Issues: (i) Whether, for A.Y. 2016-17, weighted deduction for expenditure on an approved in-house R&D facility could be restricted to the amount quantified by DSIR in Form 3CL; (ii) Whether the balance 50% of additional depreciation on eligible assets used for less than 180 days could be claimed in the immediately succeeding year; (iii) Whether, under Rule 8D, average total assets could be computed using written down value of fixed assets and net current assets; (iv) Whether, for A.Ys. 2017-18 and 2018-19, DSIR quantification in Form 3CL bound the tax authorities for weighted deduction, and whether unapproved expenditure could independently qualify under other scientific-research deduction provisions.

Issue (i): Whether, for A.Y. 2016-17, weighted deduction for expenditure on an approved in-house R&D facility could be restricted to the amount quantified by DSIR in Form 3CL.

Analysis: As applicable to A.Y. 2016-17, section 35(2AB) and Rule 6(7A) required approval of the in-house R&D facility, not DSIR certification of each item or quantum of expenditure. The facility held valid approval, and the genuineness and scientific-research nexus of the expenditure were not disputed. The subsequent requirement for DSIR quantification imposed an additional condition and operated prospectively.

Conclusion: For A.Y. 2016-17, the deduction could not be restricted merely to the amount stated in Form 3CL; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the balance 50% of additional depreciation on eligible assets used for less than 180 days could be claimed in the immediately succeeding year.

Analysis: Section 32(1)(iia) conferred a one-time incentive, while the second proviso to section 32(1) restricted allowance in the acquisition year where use was below 180 days. That restriction did not extinguish the remaining entitlement. The third proviso applicable from A.Y. 2016-17 expressly allowed the balance in the succeeding year and was consistent with the beneficial object of additional depreciation.

Conclusion: The balance 50% additional depreciation was allowable in the immediately succeeding year; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether, under Rule 8D, average total assets could be computed using written down value of fixed assets and net current assets.

Analysis: Rule 8D(2)(ii) prescribes the average of total assets as appearing in the balance sheet. Its formula does not permit replacement of gross asset figures with written down values or reduction of current assets by current liabilities. Such substitutions reduce the denominator and impermissibly inflate the disallowance.

Conclusion: Average total assets must be taken from the gross balance-sheet figures, without the Assessing Officer's substitutions; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether, for A.Ys. 2017-18 and 2018-19, DSIR quantification in Form 3CL bound the tax authorities for weighted deduction, and whether unapproved expenditure could independently qualify under other scientific-research deduction provisions.

Analysis: Following the insertion of Rule 6(7A)(b) from 01.07.2016, DSIR was statutorily entrusted with quantifying expenditure eligible for weighted deduction under section 35(2AB). Tax authorities could not substitute their views for the technical determination of that expert authority. However, denial of DSIR approval for weighted deduction did not by itself determine eligibility under sections 35(1)(i), 35(1)(iv), and 35(2), whose conditions require independent examination.

Conclusion: The restriction of weighted deduction to DSIR-approved expenditure was sustained against the assessee, but the alternate claims under sections 35(1)(i), 35(1)(iv), and 35(2) were remitted for fresh determination; the finding is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's substantive challenges for A.Y. 2016-17 fail, while the assessee's claims for weighted deduction for A.Ys. 2017-18 and 2018-19 fail to that extent; independent eligibility of the alternate scientific-research claims remains to be determined afresh.

Issues: Whether cancellation of regular bail was warranted under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, where the accused was a woman and the investigation had been completed.

Analysis: The first proviso to Section 45(1) creates a special category for women and operates as an exception to the twin conditions in clause (ii). The benefit is discretionary and must be exercised on the facts of each case; however, denial of that benefit requires specific reasons. The bail order was reasoned, the accused had cooperated with the investigation, the complaint had been filed, her custodial presence was not required, and the voluminous evidence and number of witnesses made an early conclusion of trial unlikely.

Conclusion: No ground for cancellation of the regular bail was established, and the bail granted to the respondent remains operative.

