Issues: Whether the assessment order passed under Section 147 read with Section 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for assessment year 2018-19 was liable to be set aside and remanded for fresh adjudication on the ground of inadequate opportunity and service of notices at an old address.

Analysis: The petitioner showed that the premises where notices were served had been sold prior to issuance of notice under Section 148A, and the petition also proceeded on the assertion that the petitioner was abroad during the relevant period. Although there was an admission that the change of address was not communicated to the department, the challenge was confined to seeking an opportunity to contest the assessment on merits. In these circumstances, the Court found the request bona fide and considered that the interests of justice would be served by reopening the matter before the Assessing Officer.

Conclusion: The assessment order was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh decision in accordance with law, with liberty to the petitioner to file a response and without requiring issuance of a fresh show cause notice.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the appeal before the first appellate authority deserved condonation. (ii) Whether the amount received by BSNL employees under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 was retrenchment compensation exempt under section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, or voluntary retirement compensation falling under section 10(10C).

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the appeal before the first appellate authority deserved condonation.

Analysis: The delay was found to be supported by sufficient cause. The explanation offered by the assessees, coupled with the principle that substantial justice should prevail over technical objections, justified condonation.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether the amount received by BSNL employees under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 was retrenchment compensation exempt under section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, or voluntary retirement compensation falling under section 10(10C).

Analysis: The Tribunal followed its earlier coordinate Bench decisions and held that compensation received under the BSNL VRS, 2019 was to be treated as retrenchment compensation. It was viewed as a capital receipt and not as mere voluntary retirement compensation. The Tribunal also accepted that the exemption under section 10(10B) applied on the facts of the case.

Conclusion: The amount was held exempt under section 10(10B) and not taxable under section 10(10C), in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The appellate orders were reversed and the assessees obtained full relief on both the procedural and substantive issues, with the compensation treated as exempt and the appeals allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Compensation paid to BSNL employees under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 was treated as retrenchment compensation and a capital receipt eligible for exemption under section 10(10B) when the facts showed that the earlier coordinate Bench view squarely applied.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the Customs Authority for Advance Ruling order was maintainable in view of the statutory appeal remedy under the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The petitioner sought to quash the advance ruling under Section 28H of the Customs Act, 1962. The Court noted that an appeal remedy was available under Section 28KA of the Customs Act, 1962, and therefore the writ petition was not the appropriate course for challenge.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable and stood dismissed, with liberty to pursue the statutory appeal remedy.

Issues: Whether the cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns should be set aside and the registration restored on payment of outstanding dues, interest, late fee and penalty.

Analysis: The Petitioner had defaulted in filing GST returns for a substantial period and the registration had been cancelled, with the appellate challenge having failed on account of non-appearance. The Court noted the explanation offered for the default, including financial and disruption during the Covid period, and also relied on the fact that a similarly situated assessee had been granted relief. The State did not oppose a similar order if appropriate safeguards were imposed. The Court therefore accepted that relief could be granted in a conditional form, linked to determination and payment of the arrears.

Conclusion: The cancellation and the appellate rejection were quashed and set aside, and GST registration was directed to be restored upon payment of the amount intimated by the authorities within the stipulated time.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded to the extent of conditional restoration of GST registration, subject to compliance with the payment directions, and the impugned orders ceased to operate.

Ratio Decidendi: Where cancellation of GST registration results from non-filing of returns, relief may be granted by conditional restoration upon payment of the outstanding statutory dues and allied liabilities, particularly when parity with similarly situated cases supports such relief.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax was leviable on the amounts reflected as negative debtors or treated by the department as advance receipts, and (ii) whether the demand could be sustained by invoking the extended period of limitation.

Issue (i): Whether service tax was leviable on the amounts reflected as negative debtors or treated by the department as advance receipts.

Analysis: The amounts appearing with negative marking were found to be part of the assessee's current-account style accounting with network firms and were supported by debit notes and invoices on which service tax had already been charged and discharged by the service providers. The department did not establish, with transaction-wise evidence, that the entries represented undisclosed advance receipts liable to service tax. On the facts found by the Tribunal, the demand rested on a presumption drawn from the accounting treatment and not on proof of a taxable receipt escaping assessment.

