Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to enhancement of the informant reward beyond the amount finally fixed by the CBDT under the 2007 reward guidelines.

Analysis: The final reward had been determined by the competent authority after reconsideration of the material, including the recovery attributable to the petitioner's information and the applicable weightage factors under the reward policy. The reward was treated as an ex gratia payment resting in the absolute discretion of the authority, and the petitioner had also undertaken not to challenge the correctness of that decision in court. In the absence of manifest illegality or patent arbitrariness in the fixation of the reward, the Court declined to interfere with the expert body's assessment or to substitute its own calculation.

Conclusion: The petitioner had no enforceable right to claim a higher reward, and the challenge to the final reward determination was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: An informant reward governed by policy and granted ex gratia cannot be judicially enhanced unless the final fixation is shown to be manifestly illegal or patently arbitrary.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained when rectification orders had recorded nil assessed income and there was no under-reporting of income.

Analysis: Section 270A permits penalty only where a person has under-reported income. The rectification orders, passed after the assessment, recorded the assessed income as nil after adjusting the assessed income against current year and brought forward losses. In that factual setting, the precondition for invoking Section 270A was absent. The existence of a later liquidation order and the contention based on the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code were noticed, but no definitive finding was recorded on that aspect because the penalty failed on the threshold issue of under-reporting.

Conclusion: The penalty order could not be sustained and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) whether the assessee's additional ground challenging the jurisdiction of the Additional Commissioner to frame the assessment was admissible and, if so, sustainable; (ii) whether the assessee was entitled to claim the beneficial treaty rate on dividend distribution tax paid under section 115-O of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and consequential refund; (iii) whether the disallowance sustained towards provisions for liquidated damages and warranty was justified; (iv) whether the addition made under section 145A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable; and (v) whether the amount paid to M/s Apex Medi Equipment was rightly disallowed as commission expenditure.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee's additional ground challenging the jurisdiction of the Additional Commissioner to frame the assessment was admissible and, if so, sustainable?

Analysis: The additional ground raised a pure question of law based on material already on record and therefore was admissible. On merits, the assessment order itself recorded that jurisdiction had been assumed pursuant to authorization under section 120(4)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The challenge related to allocation and exercise of jurisdiction within the statutory scheme and was governed by section 124(3)(a), under which no objection had been raised within the prescribed time. The belated jurisdictional challenge was therefore not accepted.

Conclusion: The additional ground was admitted but the jurisdictional challenge failed and was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was entitled to claim the beneficial treaty rate on dividend distribution tax paid under section 115-O of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and consequential refund?

Analysis: The claim was permitted to be raised as an additional ground because the foundational facts regarding dividend distribution and the non-resident shareholder were on record. In view of the jurisdictional High Court ruling that dividend distribution tax is intrinsically linked to dividend income and treaty protection cannot be denied merely because the levy is collected through the domestic company, the legal plea was held to be prima facie sustainable. At the same time, entitlement to relief depended on verification of treaty documents such as the TRC and Form No. 10F, together with residential status and other treaty conditions.

Conclusion: The ground was allowed for statistical purposes and remanded for factual verification.

Issue (iii): Whether the disallowance sustained towards provisions for liquidated damages and warranty was justified?

Analysis: Both provisions were supported by contractual obligations and actuarial or project-wise estimation, so they could not be treated as purely contingent liabilities. However, the historical utilisation and reversal pattern showed that the assessee had consistently created provisions in excess of the amounts eventually crystallised. Applying the principles governing accrued liability, reasonable estimation, and prudence, the partial disallowance sustained by the first appellate authority was found to be justified. The alternate plea based on timing difference was accepted only to the extent that corresponding reversals or utilisations should not be taxed twice.

Conclusion: The disallowances were upheld only to the extent sustained by the first appellate authority, with consequential relief directed to avoid double taxation.

Issue (iv): Whether the addition made under section 145A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable?

Analysis: The adjustment made by the Assessing Officer was held to be unsustainable because it was made in an isolated manner by loading excise duty into closing stock without giving corresponding effect to opening stock, purchases and sales. The assessee's reconciliation showed that the method consistently followed was revenue neutral. The settled principle is that inventory valuation under section 145A must be applied consistently across all related components and cannot be used to artificially enhance profits.