Issues: (i) Whether an appeal can be dismissed for non-submission of a board resolution without issuing a defect notice or affording an opportunity to cure the defect; (ii) Whether an amount deposited during audit or investigation and appropriated towards the confirmed demand satisfies the statutory pre-deposit requirement.

Issue (i): Whether an appeal can be dismissed for non-submission of a board resolution without issuing a defect notice or affording an opportunity to cure the defect.

Analysis: Non-submission of a board resolution under Rule 3(2)(c) of the Central Excise Rules, 2001 is a curable procedural defect and does not extinguish the substantive right of appeal. Once an appeal has been assigned an appeal number, dismissal solely for that defect, without a defect notice and reasonable opportunity to rectify it, is impermissible.

Conclusion: The dismissal on account of non-submission of the board resolution was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an amount deposited during audit or investigation and appropriated towards the confirmed demand satisfies the statutory pre-deposit requirement.

Analysis: Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as applied to service-tax matters through Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, requires statutory pre-deposit for an appeal. Circular No. 984/8/2014 dated 16.09.2014 recognises that payments made during investigation or audit before filing the appeal may be counted towards that requirement. The amount deposited before issuance of the show-cause notice had been appropriated against the adjudicated service-tax demand.

Conclusion: The prior deposit constituted compliance with the statutory pre-deposit requirement, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The first appellate authority must adjudicate the challenge on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing and considering all grounds available to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appeal cannot be rejected on curable procedural defects or alleged pre-deposit default where the defect was not allowed to be cured and prior payments satisfy the prescribed pre-deposit requirement.

Issues: Whether alleged failure by a Customs Broker to verify the exporter's credentials, without evidence of knowledge, collusion, assistance or abetment in the attempted export of substituted prohibited goods, warranted penalties under Sections 114 and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 114 requires a positive act or omission connected with the attempted improper export, or abetment thereof; liability under Section 114AA requires knowing or intentional use of a materially false declaration, statement or document. The material showed that KYC and IEC documents had been obtained, bank-related details were verified, and cooperation was extended during investigation. There was no allegation in the show-cause notice, or evidence on record, establishing prior knowledge of the smuggling, active collusion, assistance in substitution of the goods, or any other positive act amounting to abetment. The alleged breach of Customs Broker verification obligations did not by itself establish the requisite knowledge or participation.

Conclusion: The penalty imposed under Section 114 was unsustainable, and no penalty under Section 114AA could be imposed in the absence of proof of knowing participation or abetment.

Issues: (i) Whether the imported fish meal could be treated as finished goods and an adverse inference drawn for non-production of laboratory records; (ii) Whether the declared transaction value could be rejected and re-determined under the residual valuation method without examining available contemporaneous imports and establishing extra consideration.

Issue (i): Whether the imported fish meal could be treated as finished goods and an adverse inference drawn for non-production of laboratory records.

Analysis: The laboratory register and in-house test records had been seized during investigation, and copies had been repeatedly sought by the importer. Technical reports relating to subsequent imports of the same goods recorded coarse powder containing scales and fibre-like bone pieces and did not determine the goods to be finished fish meal. The prior detailed determination also found that BIS specifications did not by themselves determine whether fish meal was finished or semi-finished.

Conclusion: The goods could not be treated as finished fish meal, and the adverse inference for non-production of laboratory material was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the declared transaction value could be rejected and re-determined under the residual valuation method without examining available contemporaneous imports and establishing extra consideration.

Analysis: Enhancement of transaction value required reliable evidence of payment above the declared invoice value. The record did not establish such extra consideration through a money trail or primary proof. Although contemporaneous transactions were admittedly available, they were rejected merely as involving small quantities without identifying them, assessing comparability, or recording reasons for their exclusion. The prescribed sequential valuation framework under Rules 4 and 5 was thereby bypassed before resorting to Rule 9.

