Issues: Whether the disallowance of short-term capital loss on sale of shares could be sustained on the basis of a non-speaking appellate order, and whether the matter required fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The appellate order sustained the disallowance of loss on equity shares while accepting that section 94(8) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not applicable to share transactions. The reasons recorded for treating the transactions as sham were found to be summary in nature and insufficiently reasoned. The appellate authority did not give a speaking finding explaining why the claim of short-term capital loss on shares was to be disallowed, though it had already allowed the mutual fund loss component. The matter was therefore considered fit to be examined afresh, with a direction to pass a speaking order after granting reasonable opportunity of hearing in terms of section 250(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: The issue was set aside to the appellate authority for fresh adjudication, and the assessee's appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

Issues: Whether penalty under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for under-reporting or misreporting of income was sustainable where the assessee filed the return only in response to notice under section 148, the assessed income was accepted without variation, and the assessee explained the default by accident, medical treatment, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Analysis: The assessee's income was entirely salary income on which tax had been deducted at source, and the assessment was completed without any addition or disallowance. The material on record showed that the return filed in response to notice under section 148 was accepted as returned, and there was no escapement of income, concealment, or tax evasion. The assessee also produced medical records supporting the explanation that an accident and subsequent treatment, followed by the pandemic, prevented timely filing of the original return. The Tribunal treated the explanation as bona fide and followed the view that delayed filing by itself does not amount to under-reporting within the meaning of section 270A where the income is fully disclosed and verifiable.

Conclusion: Penalty under section 270A was not warranted and was deleted.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded, and the penalty order was set aside on the footing that bona fide non-filing of the original return, in the absence of concealment or revenue loss, does not justify penalty for under-reporting.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under section 270A cannot be sustained merely because the return was first filed in response to notice under section 148, if the income is fully disclosed, accepted without variation, and the assessee establishes a bona fide explanation with no concealment or tax evasion.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to foreign tax credit despite filing Form No. 67 after the due date prescribed under the income-tax return filing provisions.

Analysis: The claim for foreign tax credit was denied only on the ground that Form No. 67 was filed belatedly. The Tribunal followed its earlier coordinate bench decisions holding that filing of Form No. 67 is directory and not mandatory, and that delay in filing the form, by itself, cannot defeat a substantive claim for foreign tax credit when the foreign taxes paid and the supporting particulars are otherwise verifiable. On that basis, the denial of relief was found unsustainable.

Conclusion: The assessee was held entitled to foreign tax credit, and the Assessing Officer was directed to verify the claim and allow it.

Issues: (i) Whether the imported knee, hip and shoulder implant systems and component parts are classifiable under tariff item 90211000 as orthopaedic appliances, tariff item 90213100 as artificial joints, tariff item 90213900 as other artificial parts of the body, or any other tariff item; (ii) Whether the goods are eligible for exemption under Sr. No. 385 of Notification No. 45/2025-Cus dated 24.10.2025, particularly under Entry B(1) or Entry E(9) of List 21.

Issue (i): Whether the imported knee, hip and shoulder implant systems and component parts are classifiable under tariff item 90211000 as orthopaedic appliances, tariff item 90213100 as artificial joints, tariff item 90213900 as other artificial parts of the body, or any other tariff item

Analysis: Heading 9021 and Chapter Note 6 distinguish orthopaedic appliances from artificial parts of the body. Orthopaedic appliances are devices that prevent or correct deformities or support existing body parts after illness, operation or injury, whereas artificial joints and related prosthetic parts are implantable replacements that wholly or partially replace defective anatomical structures. The tariff separately provides for orthopaedic or fracture appliances, artificial joints, other artificial parts of the body and residuary goods, and the HSN Explanatory Notes support this distinction. Classification depends on the objective character of the goods as imported, not on the medical specialty in which they are used. Complete prosthetic joint assemblies fall under artificial joints, while implantable components such as stems, cups, liners and similar parts fall under other artificial parts of the body.

Conclusion: Complete knee, hip and shoulder replacement systems are classifiable under tariff item 90213100, and individual implantable components are classifiable under tariff item 90213900. None of the subject goods are classifiable under tariff item 90211000.

