Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 135 days in filing the appeal was liable to be condoned on showing sufficient cause; (ii) Whether interest earned by a cooperative society from deposits or investments with cooperative banks was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) as income attributable to the activity of providing credit facilities to its members.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 135 days in filing the appeal was liable to be condoned on showing sufficient cause.

Analysis: The delay was explained as having occurred because the accountant entrusted with filing the appeal was handling assessment, appellate, compliance, and audit work and, due to oversight and workload, failed to act on receipt of the appellate order. The explanation showed that the assessee had received the order and that the failure was not deliberate but attributable to an inadvertent lapse in the course of multiple assignments.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the appeal was admitted.

Issue (ii): Whether interest earned by a cooperative society from deposits or investments with cooperative banks was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) as income attributable to the activity of providing credit facilities to its members.

Analysis: Section 80P grants deduction to a cooperative society in respect of profits and gains attributable to the specified business activity. The assessee was engaged in providing credit facilities to its members, and the Tribunal found the facts closer to the line of decisions supporting eligibility under section 80P(2)(a)(i). The interest from cooperative banks was treated as business income attributable to the society's activity, rather than as income from other sources, and the conflicting authorities were resolved in favour of the view closer to the assessee's facts.

Conclusion: The interest income was held eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i), and the assessee's claim was allowed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on the deduction issue, with the delay also being excused, but the remaining grounds were not adjudicated and did not alter the partial relief granted to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a cooperative society's interest income from cooperative banks is found on the facts to be attributable to its business of providing credit facilities to members, deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) is allowable; delay in filing an appeal may also be condoned on a bona fide and sufficiently explained inadvertent lapse.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition of Rs. 21,38,337 as unexplained investment under section 69, based on the impounded loose paper, was sustainable; (ii) whether the addition of Rs. 42,97,350 as unexplained money under section 69A, arising from the same paper, was sustainable; (iii) whether the addition of Rs. 2,15,103 as gross profit on alleged stock shortage was sustainable; and (iv) whether the addition of Rs. 5,00,000 as alleged betting income under section 69A was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the addition of Rs. 21,38,337 as unexplained investment under section 69, based on the impounded loose paper, was sustainable.

Analysis: The impounded paper showed the figure as a debit balance in the name of Nirmal Bhai and not in the assessee's name. The paper was undated, unsigned, and not supported by any corroborative material showing that the amount represented an investment made by the assessee. On the facts, it could not be treated as the assessee's unexplained investment.

Conclusion: The addition was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition of Rs. 42,97,350 as unexplained money under section 69A, arising from the same paper, was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 69A applies only where the assessee is found to be the owner of money, bullion, jewellery, or other valuable article. No such asset or money was found from the assessee, and the figure in the loose paper was merely a working without proof that it represented real unaccounted money or profit of the assessee. The presumption arising from seized material could not substitute for proof of ownership or source.

Conclusion: The addition was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the addition of Rs. 2,15,103 as gross profit on alleged stock shortage was sustainable.

Analysis: The addition was made only on a presumption that the shortage represented out-of-book sales. The assessee had furnished an explanation that the stock had been given to karigars for job work, supported by ledger material and related records. In the absence of concrete evidence rebutting that explanation, the presumption-based addition could not stand.

Conclusion: The addition was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the addition of Rs. 5,00,000 as alleged betting income under section 69A was sustainable.

Analysis: The addition rested on a police-derived WhatsApp reference from another person's mobile phone and not on any money, bullion, jewellery, or asset found with the assessee. The assessee was not confronted with the underlying police material and cross-examination of the relevant person was not afforded. The material was insufficient to establish unexplained money in the assessee's hands.

Conclusion: The addition was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: All substantive additions were set aside and the assessee obtained full relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Additions under sections 69 and 69A cannot be sustained on the basis of an uncorroborated loose paper or third-party material unless the Department proves, with supporting evidence, that the assessee owned the investment or unexplained money and that the material has direct evidentiary nexus with the assessee.