Conclusion: Re-determination of value under Rule 9 was invalid; consequently, the duty demand, interest, confiscation, redemption fine and penalties could not be sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The valuation allegations and the finding of finished fish meal lacked a sustainable factual and legal foundation, eliminating the basis for the consequential fiscal and penal liabilities.

Ratio Decidendi: Declared transaction value cannot be displaced through the residual valuation method unless the sequential valuation rules are lawfully applied and enhancement is supported by reliable evidence of consideration exceeding the declared value.

Issues: Whether licensing kitchen premises to food-court operators was taxable as business support service before renting of immovable property service was introduced.

Analysis: The activity was accepted as renting of immovable property service from 1 July 2007. Introduction of a distinct taxable entry signifies that the service was not covered by an earlier entry; business support service is not a residuary category for taxing an activity before its specific entry was introduced.

Conclusion: The activity was not taxable as business support service before 1 July 2007, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether statutory interest was payable on the delayed refund after release of the principal refund amount.

Analysis: The principal refund grievance stood redressed upon clearance of the refund amount. Since the date of release of the principal amount was ascertainable, the Department could quantify the statutory interest payable under the applicable refund rule.

Conclusion: Statutory interest on the delayed refund is payable to the assessee and must be quantified and released.

Issues: Whether differential customs-supervision charges on a cost-recovery basis could be demanded from a special warehouse licensee despite no exclusive posting of Customs officers and payment of merchant overtime charges.

Analysis: Regulation 3(e) requires the licensee to undertake payment for Customs supervision on recovery of cost. The applicable circular requires the Commissioner to evaluate the warehouse's operational requirements and distance from the Customs office in deciding whether supervision is to be charged on merchant overtime or cost-recovery basis. Cost-recovery charges apply to officers additionally sanctioned and posted for exclusive supervision. Although an evaluation was communicated to the licensee, no proposal for cost-recovery posting was sent to the competent board and no officer was exclusively posted at the warehouse. The Department raised and accepted merchant overtime bills throughout the disputed period.

Conclusion: The differential demand computed between cost-recovery charges and merchant overtime charges was unsustainable in the absence of an exclusively posted Customs officer; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether fly ash generated as waste from burning coal for captive generation of electricity is excisable goods liable to central excise duty.

Analysis: Marketability alone does not establish excisability under the statutory levy; the material must also be produced or manufactured. Burning coal as fuel to generate steam and electricity does not involve transformation of the coal through a manufacturing process into a distinct new product. Fly ash emerging from such combustion is therefore not the result of manufacture.

Conclusion: Fly ash generated during captive electricity production from coal is not excisable goods and is not liable to central excise duty; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether notional rental income was chargeable on completed unsold units held as stock-in-trade under section 23(5). (ii) Whether units against which advances had been received could be excluded from the stock value for computing notional rent. (iii) Whether annual letting value could be estimated at 2% or 8% of the cost of unsold stock.

Issue (i): Whether notional rental income was chargeable on completed unsold units held as stock-in-trade under section 23(5).

Analysis: Section 23(5) applied from the relevant assessment year and specifically covered property held as stock-in-trade after expiry of the prescribed vacancy period. The completion and occupation certificates had been received, and the units were not shown to be work-in-progress. The statutory charge could therefore be invoked.

Conclusion: Notional rental income on the completed unsold stock was chargeable under section 23(5), against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether units against which advances had been received could be excluded from the stock value for computing notional rent.

Analysis: Receipt of advance against an identified unit, without delivery of final possession, was treated as taking that unit outside the basis for notional-rent computation. Since the claim and supporting details were first produced before the appellate authority, verification by the Assessing Officer was necessary under Rule 46A.

Conclusion: The cost of units against which advances were received shall be excluded if verified by the Assessing Officer, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether annual letting value could be estimated at 2% or 8% of the cost of unsold stock.

Analysis: An ad hoc percentage of investment was not a sustainable basis for annual letting value. The applicable measure was the municipal ratable value, and the Assessing Officer could obtain that value through departmental or governmental machinery.

