Issues: (i) Whether the surplus arising on the transfer of the consolidated rights in the subject property after termination of the Joint Development Agreement was assessable as a non-taxable capital receipt or as business income; (ii) whether the gain was correctly assessable under the head "Capital Gains" instead of "Profits and Gains of Business or Profession"; (iii) whether the disallowance made under section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could survive once the receipt was held taxable under the head "Capital Gains"; and (iv) whether the provision created for compensation relating to removal of encroachments and settlement of boundary disputes was allowable.

Issue (i): Whether the surplus arising on the transfer of the consolidated rights in the subject property after termination of the Joint Development Agreement was assessable as a non-taxable capital receipt or as business income?

Analysis: The additional plea rested on the contention that prolonged blockage or sterilisation of the commercial rights and the alleged loss of the profit-making apparatus had converted the receipt into a capital receipt outside the charging provisions. The Court distinguished the authorities relied upon by the assessee, holding that those cases turned on their own factual matrices and did not lay down any absolute rule that every receipt arising after blockage, sterilisation, or termination of a commercial arrangement is automatically a capital receipt. On the facts, no compensation was received for destruction of the profit-making apparatus; instead, the contractual restraints were lifted, the pre-existing rights stood restored, the reversionary rights completed the bundle of rights, and the impugned surplus arose only upon the voluntary transfer of that consolidated bundle.

Conclusion: The receipt was not a non-taxable capital receipt and remained chargeable to tax.

Issue (ii): Whether the gain was correctly assessable under the head "Capital Gains" instead of "Profits and Gains of Business or Profession"?

Analysis: The Court held that the matter had to be decided on the cumulative commercial realities of the entire transaction, including the prior transfer of development rights, the prolonged inability to commercially exploit the rights for reasons beyond the assessee's control, the termination of the Joint Development Agreement, and the later acquisition of reversionary rights which consolidated and perfected title. The original trading character of the asset was not treated as conclusive. The Court approved the approach that the rights transferred on 18.09.2018 were the consolidated and marketable rights that had emerged after involuntary sterilisation and restoration, rather than a fresh business asset dealt with in the ordinary course of trading.

Conclusion: The gains were correctly assessable under the head "Capital Gains".

Issue (iii): Whether the disallowance made under section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could survive once the receipt was held taxable under the head "Capital Gains"?

Analysis: The disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) is a computation provision confined to business income. Once the gain was held assessable under the separate and self-contained capital gains code, the basis for invoking that provision no longer survived.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) was directed to be deleted.

Issue (iv): Whether the provision created for compensation relating to removal of encroachments and settlement of boundary disputes was allowable?

Analysis: The Court accepted in principle that expenditure or liability directly connected with removing encroachments and conveying clear and marketable title may be relevant for computation, but held that the quantum and supporting material required verification. Since the lower authorities had examined the claim only in the context of business computation, the issue was sent back for limited factual verification of crystallisation and supporting evidence.

Conclusion: The claim was accepted in principle and remanded for limited verification.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the characterisation of the principal receipt failed, the capital-gains treatment was upheld, the business disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) was deleted, and the encroachment-related provision issue was restored for limited reconsideration.

Ratio Decidendi: The true character of a receipt arising from termination of a commercial arrangement depends on the cumulative commercial realities and legal effect of the transaction; prolonged blockage or restoration of rights does not by itself convert a trading transaction into a non-taxable capital receipt, but it may justify assessment under the capital gains regime where the receipt arises from transfer of a consolidated bundle of rights rather than from ordinary trading operations.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax could be demanded on the receipts for construction of Anganwadi Kendra when the assessee's taxable turnover, after excluding exempt services, was below the small service provider threshold exemption limit under Notification No. 33/2012-ST; (ii) Whether service tax under reverse charge was payable on amounts shown as legal expenses when the amounts were established to be payments for purchase of stamp papers.

Issue (i): Whether service tax could be demanded on the receipts for construction of Anganwadi Kendra when the assessee's taxable turnover, after excluding exempt services, was below the small service provider threshold exemption limit under Notification No. 33/2012-ST.

Analysis: The only surviving taxable receipt after exclusion of exempt construction services was the amount received for construction of Anganwadi Kendra. Explanation (B) to Notification No. 33/2012-ST provides that aggregate value for threshold exemption does not include the value of services wholly exempt under any other notification. Once the exempt receipts were excluded, the remaining taxable turnover was less than Rs. 10 lakhs. On that basis, the demand raised on the taxable value of Rs. 3,12,944/- could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The demand on the Anganwadi construction receipts was not sustainable and was set aside; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service tax under reverse charge was payable on amounts shown as legal expenses when the amounts were established to be payments for purchase of stamp papers.

