Issues: Whether the revisionary order under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, disallowing the assessee's claim under section 80JJAA and directing a fresh assessment, was sustainable when the assessment record showed enquiries on the claim and the assessee had furnished supporting details during scrutiny.

Analysis: The assessment record showed that the Assessing Officer had issued a notice under section 142(1) calling for employee-wise details, documentary evidence, and justification for the deduction under section 80JJAA. The assessee furnished the required particulars, employee lists, pay slips, computation details, and Form 10DA, and explained the basis of the claim. The revisionary authority, however, proceeded on the premise that no relevant material had been furnished and that the deduction was not allowable because of business reorganisation. The record did not support a case of absence of enquiry. Once the Assessing Officer had called for information and examined the claim, the mere fact that the assessment order did not contain an elaborate discussion did not render it erroneous. The revisionary authority also did not identify any specific enquiry that remained unmade by the Assessing Officer.

Conclusion: The order under section 263 was not sustainable and the assessee's claim could not be disturbed on the ground of lack of enquiry.

Final Conclusion: The revisionary interference was unwarranted because the assessment was founded on enquiry and verification, and the Commissioner could not invoke section 263 merely to remand the matter for a second look.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessment record evidences enquiry into a claim, section 263 cannot be invoked merely because the assessment order is brief or does not discuss the issue in detail; the revisional authority must identify a specific lack of enquiry or error causing prejudice to the Revenue.

Issues: Whether a complaint filed by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office under the Companies Act, 2013 requires a pre-cognizance hearing under the first proviso to Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 before the Special Court takes cognizance.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of the Companies Act, 2013 was held to provide a distinct and self-contained procedure for investigation, filing of complaint, cognizance and framing of charge in prosecutions initiated by the SFIO. Section 212(15) was construed as creating a legal fiction that the SFIO investigation report is to be treated as a police report for the purposes contemplated by the Act, and Section 436(1)(d) was read as enabling the Special Court to take cognizance on the complaint or police report without any additional pre-cognizance hearing. The Court held that Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 applies to complaint cases before a Magistrate and cannot be imported into SFIO prosecutions before the Special Court in view of the special procedure under the Companies Act, 2013. The judgment also held that the special statute prevails over the general procedural law to the extent of any inconsistency and that the distinction urged between private complaints and SFIO prosecutions justified exclusion of the claimed pre-cognizance safeguard.

Conclusion: The petitioner had no right to a pre-cognizance hearing in the SFIO prosecution, and the challenge to the order refusing such hearing failed.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution under the Companies Act, 2013 was held to proceed under the special statutory mechanism without application of the pre-cognizance notice requirement, and the impugned order was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribes a complete procedural scheme and deems the SFIO investigation report to be a police report, the general pre-cognizance hearing provision applicable to complaint cases under the BNSS does not apply before the Special Court.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand under the category of Real Estate Agent Services was sustainable; (ii) whether differential service tax could be demanded under Works Contract Services by rejecting valuation under Rule 2A(i) and applying Rule 2A(ii); (iii) whether the GTA demand and consequential penalties could be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the demand under the category of Real Estate Agent Services was sustainable.

Analysis: The taxable entry required rendering of service by a real estate agent or consultant. The transactions on record showed purchase, development and sale of land undertaken on behalf of the firm because agricultural lands had to be acquired in another person's name under the applicable land law. The documents indicated that the lands were held in trust for the firm and that there was no agency service, commission, or other service element of the kind contemplated by the definition.

Conclusion: The demand under Real Estate Agent Services was not sustainable and was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether differential service tax could be demanded under Works Contract Services by rejecting valuation under Rule 2A(i) and applying Rule 2A(ii).

Analysis: Rule 2A(i) provides for determination of the service portion by deducting the value of property in goods transferred in execution of the works contract, and Rule 2A(ii) applies only when valuation cannot be determined under clause (i). The record showed that VAT had been paid on the value of goods, and the assessee had separately accounted the service portion. The demand was built by selectively picking invoices and applying a notional percentage without rejecting the valuation method under clause (i) on any supported basis.

