Issues: (i) Whether loans advanced to a shareholder were taxable as deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where the lender's money-lending activity constituted a substantial part of its business and interest was paid on the borrowings. (ii) Whether, on the facts found by the Tribunal, any substantial question of law arose for consideration in the revenue's appeal under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether loans advanced to a shareholder were taxable as deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where the lender's money-lending activity constituted a substantial part of its business and interest was paid on the borrowings.

Analysis: The Tribunal found that the assessee had paid interest on the borrowed sums, supported by TDS certificates and ledger entries, and therefore had not derived any gratuitous benefit from the company. It further noted that the lender carried on money lending as a substantial part of its business, bringing the transaction within the statutory exclusion for advances made in the ordinary course of business. On these facts, the advance was held to fall outside the mischief of deemed dividend.

Conclusion: The loan transactions were not chargeable as deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e) and the addition was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether, on the facts found by the Tribunal, any substantial question of law arose for consideration in the revenue's appeal under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The findings recorded by the Tribunal were factual, consistent with the assessee's earlier year's case, and based on the statutory exclusion applicable to business advances in a money-lending business. In the absence of any contrary material, the appeal did not disclose a debatable legal issue warranting interference.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose for determination.

Final Conclusion: The revenue's challenge failed and the Tribunal's deletion of the addition was left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A loan advanced to a shareholder is not deemed dividend where it is advanced in the ordinary course of a lender's business and lending money forms a substantial part of that business, especially when the borrower pays interest and receives no gratuitous benefit.

Issues: Whether the Revenue's appeal under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could succeed against deletion of commission expenditure claimed without filing a revised return, and whether any substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's decision.

Analysis: The assessee had disclosed the commission liability in the return and later pressed the claim during assessment. The Assessing Officer was directed to verify the quantum and nature of the expenditure, but the appellate authorities accepted the claim on the basis of material on record and the consistent treatment of similar expenses in other years. The Court applied the settled principle that the restriction on entertaining a fresh claim without a revised return operates at the assessment stage and does not bar the appellate authority or the Tribunal from considering a claim where the relevant facts are already on record.

Conclusion: The deletion of the commission expenditure was upheld, and the Revenue failed to demonstrate any substantial question of law.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, leaving the assessee's relief intact.

Ratio Decidendi: A claim not made in the original return may still be entertained by the appellate authority or the Tribunal when the necessary facts are already on record, and the bar against a fresh claim without a revised return is confined to the Assessing Officer.

Issues: Whether profit at 6% could be estimated and added on sales allegedly made to bogus parties, despite the sales being recorded in the books of account and no evidence of suppression of sales being shown.

Analysis: The sales were already credited in the assessees' books of account. The earlier addition at 6% had already been sustained on the bogus purchases side. The Court found no material to show that the recorded sales were suppressed or that any separate addition could be made merely because the purchases were from bogus entities. In the absence of evidence of suppression of sales, no further addition on the sales figure was permissible.

Conclusion: No addition of profit at 6% on the recorded sales was warranted; the revenue's challenge failed.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition made under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of unsecured loans received from Prraneta Industries Ltd., where the loan was received and repaid through banking channels and the Revenue did not dispute repayment.

Analysis: The Tribunal found that the assessee had received the amount by cheque and had repaid it through banking channels. It also noted the relevant bank statements and the lender's income-tax returns. In these circumstances, and in light of the jurisdictional precedents relied upon by the Tribunal, the Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition under section 68 was upheld and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Issues: Whether the additions made on account of alleged unaccounted sales based on digital data from a third party were sustainable and whether any substantial question of law arose from the concurrent findings deleting those additions.

Analysis: The assessment rested on an interpretation of entries in the EmmEss-Gold software found during survey in the case of V.K. Group. The appellate authorities found that no addition had been made in the hands of V.K. Group for alleged unaccounted purchases, that the software entries had been misread by the Assessing Officer, and that the accounts between the assessee and V.K. Group tallied. The Court accepted these concurrent factual findings and held that, in the absence of any unaccounted purchase in the hands of V.K. Group, the corresponding addition for unaccounted sales in the assessee's hands could not survive.