Issue (ii): Whether the goods are eligible for exemption under Sr. No. 385 of Notification No. 45/2025-Cus dated 24.10.2025, particularly under Entry B(1) or Entry E(9) of List 21

Analysis: Entry B(1) extends the exemption only to orthopaedic appliances falling under heading 90.21, and not to all goods of heading 9021. Since the subject goods are classifiable as artificial joints or other artificial parts of the body, they do not answer the description of orthopaedic appliances. Entry E(9) covers implants for severely physically handicapped patients, but the present notification omits the earlier language relating to joint replacement and spinal implants. That omission must be given effect, and the earlier exemption decisions rendered under materially different notifications cannot be mechanically applied. The applicant did not establish that the goods are specially intended for the narrower class of severely physically handicapped patients contemplated by the notification. Exemption entries must be construed strictly.

Conclusion: The goods are not eligible for exemption under Entry B(1) or Entry E(9) of List 21 and are not entitled to exemption under Sr. No. 385 of Notification No. 45/2025-Cus dated 24.10.2025.

Final Conclusion: The ruling classifies the complete replacement systems under tariff item 90213100 and the separate implantable components under tariff item 90213900, and denies the claimed customs exemption under Notification No. 45/2025-Cus.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a tariff heading separately provides for artificial joints and other artificial parts of the body, implantable prosthetic replacements must be classified by their specific tariff description and cannot be treated as orthopaedic appliances merely because they are used in orthopaedic treatment; exemption notifications must then be applied strictly according to their express terms, without supplying omitted words or enlarging the entry by implication.

Issues: (i) Whether the earlier order permitting collapse of transactions only where consent had been given was misconstrued as making consent a mandatory precondition in all cases; (ii) whether consent of the counterparty is a condition precedent for relief under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 where the pleaded case is that the transactions are fraudulent and void; (iii) whether the pleadings and materials, including regulatory and forensic reports, required adjudication of the alleged circuitous and fraudulent transactions; and (iv) whether the application was barred by election, estoppel, or approbate and reprobate because separate Section 7 proceedings had earlier been pursued.

Issue (i): Whether the earlier order permitting collapse of transactions only where consent had been given was misconstrued as making consent a mandatory precondition in all cases?

Analysis: The earlier order had allowed collapse only in respect of transactions where consent was already available in the proceedings then before the Tribunal, while expressly leaving the disputed transactions open for examination in pending proceedings. That limited disposal did not lay down a general rule that consent was indispensable for every future request to unwind or collapse transactions.

Conclusion: The impugned order wrongly treated the earlier order as imposing a universal consent requirement.

Issue (ii): Whether consent of the counterparty is a condition precedent for relief under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 where the pleaded case is that the transactions are fraudulent and void?

Analysis: Section 242(1) confers wide powers to make such order as the Tribunal thinks fit to bring an end to oppression and mismanagement. Section 242(2)(f) is illustrative and deals with termination, setting aside, or modification of subsisting agreements, but its proviso cannot limit the general power under sub-section (1) where the relief sought is founded on allegations that the transactions are sham, fraudulent, or void. In such a case, the requirement of consent does not operate as an absolute fetter.

Conclusion: Consent of the parties was not a condition precedent on the facts pleaded.

Issue (iii): Whether the pleadings and materials, including regulatory and forensic reports, required adjudication of the alleged circuitous and fraudulent transactions?

Analysis: The application contained detailed pleadings on six transactions and was supported by the RBI inspection report, SFIO report, and forensic material indicating that funds were routed through third parties to bypass regulatory directions and reach group entities. These materials were sufficient to necessitate consideration of the true nature of the transactions and their alleged fraudulent character.

Conclusion: The Tribunal ought to have examined the allegations on merits.

Issue (iv): Whether the application was barred by election, estoppel, or approbate and reprobate because separate Section 7 proceedings had earlier been pursued?

Analysis: The earlier Section 7 proceedings did not create a bar against raising the plea that the transactions were fraudulent or void. The doctrines of election, estoppel, and approbate and reprobate cannot be used to prevent a party from challenging transactions alleged to be illegal or void ab initio, particularly where the statutory regime and public interest are involved.

Conclusion: The application was not barred by election, estoppel, or approbate and reprobate.

