Issues: (i) Whether the Resolution Professional acted beyond jurisdiction by seeking additional documents and clarifications while verifying the claim; (ii) whether the claim towards farmers' compensation and the higher amount claimed towards time extension charges were liable to be admitted in full.

Issue (i): Whether the Resolution Professional acted beyond jurisdiction by seeking additional documents and clarifications while verifying the claim.

Analysis: The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons Regulations, 2016 require the Resolution Professional to collect, verify and collate claims, and permit him to call for evidence or clarification necessary to substantiate the claim. Seeking supporting material for verification does not amount to adjudication of the claim. The demand for further particulars was therefore within the statutory function of verification.

Conclusion: The objection to the Resolution Professional's conduct was rejected, and the request for additional information was held to be permissible.

Issue (ii): Whether the claim towards farmers' compensation and the higher amount claimed towards time extension charges were liable to be admitted in full.

Analysis: The farmers' compensation claim remained unsubstantiated because the basis of the amount claimed, the area-wise computation, the share attributable to the corporate debtor, and the date of payment were not adequately proved. The time extension charges were also correctly recalculated up to the insolvency commencement date, and the higher figure claimed by the appellant included a period beyond that date and reflected computational error. The admitted amounts were therefore based on the available material and the correct contractual and insolvency timeline.

Conclusion: The claim for farmers' compensation was rightly not admitted in full, and the reduced admission of time extension charges was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed, and the order rejecting interference with the Resolution Professional's claim verification was affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: A Resolution Professional may seek additional evidence or clarification to substantiate a claim and may admit only that part of the claim which is duly proved and correctly computed as on the insolvency commencement date.

Issues: (i) whether service of the section 7 petition on the corporate debtor through its MCA-registered email address and attempted service at the registered office constituted valid service and justified ex parte proceedings; (ii) whether a section 7 petition was maintainable where the appellant contended that only interest remained outstanding after payments under the settlement arrangement; (iii) whether breach and withdrawal of the conditional one-time settlement revived the original loan liability and enabled admission of the section 7 petition.

Issue (i): whether service of the section 7 petition on the corporate debtor through its MCA-registered email address and attempted service at the registered office constituted valid service and justified ex parte proceedings.

Analysis: Service of the petition was effected at the email address reflected in the MCA records, and attempts were also made at the registered office. The applicable tribunal rules and the Companies Act regime recognise service at the registered email address maintained in the statutory records as valid and sufficient service. Where the company fails to keep a functional registered office or update its records, it cannot successfully challenge service on the ground of lack of notice. The record also showed further steps by publication before the matter was set ex parte.

Conclusion: Valid service was established, and the challenge based on denial of natural justice failed.

Issue (ii): whether a section 7 petition was maintainable where the appellant contended that only interest remained outstanding after payments under the settlement arrangement.

Analysis: Admission under section 7 depends on existence of debt and default above the statutory threshold. A default in payment of interest is also capable of constituting default for the purposes of the Code if the outstanding amount crosses the threshold. The material on record, including the ledger and other financial documents, showed an admitted outstanding liability exceeding the threshold.

Conclusion: The petition remained maintainable notwithstanding the appellant's plea that the balance related only to interest.

Issue (iii): whether breach and withdrawal of the conditional one-time settlement revived the original loan liability and enabled admission of the section 7 petition.

Analysis: The settlement was conditional, and the terms provided for withdrawal on default. Once the settlement was withdrawn, the debtor could not insist on its continuation or limit liability only to the balance claimed under the settlement. The original dues under the loan arrangement stood revived, and post-withdrawal payments were to be adjusted against the revived liability.

Conclusion: The withdrawal of the settlement revived the original debt, supporting admission of the insolvency application.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was held to be without merit, and the admission of the corporate debtor into CIRP was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Service of a section 7 petition at the corporate debtor's MCA-registered email address is valid service, and upon breach and withdrawal of a conditional one-time settlement, the original financial debt revives for the purpose of establishing default under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues: (i) whether the appellants, in view of the registered agreement to sell and the record in the corporate debtor's virtual data room, were entitled to be treated as genuine homebuyers under Category A of the resolution plan; (ii) whether the appellants' belated claim could be rejected when the relevant allotment and payment details were already available with the interim resolution professional and the resolution professional failed to notify them.