Conclusion: The levy was not sustainable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand could be sustained by invoking the extended period of limitation.

Analysis: The accounting method and the relevant figures were reflected in the books and financial statements, and earlier audits had not raised such an objection. In the absence of material showing a positive act of suppression or wilful misstatement, the precondition for invoking the extended period was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The extended period was not available and the limitation plea was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order, and the Revenue's appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Service tax cannot be sustained on negative debtor entries or presumed advance receipts unless the department proves a taxable receipt escaping assessment, and the extended limitation period requires proof of suppression or similar culpable conduct.

Issues: Whether service tax was payable under reverse charge mechanism on the advance paid for procurement of capital goods, where the contract was subsequently cancelled and the advance was refunded, and whether penalty could survive.

Analysis: The advance was found to have been paid towards the capital goods and not towards any service. The contract was cancelled and the amount paid was refunded by the foreign supplier. On these facts, no service transaction survived between the parties, and the demand could not be sustained under reverse charge. Since the tax demand itself failed, the penalty also could not survive.

Conclusion: The appellant was held not liable to pay service tax under reverse charge mechanism and no penalty was imposable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the payment is for procurement of goods, the contract is cancelled, and the consideration is refunded, no taxable service survives to attract service tax under reverse charge mechanism.

Issues: (i) Whether MODVAT or CENVAT credit on LSHS used for generation of electricity could be denied to the extent the electricity and steam were supplied to sister units and the housing colony outside the generating unit. (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of the credit and penalty.

Issue (i): Whether MODVAT or CENVAT credit on LSHS used for generation of electricity could be denied to the extent the electricity and steam were supplied to sister units and the housing colony outside the generating unit.

Analysis: Rule 57A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, as amended by Notification No. 11/95, expanded the definition of inputs to include fuel and inputs used for generation of electricity used within the factory of production for manufacture of final products or for any other purpose. The decisive factor was whether the electricity remained part of a captive arrangement linked to manufacturing activity. Credit was held admissible for electricity wheeled to sister units of the same assessee because the factory concept could extend to multiple manufacturing units of the same company and the electricity was used in captive generation and captive consumption. However, electricity used for lighting the housing colony was not used in the manufacture of dutiable final products and fell outside the admissible credit chain.

Conclusion: The denial of credit was not sustainable for electricity supplied to sister units used for manufacture, but was sustainable for the portion used in the housing colony. The issue was therefore answered partly in favour of the assessee and partly against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of the credit and penalty.

Analysis: The demand arose after the assessee had transferred electricity to sister units and the housing colony, and the diversion came to light only after inspection. On those facts, the Court found intentional non-disclosure in relation to the inadmissible portion of credit. Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 therefore permitted invocation of the extended period where suppression of facts with intent to evade duty was established.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was rightly invoked, and the issue was decided in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed only to the extent of protecting credit relatable to electricity used for manufacturing in the assessee's sister units, while sustaining denial for the portion attributable to housing colony use and sustaining the extended period demand for that inadmissible portion.

Ratio Decidendi: Credit on fuel used to generate electricity is admissible only to the extent the electricity is used in a captive manufacturing arrangement, whereas electricity used for non-manufacturing purposes remains outside the credit scheme; suppression of the inadmissible diversion justifies the extended limitation under Section 11A.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned order passed under section 73 could be sustained when no date of personal hearing was fixed in the show-cause notice or otherwise afforded before the final order. (ii) Whether the objection as to delay in filing the writ petition could defeat relief despite the alleged breach of natural justice.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned order passed under section 73 could be sustained when no date of personal hearing was fixed in the show-cause notice or otherwise afforded before the final order.

Analysis: The absence of any fixed date of personal hearing, either in the show-cause notice or at any later stage before passing the order, constituted a clear breach of the mandatory requirement of section 75(4). Such non-compliance vitiated the adjudication, as the assessee was denied the procedural safeguard of hearing before adverse determination.

Conclusion: The order was unsustainable and liable to be quashed for violation of section 75(4) and the principles of natural justice.

Issue (ii): Whether the objection as to delay in filing the writ petition could defeat relief despite the alleged breach of natural justice.

Analysis: Since the impugned order suffered from a clear procedural illegality and violation of natural justice, the Court declined to treat the delay objection as decisive against the petitioner.