Conclusion: The deletion of the additions was upheld and no substantial question of law was held to arise.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the appellate authorities record concurrent findings that the third-party material was misinterpreted and no unaccounted transaction is established on facts, the High Court will not treat the matter as giving rise to a substantial question of law under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether reassessment initiated on the basis of investigation-wing information regarding accommodation entries was valid. (ii) Whether the addition in respect of bogus purchases could be restricted to 6% of the disputed purchases instead of sustaining 100% disallowance.

Issue (i): Whether reassessment initiated on the basis of investigation-wing information regarding accommodation entries was valid.

Analysis: The reopening was founded on information received from the Investigation Wing that the assessee was a beneficiary of accommodation entries from entry-providing concerns. The order notes that similar reopening had already been upheld in comparable cases where the jurisdictional link was traced to credible investigation material showing bogus entries given to beneficiaries.

Conclusion: The reassessment under section 147 was held to be valid and the challenge to reopening was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition in respect of bogus purchases could be restricted to 6% of the disputed purchases instead of sustaining 100% disallowance.

Analysis: The assessee had shown low gross profit and the disputed purchases were found to be accommodation entries. The Tribunal relied on the earlier coordinate-bench view and the jurisdictional precedent that only the income element embedded in such purchases can be taxed. Considering the factual matrix and the need to estimate the possible profit element, 6% of the disputed purchases was treated as sufficient.

Conclusion: The restriction of addition to 6% of the bogus purchases was upheld and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal did not disclose any merit, and the relief granted by the Tribunal was sustained in full.

Ratio Decidendi: In cases involving bogus purchases supported by accommodation-entry material, reassessment based on credible investigation information is valid, and the taxable addition is confined to a reasonable estimate of the profit element embedded in the disputed purchases rather than the entire purchase value.

Issues: (i) Whether the first appellate authority was justified in dismissing the appeal as time-barred without extending the benefit of the Supreme Court's orders on limitation during the Covid-19 period; (ii) Whether the cash deposits in the bank account were liable to be treated as unexplained money under section 69A or only as business receipts with estimation of profit.

Issue (i): Whether the first appellate authority was justified in dismissing the appeal as time-barred without extending the benefit of the Supreme Court's orders on limitation during the Covid-19 period.

Analysis: The limitation period had to be computed by giving effect to the exclusion and protection granted by the Supreme Court in its suo motu limitation orders. On that basis, the appeal filed before the first appellate authority fell within the protected period, and the delay could not be treated as fatal without examining the matter on merits.

Conclusion: The dismissal of the appeal as time-barred was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the cash deposits in the bank account were liable to be treated as unexplained money under section 69A or only as business receipts with estimation of profit.

Analysis: The assessee's transport activity and ownership of lorries were not disproved, and the surrounding circumstances indicated that the cash deposits could represent business collections. At the same time, the assessee failed to produce reliable books or supporting records, so the entire deposits could not be accepted as fully explained. In such a situation, only the profit element embedded in the receipts could be brought to tax, and not the whole of the deposits as unexplained money. The application of section 115BBE could not survive once the receipts were assessed as business income.

Conclusion: The deposits were directed to be treated as gross business receipts, and income was restricted to 15% of such deposits, with the balance deletion of the addition in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on the limitation issue and partially on the merits, with the assessment modified to tax only an estimated profit element from the cash deposits instead of treating the full amount as unexplained income.

Ratio Decidendi: Where cash deposits are found to have a nexus with business activity, the entire deposits cannot be assessed as unexplained money merely for lack of complete records; only a reasonable profit element may be taxed, and limitation orders of the Supreme Court must be applied when computing delay.

Issues: Whether the Registry of the National Company Law Tribunal could reject registration of a company petition on the ground of maintainability at the scrutiny stage under the NCLT Rules, and whether the impugned order refusing registration could be sustained.