Final Conclusion: The dismissal of the collapsing application and the consequential orders allowing the connected applications could not be sustained, and the matter required fresh consideration on merits by the Tribunal below.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013, the Tribunal's wide remedial power is not curtailed by the consent proviso in Section 242(2)(f) where the pleaded case is that the impugned transactions are fraudulent, sham, or void, and such allegations cannot be shut out by election, estoppel, or approbate and reprobate.

Issues: (i) Whether the disbursement proposed for ACRE in the resolution plan was in accordance with Section 30(2)(b) and Section 53(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, including whether its security interest extended to allotted units and receivables. (ii) Whether the CIRP and approval of the resolution plan in the appeal filed by Dhankalash were vitiated by non-consideration of objections, alleged valuation defects, and non-compliance with Section 30(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. (iii) Whether NOIDA was wrongly treated as an operational creditor, or whether it was entitled to be treated as a secured creditor on the basis of the registered sub-lease deed and the statutory framework.

Issue (i): Whether the disbursement proposed for ACRE in the resolution plan was in accordance with Section 30(2)(b) and Section 53(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, including whether its security interest extended to allotted units and receivables.

Analysis: ACRE derived its rights through assignment from the original lender and could not claim a wider security than what originally existed. The security was found to be confined to unsold inventory, since the lender's SARFAESI notice itself excluded sold units and the rights of homebuyers had crystallised prior to mortgage. Section 11(4)(h) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 protected allottee rights, and the allotments could not be treated as part of the secured creditor's security pool. The Tribunal also held that the value of the security interest had to be assessed on the basis of the actual available security, not the entire admitted debt, and that future receivables could not be separately counted for liquidation entitlement in a hypothetical liquidation on the insolvency commencement date.

Conclusion: The proposed payment of Rs. 70 crores to ACRE was held to be above the assessed value of its security interest and the resolution plan was found compliant on this issue; the appeal by ACRE failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the CIRP and approval of the resolution plan in the appeal filed by Dhankalash were vitiated by non-consideration of objections, alleged valuation defects, and non-compliance with Section 30(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The CIRP involved multiple committee meetings, competing resolution applicants, revised plans, and extended deliberation. The objections raised by Dhankalash related principally to commercial evaluation, valuation, feasibility, and viability, all of which fell within the commercial wisdom of the committee of creditors. The grievance regarding non-decision of the restoration application did not establish material prejudice, and the record did not show collusion, bias, or any mandatory legal violation affecting approval of the plan. The allocation to Dhankalash, an unsecured financial creditor, was also held to be consistent with the priority under the waterfall mechanism.

Conclusion: The challenge by Dhankalash was rejected and its appeal was dismissed.

Issue (iii): Whether NOIDA was wrongly treated as an operational creditor, or whether it was entitled to be treated as a secured creditor on the basis of the registered sub-lease deed and the statutory framework.

Analysis: The registered sub-lease deed created a first charge in favour of NOIDA to secure payment of its dues and satisfied the requirements of a transaction creating security interest under Section 3(31) and Section 3(33) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Tribunal held that NOIDA's rights arose from the contractual sub-lease arrangement, supplemented by the statutory framework, and that the adjudicating authority had not meaningfully considered these rights while approving the resolution plan. The classification of NOIDA merely as an operational creditor was held to be erroneous.

Conclusion: NOIDA was held to be a secured creditor and the impugned order was set aside to the limited extent of distribution, with a direction to revise the resolution plan distribution accordingly.

Final Conclusion: The appeals of ACRE and Dhankalash were dismissed, while NOIDA succeeded only to the limited extent of securing reconsideration of its treatment in the distribution under the resolution plan.

Ratio Decidendi: In a real estate insolvency, the entitlement of a dissenting secured creditor under Section 30(2)(b) is confined to the value of its actual and legally enforceable security interest, whereas a registered sub-lease deed creating a first charge can constitute a security interest requiring treatment as that of a secured creditor.

Issues: (i) Whether cancellation and suspension of GST registration with retrospective effect is permissible under Section 29(2) of the CGST Act and the relevant Rules. (ii) Whether the challenge to Section 29(2) and Rule 21(a) of the GST Rules was fit to be entertained in the writ petition.

Issue (i): Whether cancellation and suspension of GST registration with retrospective effect is permissible under Section 29(2) of the CGST Act and the relevant Rules.