Issue (i): Whether the appellants were entitled to be treated as genuine homebuyers under Category A of the resolution plan.

Analysis: The registered agreement to sell dated 23.04.2012, the virtual data room extract, and the repayment trail showed that Unit No. 1002 had been allotted to the appellants and that the corporate debtor's records reflected the transaction. The registered agreement placed the appellants on a higher footing than a mere unregistered reservation or allotment letter. The competing claim relied on by the resolution professional was found to be based on reservation letters and an investment-linked arrangement, indicating a speculative investment rather than a genuine home purchase. The appellants had also confined their present claim to the contractual flat consideration, which supported their bona fides.

Conclusion: The appellants were held entitled to be treated as genuine homebuyers and to be placed in Category A of the resolution plan.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellants' belated claim could be rejected despite the allotment and payment details being available in the corporate debtor's records and virtual data room.

Analysis: The record showed that the interim resolution professional was aware of the appellants' agreement to sell, but no meaningful communication regarding the CIRP was produced to show that the appellants had been notified. The rejection of the claim rested only on delay, although the relevant information was already available in the corporate debtor's records and was not properly considered while preparing the information memorandum and resolution plan. The inconsistent stands taken by the resolution professional regarding the payments also showed lack of due diligence. In these circumstances, the belated filing could not defeat a claim that was already traceable from the corporate debtor's records.

Conclusion: The belated claim could not be rejected, and the rejection order was liable to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the impugned order was set aside, and the appellants' claim was directed to be admitted in Category A of the resolution plan as an addendum.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a homebuyer's registered allotment and payment details are already reflected in the corporate debtor's records and virtual data room, a mere delay in filing the claim cannot justify exclusion from the resolution plan, particularly when the stakeholder was not duly notified during CIRP.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant had complied with the pre-deposit requirement and cured the defect in the appeal papers. (ii) Whether service tax could be sustained solely on the basis of Form 26AS data and the receipts reflected therein. (iii) Whether the demand was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant had complied with the pre-deposit requirement and cured the defect in the appeal papers.

Analysis: The challans produced by the appellant, when taken together, covered the required pre-deposit against the litigated amount. The refusal to accept those challans was held to be unsustainable, and the defect memo was treated as satisfied.

Conclusion: The pre-deposit condition was held to be fulfilled and the defect was cured.

Issue (ii): Whether service tax could be sustained solely on the basis of Form 26AS data and the receipts reflected therein.

Analysis: The receipts appearing in Form 26AS were explained through invoices showing that the appellant had rendered only manpower services. For such services, tax liability lay on the recipient under the reverse charge mechanism. The demand was found to rest only on Income Tax data without corroborative material establishing taxable liability.

Conclusion: The confirmed service tax demand was set aside on merits.

Issue (iii): Whether the demand was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The demand was also examined on the question of limitation and was found to be unsustainable on time-bar grounds as well, following the same line of authority disapproving indiscriminate notices based merely on third-party income-tax data.

Conclusion: The demand was held to be time-barred.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the demand was annulled, and consequential relief was directed in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A service tax demand cannot be sustained merely on the basis of Form 26AS or similar income-tax data unless supported by independent corroborative evidence establishing taxable service and liability; limitation must also be independently satisfied.

Issues: Whether the markup earned on purchase and resale of ocean freight or cargo space on a principal-to-principal basis was liable to service tax as Business Support Service or declared service, and whether the activity could be treated as intermediary service or a taxable composite service.

Analysis: The appellant purchased cargo space from shipping lines on its own account and resold it to exporters at a markup, bearing the commercial risk of profit or loss. The Revenue's theory that the markup represented consideration for ancillary support activities was found unsupported by evidence and internally inconsistent, because the impugned demand was built on the premise that the appellant was neither a pure agent nor merely an intermediary, while simultaneously treating the markup as the value of bundled support services. The transaction was held to be a principal-to-principal trade in space, not facilitation of another's service. The applicable circulars and the settled view of coordinate benches were followed to hold that freight forwarders acting as principals are not liable where the activity is purchase and sale of space on their own account, and that the destination-based rule for transportation of goods did not convert such trading margin into taxable service.