Analysis: Rule 17 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 confines the Registrar's role to ministerial and administrative functions such as registration and scrutiny of pleadings, defects, and procedural compliance. A question touching the maintainability of a company petition, especially one requiring consideration under Section 244 of the Companies Act, 2013, is a judicial issue and cannot be finally decided by the Registry. Where objections relate to maintainability rather than mere curable defects, the petition must be numbered and placed before the appropriate bench for judicial determination under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Conclusion: The Registry had no competence to reject the petition on maintainability grounds at the scrutiny stage, and the impugned order could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was sent back for consideration of maintainability by the Tribunal on the judicial side.

Ratio Decidendi: The Registry cannot exercise judicial power to determine maintainability of a company petition at the scrutiny stage; such a question must be decided by the Tribunal on the judicial side.

Issues: (i) Whether disallowance of deduction under section 10AA could be sustained on the ground that partners' remuneration and interest on capital were not debited to the profit and loss account. (ii) Whether an addition could be made in reassessment on a matter that did not form part of the recorded reasons when no addition was made on the original reopening issue.

Issue (i): Whether disallowance of deduction under section 10AA could be sustained on the ground that partners' remuneration and interest on capital were not debited to the profit and loss account.

Analysis: The eligible business profit remained deductible under section 10AA even if the remuneration and interest payable to partners were not separately debited, because those amounts and the resultant profit were both within the deductible computation. The non-debit of such items did not alter the ultimate taxable income in the facts found, and the disallowance of exemption attributable to that omission could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 10AA was not justified and was held to be unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether an addition could be made in reassessment on a matter that did not form part of the recorded reasons when no addition was made on the original reopening issue.

Analysis: The reopening was based on a different reason relating to import figures, but no addition was made on that recorded reason. In reassessment, the addition was made on a separate issue relating to partners' remuneration and interest, which did not form part of the recorded reasons. Such an addition could not validly be made in reassessment in view of the governing jurisdictional principle.

Conclusion: The reassessment addition on the unrecorded issue was invalid.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's challenge failed, and the deletion of the addition was upheld, resulting in dismissal of the appeal.

Issues: Whether the decision dated 04.04.2025 of the Resolution Professional/Liquidator on security interest and distribution entitlements constituted a final determination overriding the pending challenge to the order dated 31.05.2024.

Analysis: The decision dated 04.04.2025 expressly stated that the determination of security interest and distribution entitlements was made in terms of the order dated 31.05.2024 and was being placed before the Appellate Tribunal because some banks had already preferred proceedings. The later observations also made clear that the decision was not intended to operate with immediate finality and that its effect would depend upon the outcome of the pending appeal against the order dated 31.05.2024. In that context, the liquidator's decision was only tentative and did not independently conclude the rights of the secured creditors.

Conclusion: The decision dated 04.04.2025 was not a conclusive determination of security interest or distribution entitlements, and no final legal benefit could be derived from it at this stage.

Issues: Whether reopening under Sections 147, 148 and 148A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the relevant assessment years was sustainable on the basis of high-value bank transactions, alleged inconsistency with business activity, absence of NBFC licence, non-charging of interest, alleged M2M loss and alleged purchase of bullion.

Analysis: The impugned reasons were founded on the assessee's bank credits and debits, but the transactions were reflected in the books of account and the audited records, and the entities from whom funds were received were regular return filers. The material did not show any live nexus between the information relied upon and escapement of income. Mere high-value transactions, without evidence of unexplained income, could not justify reassessment. The assumptions regarding absence of an NBFC licence and non-charging of interest were not sufficient to establish escapement. The M2M loss issue had not been put to the assessee in the notice under Section 148A(1), and the allegation regarding bullion was unsupported by material.

Conclusion: The reopening was unsustainable and the notices under Section 148 and the orders under Section 148A(3) were quashed.

Issues: Whether a declaration under the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, 2024 could be rejected under the search-based exclusion clause when the earlier proceedings under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 had been dropped and the reassessment ultimately proceeded under section 147 on the basis of survey material under section 133A.