Conclusion: The addition under section 145A was deleted in full and the ground was allowed.

Issue (v): Whether the amount paid to M/s Apex Medi Equipment was rightly disallowed as commission expenditure?

Analysis: The evidence showed that the payment was made against a purchase order for bought-out items and accessories, through banking channels, and was confirmed by the recipient as consideration for supply of accessories rather than commission. The true nature of the transaction prevailed over the incorrect accounting head used in the books. Since the expenditure was genuine and incurred for business purposes, it remained allowable even if it was wrongly classified as commission.

Conclusion: The disallowance was deleted and the ground was allowed.

Final Conclusion: The assessee obtained relief on the DDT claim for statistical purposes and succeeded on the section 145A and commission issues, while the jurisdictional challenge and the provisions-related claim were not accepted beyond the limited relief already granted. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A provision is deductible only where a present obligation supported by reliable and scientific estimation has accrued, and inventory adjustments under section 145A must be made consistently across opening stock, purchases, sales and closing stock so as not to distort profits.

Issues: Whether rejection of the application for waiver of interest and penalty under section 128A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was sustainable when the underlying proceedings had been initiated under section 73 and not under section 74.

Analysis: The application was made after an assessment order for the relevant tax period and fell within clause (b) of section 128A(1). The rejection was based on the allegation that input tax credit had been availed from non-existing tax payers, cancelled dealers and return defaulters. The relevant statutory distinction was that proceedings based on such allegations ought to proceed under section 74, whereas the record showed that the demand had in fact been initiated under section 73. On that footing, the basis for rejecting the waiver application could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The rejection order was set aside and the authority was directed to reconsider the waiver application and pass a fresh order within thirty days.

Issues: Whether refund of TDS could be denied merely because the return was e-verified belatedly, despite the delay having been condoned and the tax having been duly deducted at source.

Analysis: The return had been filed within time and the TDS amount was admitted to have been deducted. The delay in e-verification was supported by sufficient cause and was subsequently condoned by the CPC. The denial of refund on a purely technical objection was found inconsistent with the principle that tax can be retained only when authorised by law. Refusal to grant the refund in such circumstances was held to amount to unjust enrichment by the Revenue and to offend Article 265 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: Refund could not be denied on the ground of belated e-verification once the delay stood condoned and the tax deduction was undisputed; the assessee was entitled to refund.

Ratio Decidendi: Where tax has been lawfully deducted and the delay in verification of the return is condoned, refund cannot be refused on a purely technical ground, as retention of such tax without authority of law violates Article 265 of the Constitution of India.

Issues: (i) Whether disallowance under section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained in respect of bonus, GST payable, and employer's contribution to provident fund when the amounts were paid before the due date for filing the return. (ii) Whether donations made out of corporate social responsibility expenditure were eligible for deduction under section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether disallowance under section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained in respect of bonus, GST payable, and employer's contribution to provident fund when the amounts were paid before the due date for filing the return.

Analysis: The disallowance arose from a repeated adjustment in the intimation process, although the tax audit report reflected the relevant liabilities as paid on or before the due date for filing the return under section 139(1). The same adjustment had already been deleted in rectification proceedings and that deletion had attained finality. Once payment before the due date stood established, the statutory condition for disallowance under section 43B was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 43B was rightly deleted and the Revenue's challenge on this issue failed.

Issue (ii): Whether donations made out of corporate social responsibility expenditure were eligible for deduction under section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Explanation 2 to section 37(1) disallows CSR expenditure as business expenditure, but section 80G operates in a different statutory field while computing total income. The Act contains specific exclusions only for certain CSR-linked donations under section 80G(2)(a)(iiihk) and section 80G(2)(a)(iiihl). For donations otherwise eligible under section 80G, deduction cannot be denied merely because the source of payment was CSR expenditure, since that would amount to an impermissible double disallowance.

Conclusion: The deduction under section 80G was correctly allowed and the Revenue's challenge on this issue failed.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal did not succeed on the substantive issues, and the relief granted by the first appellate authority was sustained in full.