Conclusion: The delay objection was overruled.

Final Conclusion: The impugned adjudication was set aside, and the matter was left open for fresh decision after granting the petitioner an opportunity of hearing in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudicatory order under the GST law cannot be sustained where the mandatory opportunity of personal hearing under section 75(4) is denied, and such breach justifies quashing of the order notwithstanding a minor delay in approaching the Court.

Issues: Whether interim protection was warranted against the continuation of the GST adjudication proceedings and the fixed personal hearing while the writ petitions challenging the jurisdiction and validity of the show cause notices remained pending.

Analysis: The writ petitions questioned the jurisdiction and validity of the show cause notices issued in Form GST DRG-01. The Adjudicating Authority had fixed a final personal hearing for the next day and indicated that an ex parte final order could follow under Section 74(1) with tax, interest and penalty. In view of the pending writ petitions, the Court found the adjournment refusal and the imminent hearing to be in undue haste and held that the petitioners had raised arguable issues requiring consideration. Interim interference was considered necessary to preserve the subject matter of the writ petitions.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority was directed to grant an adjournment and fix the hearing after 23.6.2026, and the hearing scheduled for 19.6.2026 was not to proceed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a writ petition raises arguable jurisdictional challenges to GST show cause notices, the Court may grant interim protection to prevent the adjudication from reaching an irreversible stage and preserve the subject matter pending consideration of the writ.

Issues: Whether additions sustained by the Assessing Officer were justified when two partnership firms with identical partners, profit-sharing ratio and remuneration maintained separate books but filed a consolidated return, and whether such assessment gave rise to escapement of income or double taxation.

Analysis: The Court noted that both firms had separate PANs, separate audit reports and separate books of account, but the transactions of one firm were reflected in the consolidated accounts and offered to tax in the return filed in the name of the other firm. The Court accepted the factual findings that the same income had already been subjected to tax, that the arrangement was adopted for business convenience and subsidy-related purposes, and that the record did not show any escapement of income or loss to the Revenue. In the absence of any substantial question of law arising from these concurrent findings, interference was unwarranted.

Conclusion: The additions were not sustainable and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where concurrent factual findings show that income has already been disclosed and taxed in consolidated accounts of related partnership firms, a further addition in the hands of one firm for the same income is not justified in the absence of escapement of income.

Issues: Whether refund of anti-dumping duty, after the duty itself stood set aside, was governed by Section 9AA of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 or by Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962 as applied through Section 9A(8) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, and whether any substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order allowing the refund claim.

Analysis: Section 9AA is a specific refund provision confined to the situations contemplated by that section, particularly cases of excess anti-dumping duty arising from variation between preliminary and final duty. Where the refund claim arises because the anti-dumping duty itself is held not leviable by judicial determination, the case falls within the broader refund mechanism under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962, which is made applicable to anti-dumping duty by Section 9A(8) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. On that basis, the Tribunal's view that the refund claim was not barred by Section 9AA and had to be processed under Section 27 was upheld.

Conclusion: The refund claim was correctly held to be maintainable under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962, and not confined to Section 9AA of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the Tribunal's interpretation of the refund framework for anti-dumping duty was affirmed and no substantial question of law was found to arise.

Ratio Decidendi: Where anti-dumping duty is held not leviable by judicial order, refund is governed by the general refund provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 as applied by Section 9A(8) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, and not restricted to the limited refund cases under Section 9AA of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

Issues: Whether any substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's finding upholding service tax demand, extended limitation and penalty on commission income not disclosed in returns.

Analysis: The commission receipts were treated as taxable Business Auxiliary Services under the statutory definition and the relevant service tax notifications. The Tribunal recorded a factual finding that the income was not declared in the ST-3 returns and that the appellant was aware of the liability but did not pay tax. In the presence of such concurrent factual findings, the challenge on suppression, limitation and penalty did not give rise to a substantial question of law under the appellate jurisdiction invoked.

Conclusion: The challenge failed and the demand, extended limitation and penalty were not interfered with.

Issues: (i) whether lease of the closed sugar factory premises amounted to taxable renting of immovable property so as to attract service tax; (ii) whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked on the facts of the case; and (iii) whether, once the extended period was held not invokable, the demand for the normal period could still survive.