Analysis: The record showed that the disputed amount booked under the legal head related to purchase of stamp papers, and supporting information had been obtained from the concerned Government department through RTI. Since the expenditure was not towards advocate's fees or legal service, it did not attract service tax under reverse charge. The characterization of the amount as legal expense in the books was not sufficient to fasten tax liability once its actual nature stood explained.

Conclusion: The demand on the amount of Rs. 9,000/- treated as legal expenses was unsustainable and was set aside; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The surviving taxable turnover fell within the threshold exemption and the reverse charge demand on stamp paper purchases was untenable; with both substantive demands failing, the related penalties also could not survive.

Issues: Whether the ex parte adjudication confirming service tax demand and penalties without reasonable opportunity to reply to the show cause notice and to be heard was sustainable.

Analysis: The order fixing final hearing during the Covid-19 restriction period was found insufficient to establish a real and effective opportunity of hearing. The appellant's earlier written explanation furnished in response to summons was also not dealt with in the adjudication order. The dispute on taxability of royalty and the applicability of the extended period involved an interpretational controversy, and those aspects required proper consideration by the adjudicating authority after hearing the appellant. In these circumstances, the adjudication was found to have contravened the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The ex parte order was unsustainable for breach of natural justice and was set aside, with the matter directed to be decided afresh after granting proper hearing; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudication order confirming tax demand and penalties cannot be sustained where reasonable opportunity to reply and to be heard is not effectively afforded, particularly when material written submissions remain unconsidered and the dispute involves arguable issues of legal interpretation.

Issues: (i) whether the material on record established that funds originating from the fraudulent medical reimbursement reached the appellant as proceeds of crime, thereby justifying confirmation of attachment; (ii) whether the plea that the attached property was purchased before the alleged crime period could defeat attachment under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002.

Issue (i): Whether the material on record established that funds originating from the fraudulent medical reimbursement reached the appellant as proceeds of crime, thereby justifying confirmation of attachment.

Analysis: The evidence showed that the reimbursed amount moved out of the salary account of the principal accused, that Rs. 36 lakh was transferred to the account of Lokesh Paliwal, and that, on the statements recorded under section 50, a substantial part of that amount was withdrawn in cash and passed on to the appellant. The Tribunal also relied on the RTGS/NEFT documentation, the cash book, and corroborative witness statements to conclude that the transactions were genuine and that the appellant had received Rs. 22 lakh in cash. At the stage of adjudication, the question was whether there was sufficient material on a preponderance of probabilities to show flow of proceeds of crime to the appellant.

Conclusion: The material was sufficient to sustain the finding that the appellant had received proceeds of crime and that the attachment was valid.

Issue (ii): Whether the plea that the attached property was purchased before the alleged crime period could defeat attachment under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that the statutory scheme permits attachment of property representing the value of proceeds of crime and that the absence of direct possession of the tainted money does not, by itself, bar attachment. It further rejected the contention that prior purchase of the property necessarily insulated it from attachment, noting that the earlier precedent relied upon by the appellant did not displace the settled position governing attachment under the Act. The attachment was treated as a protective measure to secure availability of proceeds of crime pending trial.

Conclusion: The plea based on prior acquisition of the property was rejected and did not prevent confirmation of attachment.

Final Conclusion: The impugned attachment order was sustained and the appeal failed in entirety.

Ratio Decidendi: At the adjudication stage under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, attachment can be confirmed on material showing, on a preponderance of probabilities, that the property represents proceeds of crime or their value, and prior acquisition of the asset does not automatically defeat such attachment.

Issues: (i) Whether refund arising from finalisation of provisional assessment under the Customs Act, 1962 is governed by the refund provisions and is available without applying the bar of unjust enrichment; (ii) Whether the presumption of passing on the incidence of duty and the doctrine of unjust enrichment apply to a refund claim arising from provisional assessment after final assessment.

Issue (i): Whether refund arising from finalisation of provisional assessment under the Customs Act, 1962 is governed by the refund provisions and is available without applying the bar of unjust enrichment.

Analysis: The assessment was provisional and the excess amount became refundable only after finalisation of the assessment. The Court relied on the settled position that adjustment of provisional duty on final assessment stands on a distinct footing and that refund consequential to such finalisation is not to be tested as an ordinary independent refund claim in the same manner as other refund applications.