Issues: Whether the assessment framed under sections 147 and 144 was without jurisdiction for want of notice under section 143(2) after the return filed in response to notice under section 148 was sought to be treated as the return.

Analysis: The return filed by the assessee was requested to be treated as the return in response to notice under section 148. In such a situation, issuance of notice under section 143(2) was mandatory. The omission to serve that notice was treated as a fatal defect, not a curable procedural irregularity. The assessment proceedings were therefore held to be vitiated, and the order passed under sections 144 and 147 was held to be unsustainable. The merits of the additions were not examined as they had become academic.

Conclusion: The non-issuance of notice under section 143(2) rendered the reassessment invalid, and the appeal was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a return is treated as filed in response to a notice under section 148, failure to issue notice under section 143(2) is a fatal jurisdictional defect that vitiates the reassessment.

Issues: Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was leviable where the assessee had claimed provision for bad and doubtful debts on a bona fide basis with full disclosure, but the claim was disallowed in assessment.

Analysis: The assessee had disclosed the claim in the financial statements, return of income and tax audit material. The excess claim arose from a calculation issue in working out the provision under the bank's prudential/RBI norms, and the disallowance did not establish concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. An incorrect claim, by itself, does not attract penalty when the facts are fully disclosed and the claim is made bona fide.

Conclusion: Penalty was not sustainable and was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the first appellate authority could enhance the assessment by bringing to tax long-term capital gain arising from a source not examined in the reassessment proceedings; (ii) whether the property sold by the assessee was a residential house property so as to permit indexed cost of construction/improvement in computing capital gains; (iii) whether deduction under sections 54/54F could be denied merely for non-deposit of the unutilized amount in the Capital Gain Account Scheme.

Issue (i): Whether the first appellate authority could enhance the assessment by bringing to tax long-term capital gain arising from a source not examined in the reassessment proceedings.

Analysis: The reassessment was initiated only on the basis of alleged unexplained investment in the Panchkula property. The assessment proceedings, reasons recorded, and reassessment order were confined to that issue. The taxability of capital gain arising from sale of the Manesar property was never examined by the Assessing Officer. The settled principle applied by the Court is that wide appellate powers do not extend to introducing a new source of income which was not considered in the assessment or reassessment proceedings, and enhancement cannot be used to assess income that was outside the scope of the recorded reasons for reopening.

Conclusion: The enhancement made by the first appellate authority on account of long-term capital gain was beyond jurisdiction and could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the property sold by the assessee was a residential house property so as to permit indexed cost of construction/improvement in computing capital gains.

Analysis: The sale deed described the asset as a residential house plot, the occupation certificate showed existence of a constructed building fit for occupation, and the supporting documents, including approved plans, loan records and valuation material, established that substantial residential construction existed. The finding that only a vacant plot had been sold was unsupported by the record.

Conclusion: The property was a residential house property and the assessee was entitled to indexed cost of construction/improvement while computing capital gains.

Issue (iii): Whether deduction under sections 54/54F could be denied merely for non-deposit of the unutilized amount in the Capital Gain Account Scheme.

Analysis: The assessee had invested the sale consideration in purchase of the Panchkula property and construction of a residential house within the prescribed period. The provisions of sections 54 and 54F are beneficial and were applied liberally. On the facts, the substantive conditions stood satisfied, and the absence of deposit in the Capital Gain Account Scheme could not defeat the claim.

Conclusion: Deduction under sections 54/54F could not be denied on the technical ground invoked by the appellate authority.

Final Conclusion: The enhancement and the consequential addition were unsustainable both on jurisdictional grounds and on merits, and the assessee's appeal succeeded in full.