Ratio Decidendi: CSR expenditure may be disallowed as business expenditure under section 37(1), but donations otherwise satisfying section 80G cannot be denied deduction merely because they form part of CSR outlay, and payments made before the due date of return filing cannot be disallowed under section 43B.

Issues: Whether the challenge to the common adjudication order on the grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction, delay, and breach of procedural fairness required consideration; and whether interim protection against coercive action was warranted pending further hearing.

Analysis: The writ petitions assail the adjudication order principally on the basis that the proceedings were transferred from Delhi to Mumbai through a corrigendum without authority, besides alleging inordinate delay and procedural unfairness causing prejudice. The issues were regarded as requiring deeper consideration. Pending notice to the respondents, the Court granted interim protection against coercive action on the basis of the impugned order.

Outcome: Notice issued to the respondents, returnable on 11 August 2026, with private notice and humdast permitted, and no coercive action to be taken against the petitioners on the basis of the impugned order without leave of the Court.

Issues: Whether, under Section 93 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, fresh assessment and recovery proceedings can be initiated against the legal heir of a deceased taxable person after the business has been discontinued, even where no notice or proceedings were initiated during the deceased's lifetime.

Analysis: Section 93 expressly contemplates liability of the legal representative where the business is discontinued, and it also covers situations where tax, interest or penalty is determined after the death of the taxable person. The expression "person chargeable with tax" in Section 74 is not confined to the registered taxable person; it extends to any person on whom the Act fastens the liability to pay, including a legal heir from whom recovery is statutorily authorised. Reading Section 93 in conjunction with Sections 73, 74 and 74A, the words "determined after his death" include the entire adjudicatory process, including issuance of notice and determination. The statutory text is to be given its plain meaning and cannot be restricted by importing a limitation that the legislature did not express.

Conclusion: Fresh proceedings may be initiated against the legal heir after the death of the taxable person, notwithstanding that no proceedings were commenced during the deceased's lifetime; however, in the case of a discontinued business, recovery is limited to the extent of the estate inherited.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the reassessment proceedings failed, and the writ petition was dismissed because Section 93 authorises post-death initiation and recovery against the legal heir within the statutory limits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the charging and recovery provisions of the GST law expressly extend liability to legal heirs, the entire adjudicatory process may be commenced after the taxable person's death, subject to recovery being confined to the inherited estate in cases of discontinued business.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction under section 80-IB(10) where the housing project, as approved and constructed, was on less than one acre of land, and whether land used for the assessee's personal residential bungalow could be aggregated with the project land to satisfy the statutory minimum area requirement.

Analysis: The deduction under section 80-IB(10)(b) is available only when the eligible housing project is on a plot of land having a minimum area of one acre. The relevant land is the plot on which the approved housing project is actually developed, and not the entirety of the assessee's contiguous holding. Land occupied by a separate personal residence, which is not part of the approved housing project or its common amenities, cannot be added to meet the one-acre condition. On the facts found, the project area was only 0.70 acre, and the assessee's reliance on Vandana Properties was held to be misplaced because that decision did not support aggregation of land used for a private bungalow with land on which the housing project stood.

Conclusion: The assessee was not entitled to deduction under section 80-IB(10), as the housing project itself did not satisfy the minimum one-acre plot requirement.

Final Conclusion: The disallowance of the deduction was upheld for both assessment years, and the assessee's appeals failed.

Ratio Decidendi: For deduction under section 80-IB(10)(b), the one-acre requirement must be satisfied by the land comprised in the approved housing project itself, and land used for unrelated personal construction cannot be clubbed to satisfy that condition.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant was entitled to refund of service tax allegedly paid twice on transportation of goods by rail, once by the service provider and again by the appellant under reverse charge mechanism. (ii) Whether the refund claims were barred by limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant was entitled to refund of service tax allegedly paid twice on transportation of goods by rail, once by the service provider and again by the appellant under reverse charge mechanism.

Analysis: The entitlement to refund depended on a factual verification of whether service tax had in fact been discharged by both the service provider and the appellant on the same taxable service. If the appellant had paid service tax under reverse charge by mistake on a service already taxed at the hands of the provider, the amount paid by the appellant could not be retained and would be refundable. Since the record required examination to ascertain the actual tax payment position, the matter could not be finally decided on merits at that stage.