Conclusion: The refund arising from finalisation of provisional assessment was held to be admissible in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the presumption of passing on the incidence of duty and the doctrine of unjust enrichment apply to a refund claim arising from provisional assessment after final assessment.

Analysis: The Court followed the later Supreme Court pronouncement that the doctrine of unjust enrichment does not apply to provisional assessment even after finalisation of the proceedings. On the facts, the Tribunal had also recorded that the assessee could not have passed on the differential duty, and the statutory presumption was found not to arise against the assessee in the circumstances of the case.

Conclusion: The bar of unjust enrichment and the presumption of passing on duty incidence were held inapplicable, and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The questions of law were answered against the Revenue, and the assessee's entitlement to refund was upheld, resulting in dismissal of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Refund arising on finalisation of provisional assessment is governed by the special regime applicable to provisional assessment, and the doctrine of unjust enrichment does not bar such refund after final assessment.

Issues: Whether an arbitral award can survive where the respondent's pre-CIRP claims stood extinguished upon approval of a resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The claims in dispute had arisen before commencement of CIRP. Once CIRP was initiated, the statutory moratorium operated and creditors were required to lodge their claims in the insolvency process. Upon approval of the resolution plan by the adjudicating authority, claims not forming part of the plan stood extinguished by operation of law. The settled legal position is that a successful resolution applicant cannot be burdened with undecided or excluded claims, and any adjudication or award in respect of such extinguished claims cannot survive.

Conclusion: The award was liable to be set aside because the claims had ceased to survive after approval of the resolution plan.

Issues: Whether the adjudicating authority committed any error in reserving orders on the plan approval application before first deciding the appellant's interlocutory applications, in light of the earlier appellate order dated 23.04.2026.

Analysis: The earlier appellate order did not issue a mandatory direction to the adjudicating authority to decide the appellant's applications in any particular sequence. It only granted liberty to the appellant to bring that order to the notice of the adjudicating authority and request consideration and disposal of the interlocutory applications before the plan approval application was decided. The record showed that the appellant's applications had already been heard and orders reserved before the plan approval application was heard and reserved. On that basis, no infirmity was found in the adjudicating authority's course of action.

Conclusion: The adjudicating authority did not err, and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail in proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, in view of the cancellation reports in the predicate Himachal Pradesh FIRs, the absence of any identified proceeds of crime attributable to the applicant, and the period of incarceration already undergone.

Analysis: The bail request turned on whether the foundational scheduled offences were established and whether any proceeds of crime had been identified so as to attract the offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The predicate FIRs from Himachal Pradesh had either resulted in accepted cancellation reports or cancellation reports had been filed, and no independent material was shown to establish a subsisting scheduled offence against the applicant from those FIRs. The Court also noted that the complaint did not identify any asset of the applicant as proceeds of crime, and that mere allegations of unexplained cash or illegality in mineral dealings, without linkage to a scheduled offence, were insufficient to sustain continued custody under the PMLA. The applicant had remained in custody for more than 18 months, the investigation was complete, and no material was shown to indicate flight risk, tampering with evidence, or intimidation of witnesses.

Conclusion: Bail was granted in favour of the applicant.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the predicate scheduled offence is not shown to subsist and no proceeds of crime are identified against the accused, continued detention under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is not justified and bail may be granted, particularly when custody is prolonged and trial is not likely to conclude expeditiously.

Issues: Whether, for assessing the annual income of a deceased claimant under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the income-tax return of the previous year alone should be adopted or the average of the previous two or three years should be taken, and what distinction, if any, should be made between salaried and self-employed persons.

Analysis: The governing objective in compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to award just and fair compensation. Income-tax returns are an important reference point, but there is no rigid formula for every case. For salaried persons, the previous year's return is ordinarily sufficient, subject to corroboration where a promotion or similar change has occurred. For self-employed persons and those carrying on business, income may fluctuate, and the average of up to the previous three years' income shown in the returns should ordinarily be used, along with surrounding factors such as the nature of business, growth pattern, potential growth, negative income in initial years, and the effect of death on the business.

Conclusion: The annual income of a self-employed deceased person is to be assessed, as a general rule, on the average of the income reflected in the previous up to three income-tax returns, while the previous year's return ordinarily suffices for salaried persons; the claimant-appellants succeeded on this issue.

Ratio Decidendi: In motor accident compensation, income-tax returns are relevant evidence of earnings, but self-employed income should ordinarily be assessed on the average of up to the previous three returns, whereas salaried income may ordinarily be assessed on the basis of the preceding year alone.