Ratio Decidendi: In reassessment proceedings, the first appellate authority cannot, by way of enhancement, bring to tax a new source of income not examined by the Assessing Officer, and beneficial exemptions for residential property investments cannot be denied where the substantive statutory conditions are otherwise fulfilled.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the appeals before the first appellate authority deserved condonation. (ii) Whether the ex gratia received under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 was exempt as retrenchment compensation under section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and not restricted by section 10(10C).

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the appeals before the first appellate authority deserved condonation.

Analysis: The delay was explained with reference to the pendency of litigation on the status of BSNL employees and the assessee's claim being pursued only after the legal position became clearer. The Tribunal followed the consistent view taken in coordinate bench decisions that substantial justice should prevail where sufficient cause is shown for the delay.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned.

Issue (ii): Whether the ex gratia received under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 was exempt as retrenchment compensation under section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and not restricted by section 10(10C).

Analysis: The Tribunal applied the coordinate bench view that compensation received under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 is in substance retrenchment compensation falling within section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It treated the payment as exempt capital receipt and followed the settled line of decisions granting the benefit on identical facts, while rejecting the Revenue's objection based on the contrary view and prospective application of enhancement.

Conclusion: The assessee was held entitled to exemption on the ex gratia amount under section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded and the assessee obtained full relief on the exemption claim, with the assessing authority directed to give effect to the order.

Ratio Decidendi: Compensation received under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 was treated as retrenchment compensation eligible for exemption under section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and delay in pursuing the claim was condonable where sufficient cause and substantial justice were established.

Issues: (i) whether a corrigendum introducing fresh allegations and evidence could be considered after the adjudication hearing had concluded and the matter was reserved for final order; (ii) whether the amended scheme under Section 28(7A) of the Customs Act, 1962 and Regulation 4(d) of the Customs (Supplementary Notice) Regulations, 2019 could be invoked for a show cause notice issued prior to 29.03.2018.

Issue (i): Whether a corrigendum introducing fresh allegations and evidence could be considered after the adjudication hearing had concluded and the matter was reserved for final order.

Analysis: The show cause proceedings had been completed and the adjudicating authority had already concluded the hearing and reserved the matter for orders. The corrigendum was issued later and sought to introduce a new allegation and additional material, not a mere clerical correction. In these circumstances, the new matter could not be brought into the adjudication at the stage of final order.

Conclusion: The corrigendum could not be considered in the pending adjudication and was liable to be ignored.

Issue (ii): Whether the amended scheme under Section 28(7A) of the Customs Act, 1962 and Regulation 4(d) of the Customs (Supplementary Notice) Regulations, 2019 could be invoked for a show cause notice issued prior to 29.03.2018.

Analysis: Section 28(7A) and the supplementary notice regulations were relied on by the revenue to justify the corrigendum, but the notice in the case had been issued in 2014. Explanation 4 to Section 28 preserved the pre-29.03.2018 position for such notices, so the later supplementary-notice regime did not govern the proceedings. The corrigendum therefore could not be sustained under the amended framework.

Conclusion: The amended supplementary-notice provisions did not apply to the proceedings and could not validate the corrigendum.

Final Conclusion: The impugned corrigendum was held unsustainable, and the adjudication was directed to proceed on the original show cause notice without taking it into account.

Ratio Decidendi: A fresh allegation or additional evidence cannot be introduced by corrigendum after adjudication has concluded where the notice is governed by the pre-amendment regime, and later supplementary-notice provisions do not apply retrospectively to such proceedings.

Outcome: The petition was disposed of with a direction to the authorities to decide the petitioner's representation by a reasoned order within two weeks and communicate the decision.

Issues: Whether pendency of corporate insolvency resolution proceedings and the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 bar the Competent Authority from exercising jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 to grant deemed conveyance in favour of a flat purchasers' society.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 11 of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 obliges the promoter to convey title to the society and enables unilateral deemed conveyance where the promoter fails to do so. The Court held that this is a statutory, non-monetary function meant to perfect title and does not amount to recovery or enforcement of a debt. It further held that the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 does not extinguish or suspend statutory duties owed under MOFA, and that the deemed conveyance mechanism is not inconsistent with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Court relied on the principle that statutory obligations and regulatory actions in public interest continue despite insolvency, and that the corporate debtor's alleged asset could not be treated as a bar to the Competent Authority acting under MOFA.