Conclusion: The issue was remanded to the adjudicating authority for verification of the payments and fresh decision in accordance with law.

Issue (ii): Whether the refund claims were barred by limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Refund of an amount paid under mistake of law, where the tax was not lawfully payable by the claimant, could not be rejected merely on the ground of the one-year limitation under Section 11B. The limitation period was held inapplicable to the refund claims in the facts of the case.

Conclusion: The refund claims were held not to be barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: The limitation objection was rejected, while the question of double payment and refund entitlement was sent back for fresh adjudication after factual verification.

Ratio Decidendi: Limitation under Section 11B does not apply to a refund claim for service tax paid under mistake of law, and refund entitlement for alleged double payment must be determined on verification of the actual tax discharge by the service provider and the claimant.

Issues: (i) whether the reassessment initiated after search was valid; and (ii) whether the commission income from accommodation entry business could be estimated at 0.15% without confronting the assessee with the seized tally data and forensic analysis report.

Issue (i): whether the reassessment initiated after search was valid.

Analysis: The reassessment was based on search material and was held to have been validly initiated. The Tribunal accepted the finding that the proceedings under reassessment were not without jurisdiction merely because the assessee disputed the source and ownership of the electronic data relied upon by the Department.

Conclusion: The reassessment was upheld and the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether the commission income from accommodation entry business could be estimated at 0.15% without confronting the assessee with the seized tally data and forensic analysis report.

Analysis: The Tribunal accepted that the assessee was engaged in accommodation entry operations and agreed that 0.15% was a reasonable rate for estimating commission income. However, it held that the material used for quantification, including the tally data and forensic analysis report, had not been confronted to the assessee during assessment and that this caused a violation of natural justice. It therefore directed the Assessing Officer to confront the assessee with the material, consider the reply, and then recompute the income by applying the 0.15% rate.

Conclusion: The estimation at 0.15% was sustained in principle, but the matter was remanded for fresh computation after confrontation of material, substantially in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The order sustained the reassessment, but the quantum determination was sent back for reconsideration after giving the assessee an opportunity to meet the seized material, and the connected revenue appeals were rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: When income is estimated from seized electronic material, the material must be confronted to the assessee and the assessment must observe natural justice, even if the underlying business activity and an appropriate commission rate are otherwise accepted.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings and the consequential revisionary action could be sustained when notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not issued or was not available on record, and whether such defect could be challenged in collateral proceedings.

Analysis: The Tribunal accepted the additional legal ground as it involved a pure question of law arising from the existing record. Relying on the mandatory character of notice under section 143(2), it held that where reassessment is completed without such notice, the assessment becomes invalid and a nullity. It further held that section 292BB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cures defects in service of a notice but does not dispense with the requirement of issuing a notice that the statute mandates. On that basis, the reassessment order could not form a valid foundation for revision under section 263. The Tribunal also held that the assessee was entitled to question the invalidity of the assessment in collateral or consequential proceedings.

Conclusion: The reassessment was held to be bad in law and void, the revisionary proceedings based on it were unsustainable, and the assessee succeeded on the additional ground.

Issues: (i) Whether the customs authorities could sell confiscated gold by auction without notice to the owners while their statutory remedies remained pending, and whether such sale violated the governing circular and principles of natural justice; (ii) whether, after a de novo order permitting redemption of the confiscated gold had been passed and the gold had already been disposed of, the petitioners were entitled to receive the value of the gold at the prevailing market rate on the date of the de novo order rather than the tariff value on the date of transfer to SPMCIL.

Issue (i): Whether the customs authorities could sell confiscated gold by auction without notice to the owners while their statutory remedies remained pending, and whether such sale violated the governing circular and principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The confiscated gold had been sold after seizure, but the owners had not exhausted their appellate and revisional remedies at the time of sale. The circular issued by the customs administration required notice to the owner even in respect of confiscated goods where legal remedies were still open. The gold was not perishable or hazardous, and no notification under the seizure-and-disposal mechanism justified immediate sale. The absence of notice deprived the petitioners of an opportunity to participate in the auction and constituted a breach of the prescribed procedure and natural justice.