Conclusion: The markup on resale of ocean freight was not taxable service, the demand and penalties could not survive, and the appeal succeeded in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether a single show-cause notice could be issued under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for multiple financial years; (ii) Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether a single show-cause notice could be issued under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for multiple financial years.

Analysis: Section 74 prescribes a separate limitation framework for each financial year, with the notice and adjudication periods tied to the due date for furnishing the annual return for that financial year. The expression "for the financial year" and the definition of "tax period" indicate that each financial year is a distinct unit for proceedings under the provision. On a strict and harmonious reading of Section 74, clubbing multiple financial years into one notice would allow the department to extend limitation indirectly for years already barred, which is impermissible.

Conclusion: A single show-cause notice covering multiple financial years is not permissible under Section 74, and the impugned notice was without jurisdiction in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Though an appellate remedy existed, the impugned notice suffered from an apparent jurisdictional defect on the face of the record. Where the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction, the existence of an alternate remedy does not bar writ intervention. Since the jurisdictional error was ex facie and no further factual inquiry was necessary, the writ court could exercise its constitutional power under Article 226.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned show-cause notice and the consequential adjudication order were held unsustainable and were set aside, while leaving the revenue free to proceed afresh strictly in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, limitation is financial-year specific, so a consolidated notice cannot validly bundle multiple financial years into one proceeding; an apparent jurisdictional defect under Article 226 can be directly corrected notwithstanding an alternate remedy.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment order passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the consequential demand notice were vitiated for want of reasonable opportunity of hearing and breach of natural justice; (ii) Whether the addition made under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained when no such addition was proposed in the show-cause notice.

Issue (i): Whether the assessment order passed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the consequential demand notice were vitiated for want of reasonable opportunity of hearing and breach of natural justice.

Analysis: The time granted for reply to the show-cause notice was less than two clear days and covered Saturday and Sunday. Such short time was held to be unreasonable and insufficient for an effective response.

Conclusion: The assessment proceedings were vitiated by breach of the principles of natural justice, and the challenge succeeded on this ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition made under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained when no such addition was proposed in the show-cause notice.

Analysis: The show-cause notice proposed only a different addition, whereas the impugned assessment order introduced a substantial addition under Section 69A without prior notice or hearing on that proposal.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 69A was not sustainable, as it travelled beyond the scope of the show-cause notice.

Final Conclusion: The impugned assessment order and consequential demand notice were quashed, and the matter was remitted for a fresh assessment after affording adequate opportunity of hearing within the prescribed time.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment order cannot be sustained where the assessee is denied a reasonable opportunity of hearing, and an addition made on a ground not proposed in the show-cause notice violates natural justice.

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to a monthly remuneration for the entire period of his tenure as interim resolution professional, and whether the CoC's fixation of remuneration at a consolidated amount could be interfered with.

Analysis: The remuneration structure had to be gathered from the agenda and minutes of the first CoC meeting, which showed that the amount approved for the appellant's role as interim resolution professional was a consolidated figure, while monthly remuneration was contemplated only if he were appointed as resolution professional. The later dispute over payment did not justify treating the approved amount as a monthly entitlement for the whole tenure. At the same time, the tribunal held that fixation of fees for insolvency professionals is not governed by the same principle of non-justiciability applicable to approval or rejection of resolution plans; the tribunal had jurisdiction to examine the claim on its own merits under the insolvency framework.

Conclusion: The appellant was not entitled to the claimed monthly remuneration for the entire period, and the CoC's quantified remuneration fixation was sustained.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed, and the order directing payment of the consolidated remuneration and verified expenses was left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Fee claims of insolvency professionals are to be determined on the basis of the approved record and the insolvency framework governing professional costs, and the commercial wisdom doctrine applicable to resolution plan approval does not bar judicial scrutiny of such fee fixation.