Conclusion: The differential demand under Works Contract Services was not justified and was set aside.

Issue (iii): Whether the GTA demand and consequential penalties could be sustained.

Analysis: The GTA amount had already been paid at the time of audit and the issue was not contested. In view of the result on the substantive demands, the penalties were also not sustained.

Conclusion: The GTA demand was confirmed only to the extent of the admitted amount, and the penalties were set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were substantially allowed in favour of the assessee, with only the admitted GTA liability surviving and all other contested tax and penalty demands being set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A direct sale and purchase transaction without an agency, consultancy, or commission element is not taxable as real estate agent service, and valuation of works contract service must first be made under the actual-deduction method where the value of goods transferred is identifiable and supported by records.

Issues: Whether the review application disclosed any ground warranting review of the earlier judgment.

Analysis: The review petition was founded on alleged misinterpretation of prior judgments and omission to deal with certain prayers, pleadings and contentions. On a bare perusal of the review papers, the Court found that none of the recognised grounds for review were established, namely error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new material, or patent illegality.

Conclusion: The review application was not entertained and was dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether the proceedings instituted by the Central GST authorities against the petitioner in Crime No. 34 of 2025 arising out of PCR No. 280 of 2025 deserved to be quashed on the ground of parallel proceedings; (ii) Whether the petitioner's arrest was illegal so as to invalidate the proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the proceedings instituted by the Central GST authorities against the petitioner in Crime No. 34 of 2025 arising out of PCR No. 280 of 2025 deserved to be quashed on the ground of parallel proceedings?

Analysis: The bar against parallel action under section 6(2)(b) is attracted only when the authorities proceed on the same subject-matter, meaning an identical liability or alleged offence sought to be assessed or recovered. Mere overlap of facts or ongoing inquiry does not by itself prohibit a different authority from continuing intelligence-based enforcement. Where one authority is already investigating and another authority later comes across overlapping material, the authorities must decide inter se which will proceed, and the investigation may be transferred accordingly. On the facts, the State GST inquiry had been transferred to the Central GST authorities, and the challenge to the latter proceedings on the footing of impermissible parallel proceedings could not succeed.

Conclusion: The proceedings were not liable to be quashed on the ground of parallel proceedings, and this issue was decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner's arrest was illegal so as to invalidate the proceedings?

Analysis: Arrest under section 69(1) requires reasons to believe based on material showing commission of a cognizable and non-bailable offence under section 132(1)(c) read with section 132(5). The governing GST instructions and the Supreme Court's guidance require that the grounds of arrest be explained in writing and acknowledged, and that arrest not be routine but founded on credible material, necessity for investigation, and risk of tampering with evidence or evasion. The arrest memo and grounds of arrest were furnished and acknowledged, and the material recorded non-cooperation, obstruction, attempted destruction of evidence, and the need for custodial interrogation in a large fake ITC investigation. The arrest was therefore held to be in conformity with law.

Conclusion: The petitioner's arrest was not illegal, and this issue was decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the proceedings and arrest failed on both grounds, and no basis was made out for interference with the criminal case or the consequential action taken by the authorities.

Ratio Decidendi: The statutory bar on parallel GST proceedings applies only to the same subject-matter, and arrest under the CGST Act is valid when supported by recorded reasons to believe based on material showing a cognizable non-bailable offence and the necessity of arrest for investigation, prevention of tampering, or securing the inquiry.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the final anti-dumping findings and the consequential notification was maintainable in view of the statutory appeal under Section 9C of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, and whether the case attracted the exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy on account of alleged violation of natural justice, statutory procedure, or lack of jurisdiction.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Section 9C provides an appellate remedy before the Tribunal against orders concerning dumping, injury and the resulting determination. The Court noted that the availability of that remedy does not by itself curtail writ jurisdiction, but interference under Article 226 is reserved for exceptional situations such as gross violation of natural justice, breach of mandatory statutory provisions, or absence of jurisdiction. On the facts, the disclosure statement and the final findings showed that interested parties were given opportunity of hearing, non-confidential material was shared as required, and the authority dealt with the relevant submissions while determining normal value, export price, dumping margin and injury margin. The Court held that disputes about the methodology, valuation, computation of landed value, non-injurious price, injury margin and the lesser duty assessment fall within the Tribunal's domain and cannot be reappraised in writ proceedings. The pendency of a challenge before the Tribunal by another interested party was also treated as a further reason not to exercise writ interference.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained and the petitioner was relegated to the statutory appellate remedy before the Tribunal; no exceptional ground for writ interference was made out.

