment and penalty relating to the excess input tax credit were sustained.

Issue (iii): Whether the turnover mismatch between GSTR-9 and GSTR-9C required fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The proposed turnover difference was explained by reference to pre-GST VAT sales, sales in another State, and reconciliation with the financial statements. However, supporting returns and documents had not been furnished. The turnover mismatch consequently required reconsideration after an adequate supporting reply to the show cause notice.

Conclusion: The turnover-mismatch component of the assessment was set aside for fresh adjudication upon submission of supporting documents.

Final Conclusion: The validity of the Section 74 proceedings and the liability relating to excess input tax credit and penalty were maintained, while the turnover-mismatch component was remitted for a fresh order after consideration of supporting records.

Ratio Decidendi: Invocation of the extended limitation period under Section 74 is sustainable where the facts disclose wrongful availment of input tax credit and the statutory basis for alleging tax evasion is established; a turnover discrepancy supported only by an unsubstantiated reconciliation requires fresh adjudication.

Issues: Whether an individual opting for the new tax regime under section 115BAC(1A), whose total income is within the prescribed threshold, is entitled to rebate under section 87A notwithstanding tax on short-term capital gains under section 111A.

Analysis: Section 115BAC(1A) contains no express exclusion of the section 87A rebate. The statutory rebate cannot be mechanically denied at the stage of processing under section 143(1) merely because the assessee opted for the new tax regime or had income taxable at special rates. The applicable judicial decisions recognised entitlement to the rebate for Assessment Year 2024-25 where total income does not exceed the prescribed threshold.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to rebate under section 87A, and the Assessing Officer was directed to grant it.

Issues: Whether the transfer pricing adjustment relating to the contract manufacturing and contract research and development segments was sustainable.

Analysis: The transfer pricing adjustment was based principally on the margins agreed under the assessee's earlier advance pricing agreement, despite the assessee having undertaken contemporaneous benchmarking under the transactional net margin method. The unchanged functional, asset and risk profile gave the earlier APA persuasive value, but did not by itself justify rejection of the current-year benchmarking. The Revenue did not identify any defect in the comparables or undertake an independent alternative benchmarking exercise. The margins earned during the year were broadly aligned with the APA margins and fell within the permissible tolerance band under the transfer pricing provisions.

Conclusion: The international transactions were at arm's length and the transfer pricing adjustment was directed to be deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: Earlier APA margins may serve as a persuasive benchmark for a subsequent year where the functional, asset and risk profile remains unchanged, but they cannot alone displace contemporaneous benchmarking without material defects or independent contrary analysis being established.