Analysis: Section 29(2) expressly permits cancellation of registration from any date, including a retrospective date. The second proviso to Section 29(2) also empowers suspension of registration during pendency of cancellation proceedings for such period and in such manner as may be prescribed. The expression "as may be prescribed" was treated as referring to the prescription under Section 29 itself.

Conclusion: Retrospective cancellation and suspension of GST registration are permissible in law.

Issue (ii): Whether the challenge to Section 29(2) and Rule 21(a) of the GST Rules was fit to be entertained in the writ petition.

Analysis: The Court found no valid ground to entertain the challenge to the statutory provisions. It also noted that the show cause notice afforded an opportunity to reply and personal hearing, and the objections raised in the writ petition could be taken in the show cause reply.

Conclusion: The challenge was not entertained.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition failed on merits and was dismissed, while the legal questions were left open for decision in an appropriate proceeding.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute expressly authorizes cancellation of registration from any date and permits suspension during cancellation proceedings, retrospective cancellation and corresponding suspension are legally permissible.

Issues: Whether cancellation and suspension of GST registration with retrospective effect under Section 29(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 21(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 are impermissible in law and liable to be interdicted in writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 29(2) permits cancellation of registration from any date, including a retrospective date. The second proviso also authorises suspension of registration during pendency of cancellation proceedings, and the expression "as may be prescribed" was read as referring to the prescription under Section 29 itself. In the facts noted, the show cause notice alleged fraud and also afforded an opportunity to reply and seek personal hearing, which the petitioner did not utilise. The challenge to Section 29(2) and Rule 21(a) was therefore not found to disclose any ground for interference.

Conclusion: The challenge was rejected and the writ petition was dismissed.

Final Conclusion: Retrospective cancellation and interim suspension of GST registration were held to be within the statutory framework, leaving the petitioner without writ relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 29(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits retrospective cancellation of registration and authorises suspension pending cancellation proceedings in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

Issues: Whether the writ petition was maintainable in view of the statutory appeal remedy under the GST regime and whether the petitioner should be relegated to the Appellate Tribunal after complying with the pre-deposit requirement.

Analysis: The Court noted that an appeal against the impugned order lay under Section 112(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Rule 110 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 before the Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 109 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. It held that where an alternate efficacious statutory remedy exists, exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not warranted unless an exceptional case is made out. The petitioner did not establish such a case, and the Tribunal was held competent to consider the issues urged, including revenue neutrality, on merits.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained and the petitioner was directed to pursue the statutory appeal before the Appellate Tribunal after complying with the pre-deposit requirement.

Issues: Whether revision under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was justified where the Assessing Officer had made an addition of 12.5% of alleged bogus purchases on a plausible view, and whether such order could be treated as erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of revenue.

Analysis: The Assessing Officer had examined the matter and adopted a view that only 12.5% of the alleged bogus purchases should be added. The Principal Commissioner sought to revise the assessment on the basis that the entire amount ought to have been added under section 69C and taxed under section 115BBE. The Tribunal found that this was not a case of lack of inquiry, but of an attempt to substitute one possible view with another. The Court agreed that where the Assessing Officer has taken a legally plausible view after inquiry, the revisionary power cannot be used merely because the Commissioner prefers a different approach. The order was therefore not unsustainable in law and did not satisfy the requirements of section 263.

Conclusion: The revision under section 263 was not justified, and the Tribunal's order was upheld.

Issues: Whether compensation received under the BSNL Voluntary Retirement Scheme, 2019 was retrenchment compensation in the nature of a capital receipt exempt under section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and not merely eligible for the limit under section 10(10C).

Analysis: The Tribunal followed its earlier coordinate bench decisions on identical facts and held that the amount paid to BSNL employees under the voluntary retirement scheme was retrenchment compensation arising from forced retirement under the revival package. It accepted that the compensation was not taxable as salary income and that the benefit was governed by section 10(10B), which applies to such compensation as a capital receipt, rather than being confined to the exemption contemplated by section 10(10C).

Conclusion: The compensation received under BSNL VRS-2019 was held to be exempt under section 10(10B) and the assessee's claim was allowed.

Issues: Whether the revisionary order under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid where the Assessing Officer had not initiated penalty proceedings or made proper enquiry before completing the reassessment.