Issue (i): whether lease of the closed sugar factory premises amounted to taxable renting of immovable property so as to attract service tax.

Analysis: The factory premises were leased as an entirety, including land and structures, and the plea that only land was leased was rejected. The claim of exemption on the footing that the appellant was a State Government undertaking was also rejected, as no exemption from service tax was available merely because the lessor was a PSU.

Conclusion: The levy was upheld on merits and the demand was not set aside on this ground.

Issue (ii): whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked on the facts of the case.

Analysis: The relevant period fell within the stage when the taxability of renting of immovable property was under active judicial challenge and uncertainty. In that background, the appellant's non-payment was treated as arising from bona fide belief rather than suppression, fraud, collusion, or wilful intent to evade tax. The ingredients for invoking the extended period were therefore not established.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation could not be invoked, and the demand for the extended period was set aside.

Issue (iii): whether, once the extended period was held not invokable, the demand for the normal period could still survive.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied the principle that, prior to the insertion of Section 73(2A), once the notice founded on the extended period failed for want of suppression or intent to evade, the normal-period demand could not be separately sustained on the same notice. The retrospective uncertainty surrounding the levy and the timing of the show-cause notice also supported this result.

Conclusion: The normal-period demand also did not survive.

Final Conclusion: The entire confirmed service tax demand was set aside on limitation grounds, and the appeal succeeded with consequential relief as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the notice invoking the extended period is not sustainable for want of suppression or intent to evade, and the case arises before the curative provision in Section 73(2A) of the Finance Act, 1994, the same notice cannot be used to sustain the normal-period demand.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition was not maintainable in view of the statutory appellate remedy under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the show cause notice and the order in original were liable to be quashed for alleged non-supply of the complete notice and relied upon documents, and for alleged violation of natural justice.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition was not maintainable in view of the statutory appellate remedy under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The petitioner had an efficacious statutory remedy of appeal, and the challenge raised involved disputed factual questions arising from the departmental proceedings. In such circumstances, the writ court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The challenge was not entertained on the ground of availability of the appellate remedy, and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was declined.

Issue (ii): Whether the show cause notice and the order in original were liable to be quashed for alleged non-supply of the complete notice and relied upon documents, and for alleged violation of natural justice.

Analysis: The petitioner had participated in the proceedings, filed replies, and was granted personal hearing. The objection that only three pages of the notice were received was not raised during the departmental proceedings. The reference to certain relied upon documents in the notice was found to be a typographical error, as the investigation related to the period from October 2018 to November 2019 and the relevant return records and e-way bills were available and dealt with in the order in original. No violation of natural justice was made out.

Conclusion: The notice and the order in original were not quashed on these grounds.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition failed on merits and the Court declined to interfere with the impugned departmental action, leaving the petitioner to pursue the statutory appellate remedy.

Ratio Decidendi: When an effective statutory appeal is available and the party has participated in the adjudication with notice, reply, and personal hearing, a writ court ordinarily will not interfere absent a clear breach of natural justice or jurisdictional error.

Issues: (i) Whether anti-dumping duty could be demanded on imports made during the currency of the notification even though the show-cause notice and adjudication followed its expiry, and whether Section 9A(2A) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 exempted the goods on clearance into the Domestic Tariff Area by a 100% EOU; (ii) whether the imported goods were subjected to "manufacture" within the meaning of the EXIM Policy so as to retain the benefit of the EOU exemption; (iii) whether penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 was correctly imposed at the duty-equivalent rate; (iv) whether anti-dumping duty formed part of the assessable value for CVD and SAD; and (v) whether duty already paid on DTA clearances could be adjusted against the confirmed customs demand.

Issue (i): Whether anti-dumping duty could be demanded on imports made during the currency of the notification even though the show-cause notice and adjudication followed its expiry, and whether Section 9A(2A) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 exempted the goods on clearance into the Domestic Tariff Area by a 100% EOU?

Analysis: Liability to anti-dumping duty arose upon import during the subsistence of the notification issued under Section 9A(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. Section 9A(8) incorporates the recovery machinery of the Customs Act, 1962, and Section 159A of the Customs Act preserves liabilities already incurred. Expiry of the notification did not obliterate duty already attracted by imports made while it was operative. Section 9A(2A) did not assist the assessee because the goods were diverted to the Domestic Tariff Area contrary to the conditions of the exemption and without the requisite manufacturing activity.