Issues: (i) Whether attachment and physical removal of assets by the Enforcement Directorate during the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code were legally sustainable. (ii) Whether the Enforcement Directorate could retain monies withdrawn from the corporate debtor's bank account after the attachment order was vacated by the appellate authority under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, while the challenge before the High Court remained pending. (iii) Whether the notice issued under section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act to the corporate debtor's customers, directing them not to release dues, was sustainable before the insolvency fora.

Issue (i): Whether attachment and physical removal of assets by the Enforcement Directorate during the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code were legally sustainable.

Analysis: The insolvency moratorium protects the corporate debtor's legitimate assets and proceedings capable of augmenting civil debt-liability, but it does not nullify criminal or public law action concerning proceeds of crime. The Prevention of Money Laundering Act and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code operate in different domains. Assets alleged to be tainted and attached under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act are not insulated by the moratorium merely because the corporate debtor is under corporate insolvency resolution or liquidation.

Conclusion: The attachment and related action during moratorium were held not to be vulnerable before the insolvency fora; the challenge could not be entertained under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Issue (ii): Whether the Enforcement Directorate could retain monies withdrawn from the corporate debtor's bank account after the attachment order was vacated by the appellate authority under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, while the challenge before the High Court remained pending.

Analysis: Once the attachment and its vacation fall within the statutory mechanism under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, the proper forum for examining consequential retention or restitution is the forum created under that Act, with further challenge lying in the High Court. The insolvency fora cannot reopen or control that exercise through section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Conclusion: The insolvency fora lacked jurisdiction to order refund or restitution of the amount withdrawn and retained in the context of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act proceedings.

Issue (iii): Whether the notice issued under section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act to the corporate debtor's customers, directing them not to release dues, was sustainable before the insolvency fora.

Analysis: Directions issued under section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act were part of the statutory process connected with investigation and attachment of proceeds of crime. Such notices, like attachment proceedings themselves, fall within the exclusive domain of the authorities constituted under that Act and cannot be interdicted by insolvency tribunals.

Conclusion: The section 50 notices were not open to interference under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code jurisdiction.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed because the insolvency fora were held incompetent to interfere with proceedings, attachment, retention, or notices issued under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, even though the corporate debtor was in moratorium or liquidation under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Ratio Decidendi: Insolvency moratorium and liquidation protections do not extend to proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act relating to proceeds of crime, and challenges to attachment or consequential action under that statute must be pursued before the statutory PMLA forum and the High Court, not under section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Issues: (i) Whether the ownership of the appellant in the subject property could be questioned in the corporate debtor's insolvency proceedings; (ii) whether the interim status quo order passed in separate land reforms proceedings could be relied upon by the corporate debtor to retain possession; (iii) whether the corporate debtor had any subsisting right in the leased immovable property; (iv) whether the property could be treated as an asset of the corporate debtor and included in the information memorandum and CIRP.

Issue (i): Whether the ownership of the appellant in the subject property could be questioned in the corporate debtor's insolvency proceedings?

Analysis: The lease granted to the corporate debtor had expired long ago, and the eviction decree obtained by the appellant had been affirmed through the appellate hierarchy, including the Supreme Court. Once the landlord-tenant dispute had culminated in a final eviction decree, the corporate debtor could not reopen the appellant's title or ownership in insolvency proceedings. The adjudicating authority's observation that the appellant had failed to produce title documents was held to be erroneous and unnecessary in the face of the concluded eviction litigation.

Conclusion: The appellant's ownership as landlord was accepted, and the corporate debtor was not permitted to question it in the CIRP.

Issue (ii): Whether the interim status quo order passed in separate land reforms proceedings could be relied upon by the corporate debtor to retain possession?

Analysis: The interim injunction was passed in proceedings between the appellant and the State of West Bengal concerning alleged vesting of land. That order was not between the appellant and the corporate debtor, and therefore could not enlarge any right of the corporate debtor or justify its continued possession after expiry of the lease and the eviction decree. The corporate debtor could not derive benefit from an order passed in a different lis to defeat the appellant's rights.