Analysis: The assessment was completed under section 147 and section 144B without initiating penalty proceedings, despite the assessee's failure to file the return within the prescribed time. The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer was required to examine the applicability of penalty provisions and undertake necessary verification. Since this enquiry was not made, the assessment order was treated as erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, justifying exercise of revisionary jurisdiction under section 263.

Conclusion: The revision order was upheld and the assessee's challenge failed.

Issues: Whether interest received on compensation for compulsory acquisition of agricultural land is taxable as interest income under section 56(2)(viii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, or forms part of the compensation eligible for exemption under section 10(37) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The compensation arose from compulsory acquisition of agricultural land used for agricultural purposes. The interest component on delayed payment of compensation under sections 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act was held to partake the character of the principal compensation itself. Such receipt was treated as an accretion to compensation and not as independent interest income within the meaning of section 56 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the absence of any contrary jurisdictional authority, the addition could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The interest received on compensation was not taxable under section 56(2)(viii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the assessee was entitled to the benefit of section 10(37) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Outcome: The appeals were dismissed as infructuous because the consequential assessment order, having been passed in effect of the revisionary order, no longer survived after the revisionary order was set aside for fresh consideration.

Issues: (i) Whether the assumption of jurisdiction under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was vitiated by a consolidated and defective satisfaction note recorded for multiple assessment years.

Analysis: The assessment was founded on a single satisfaction note covering several assessment years, without year-wise identification of the material, the entries relied upon, or a clear finding that the seized material pertained to the assessee for the specific year under appeal. The order followed the same reasoning adopted in earlier coordinate bench decisions, which held that section 153C requires a valid satisfaction note with year-wise application and that a consolidated note for multiple years is not sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. Following that view, the Court found the jurisdictional assumption to be invalid.

Conclusion: The jurisdiction under section 153C was invalidly assumed and the assessment was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the search assessment could not survive the jurisdictional defect arising from the defective satisfaction note.

Ratio Decidendi: For invoking section 153C, the satisfaction note must validly and separately connect the seized material to the assessee and to the relevant assessment year; a consolidated or non-specific satisfaction note vitiates the jurisdiction and the resulting assessment.

Issues: Whether the assessee's receipts for management and business support services rendered to its Indian subsidiary were taxable as fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Article 12(4)(b) of the India-Singapore Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.

Analysis: The dispute was held to be covered by the Tribunal's consistent view in the assessee's own earlier assessment years. The services under the continuing agreement were treated as business/support services, and it was found that the receipts did not satisfy the treaty requirement of making available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes. Applying section 90(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the treaty being more beneficial prevailed over the broader domestic definition of fees for technical services.

Conclusion: The receipts were not taxable as fees for technical services in India and the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) whether the transfer pricing adjustment on brand royalty was sustainable; (ii) whether the transfer pricing adjustment on ECB interest and upfront fee was sustainable; (iii) whether the transfer pricing adjustment on AMP expenditure could be made in the absence of proof of an international transaction; (iv) whether depreciation on the right to use 3G spectrum was allowable; (v) whether penalty paid to the Department of Telecommunication was deductible; (vi) whether depreciation on Asset Restoration Cost was allowable or, alternatively, whether the amount was deductible as revenue expenditure; (vii) whether liabilities written back were taxable; (viii) whether discount allowed to prepaid distributors attracted disallowance under section 40(a)(ia); (ix) whether annual licence fee payable to DOT was capital in nature and, if so, how consequential deduction under section 35ABB was to be worked out; (x) whether payments made to IBM and royalty/WPC charges were allowable as revenue expenditure.

Issue (i): whether the transfer pricing adjustment on brand royalty was sustainable.

Analysis: The agreement relied upon by the Transfer Pricing Officer as a comparable was a controlled transaction and could not be treated as a valid CUP benchmark. Comparable uncontrolled transactions alone could be used for determining arm's length price under Rule 10B of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. The issue had already been decided in the assessee's favour in earlier years on identical facts.

Conclusion: The adjustment on brand royalty was deleted and the ground was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether the transfer pricing adjustment on ECB interest and upfront fee was sustainable.

Analysis: The RBI-approved all-in-cost ceiling was a highly relevant contemporaneous benchmark, and the transfer pricing analysis of the lower authorities suffered from comparability defects, including inadequate consideration of country risk, currency risk, tenure, borrower profile, subordination, and upfront fee. The issue was covered by earlier coordinate bench decisions on identical ECB arrangements.