Conclusion: The auction sale without notice was illegal and fatal to the respondents' stand.

Issue (ii): Whether, after a de novo order permitting redemption of the confiscated gold had been passed and the gold had already been disposed of, the petitioners were entitled to receive the value of the gold at the prevailing market rate on the date of the de novo order rather than the tariff value on the date of transfer to SPMCIL.

Analysis: Once the de novo order granted redemption, the petitioners became entitled to restitution of the confiscated commodity or its equivalent value. The administration could not rely on the 2022 instruction to limit payment to the tariff value on the date of transfer to SPMCIL when the earlier disposal had itself occurred without notice and contrary to the governing procedure. The Court balanced the equities between the parties and held that the petitioners should receive the value of the gold at 24K purity prevailing on the date of the de novo order, after deduction of redemption fine, duty, and penalties.

Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to payment based on the prevailing value on 02.05.2025, less the amounts legally recoverable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned refund orders were set aside and the respondents were directed to pay the petitioners the equivalent value of the gold at the rate prevailing on the date of the de novo redemption order, after lawful deductions.

Ratio Decidendi: Where confiscated gold is sold without the mandatory notice while statutory remedies remain pending, and redemption is later granted, the owner is entitled to restitution on a fair market-value basis rather than a stale tariff-value basis fixed by the department.

Issues: Whether late fee for delayed filing of supplementary Bills of Entry under Regulation 4(3) of the Bill of Entry (Electronic Integrated Declaration) Regulations, 2018 read with Section 46(3) of the Customs Act, 1962 was justified, and whether the proper officer ought to have waived the levy in the facts of the case.

Analysis: The delay in filing the supplementary Bills of Entry arose after the original Bills of Entry had been filed within time, and the excess coal was found from the same consignment during draft survey. The appellant had sought amendment and was willing to pay duty, but the request was not allowed, resulting in the filing of supplementary Bills of Entry. On these facts, the delay was held not attributable to any fault of the appellant. The proviso to Section 46(3) was read as conferring discretion on the proper officer to waive late charges where sufficient cause exists, and the levy was required to be applied judiciously, not mechanically. The Board circular and the SOP were treated as reinforcing that late fee and related action should depend on the circumstances and bona fides. The cited precedent was found applicable on identical facts.

Conclusion: The late fee was held unsustainable and liable to be waived, and the appeals succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: Where delayed filing of a supplementary Bill of Entry is occasioned by bona fide circumstances not attributable to the importer, the proper officer may waive late fee under Section 46(3) of the Customs Act, 1962 and such levy cannot be imposed mechanically.

Issues: Whether the review applications disclosed any error apparent on the face of the record in the earlier writ order, and whether the petitioners could reopen the merits of the show cause notice notwithstanding the availability of statutory remedies under FEMA.

Analysis: The challenge in review was directed principally against the earlier dismissal of the writ petitions on the ground of alternative remedy. The grounds urged on delay in issuing the show cause notice, the applicability of precedent on reasonable time, the alleged pre-notification nature of the violation, the status of the FDI policy, and factual questions such as exit from the company or the definition of group company were all held to be matters going to the merits, which could be urged before the adjudicating authority. The earlier writ order had already considered the delay issue and had taken the view that reasonableness depended on the facts and circumstances and could be examined in the statutory adjudicatory process. The existence of further remedies under FEMA, including appeal and further appeal on questions of law, reinforced the limited scope of interference in review.

Conclusion: No error apparent on the face of the record was made out. The review applications were not maintainable as a vehicle for re-arguing the merits, and they were dismissed.

Issues: Whether the petitioners' arrest under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was illegal for want of fresh tangible material and for reliance on stale material from earlier proceedings.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 requires the authorised officer to possess material in hand, form a reason to believe on that material, record the reasons in writing, communicate the grounds of arrest, and comply with the forwarding and remand safeguards. The power of arrest is not a routine investigative measure and cannot be exercised on conjecture, recycled suspicion, or mere non-cooperation. The material relied on for arrest must be current, objective, and capable of supporting the statutory satisfaction that the person is guilty of money-laundering. Arrest cannot be sustained by using the same foundation that had earlier not resulted in arrest, especially when no summons were issued and no fresh incriminating material emerged from the subsequent search.