Conclusion: The pendency of CIRP did not bar adjudication of the deemed conveyance application, and the Competent Authority was bound to decide it on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was maintainable against a recovery letter issued by the Deputy Commissioner. (ii) Whether the appellant could validly discharge the June 2017 duty liability by utilising Cenvat credit not available on 30.06.2017 and whether the consequent recovery was justified.

Issue (i): Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was maintainable against a recovery letter issued by the Deputy Commissioner.

Analysis: Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994 permits an appeal against a decision or order of an adjudicating authority subordinate to the Commissioner (Appeals). The impugned communication was only a letter proposing recovery of government dues and was not an appealable adjudication order.

Conclusion: The appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was not maintainable, and that finding was upheld against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant could validly discharge the June 2017 duty liability by utilising Cenvat credit not available on 30.06.2017 and whether the consequent recovery was justified.

Analysis: Rule 3(4) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 permits utilisation of credit only to the extent available for payment of duty for the relevant month. The available credit on 30.06.2017 was far less than the amount utilised. Rule 4(7) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 also required payment of the underlying service tax before the related credit could be taken. On the recorded facts, the appellant failed to show entitlement to the credit utilised, and the recovery action under Section 11 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was sustained.

Conclusion: The utilisation of Cenvat credit was held to be wrongful, and the recovery of the unpaid duty with interest and penalty was upheld against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The challenged order was affirmed in full, and the appellant obtained no relief on the merits of the demand or on maintainability.

Ratio Decidendi: Cenvat credit can be utilised only to the extent lawfully available for the relevant period, and an appeal lies under Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994 only from an adjudicatory order, not from a mere recovery notice or letter.

Issues: Whether the provisional attachment of the petitioner's bank account under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was sustainable in the absence of formation of opinion by the competent authority before issuing the attachment order.

Analysis: Provisional attachment under Section 83 is a drastic power and can be exercised only upon strict observance of the statutory conditions. The competent authority must form an opinion that attachment is necessary to protect the interest of government revenue and must record that basis before directing attachment. The impugned order merely stated that the account was attached to protect revenue and did not disclose any prior formation of opinion or other material showing compliance with the mandatory preconditions. In such circumstances, the attachment was found to be mechanically issued and contrary to the statutory scheme governing provisional attachment.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment was held to be unsustainable in law and was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The bank account attachment was quashed and the bank was directed to de-freeze the petitioner's account, bringing the writ petition to a successful close for the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: A provisional attachment under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is valid only if the competent authority first forms and records an opinion that such attachment is necessary to protect revenue; absence of that mandatory precondition renders the attachment unsustainable.

Issues: Whether the order-in-original was vitiated for failure to consider the petitioner's show cause reply, resulting in violation of the principles of natural justice, and whether the matter should be remanded for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The show cause reply had been filed through the departmental portal, but it was not brought to the notice of the adjudicating authority. Since the reply was not considered before passing the impugned order, the adjudication stood affected by a communication lapse and the petitioner was denied proper consideration of its defence. In these circumstances, the impugned order could not be sustained and the appropriate course was to restore the matter to the adjudicating authority with a fresh opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The order-in-original was set aside as violative of natural justice and the matter was remanded for fresh decision after considering the reply and granting the petitioner a fresh hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether interest income received from cooperative banks and on staff loans was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether e-stamping commission was deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i) or section 80P(2)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (iii) Whether dividend income from a cooperative bank was allowable as a deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether interest income received from cooperative banks and on staff loans was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee is a cooperative society engaged in providing credit facilities to its members. The Tribunal treated the interest on staff loans and interest from cooperative banks as income attributable to that activity, and preferred the line of authority closer on facts to the assessee's case over the contrary view relied on by the Revenue.