Conclusion: The adjustment on ECB interest and upfront fee was deleted and the ground was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): whether the transfer pricing adjustment on AMP expenditure could be made in the absence of proof of an international transaction.

Analysis: An international transaction in respect of AMP expenditure cannot be presumed merely from high advertisement or marketing spend or by application of the Bright Line Test. Tangible material showing an arrangement or understanding with the associated enterprise is required before Chapter X can be invoked. The assessee's AMP spend was held to be incurred for its own business, and the issue was already covered by binding precedent.

Conclusion: The AMP adjustment was deleted and the ground was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): whether depreciation on the right to use 3G spectrum was allowable.

Analysis: The right to use spectrum had already been held by coordinate benches to be an intangible asset on which depreciation is admissible. No distinguishing facts or contrary authority were shown for the year under consideration.

Conclusion: Depreciation on the right to use 3G spectrum was directed to be allowed and the ground was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): whether penalty paid to the Department of Telecommunication was deductible.

Analysis: The payment was treated as compensatory and business-related, not as an outlay for an offence or prohibited act. The issue stood covered by earlier coordinate bench decisions in the assessee's own case and related group cases.

Conclusion: The disallowance was deleted and the ground was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vi): whether depreciation on Asset Restoration Cost was allowable or, alternatively, whether the amount was deductible as revenue expenditure.

Analysis: Depreciation on Asset Restoration Cost was not allowable, following the binding appellate view. However, the alternate claim under section 37(1) was accepted because the expenditure was revenue in character and the quantification had to be examined in light of the factual workings filed by the assessee.

Conclusion: The depreciation claim was rejected, but the matter was restored for verification of the consequential deduction as revenue expenditure under section 35ABB in the manner directed by precedent.

Issue (vii): whether liabilities written back were taxable.

Analysis: The earlier coordinate bench decisions on identical facts had upheld the addition, and no higher-court reversal or material change in law was shown.

Conclusion: The addition on account of liabilities written back was sustained and the ground was dismissed.

Issue (viii): whether discount allowed to prepaid distributors attracted disallowance under section 40(a)(ia).

Analysis: The Supreme Court has held that such discount does not constitute commission within section 194H, and therefore non-deduction of tax at source does not trigger disallowance under section 40(a)(ia). The coordinate benches had consistently followed this position in the assessee's own cases.

Conclusion: The disallowance was deleted and the ground was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ix): whether annual licence fee payable to DOT was capital in nature and, if so, how consequential deduction under section 35ABB was to be worked out.

Analysis: The annual licence fee was capital in nature and not deductible under section 37(1), following binding Supreme Court precedent. At the same time, the assessee's computation for consequential amortisation required verification because mergers, licence transfers and surviving licence period affected the section 35ABB allowance.

Conclusion: The revenue deduction claim was rejected, but the matter was restored for verification and recomputation of the allowable deduction under section 35ABB.

Issue (x): whether payments made to IBM and royalty/WPC charges were allowable as revenue expenditure.

Analysis: The IBM payments were for use of hardware owned by IBM and were held to be revenue in nature despite book treatment as finance lease. The WPC royalty was also treated as revenue expenditure on the basis of consistent precedent holding such spectrum-related payments deductible under section 37(1).

Conclusion: The disallowances on IBM payments and WPC royalty charges were deleted and the grounds were allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on the principal transfer pricing issues and several deduction claims, failed on the liabilities written back issue, and was sent back only for limited verification and recomputation on Asset Restoration Cost and licence fee amortisation.

Ratio Decidendi: Comparable uncontrolled transactions are required for CUP-based transfer pricing, an international transaction in AMP cannot be presumed without tangible evidence of arrangement, and business outgoings retain their revenue or capital character according to the real nature of the transaction, as governed by binding precedent.

Issues: (i) Whether the seized imported goods were liable to be provisionally released on conditions; (ii) Whether the adjudicating authority could proceed independently and decide the matter uninfluenced by the conditional release order.

Issue (i): Whether the seized imported goods were liable to be provisionally released on conditions.

Analysis: The writ petition concerned only a seizure memo and a request for interim release of the imported consignment. The Court followed its earlier approach in similar matters and directed provisional release of the goods on fulfilment of stipulated conditions, including payment of the enhanced duty, quantification by Customs within a fixed time, furnishing of a bank guarantee, and maintenance of transaction details if the goods were subsequently sold.