Conclusion: The status quo order did not inure to the benefit of the corporate debtor.

Issue (iii): Whether the corporate debtor had any subsisting right in the leased immovable property?

Analysis: The leasehold interest ended on 31.12.1978. After expiry of the lease and in the teeth of the eviction decree, the corporate debtor remained only in unauthorised possession. A person in unlawful occupation after termination of tenancy cannot claim any continuing proprietary or possessory right. The property therefore could not be treated as one over which the corporate debtor had any subsisting enforceable interest on the date of commencement of CIRP.

Conclusion: The corporate debtor had no subsisting right in the property.

Issue (iv): Whether the property could be treated as an asset of the corporate debtor and included in the information memorandum and CIRP?

Analysis: Under the insolvency code, assets under the control of the resolution process are those in which the corporate debtor has ownership rights or a legally enforceable interest. Property owned by a third party and merely wrongfully occupied by the corporate debtor cannot become an asset of the corporate debtor. Since the corporate debtor had no surviving leasehold or other right, the property could not be included in the information memorandum or dealt with in the resolution process. Actions taken in relation to that property during CIRP were therefore unsustainable.

Conclusion: The property was not an asset of the corporate debtor and was liable to be excluded from CIRP.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside, the appellant's request for exclusion of the property from CIRP was allowed, and all subsequent steps taken in relation to that property during the insolvency process were declared ineffective.

Ratio Decidendi: Property in the wrongful possession of a corporate debtor after expiry of a lease and a final eviction decree, without any subsisting proprietary or enforceable right, cannot be treated as an asset of the corporate debtor for CIRP purposes.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 82 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 conferred secured creditor status on the State Tax Department despite insolvency proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether the Resolution Professional could reject the revised tax claim raised during the moratorium period.

Issue (i): Whether Section 82 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 conferred secured creditor status on the State Tax Department despite insolvency proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Section 82 creates a first charge, but it expressly operates "save as otherwise provided in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016". That saving clause makes the statutory charge subject to the insolvency regime. The distinction from Section 48 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003 was material because Rainbow Papers was confined to a provision that did not contain such subordination. The dues were therefore payable only in the manner provided under the Code and could not elevate the Department to secured creditor status.

Conclusion: The Department was not entitled to be treated as a secured creditor, and its claim was correctly treated as an operational debt.

Issue (ii): Whether the Resolution Professional could reject the revised tax claim raised during the moratorium period.

Analysis: The revised liability was sought to be introduced during the CIRP moratorium. In view of the moratorium under the Code, the Resolution Professional was justified in declining to entertain the updated claim based on such proceedings.

Conclusion: The rejection of the revised claim was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The approved resolution plan was found to be compliant with the insolvency framework, and no interference was warranted.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory first charge under a taxing statute does not confer secured creditor status in insolvency where the charging provision expressly subordinates itself to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant had locus standi to challenge the order directing a fresh auction of the additional land. (ii) Whether the direction for a fresh auction and the setting aside of the concluded e-auction were sustainable in the absence of fraud, collusion, or material procedural irregularity.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant had locus standi to challenge the order directing a fresh auction of the additional land.

Analysis: The appeal was filed by a party aggrieved by the direction to conduct a fresh auction of the very property for which it had emerged as the successful bidder. An aggrieved person within the meaning of Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is entitled to challenge such an order.

Conclusion: The appellant had locus standi to maintain the appeal.

Issue (ii): Whether the direction for a fresh auction and the setting aside of the concluded e-auction were sustainable in the absence of fraud, collusion, or material procedural irregularity.

Analysis: The reserve price fixed for the additional land was held to have been wrongly assessed by treating the earlier sale consideration as if it related only to the leasehold portion, whereas the earlier lot included both leasehold and freehold components. On the correct computation, the reserve price was not shown to be irrational or lower than the earlier auction value. The concluded auction had been conducted publicly, the process had not been shown to be collusive or fraudulent, and there was no fundamental procedural defect warranting interference. A valid auction cannot be cancelled merely on an expectation of obtaining a higher price, and private sale could not be imposed without satisfying the statutory requirements.