Conclusion: The arrest was held contrary to law because the statutory threshold under Section 19 was not met on the basis of fresh and tangible material; the petitioners were entitled to be released forthwith.

Ratio Decidendi: Arrest under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is valid only when, on the material then in possession, the authorised officer records written reasons to believe supported by objective and current material, and the power cannot be used on stale or recycled material merely to continue or intensify investigation.

Issues: Whether the denial of the Voluntary Compliance Encouragement Scheme benefit on the ground of a substantially false declaration, the treatment of payments and CENVAT credit under the Scheme, and the service tax demand for flex printing, fixing and in-shop branding for the subsequent period were properly examined on merits.

Outcome: The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication after considering the appellant's records and passing a speaking order; no final adjudication was recorded on the disputed issues.

Issues: (i) Whether freight and transportation charges were includible in the assessable value of goods sold on ex-works/FOR-works basis when separate invoices were raised for supply and transportation; (ii) whether Rule 8 of the Central Excise Valuation Rules, 2000 applied to goods supplied under turnkey contracts for erection and commissioning at the customer's site; (iii) whether the demand was barred by limitation; and (iv) whether interest and penalty survived.

Issue (i): Whether freight and transportation charges were includible in the assessable value of goods sold on ex-works/FOR-works basis when separate invoices were raised for supply and transportation.

Analysis: The contracts showed transfer of title at the factory gate and separate consideration for transportation and erection/commissioning. For the relevant period, Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 treated the factory or warehouse as the place of removal, and Rule 5 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000 excluded transportation beyond the place of removal where separately shown.

Conclusion: Freight and transportation charges were not includible in the assessable value, and the demand on this count was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether Rule 8 of the Central Excise Valuation Rules, 2000 applied to goods supplied under turnkey contracts for erection and commissioning at the customer's site.

Analysis: Rule 8 applies only where excisable goods are not sold but are used for consumption by or on behalf of the assessee. Here, the goods were sold at the factory gate and only thereafter used in the turnkey erection process. The erected boilers and turnkey installations resulted in immovable property, so valuation could not be shifted to Rule 8 on a captive-consumption theory.

Conclusion: Rule 8 was inapplicable, and the valuation based on 110/115% of cost of production could not be sustained.

Issue (iii): Whether the demand was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The show cause notices covered overlapping periods on identical issues, and the department was already aware of the facts after the first notice. Non-disclosure of freight in returns did not justify extended limitation where the return format did not require such disclosure, and the dispute was interpretational without mala fide suppression.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was not sustainable.

Issue (iv): Whether interest and penalty survived.

Analysis: Once the principal duty demand failed on merits and limitation, the ancillary levy of interest and penalty could not stand independently.

Conclusion: Interest and penalty were also unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The duty demand, valuation reassessment, limitation-based confirmation, and allied interest and penalty all failed, resulting in complete relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For ex-works sales where title passes at the factory gate and transportation is separately contracted and invoiced, freight beyond the place of removal is excluded from assessable value; Rule 8 is confined to non-sale captive consumption and cannot be used to value goods sold for turnkey erection into immovable property.

Issues: Whether interference was warranted in a challenge to the assessment proceedings under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, when the petitioner had an statutory appeal remedy and approached the writ court belatedly.

Analysis: The assessment order and show cause notice disclosed the factual basis for the proceedings, and the petitioner had an appeal remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The order also noted that electronic communication had been issued, that the petitioner became aware of the proceedings much earlier, and that the writ petition was filed after delay. In these circumstances, the writ petition was treated as an impermissible substitute for the appellate remedy.

Conclusion: No interference was warranted and the Special Leave Petition was dismissed.

Issues: Whether the writ petition seeking a creamy-layer based restriction on tax exemption for scheduled tribes and a declaration that the impugned exemption was unconstitutional under the Income-tax Act, 2025 called for adjudication under Article 32, or whether the petitioner should be relegated to an alternate forum for redress.

Outcome: The petition was not entertained on merits; the petitioner was permitted to approach the Committee on Petitions under Rule 306 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, and to forward the petition as a representation to the respondents and other concerned authorities.