Conclusion: The goods were directed to be released provisionally subject to the specified conditions, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the adjudicating authority could proceed independently and decide the matter uninfluenced by the conditional release order.

Analysis: The Court expressly preserved the adjudicatory function of the Customs authority and clarified that the conditional release order would not inhibit further proceedings. It also stated that the petitioner would be entitled to participate in the adjudication and that the authority must decide the objections and contentions of both sides on their own merits.

Conclusion: The adjudicating authority was permitted to proceed in accordance with law, uninfluenced by the provisional release order.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded with conditional provisional release of the seized goods, while leaving the merits of the customs adjudication open for independent determination.

Issues: (i) Whether the expressions "by-products" arising from refining crude oils can be treated as "resultant goods" under Section 65 of the Customs Act, 1962 read with the Manufacture and Other Operations in Warehouse Regulations, 2019; (ii) whether export of such resultant goods entitles the applicant to remission of customs duty on imported inputs contained therein, even when the main products are cleared for home consumption; and (iii) whether proportionate attribution of imported inputs to exported resultant goods is permissible under the MOOWR framework.

Issue (i): Whether the expressions "by-products" arising from refining crude oils can be treated as "resultant goods" under Section 65 of the Customs Act, 1962 read with the Manufacture and Other Operations in Warehouse Regulations, 2019.

Analysis: The expression "resultant goods" is not defined in the statute or the regulations and therefore falls to be understood in its ordinary, commercial and trade sense. Goods that emerge from the permitted manufacturing process, including scientifically distinct and commercially marketable incidental outputs, are not excluded merely because they are described in trade as by-products. The statutory framework uses broad language and does not confine the benefit to principal or main products. A restrictive reading would introduce a limitation not found in the scheme and would defeat its facilitative object.

Conclusion: The by-products identified by the applicant qualify as resultant goods under Section 65 and the MOOWR framework.

Issue (ii): Whether export of such resultant goods entitles the applicant to remission of customs duty on imported inputs contained therein, even when the main products are cleared for home consumption.

Analysis: The scheme operates as a duty deferment regime at the stage of import, but the duty burden is extinguished to the extent resultant goods are exported. Section 69 and the circular governing the scheme make it clear that no duty is required to be paid in respect of imported goods contained in exported resultant products. The fact that the principal products are sold domestically does not prevent remission on the portion of inputs embedded in exported resultant goods.

Conclusion: Duty remission is available on imported inputs contained in exported resultant goods, notwithstanding domestic clearance of the main products.

Issue (iii): Whether proportionate attribution of imported inputs to exported resultant goods is permissible under the MOOWR framework.

Analysis: The expression "to the extent" in the governing circular and the reference to goods "contained in so much of the resultant products" support a proportionate, input-linked approach. The absence of a rigid statutory formula does not negate attribution based on verifiable yield ratios and material balance. The framework therefore permits correlation and segregation of input content between exported and domestically cleared resultant goods.

Conclusion: Proportionate attribution of imported inputs to exported resultant goods is permissible, and the claimed benefit cannot be denied on the ground that the scheme lacks an express computational formula.

Final Conclusion: The applicant is entitled to the MOOWR benefit for exported by-products treated as resultant goods, with remission of duty limited to the imported inputs embedded in such exports, while duty remains payable on inputs attributable to goods cleared for home consumption.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a manufacturing process under Section 65 yields commercially identifiable outputs, the expression "resultant goods" includes all such outputs in trade and commercial parlance, and export of those goods extinguishes customs duty to the extent of imported inputs contained therein on a proportionate attribution basis.

Issues: Whether the refund claim was barred by limitation under section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as made applicable to service tax, and whether the appellant had substantiated entitlement to the claimed refund amount.

Analysis: The statutory scheme requires refund applications to be filed within one year from the relevant date. The amount claimed was examined against the available challans and records, but the authorities found that the appellant could not establish with supporting evidence that the entire disputed amount related to tax paid on non-taxable services within the limitation period. The claim was therefore not proved to be maintainable within the time prescribed by law.

Conclusion: The refund claim was held to be barred by limitation to the extent disallowed, and the rejection of the refund was sustained in favour of the Revenue.