Conclusion: Annual letting value must be recomputed with reference to municipal ratable value, and not at either the 2% or 8% rate, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment of notional rent remains permissible, but its computation must be redetermined after verification of advance-bearing units and determination of municipal ratable value.

Ratio Decidendi: Notional rent on completed unsold stock-in-trade is assessable under section 23(5), but identified units against which advances have been received are excluded on verification, and annual letting value cannot be fixed by an ad hoc percentage of cost where municipal ratable value is ascertainable.

Issues: Whether service tax was leviable on receipts for road construction and maintenance works performed for governmental authorities and on the amount received towards supply of soil, and whether the extended limitation period could be invoked.

Analysis: The receipts relating to construction and maintenance of public roads for the Nagar Palika Parishad and the Public Works Department were supported by subsequently produced certificates and documents. They fell within the same category of road-related works for which exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-ST had already been accepted. The receipt towards supply of soil was evidenced as a sale of goods and was not exigible to service tax. Since the appellant had a bona fide belief that no service tax was payable on exempt or non-taxable receipts, invocation of the extended period under the proviso to Section 73(1) was unsustainable.

Conclusion: The service-tax demand was unsustainable as the road-related services were exempt, the soil-supply receipt was not taxable, and the demand was time-barred; consequential interest and penalties were also not sustainable.

Issues: Whether a single composite assessment order could be issued for more than one financial year.

Analysis: Sections 73 and 74 require assessment proceedings to correspond with the relevant tax period. A composite show-cause notice or assessment order cannot cover more than one year once the due date for filing the annual return has been reached. The assessment in question covered two financial years through one order and was therefore impermissible.

Conclusion: The composite assessment order for two financial years was invalid and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the quantum and penalty appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) should be condoned.

Analysis: The assessee explained that the assessment and penalty proceedings were not communicated to her because the registered email belonged to her chartered accountant and notices were not received at either her old or changed address. On learning of the demand, she promptly obtained certified copies and filed appeals within thirty days. The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeals without seeking a condonation application or supporting evidence. This denied a meaningful opportunity to establish the asserted date of service and caused serious prejudice. In the transitional phase to faceless proceedings, a liberal approach was warranted where no malice or gross negligence was apparent; procedural technicalities could not override substantial justice.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned in favour of the assessee, and the matters were restored to the Commissioner (Appeals) for adjudication on merits after affording both parties an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether registration under section 12AB and approval under section 80G, granted pursuant to a binding jurisdictional High Court judgment, could be qualified by a caveat making them subject to a proposed challenge before the Supreme Court.

Analysis: A jurisdictional High Court judgment binds authorities within its territorial jurisdiction unless stayed, modified or reversed. A contemplated or pending challenge before a superior forum does not diminish that binding force. Having granted registration and approval in compliance with the High Court judgment, the authority could not convert the statutory recognition into tentative or conditional recognition based on speculative future developments. No statutory mechanism authorised the imposition of such a rider.

Conclusion: The caveats making the registration, approval and consequential benefits subject to the outcome of a proposed Supreme Court challenge were unsustainable and were directed to be deleted; the assessee is entitled to the registration and approval without qualification.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 applies to pending insolvency-resolution applications against personal guarantors and removes the interim moratorium under Section 96(1); (ii) Whether limited protective relief for disclosure and preservation of guarantors' assets should be granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 pending arbitration.

Issue (i): Whether Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 applies to pending insolvency-resolution applications against personal guarantors and removes the interim moratorium under Section 96(1).

Analysis: Section 96(4), effective from 26 May 2026, excludes applications concerning personal guarantors to corporate debtors from Section 96. The expression "where an application is filed" encompasses applications already filed and pending on the effective date. Its application to an ongoing proceeding is retroactive, not retrospective, because it operates prospectively upon an existing and continuing status without impairing vested rights. The identity of the person who initiated the insolvency application is immaterial under the amended provision.