Conclusion: The interest income was held eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) and the claim was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether e-stamping commission was deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i) or section 80P(2)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The e-stamping commission was found not to be attributable to the business of providing credit facilities to members. It was therefore outside the scope of the deduction provision invoked by the assessee and also did not fall within the alternative deduction provision relied upon.

Conclusion: The deduction claim on e-stamping commission was disallowed and the finding was against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether dividend income from a cooperative bank was allowable as a deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The dividend income was treated as falling within the specific deduction provision for income by way of dividends from cooperative society investments.

Conclusion: The deduction under section 80P(2)(d) was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment was modified by granting deduction for interest on staff loans and cooperative bank interest, and for dividend income, while denying deduction for e-stamping commission, resulting in partial relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For a cooperative society engaged in providing credit facilities to members, interest income found attributable to that activity may qualify for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i), but income not so attributable remains outside that deduction, while dividend income may qualify specifically under section 80P(2)(d).

Issues: Whether penalty imposed under section 271DA for alleged contravention of section 269ST was sustainable when the order did not record findings that the cash receipt exceeded the statutory threshold in a single day, single transaction, or one event or occasion.

Analysis: Section 269ST is attracted only where receipt of two lakh rupees or more occurs in aggregate from a person in a day, in respect of a single transaction, or in respect of transactions relating to one event or occasion. The penalty order proceeded only on the basis that cash sales of ten lakh rupees were admitted during the year, but it did not establish the specific manner of receipt required to constitute a violation. In the absence of recorded facts showing that the statutory conditions were met, the penalty could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 271DA was not justified and was deleted; the assessee succeeded on this issue.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty for violation of section 269ST cannot be sustained unless the authority records and proves the specific statutory mode of prohibited cash receipt.

Issues: Whether the approval granted under section 151 for issuance of notice under section 148 was mechanical and without application of mind, thereby invalidating the reassessment proceedings.

Analysis: The approval recorded only a bare endorsement that, in view of the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer, income had escaped assessment and that it was a fit case for issue of notice under section 148. Such a mechanical concurrence was held to be insufficient because the sanctioning authority must independently consider the material and record discernible satisfaction before the reopening notice can validly issue. Since the approval did not reflect such independent application of mind, the jurisdictional safeguard under section 151 was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The approval under section 151 was invalid, the reopening under section 148 was unsustainable, and the reassessment was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether, for the purpose of section 56(2)(x)(b)(B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the stamp duty value was to be taken as on the date of registration or on the date of allotment/agreement where consideration had been paid through banking channels before the agreement; and whether the additional evidence relating to valuation and ready reckoner value should be admitted.

Analysis: The property was booked under an allotment letter issued in an earlier financial year, and the consideration was paid through banking channels before the registered agreement. In such a situation, the first proviso to section 56(2)(x)(b)(B) requires adoption of the stamp duty value as on the date of agreement/allotment, not the later registration date. The valuation report and ready reckoner value for the earlier year were material to determine the correct statutory comparison, and their production at the appellate stage was found necessary for proper adjudication. The additional evidence was therefore admitted, with a direction that the Assessing Officer verify its authenticity and correctness.

Conclusion: The addition based on the registration-date stamp duty value was found to be inconsistent with section 56(2)(x)(b)(B), and the matter was sent back for fresh examination of the allotment-date valuation and supporting documents.

Final Conclusion: The assessee obtained appellate relief in the form of remand for fresh verification, and the disputed addition was not finally sustained at this stage.

Ratio Decidendi: Where consideration for immovable property is paid through prescribed banking modes on or before the date of the agreement or allotment, the stamp duty value relevant under section 56(2)(x)(b)(B) is the value on that earlier date, not the registration date.