Conclusion: The direction to hold a fresh auction was unsustainable, and the successful e-auction purchaser was entitled to have the sale certificate issued in its favour.

Final Conclusion: The appellate order restored the validity of the auction process for the additional land, rejected the challenge to the successful bidder's entitlement, and left the auction purchaser entitled to consequential transfer steps.

Ratio Decidendi: A duly conducted and concluded liquidation auction cannot be set aside merely because a higher price is later contemplated, unless fraud, collusion, or a fundamental procedural irregularity is established; reserve-price assessment must be based on the correct sale base and statutory auction norms.

Issues: Whether the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, once admitted, could be terminated on the basis of subsequent deposit of the entire debt amount where the corporate debtor had only one creditor, and whether refusal by that sole creditor to accept settlement could be treated as malicious or abusive conduct warranting intervention.

Analysis: Admission under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 depends on proof of debt and default, but post-admission withdrawal or termination is governed by the settlement framework under Section 12A read with Regulation 30 of the Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons Regulations, 2016. The object of the Code is revival of the corporate debtor, not punitive divestment, and that object is materially relevant where there is only one creditor constituting the entire committee of creditors. In such a situation, a genuine offer to repay the admitted debt, made by the suspended board before third-party interests are created, cannot be disregarded merely because the original trigger for admission existed. Continued insistence on CIRP, despite complete repayment being made available and no other creditors having appeared, was treated as unjustified and reflective of an attempt to misuse the insolvency process.

Conclusion: The refusal of the sole creditor to accept settlement did not bar the Tribunal from terminating the CIRP, and the conduct was held to justify intervention to prevent abuse of the Code.

Final Conclusion: The CIRP against the corporate debtor was brought to an end and the appeal succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a corporate debtor has only one creditor and the entire admitted debt is made available for repayment during the pendency of CIRP, the Tribunal may terminate the insolvency process to prevent abuse, notwithstanding the creditor's refusal to accept settlement, if continuation of CIRP would defeat the Code's revival-oriented object.

Issues: Whether the liquidator wilfully disobeyed the order dated 11.03.2026 so as to warrant initiation of contempt proceedings.

Analysis: The alleged order was passed on the mistaken impression that the sale proceeds were still available with the liquidator, whereas the record showed that the amount had already been disbursed on 17.02.2026. Since the factual foundation on which the order rested did not exist when it was made, the direction could not operate as a capable and enforceable command. A contempt proceeding cannot be used to obtain restoration of funds or to rewrite the order into one directing status quo ante when no such direction was actually issued.

Conclusion: No wilful disobedience was made out and the contempt petition was liable to be dismissed.

Issues: Whether the Section 9 insolvency application was liable to be admitted despite the corporate debtor's defence of pre-existing dispute based on contemporaneous performance complaints, settlement discussions, a memorandum of understanding, a disputed credit note, and a work completion certificate.

Analysis: The appeal turned on the Mobilox test under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, namely whether there existed an operational debt due and payable and whether the record disclosed a real dispute raised before the demand notice. The Tribunal held that the contemporaneous letters from 2019 to 2020 complaining of deficient performance, the subsequent penalty proposal, the draft memorandum of understanding referring to ongoing business disputes, the disputed credit note, and the parties' rival stands on the work completion certificate together showed a plausible pre-existing dispute. It further held that the Adjudicating Authority could not decide the authenticity or fabrication of the credit note or conclusively determine the merits of the contractual controversy in summary proceedings under Section 9.

Conclusion: The Section 9 application ought to have been rejected because a plausible pre-existing dispute existed, and the admission order initiating CIRP was unsustainable.

Issues: (i) whether marketing and administrative support services rendered to an overseas company qualified as export of service and were therefore not taxable in India; (ii) whether denial of CENVAT credit of Rs. 6,96,493 was sustainable when the credit availment was disclosed in returns and the demand was raised by invoking the extended period; (iii) whether the penalty under section 77(1)(a) of the Finance Act, 1994 required interference.