Outcome: The matter was referred for constitution of a Larger Bench to resolve the conflict on whether DEPB scrips obtained by fraud or forgery can be enforced against a transferee for duty, penalty, interest, confiscation and the allied limitation issues.

Issues: Whether royalty paid under the Technical License Contract Agreement for use of technical documentation and know-how was liable to service tax as intellectual property right service under Section 65(55a) and Section 65(55b) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The agreement granted a non-exclusive and non-transferable right to use technical documentation and know-how for manufacturing, assembling, procuring components, developing improvements and distributing the licensed products. The payment was therefore for technical know-how and documentation, not for any trademark, design, patent or other intellectual property right covered by Indian law. The Board's clarification also stated that only intellectual property rights recognized under Indian law for the time being in force were taxable, and that intangible rights not so covered would not fall within the taxable service. On the record, no material showed that the royalty was paid for a taxable intellectual property right.

Conclusion: The royalty payments did not constitute taxable intellectual property right service and the service tax demand was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the demand, along with consequential liability, was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Royalty paid for mere technical know-how and documentation, without transfer or licensing of an intellectual property right recognized under Indian law, does not attract service tax as intellectual property right service.

Issues: Whether the imported aluminium panels, classified under Chapter Heading 7610, could be treated as moulds/capital goods for availing Cenvat credit.

Analysis: The imported goods were assessed at the time of import as aluminium panels under Chapter Heading 7610, while moulds fall under Chapter Heading 8480. The relevant enquiry was the character of the goods as imported, not the form they assumed after assembly at the respondent's premises. The panels acquired the shape of a mould only after being assembled on site, and the tariff entry for Chapter Heading 7610 is an eo nomine entry that does not permit the credit claim to be sustained on the basis of subsequent functional use. Since the goods imported were not moulds at the point of import and were not covered by the capital goods definition as claimed, the credit was inadmissible.

Conclusion: The denial of Cenvat credit on the imported aluminium panels is upheld and the Revenue succeeds on the merits.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order granting credit was set aside on the merits, while the limitation question was sent back for decision by the original authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Classification for customs and allied credit purposes must be determined on the basis of the condition and essential character of the goods at the time of import, and not by the importer's subsequent use or assembly of the goods into a different functional form.

Issues: (i) whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was filed within the permissible period in the circumstances of non-supply of the order-in-original; (ii) whether a service tax demand based solely on Form 26AS entries, without corroborative verification, could be sustained and whether the extended period under section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 was invokable.

Issue (i): Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was filed within the permissible period in the circumstances of non-supply of the order-in-original.

Analysis: The record showed repeated efforts by the appellant to obtain a copy of the order-in-original, including correspondence with the department, recourse to the High Court, and an RTI application. The appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was filed shortly after receipt of the order through the RTI response. On these facts, the delay was treated as not attributable to the appellant.

Conclusion: The appeal was held to have been filed within the permissible period, and the dismissal on limitation was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether a service tax demand based solely on Form 26AS entries, without corroborative verification, could be sustained and whether the extended period under section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 was invokable.