Issues: Whether the receipts attributable to non-UK resident partners of a UK partnership firm were taxable in India, and whether such legal/professional services could be treated as fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The partnership firm was treated as tax transparent in the UK, and the income of the firm had to be examined in the hands of the partners according to their country of residence. The income attributable to UK resident partners was accepted as not taxable in India under the India-UK DTAA, and the income attributable to the German partners was also accepted on the basis of the India-Germany DTAA. The remaining dispute concerned partners resident in Australia, France, Belgium, China and Japan. The Tribunal held that legal services rendered by the firm were professional services and not fees for technical services within the meaning of section 9(1)(vii). It also held that the treaty position of each non-UK resident partner had to be examined with reference to the relevant DTAA of the country of residence, and that the India-UK DTAA did not bar examination of treaty entitlement under those other agreements.

Conclusion: The addition made on the footing of section 9(1)(vii) was unsustainable and was deleted, but the matter was remitted to the Assessing Officer to examine the taxability of the non-UK resident partners under their respective DTAAs.

Issues: Whether the imported interactive display systems were correctly classifiable under tariff item 8471 4190 as automatic data processing machines, and whether the revenue could reopen the same classification dispute contrary to the earlier binding decision.

Analysis: The goods were found to be identical to the goods considered in the assessee's own earlier case, where classification under tariff item 8471 4190 had already been accepted. The earlier Tribunal decision had also been followed in later matters and those decisions had attained finality. In these circumstances, the classification question was no longer res integra, and the department was bound to follow the prior appellate determination under the principle of judicial discipline and the binding effect of appellate orders.

Conclusion: The imported goods were correctly classifiable under tariff item 8471 4190, and the revenue's attempt to re-agitate the classification issue was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on the classification issue, and the revenue appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: When an identical classification dispute has already been conclusively decided in the assessee's own case, subordinate authorities cannot depart from that binding appellate determination and reopen the issue afresh.

Issues: (i) Whether the declarant's benefit under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 lapsed for failure to pay the amount stated in SVLDRS-3 within the stipulated time; (ii) Whether the penalty imposed pursuant to the demand could be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the declarant's benefit under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 lapsed for failure to pay the amount stated in SVLDRS-3 within the stipulated time.

Analysis: The scheme required payment of the amount indicated in SVLDRS-3 within 30 days, and Section 127(5) treated non-payment within time as lapse of the declaration. The stipulated period expired on 30.06.2020, whereas payment was made only on 22.10.2020. The language of the provision was found to be clear and unambiguous, leaving no scope to extend the scheme benefit on equitable grounds or because of delayed credit.

Conclusion: The declaration had lapsed and the demand and interest were upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty imposed pursuant to the demand could be sustained.

Analysis: Although the demand and interest were held recoverable, the delay occurred in the context of the COVID-19 period after a voluntary disclosure under the amnesty scheme. On these facts, the element of mala fide intent was not established, and the case did not justify penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the limited extent of deletion of penalty, while the confirmation of the tax demand and interest was maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory amnesty scheme prescribes payment within a fixed period and declares non-payment within time to result in lapse, the provision must be applied according to its plain terms, while penalty may still be denied if mala fide intent is not established.

Issues: Whether re-transportation of machinery for testing, without fresh consideration, constituted a taxable supply and whether the reduced penalty for transport without an e-way bill warranted interference.

Analysis: A supply requires a sale, transfer or other specified transaction for consideration in the course or furtherance of business. The re-transportation of machinery to the supplier for testing did not involve consideration and was therefore not a supply. Goods moved for reasons other than supply could be covered by a delivery challan, but the applicable rules still required generation of an e-way bill; the transaction did not fall within any exemption. The breach consequently attracted penalty, while the modification limiting the penalty was sustained.

Conclusion: The re-transportation was not a taxable supply, but failure to generate an e-way bill justified the reduced penalty; the decision is in favour of the assessee.