Conclusion: The interim moratorium in respect of the personal guarantors ceased from 26 May 2026; the Section 9 petition was not barred. This issue is in favour of the Petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether limited protective relief for disclosure and preservation of guarantors' assets should be granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 pending arbitration.

Analysis: The arbitration agreements and indebtedness were undisputed. The relief sought was confined to asset disclosure and restraint against dissipation, rather than any direction for deposit. Such limited measures were equitable and appropriate pending arbitration, particularly after cessation of the moratorium.

Conclusion: The guarantors must disclose their assets and are restrained from dealing with the disclosed assets pending arbitration. This issue is in favour of the Petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The amended insolvency regime permits recourse to interim arbitral protection against personal guarantors whose insolvency applications remain pending, and limited asset-preservation measures may be granted pending commencement and conduct of arbitration.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory exclusion introduced prospectively may apply to pending proceedings founded on an existing status without being retrospective; accordingly, Section 96(4) removes the automatic interim moratorium for pending insolvency applications against personal guarantors to corporate debtors.

Issues: Whether a single composite assessment order may cover more than one financial year under Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: A single show-cause notice or composite assessment order cannot validly cover more than one tax period where assessment is undertaken before the annual-return due date, or more than one year after that due date. The assessment order covered two separate financial years and was therefore impermissibly composite.

Conclusion: The composite assessment order for two financial years was invalid and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the rectification representations could be rejected as time-barred when they had been made within time but remained undisposed of by the tax authorities.

Analysis: The representations were received in 2020 and again in 2023, but the authority did not dispose of them within the stipulated period. An authority cannot rely on its own failure to act upon a timely application to non-suit the applicant on limitation.

Conclusion: The time-bar rejection was unsustainable; the rectification representations must be considered afresh in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether a single composite assessment order could validly cover more than one financial year.

Analysis: Sections 73 and 74 of the G.S.T. Act, 2017, as applied through the binding Division Bench ruling, do not permit a single show-cause notice or composite assessment order for multiple tax periods where the due date for filing the annual return has been reached; separate proceedings are required for each year.

Conclusion: The composite assessment covering multiple financial years was invalid and was set aside, with liberty to commence separate proceedings for each assessment year.

Ratio Decidendi: Where annual-return due dates have been reached, assessment proceedings under the G.S.T. Act must be undertaken separately for each financial year and cannot be concluded through one composite assessment order.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with directions to seek revocation of registration and deposit the taxes due.

Issues: (i) Whether an MSME Council award made by a Council comprising eight members, contrary to the statutory maximum of five members, is void ab initio; (ii) Whether the writ petitions challenging such an award are maintainable despite the remedy of setting aside under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issue (i): Whether an MSME Council award made by a Council comprising eight members, contrary to the statutory maximum of five members, is void ab initio.

Analysis: Section 21 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 mandates a Council of not fewer than three and not more than five members. Rule 4 of the Jharkhand Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises Facilitation Council Rules, 2007, which permitted a larger composition, was contrary to the parent statute and had already been treated as invalid. The Council that issued the award comprised eight members, rendering its constitution contrary to the statutory mandate. A decision by a forum lacking inherent jurisdiction is a nullity and may be challenged at any stage.

Conclusion: The award issued by the eight-member Council was without jurisdiction and void ab initio, in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petitions challenging such an award are maintainable despite the remedy of setting aside under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: Although an award under Section 18(3) ordinarily attracts the remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the alternative-remedy rule is self-imposed and does not bar constitutional jurisdiction where the impugned action is wholly without jurisdiction. The challenge concerned the statutory competence and composition of the adjudicating Council, rather than a mixed factual and legal objection capable of ordinary arbitral review. The Section 34 remedy was therefore not an effective bar to writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The writ petitions were maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in favour of the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The invalid award and consequential review order cannot stand; the dispute requires fresh adjudication by a lawfully constituted MSME Council.

Ratio Decidendi: An award of a Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council constituted beyond the member-limit mandated by Section 21 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 is a jurisdictional nullity, for which the alternative remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not preclude writ jurisdiction.