Analysis: The demand rested entirely on Form 26AS data for the relevant years, while no independent enquiry or corroborative material was brought on record to establish taxable services in the manner assumed by the department. The entries under sections 194C and 194IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were examined, and the Tribunal found that the department had not substantiated the alleged liability with proper verification. In such circumstances, the invocation of the extended period was also found unsustainable.

Conclusion: The confirmed demand was set aside and the extended period was held not invokable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the impugned order was set aside, and the service tax demand did not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: A service tax demand cannot be sustained merely on the basis of Form 26AS data without corroborative evidence establishing taxable receipt, and where the assessee shows bona fide efforts to obtain the order-in-original, limitation cannot be applied mechanically to defeat the appeal.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant's construction contracts were covered by the exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-Service Tax dated 20.06.2012 on the footing that the contract had been entered into before the relevant cutoff date; (ii) Whether the demand was barred by limitation in the absence of suppression or wilful intent to evade tax.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant's construction contracts were covered by the exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-Service Tax dated 20.06.2012 on the footing that the contract had been entered into before the relevant cutoff date.

Analysis: The tender papers showed that the quotation was submitted on 09.02.2015 and the final contract award followed after evaluation of bids. The Tribunal accepted the chronology placed on record and held that, for the purpose of the exemption entry, the contract had to be treated as one entered into prior to 01.03.2015. The Department did not produce material to dislodge the appellant's version, and the denial of exemption based only on the formal award date was held to be too narrow.

Conclusion: The exemption applied, and the confirmed demand failed on merits.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand was barred by limitation in the absence of suppression or wilful intent to evade tax.

Analysis: The record showed that the appellant had consistently communicated its claim to exemption to the department and had not shown any collection of service tax from the recipient. On those facts, the Tribunal found a bona fide belief that tax was not payable and no material indicating deliberate suppression or intent to evade. In such circumstances, the extended period could not be invoked.

Conclusion: The demand was time-barred and the extended period was not available to the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on both exemption and limitation, with the demand and penalty set aside and consequential relief left to follow in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the contemporaneous record supports a bona fide belief that the activity is exempt and the Department fails to prove deliberate suppression or evasion, the exemption cannot be denied on a narrow reading of the cutoff condition and the extended period of limitation is unavailable.

Issues: (i) Whether royalty payable under the technology assistance agreement was includible in the transaction value of the imported raw materials; (ii) whether invocation of the extended period for demanding differential duty was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether royalty payable under the technology assistance agreement was includible in the transaction value of the imported raw materials.

Analysis: The agreement did not show that royalty was payable as a condition for the import or sale of the raw materials. The royalty was linked to manufacture and sale of finished goods, and no evidence established a direct nexus between the royalty payment and the imported raw materials. The earlier orders had also accepted the declared value and held royalty to be outside the assessable value.

Conclusion: The royalty was not includible in the transaction value of the imported raw materials.

Issue (ii): Whether invocation of the extended period for demanding differential duty was sustainable.

Analysis: The department had full knowledge of the arrangement and the relevant documents were consistently furnished over the years. The same issue had already been examined in earlier proceedings, and no new facts or change in law were shown to justify reopening the matter after such a long lapse of time. On the material available, suppression of facts was not established.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demand could not be sustained, and the appeal succeeded with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Royalty is includible in the value of imported goods only where it is shown to be payable as a condition of sale or import and is directly linked to the imported goods; in the absence of such nexus, and where the department had prior knowledge of the relevant facts, an extended-period demand cannot be maintained.

Issues: (i) whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand relating to rent received on sub-lease of premises; (ii) whether service tax was payable on electricity charges recovered from lessees as reimbursement; (iii) whether denial of CENVAT credit on services covered by the show cause notice was barred by limitation; and (iv) whether denial of CENVAT credit on the services covered by the statement of demand was sustainable.

Issue (i): whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand relating to rent received on sub-lease of premises.