Conclusion: The demand of anti-dumping duty was held valid in law, and the exemption under Section 9A(2A) was held inapplicable on the facts.

Issue (ii): Whether the imported goods were subjected to "manufacture" within the meaning of the EXIM Policy so as to retain the benefit of the EOU exemption?

Analysis: The definition of manufacture in the EXIM Policy is expansive, but the inclusive activities such as labelling or repacking cannot stand alone divorced from the core requirement that a new product with a distinctive name, character or use must emerge. On the evidence, the department's samples and reports showed the goods to be the same before and after the alleged processing, and the claim of repacking or relabelling was unsupported and raised belatedly. The factual findings of the adjudicating authority and the Tribunal that no genuine manufacturing or processing took place were not shown to be perverse.

Conclusion: The finding that no manufacturing process was undertaken was upheld against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 was correctly imposed at the duty-equivalent rate?

Analysis: Penalty under Section 114A follows where non-levy or short-levy results from wilful misstatement or suppression of facts. The record supported a finding that the assessee had misrepresented the nature of the activity and cleared the imported goods into the Domestic Tariff Area without the required process. In such a case, the penalty is mandatory and not discretionary. The reduction of penalty by the Tribunal to 10% was unsupported by reason and contrary to the statutory scheme.

Conclusion: The equal penalty under Section 114A was restored, while the assessee was given the statutory option to avail the reduced-penalty regime on compliance within the prescribed time.

Issue (iv): Whether anti-dumping duty formed part of the assessable value for CVD and SAD?

Analysis: The levy of anti-dumping duty is distinct from customs duty and, after the relevant amendments, is excluded from the computation base for additional customs duties. The Supreme Court authority on the point establishes that anti-dumping duty is not to be included while computing CVD or SAD.

Conclusion: The exclusion of anti-dumping duty from the assessable value for CVD and SAD was upheld.

Issue (v): Whether duty already paid on DTA clearances could be adjusted against the confirmed customs demand?

Analysis: The amount paid at the time of DTA clearance was excise duty, whereas the confirmed demand was customs duty/anti-dumping duty. No statutory basis was shown for cross-adjustment between the two distinct levies, and the claim for abatement was unsupported on the record.

Conclusion: Adjustment of the duty already paid on DTA clearances against the confirmed demand was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's challenge failed on the core liability issues, the Revenue's challenge succeeded on the post-11.05.2001 anti-dumping duty and penalty issues, the computation of CVD and SAD remained undisturbed, and the writ seeking set-off of duty paid on DTA clearances was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Anti-dumping duty attracted on import during the currency of a valid notification remains recoverable notwithstanding subsequent expiry, and penalty under Section 114A follows mandatorily where non-levy is caused by wilful misstatement or suppression of facts.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner's statement admitting part of the service tax liability during inquiry amounted to "quantification" on or before 30.06.2019 so as to make the petitioner eligible for the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019; (ii) Whether rejection of the declaration without constituting the Designated Committee or granting a hearing was unsustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner's statement admitting part of the service tax liability during inquiry amounted to "quantification" on or before 30.06.2019 so as to make the petitioner eligible for the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019.

Analysis: The Scheme permits a declaration in pending inquiry or investigation only where the amount of duty has been quantified on or before the statutory cut-off date. "Quantified" means a written communication of the amount of duty payable, and the clarification in the circular includes a duty liability admitted during inquiry or investigation only when it forms part of the final quantification made on or before 30.06.2019. The admission recorded in the petitioner's statement did not establish that the duty liability had been quantified by that date, especially when the proceedings later culminated in a substantially different determination.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not eligible under the Scheme, and the rejection of the declaration on the ground that service tax had not been quantified on or before 30.06.2019 was . The conclusion is against the petitioner and in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of the declaration without constituting the Designated Committee or granting a hearing was unsustainable.

Analysis: The requirement of consideration by the Designated Committee and the consequential hearing mechanism arises only after a declarant is found eligible under the Scheme. Since the petitioner was held ineligible for want of pre-cut-off quantification, the Designated Committee stage was never reached.