Issues: (i) Whether interest income earned by a co-operative housing society from deposits with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) despite section 80P(4); (ii) whether disallowance of such deduction could be made while processing the return under section 143(1).

Issue (i): Whether interest income earned by a co-operative housing society from deposits with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) despite section 80P(4).

Analysis: The expression "co-operative society" in section 80P(2)(d) was held to be of wide import and to include co-operative banks for the purpose of investments made with them by another co-operative society. Section 80P(4) was held to exclude a co-operative bank only in its own assessment from claiming deduction under section 80P and not to curtail the deduction available to another co-operative society under section 80P(2)(d). The interest received from deposits with co-operative banks therefore fell within the statutory deduction.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(d) on the impugned interest income.

Issue (ii): Whether disallowance of such deduction could be made while processing the return under section 143(1).

Analysis: The claim was supported by judicial precedents and turned on interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. It was therefore not an apparent or undisputed mistake amenable to prima facie adjustment under section 143(1), and the issue was debatable beyond the limited scope of processing.

Conclusion: The adjustment made under section 143(1) was not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The disallowance was set aside and the deduction claimed by the assessee was directed to be allowed, resulting in success for the assessee on both substantive entitlement and the validity of the processing adjustment.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 80P(4) excludes a co-operative bank only from claiming deduction in its own assessment and does not deny deduction under section 80P(2)(d) to another co-operative society earning interest from investments with such bank; a debatable claim supported by precedent cannot be disallowed as a prima facie adjustment under section 143(1).

Issues: Whether the petitioners' suo motu re-credit of Cenvat credit, taken during the pendency of the revision proceedings, could be sustained and whether the consequential communication directing immediate payment and recovery was liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The dispute arose from rebate claims filed under Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 read with Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The petitioners, a 100% Export Oriented Unit, had their rebate claims rejected and thereafter pursued revision, but the revision remained pending for a long period. The Court noted that there is no specific statutory provision authorising suo motu re-credit in the Cenvat account, yet on the admitted facts the rebate entitlement itself was not disputed and the petitioners had informed the authorities before taking the credit. The Court also considered the cited precedent on technical reversal of credit and held that, in the peculiar facts of the case, the petitioners' action was justified to resolve the prolonged uncertainty and not to be treated as a precedent.

Conclusion: The suo motu credit was approved, and the impugned communication demanding payment and recovery was quashed.

Issues: Whether the cancellation of registration under section 12AA was sustainable when the assessee, a statutory development authority, was engaged in activities falling within the ambit of charitable purpose under section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The issue was concluded by the Supreme Court's ruling on the scope of section 2(15) read with section 10(23C), which recognises that statutory bodies engaged in the advancement of objects of general public utility may still qualify as charities, even if they incidentally carry on activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business. The controlling consideration is the real object and statutory framework of the body, and not the mere fact that it earns receipts or sells plots. Applying that principle, the respondent's activities were treated as charitable in character, and the cancellation of registration was not justified.

Conclusion: The cancellation of registration under section 12AA was not sustainable, and the issue was answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Issues: Whether market research expenses incurred by the assessee were capital in nature or revenue in nature.

Analysis: The expenses were incurred in the normal course of business to understand consumer behaviour, improve marketing strategy, and support business operations leading to higher sales and profits. The Tribunal also relied on the recurring nature of the expenditure, the Revenue's consistent treatment of the same expenditure as revenue in earlier assessment years, and the view expressed in Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd. The High Court found that the Tribunal had correctly appreciated the facts and applied the governing legal principles.

Conclusion: The market research expenses were revenue expenditure and not capital expenditure.

Issues: (i) Whether, in respect of a completed assessment that had not abated, additions under section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be made in the absence of incriminating material found during search; and (ii) whether an addition under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained without establishing that the assessee was the owner of the money in the foreign bank accounts.

Issue (i): Whether, in respect of a completed assessment that had not abated, additions under section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be made in the absence of incriminating material found during search.

Analysis: The assessment year in question had attained finality before the search, as no scrutiny notice had been issued and the assessment had not abated. The additions were founded only on the Base Note, which was already available with the Revenue and was not shown to be material unearthed in the search. The governing principle applied was that for completed or unabated assessments, jurisdiction under section 153A is confined to additions based on incriminating material found during search, and other material cannot be used to disturb such final assessments.

Conclusion: The additions made under section 153A were unsustainable and the assessee succeeded on this issue.