Issue (i): whether marketing and administrative support services rendered to an overseas company qualified as export of service and were therefore not taxable in India.

Analysis: The services were rendered under agreements with a foreign recipient located outside India, and the place where the activities were performed in India was held to be irrelevant for determining the recipient of service. For the positive list period, the conditions under Rule 3(1)(iii) and Rule 3(2) of the Export of Service Rules, 2005 were satisfied because the recipient was outside India and payment was received in convertible foreign exchange. For the negative list period, the requirements under Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and Rule 3 of the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 were also satisfied, including the location of the recipient outside India and receipt of payment in foreign exchange.

Conclusion: The services constituted export of service and no service tax was payable; the demand, interest and related penalty on this count were set aside.

Issue (ii): whether denial of CENVAT credit of Rs. 6,96,493 was sustainable when the credit availment was disclosed in returns and the demand was raised by invoking the extended period.

Analysis: The credit was reflected in the statutory ST-3 returns, and the demand was founded on the alleged non-production of documents notwithstanding the disclosure already made. On that basis, invocation of the extended period of limitation was held to be unsustainable. The appellant had also produced supporting invoices and related records during audit and refund proceedings, which negated the basis for denial.

Conclusion: The denial of CENVAT credit was not sustainable and the corresponding demand, interest and penalty were set aside.

Issue (iii): whether the penalty under section 77(1)(a) of the Finance Act, 1994 required interference.

Analysis: The appellant was liable to registration and return compliance even though the services were treated as export of service, and there was delay in obtaining registration. However, the statutory cap on penalty for such default limited the amount imposable.

Conclusion: The penalty was upheld only to the extent of Rs. 10,000 and reduced from the amount originally imposed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded substantially, with the service tax demand and the CENVAT credit denial set aside, and the registration penalty reduced to the statutory maximum.

Ratio Decidendi: For export of service, the decisive factor is the location of the service recipient, not the place where the service is performed; disclosure in statutory returns defeats invocation of the extended period absent suppression.

Issues: (i) Whether road construction services executed as a sub-contractor were exempt under Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.6.2012; (ii) Whether construction of individual houses for five recipients was exempt under the same notification; (iii) Whether bank interest formed part of taxable service consideration; (iv) Whether the threshold exemption under Notification No. 33/2012-ST dated 20.6.2012 was available for vehicle and machinery receipts and HR PWD receipts.

Issue (i): Whether road construction services executed as a sub-contractor were exempt under Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.6.2012.

Analysis: The contracts with the concerned recipients were found to be for construction of roads for PWD as a sub-contractor. Services by way of construction of a road for use by the general public were exempt under serial no. 13(a), and sub-contractor services by way of works contract to another contractor providing exempt works contract services were covered by serial no. 29(h). The alleged discrepancies in the agreements did not displace the substantive nature of the work.

Conclusion: The road construction receipts were exempt and the demand on this count was not sustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether construction of individual houses for five recipients was exempt under Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.6.2012.

Analysis: The appellant had received consideration for construction of individual houses. The absence of property addresses, blueprints, or land-ownership papers was held not essential for availing the exemption where the substance of the transaction showed individual house construction.

Conclusion: The receipts for construction of individual houses were exempt and the related demand was set aside.

Issue (iii): Whether bank interest formed part of taxable service consideration.

Analysis: Bank interest was not consideration for any taxable service and could not be brought to service tax.

Conclusion: The demand based on bank interest was not sustainable.

Issue (iv): Whether the threshold exemption under Notification No. 33/2012-ST dated 20.6.2012 was available for vehicle and machinery receipts and HR PWD receipts.

Analysis: Once the other disputed receipts were held not exigible to service tax, the taxable value for the relevant financial years remained within the exemption limit of Rs. 10,00,000. The turnover-based denial of exemption by the lower authority was therefore unsustainable.

Conclusion: The threshold exemption was available and the demand on these receipts was not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The entire demand failed, the impugned order was set aside, and the assessee obtained full relief.

Ratio Decidendi: For exemption notifications, the substantive nature of the service prevails over immaterial defects in supporting documents, and receipts not constituting consideration for taxable service cannot be included in the taxable value for denying threshold exemption.