Analysis: The exclusion in section 96(a)(i) applies only where the assessment is made under the specified reassessment provisions on the basis of search initiated under section 132 or section 132A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The prior proceedings under section 153C were themselves dropped, and the impugned reassessment order treated the matter as one arising from survey material under section 133A, not from a search-based reassessment. The Scheme does not contain any exclusion for cases founded on survey action, and such a restriction cannot be read into the statutory text by implication. Search and survey are distinct legal proceedings, and the more stringent search-based bar cannot be extended to a survey-based reassessment in the absence of express language.

Conclusion: The rejection of the petitioner's declaration under the Scheme was unjustified and unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded, the impugned rejection orders were quashed, and the respondent was directed to accept the declarations and issue the requisite statutory forms.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory exclusion in a tax settlement scheme must be applied strictly according to its express terms, and cannot be extended by implication to reassessments based on survey material where the scheme excludes only search-based cases.

Issues: (i) Whether reopening under Section 148A(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 based on disallowance of warranty provision for Assessment Year 2017-18 was sustainable. (ii) Whether reopening based on alleged non-taxation of forfeited security deposits taken against C-Forms was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether reopening under Section 148A(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 based on disallowance of warranty provision for Assessment Year 2017-18 was sustainable.

Analysis: The provision for warranty had been made on a scientific basis, supported by historical data, audited accounts, and the settled principles governing recognition of a provision. The warranty liability was found to be a present obligation arising from past events, with a reliable estimate possible, and therefore fell within the deductible business expenditure framework under Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The reasons recorded for reopening ignored the binding principles on provision for warranty and proceeded on an erroneous premise that the claim was merely an unascertained liability. The reopening on this ground was also contrary to the material already available in the original proceedings and to the consistent treatment of the same claim in other assessment years.

Conclusion: The reopening on the warranty-provision issue was invalid and was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether reopening based on alleged non-taxation of forfeited security deposits taken against C-Forms was sustainable.

Analysis: The forfeiture of security deposits had been specifically disclosed in the original return and explained in the assessee's earlier submissions. The materials relating to customer-wise deposits, sales tax liability, and challans were already before the Assessing Officer. The reassessment was therefore founded on the same material already considered, and the Court treated the action as a mere change of opinion rather than the discovery of any fresh escapement of income.

Conclusion: The reopening on the C-Form forfeiture issue was invalid and was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned notice and order initiating reassessment for Assessment Year 2017-18 were held unsustainable, and the writ petition succeeded with relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A reopening under Section 148A(d) cannot be sustained where the disputed claim is a scientifically estimated warranty provision deductible under Section 37 and the alleged escaped income is based only on material already disclosed, amounting to a mere change of opinion.

Issues: Whether the Delhi High Court was justified in declining to entertain the writ petition on the ground of forum non conveniens despite the respondents' offices being situated in Delhi and the Court having jurisdiction under Article 226.

Analysis: The writ petition could be maintained before more than one High Court on different jurisdictional bases. Where jurisdiction is attracted under Article 226 by reason of the situs of the respondents' office, the doctrine of forum non conveniens has a limited role and should be applied sparingly. In a challenge to dismissal from BSF service, the relevant records would ordinarily be available with the respondents, and the choice of a forum convenient to the respondents cannot be treated as self-defeating. The Delhi High Court, therefore, ought not to have declined to entertain the petition merely because other fora were also available.

Conclusion: The refusal to exercise jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens was unsustainable and the writ petition ought to be heard on merits.

Issues: Whether the respondents satisfied the definition of "person resident in India" under Section 2(v) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, and whether the impugned transactions for purchase of immovable property and receipt of funds attracted the FEMA regulations and penalties.

Analysis: The respondents had stayed in India for more than 182 days during the preceding financial year, had entered India on a business visa, carried on business in India, had sought and obtained RBI clarification, and had routed the purchase consideration and inward remittances through banking channels supported by FIRC certificates. On these facts, the statutory exceptions to Section 2(v) were not attracted. The applicable investment, capital account, immovable property, and establishment regulations under FEMA were therefore inapplicable, and no perversity or legal error in the Tribunal's appreciation of evidence was shown.

Conclusion: The respondents were correctly held to be persons resident in India, the violations of FEMA were not established, and the order setting aside confiscation and penalty was rightly upheld. The appeal failed, and the connected writ petition became infructuous.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of by declining to entertain it at this stage and leaving the petitioner to pursue the appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether the respondents should be directed to carry out reassessment of the six bills of entry and whether coercive action should be restrained till such exercise is completed.