Issue (ii): Whether an addition under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained without establishing that the assessee was the owner of the money in the foreign bank accounts.

Analysis: Section 69A requires the Revenue first to show that the assessee is the owner of the money or other valuable article and that the asset is unexplained. The bank accounts stood in the names of foreign entities, and the evidence on record, including bank confirmation and contemporaneous statements, did not establish ownership or control by the assessee. The burden to link the assessee to the asset was not discharged.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69A could not be sustained and the assessee succeeded on this issue.

Final Conclusion: The appeals raised no substantial question of law, the Tribunal's deletion of the additions was upheld, and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Ratio Decidendi: In a completed and unabated search assessment, additions under section 153A can be made only on the basis of incriminating material found during search, and an addition under section 69A cannot stand unless the Revenue first establishes the assessee's ownership of the alleged money or asset.

Issues: (i) Whether reassessment proceedings initiated under section 148A(b) and section 148 were valid when the material relied upon was not furnished to the assessee; (ii) whether information from the risk management system and investigation wing could sustain reopening without independent verification and corroboration; (iii) whether additions under section 69A and section 69C based on third-party documents and statements could be sustained in the absence of cross-examination and supporting evidence; and (iv) whether the reassessment notices for the relevant assessment years were barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether reassessment proceedings initiated under section 148A(b) and section 148 were valid when the material relied upon was not furnished to the assessee.

Analysis: The notice under section 148A(b) was issued without supplying the information, reports, rukkas, and other material relied upon. The assessee had specifically sought the underlying material, but the request was not addressed. The reassessment machinery under sections 148A and 148 requires that the assessee be put to notice on the basis of the information actually relied upon, so that an effective reply can be filed.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were held invalid on this ground and the finding of the first appellate authority was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether information from the risk management system and investigation wing could sustain reopening without independent verification and corroboration.

Analysis: The deeming of flagged information as "information" for reopening does not dispense with the Assessing Officer's obligation to verify it, seek independent corroboration, and pass a reasoned order after considering objections. Mere portal-based or investigation-wing inputs, without live nexus or verification, were held insufficient to justify reopening.

Conclusion: Reopening based only on such unverified information was held unsustainable.

Issue (iii): Whether additions under section 69A and section 69C based on third-party documents and statements could be sustained in the absence of cross-examination and supporting evidence.

Analysis: The materials relied upon were third-party papers, loose sheets, statements, and alleged rukkas from the search of finance brokers. The assessee was not shown to be named in those statements as lender or borrower, no meaningful corroboration was brought on record, and cross-examination of the relied-upon persons was not allowed. Such third-party material, without corroboration, was treated as insufficient for making additions, and the presumption under section 292C was held inapplicable against a third party searched elsewhere.

Conclusion: The additions under sections 69A and 69C were rightly deleted.

Issue (iv): Whether the reassessment notices for the relevant assessment years were barred by limitation.

Analysis: For one assessment year, the notice under section 148 was issued after expiry of the applicable six-year period under section 149(1)(b). For the other, the notice was beyond the three-year period under section 149(1)(a), and the conditions for invoking the extended limitation were not satisfied. The view that limitation could run from the date of the last section 148A(b) notice was rejected.

Conclusion: The reassessment notices and consequent assessments for the relevant years were barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeals failed in their entirety, while the assessee's rule 27 application succeeded on the limitation issue for the later years, leaving the reassessment additions and notices unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment notice under section 148A(b) is invalid unless the assessee is supplied the material relied upon, and portal or investigation-wing information must be independently verified and corroborated before it can sustain reopening or additions based on third-party documents.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment contained an incorrect factual finding that the return was filed in response to a notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 when no such notice had been issued; (ii) whether the rejection of books of account and estimation of net profit at 5% should be sustained; (iii) whether the cash deposits in specified bank notes during the demonetisation period could be added as unexplained money under section 69A after estimation of business income.

Issue (i): Whether the assessment contained an incorrect factual finding that the return was filed in response to a notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 when no such notice had been issued.

Analysis: The assessment records showed an incorrect observation that the assessee had not filed the return of income and had filed it only in response to a notice under section 148, although the case was a scrutiny assessment and no such notice had been issued. The finding was held to be prima facie incorrect.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the rejection of books of account and estimation of net profit at 5% should be sustained.

Analysis: The books were rejected for want of supporting details and documents. However, the rate of 5% applied by the first appellate authority was found to be without any comparative basis or adequate justification. Having regard to the past declared results and the nature of business, the net profit rate was considered capable of being reduced to a reasonable level.