Issues: Whether late payment surcharge collected on delayed payment of electricity charges is taxable as consideration for a declared service under section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The late payment surcharge was held to be intrinsically linked to the exempt supply of electricity and payable only upon delay in payment of the electricity tariff. It was found that the surcharge formed part of the electricity tariff structure, had no independent existence apart from the principal supply, and could not be artificially bifurcated from the exempt activity of generation and supply of electricity. The charge was treated as a facility or ancillary levy naturally bundled with the principal supply, and therefore assessed in the same manner as the principal supply rather than as a separate declared service.

Conclusion: The late payment surcharge was not exigible to service tax under section 66E(e) and the demand was not sustainable against the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: An amount that is intrinsically connected to an exempt principal supply and is naturally bundled with it cannot be treated as an independent declared service merely because it is separately quantified or described as a surcharge.

Issues: (i) whether the assessee's activity of purchasing bulk advertisement space and reselling it in print media was liable to service tax; (ii) whether trade discount and volume or turnover-based incentives received from print media formed part of taxable value; (iii) whether the extended period of limitation was invocable for the demand covered by the first show cause notice; and (iv) whether penalties were sustainable.

Issue (i): whether the assessee's activity of purchasing bulk advertisement space and reselling it in print media was liable to service tax.

Analysis: The activity fell within the negative list for the relevant period, because selling of space for advertisements in print media was expressly excluded from taxability under the post-01.07.2012 regime. The assessee was engaged in purchase and onward sale of advertisement space and the demand could not be sustained merely by treating the activity as business auxiliary service or intermediary service, particularly when the foundation of the demand was not framed on the latter basis in the show cause notices.

Conclusion: The activity was not liable to service tax.

Issue (ii): whether trade discount and volume or turnover-based incentives received from print media formed part of taxable value.

Analysis: The amounts received from the print media were trade discount or incentives arising from bulk purchase arrangements and not consideration for any service rendered to the print media. There was no contractual obligation to promote the business of the print media, no evidence of commission in the sense contemplated by the income-tax withholding provisions, and no basis to treat the discounts as taxable consideration. The incentives could not be added to the value of the assessee's taxable services.

Conclusion: Trade discount and incentives were not taxable and could not be included in the assessable value.

Issue (iii): whether the extended period of limitation was invocable for the demand covered by the first show cause notice.

Analysis: The dispute turned on interpretation of the statutory taxability of the amounts received from print media. The assessee was registered, had filed returns, and the department failed to establish wilful mis-statement, suppression, or concealment with intent to evade tax. In such a case, invocation of the extended period was not justified.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable and the demand for the relevant period was time barred.

Issue (iv): whether penalties were sustainable.

Analysis: Once the substantive demand failed, the consequential levy of interest and penalties could not survive.

Conclusion: The penalties were not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The demand was set aside in entirety and the assessee obtained consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Selling of advertisement space in print media during the negative-list regime is not taxable, and discounts or incentives received from the media without a service-contract nexus do not constitute taxable consideration; where the dispute is purely interpretive and no suppression is established, the extended limitation cannot be invoked.

Issues: Whether barley husk, arising inevitably during manufacture of malt-based food products, was a manufactured exempted good so as to attract demand under Rule 6(3) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: Barley husk was found to be a residue or waste emerging in the course of manufacture of the principal dutiable products, without any separate manufacturing activity or intention to produce that material. The governing legal position, as applied from the Supreme Court ruling in DSCL Sugar and followed by subsequent Tribunal decisions, is that the deeming fiction in Section 2(d) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 cannot operate unless the article is first shown to be manufactured within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Mere marketability or tariff classification does not by itself establish excisability, and Rule 6 is inapplicable where the item is not manufactured excisable goods.

Conclusion: The demand raised under Rule 6(3) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 was held unsustainable, and the assessee succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: A residue or by-product that emerges inevitably in the course of manufacture, without independent manufacture, cannot be treated as an exempted manufactured good for the purpose of Rule 6 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.