Analysis: The petition was founded on alleged inaction in carrying out reassessment of the bills of entry and in issuing challans for the IGST payable. The respondents did not dispute that reassessment could be undertaken in a time-bound manner, while the question of waiver of interest was left to be considered by the authorities at the stage of reassessment. The Court therefore directed reassessment in accordance with the applicable law and restrained coercive action until the exercise was completed.

Conclusion: The respondents were directed to reassess the six bills of entry within eight weeks and no coercive action was to be taken against the petitioner in the meantime.

Outcome: The writ petition challenging the show cause notice was not entertained at the threshold and was disposed of with directions to file a reply and proceed with adjudication.

Issues: (i) whether the cost of acquisition for computing long-term capital gains had to be taken at the amount actually paid and proved by the assessee, instead of the lesser amount mentioned in the sale deed; and (ii) whether the cost of improvement could be restricted to 30% in the second round when that issue was not part of the earlier remand.

Issue (i): whether the cost of acquisition for computing long-term capital gains had to be taken at the amount actually paid and proved by the assessee, instead of the lesser amount mentioned in the sale deed.

Analysis: The assessee produced the housing society certificate and receipts showing payment of the higher consideration, along with registration and stamp duty charges. The lesser value shown in the sale deed was explained as having been adopted to avoid higher stamp duty. The materials on record demonstrated that the amount actually paid was the real cost of acquisition, and the authorities below had not properly appreciated the documentary evidence.

Conclusion: The actual cost of acquisition was accepted as claimed by the assessee and not the lower amount mentioned in the sale deed.

Issue (ii): whether the cost of improvement could be restricted to 30% in the second round when that issue was not part of the earlier remand.

Analysis: The earlier remand was confined to verification of the difference between the sale deed value and the actual cost of acquisition shown by the society certificate. The estimation of cost of improvement had not been the subject of dispute in the earlier round, and no finding on that issue had been returned then. In the second round, the restriction of improvement expenses to 30% was therefore unwarranted.

Conclusion: The restriction of cost of improvement to 30% was set aside and full allowance was directed.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on both contested issues, and the recomputation made by the lower authorities could not be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where documentary evidence establishes the actual purchase consideration, that amount governs computation of capital gains despite a lower value shown in the sale deed, and issues outside the scope of an earlier remand cannot be newly curtailed in the second round.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to renewal of registration under section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite the Commissioner's finding that no application had been filed after amendment of the objects under section 12A(1)(ac)(v); and whether the consequential rejection of approval under section 80G could survive once the registration issue was decided in the assessee's favour.

Issue (i): Entitlement to renewal of registration under section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The impugned rejection was founded on the assumption that the assessee had not sought approval after modification of its objects. The record showed otherwise: an application under section 12A(1)(ac)(v) had been filed and had culminated in approval in Form No. 10AD dated 18.04.2024. The Commissioner was bound to consider that subsisting order, and could not base a later refusal on a factual premise contradicted by the departmental record. No adverse finding was recorded that the objects were not charitable, that the educational activities were not genuine, or that any law material to the objects had been violated.

Conclusion: The refusal of renewal of registration under section 12AB was unsustainable and the assessee was entitled to renewal.

Issue (ii): Entitlement to renewal of approval under section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The rejection under section 80G rested entirely on the denial of renewal of registration under section 12AB. No independent adverse finding was recorded for refusing 80G approval. Once the denial of registration failed, the sole foundation for rejecting 80G approval also disappeared.

Conclusion: The rejection of approval under section 80G could not survive and the assessee was entitled to renewal.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded in both appeals. The adverse orders were set aside and the statutory benefits sought by the assessee were directed to be granted for the relevant renewal period.

Ratio Decidendi: A later registration or approval proceeding cannot rest on a factual assumption that is contradicted by a subsisting order already passed by the competent authority, and consequential denial of one benefit cannot survive once the foundational refusal is found unsustainable.