Conclusion: The issue was partly decided in favour of the assessee by reducing the net profit rate to 2.5%.

Issue (iii): Whether the cash deposits in specified bank notes during the demonetisation period could be added as unexplained money under section 69A after estimation of business income.

Analysis: Once the turnover was accepted as business turnover, the cash deposits could not again be segregated from the same turnover and brought to tax as unexplained money merely because they were deposited during the demonetisation period. The same amount could not be subjected to dual treatment in the manner adopted below.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69A was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on the incorrect factual finding and on the addition under section 69A, and the net profit estimation was further reduced, resulting in a part allowance of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Where business turnover is accepted, cash deposits forming part of that turnover cannot be separately taxed as unexplained money under section 69A, and an estimated profit rate must rest on a rational basis supported by the record and past results.

Issues: Whether the addition relating to cash deposits could be sustained when the Revenue authorities invoked an incorrect charging provision and acted without proper application of mind.

Analysis: The assessment and the first appellate order proceeded on the footing that the cash deposits were to be taxed under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, although the factual enquiry related to the source and nature of cash deposits. The Tribunal found that the Department had not demonstrated how the ingredients of the invoked provision applied to the assessee's case and that the impugned order suffered from non-application of mind. Following its earlier co-ordinate Bench decisions and the principle of consistency, it held that an assessment framed on a wrong and misplaced charging provision, without coherent reasoning, is arbitrary and unsustainable in law.

Conclusion: The addition and the appellate order were held to be bad in law and were quashed.

Issues: Whether the appellants were entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 97/2004-Cus. for import of second-hand textile machinery under the EPCG Scheme, and whether the duty demand, confiscation and penalty could be sustained.

Analysis: The imported machinery was cleared under the EPCG authorisation issued by the DGFT, and the notification did not prescribe any restriction based on the year of manufacture of the second-hand machinery. The record also did not contain concrete evidence to establish that the machinery was beyond the permissible vintage. The export obligation under the EPCG scheme stood fulfilled and the licence was redeemed by the DGFT. In these circumstances, the foundation for the confirmed duty demand failed, and the consequential confiscation and penalty could not survive.

Conclusion: The appellants were entitled to the exemption benefit, and the demand, confiscation and penalty were set aside in favour of the appellants.

Issues: (i) Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is maintainable where the cheque is alleged to have been issued in the name of a company after the company had already been dissolved. (ii) Whether the Director could be proceeded against under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in the absence of a specific averment that he was in charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company at the relevant time.

Issue (i): Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is maintainable where the cheque is alleged to have been issued in the name of a company after the company had already been dissolved.

Analysis: The company had been struck off and declared dissolved long before the cheque was issued. A cheque issued in the name of a non-existent company cannot be treated as a legally enforceable instrument. Once dissolution occurs, the company loses its juristic existence, and no valid offence under Section 138 can be founded on such a cheque.

Conclusion: The complaint under Section 138 is not maintainable on this footing.

Issue (ii): Whether the Director could be proceeded against under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in the absence of a specific averment that he was in charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company at the relevant time.

Analysis: Vicarious liability under Section 141 depends on the company being the drawer and on requisite pleadings showing that the accused Director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business. The complaint contained no such foundational averment. In any event, where the cheque itself is issued after dissolution of the company, the Director cannot be fastened with liability for a cheque issued by a legally non-existent entity.

Conclusion: The Director cannot be proceeded against on the pleaded facts.

Final Conclusion: The proceedings were quashed because the alleged cheque was issued after dissolution of the company and the complaint lacked the necessary basis to sustain vicarious liability against the Director.

Ratio Decidendi: A cheque allegedly issued on behalf of a company after its dissolution is void ab initio and cannot sustain proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; vicarious liability under Section 141 arises only where the complaint properly pleads the accused's role in the company's business at the relevant time.

Issues: Whether the writ petition should be entertained after the discrepancy in the GST summary order was rectified, and whether the petitioner should be permitted to pursue the appellate remedy against the order-in-original.

Analysis: The discrepancy between the order-in-original and Form GST DRC-07 was rectified during the pendency of the writ petition. The Court also noted that the order-in-original imposed tax, interest and penalty under Sections 74 and 122 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. In these circumstances, the Court considered it appropriate to leave the petitioner to work out the statutory appellate remedy, subject to filing an appeal with an application for condonation of delay and the required pre-deposit.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of by granting liberty to file an appeal with delay condonation and statutory pre-deposit, and no opinion was expressed on the merits.