Conclusion: No violation of the hearing requirement was established, and the challenge on this ground also fails. This issue is decided against the petitioner and in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The declaration under the Scheme was rightly refused because the duty liability had not been quantified within the prescribed time, and the writ petition was liable to be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: For eligibility under the legacy dispute resolution scheme in a pending inquiry or investigation, the duty liability must be finally quantified by a written communication on or before the statutory cut-off date; a mere admission of part liability during investigation does not by itself satisfy the requirement unless it forms part of such timely quantification.

Issues: Whether reimbursement of common expenses by a wholly owned subsidiary under a cost sharing arrangement was taxable as Business Support Service, and whether penalty could survive if no service tax was payable.

Analysis: The common facilities and expenses were procured from third parties and only the actual costs were recovered from the subsidiary through debit notes. On the facts, the arrangement did not involve rendition of any identifiable service by the appellant to the subsidiary; it was a pass-through of expenses. The broadened definition of support services by the 2011 amendment was prospective, and the activities for the relevant period did not fall within the pre-amendment scope of Business Support Service. The receipts were therefore treated as reimbursement in a cost sharing arrangement, and the tax demand was also found to be revenue neutral.

Conclusion: The reimbursement was not chargeable to service tax under Business Support Service, and the penalty could not survive.

Issues: (i) whether the delay in filing the appeal against the ex parte order could be condoned by reckoning limitation from the date of knowledge; (ii) whether the statutory pre-deposit was still required for the appeal to be considered on merits.

Issue (i): whether the delay in filing the appeal against the ex parte order could be condoned by reckoning limitation from the date of knowledge.

Analysis: The petitioner asserted lack of notice and stated that the impugned order and show cause notice came to its knowledge only later. The order under challenge was treated as having been passed ex parte. In these circumstances, limitation was held to run from the date of knowledge, and the delay in preferring the appeal was condoned in exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the appeal was directed to be treated as filed within limitation.

Issue (ii): whether the statutory pre-deposit was still required for the appeal to be considered on merits.

Analysis: The requirement of pre-deposit under the statutory scheme governing the appeal was treated as mandatory. The plea for exemption from deposit was not accepted, and time was granted to make the deposit so that the appellate authority could examine the appeal on merits.

Conclusion: The pre-deposit requirement was upheld, and the petitioner was granted time to comply.

Final Conclusion: The appellate order was set aside, the appeal was restored to the appellate file, and the matter was remitted for consideration in accordance with law after compliance with the pre-deposit requirement.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an ex parte order was not within the assessee's knowledge, limitation for appeal may be computed from the date of knowledge, but the statutory pre-deposit condition for pursuing the appeal remains obligatory.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to restoration of GST registration that had been cancelled for non-filing of returns, on payment of the outstanding GST dues with applicable interest, late fee and penalty.

Analysis: The registration had been cancelled after the petitioner failed to file GST returns for the relevant period. The Court noted the petitioner's explanation for the default and relied upon a similar order passed in a connected matter. Since the State did not oppose a similar relief, the Court held that restoration could be granted on a conditional basis. The authorities were directed to ascertain the outstanding GST dues with applicable interest and any late fee or penalty, intimate the amount to the petitioner, and upon payment within the stipulated time, restore the registration.

Conclusion: The petitioner was held entitled to restoration of GST registration, subject to payment of the quantified outstanding dues, interest, late fee and penalty within the time granted.

Ratio Decidendi: Cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns can be set aside and registration restored where the defaulting dealer pays the outstanding tax dues with applicable statutory additions within the period fixed by the Court.

Issues: Whether the assessment order and appellate order were liable to be set aside for breach of the requirement of personal hearing under the GST law, and whether the matter should be remitted for fresh decision after deposit of the demanded amount.

Analysis: The petitioner complained that no date for personal hearing had been fixed, attracting the mandate of the provision requiring such opportunity before finalisation of the proceedings. The Court also noted the petitioner's readiness to deposit the entire amount demanded in the original order. In these circumstances, the Court treated the grievance of denial of hearing as sufficient to justify interference and directed reconsideration by the authority after deposit and notice of deposit.

Conclusion: The original assessment order and the appellate order were set aside, and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication after the petitioner deposits the demanded amount within the stipulated time.