Analysis: The arrangement of sub-lease was held to be materially different from a subcontracting situation, and a mere back-to-back recovery without mark-up did not by itself make the dispute one of unresolved interpretation. The record did not establish a demonstrable ambiguity in the levy so as to justify invocation of the extended period. The normal distinction between the legal character of lease/sub-lease and the facts pleaded by the assessee was sufficient to reject the plea of interpretational doubt for time-bar purposes.

Conclusion: The demand on rent from sub-lease was set aside to the extent it rested on the extended period, and the assessee succeeded on limitation for this issue.

Issue (ii): whether service tax was payable on electricity charges recovered from lessees as reimbursement.

Analysis: Electricity was treated as goods and not as consideration for a taxable service in the context of mere recovery of actual consumption charges. The amounts collected towards electricity were found to be reimbursements of actual outgo and not a taxable component of the renting service. No sustainable basis was found to treat such collections as service consideration.

Conclusion: The demand on electricity reimbursements was held unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): whether denial of CENVAT credit on services covered by the show cause notice was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The extended period under the proviso to section 73 was held to be unavailable because the department failed to establish deliberate suppression with intent to evade tax. Mere non-disclosure in returns or audit-based detection, without a positive act of wilful suppression, was insufficient. The demand for the relevant period was also found to be time-barred on the normal limitation period.

Conclusion: The denial of CENVAT credit covered by the show cause notice was set aside as time-barred and the assessee succeeded on this issue.

Issue (iv): whether denial of CENVAT credit on the services covered by the statement of demand was sustainable.

Analysis: For the services covered by the statement of demand, the Tribunal held that the credit eligibility question was to be tested on the nexus between the input service and the output service, and the first appellate authority had correctly disallowed only the services found to be in the nature of welfare or personal use and allowed the balance. The challenge based on vagueness of the notice was not accepted in the absence of demonstrated prejudice.

Conclusion: The denial of CENVAT credit for the specified services under the statement of demand was upheld, and this issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee obtained relief on the rent, electricity reimbursement, and time-barred credit demands, but the restricted disallowance of CENVAT credit under the statement of demand was sustained, with all penalties set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: An extended period of limitation cannot be invoked absent proven wilful suppression or a genuine unresolved legal ambiguity, and reimbursement of actual electricity charges is not taxable merely because it is recovered by a service provider; CENVAT credit remains admissible only where the input service bears the requisite nexus with the output service and is not excluded as welfare or personal expenditure.

Issues: (i) Whether a penalty show-cause notice that does not specify whether the charge is concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars is valid; (ii) Whether dismissal of a special leave petition against a decision on a similar defective-notice issue displaces the applicable jurisdictional precedent.

Issue (i): Whether a penalty show-cause notice that does not specify whether the charge is concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars is valid.

Analysis: Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 contemplates distinct defaults of concealment of particulars of income and furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The notice issued under Section 274 retained both charges without striking out the inapplicable limb. It consequently failed to convey the precise allegation that required a response, rendering the notice vague and indicative of non-application of mind.

Conclusion: The penalty notice was invalid, and the consequential penalty proceedings and penalty were void. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether dismissal of a special leave petition against a decision on a similar defective-notice issue displaces the applicable jurisdictional precedent.

Analysis: A refusal of special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India does not result in merger of the challenged decision with the Supreme Court order and does not amount to a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The decision relied upon by the Revenue was also distinguishable because the assessee there understood both charges and raised the notice defect only at a later stage.

Conclusion: The dismissal of the special leave petition did not displace the jurisdictional rule governing defective penalty notices. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The requirement that a penalty notice identify the precise statutory charge governed the matter and deprived the impugned penalty of a valid legal foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice initiating penalty under Section 271(1)(c) must unambiguously specify the applicable charge; a notice retaining both distinct limbs without identification of the charge vitiates the penalty proceedings.

Issues: Whether interest expenditure on borrowings was allowable where the land acquired by the assessee was used as a business storage yard and sufficient interest-free funds were available.

Analysis: Section 36(1)(iii) permits deduction of interest on capital borrowed and used for business purposes. The documentary material, including transport records, established that the industrial land was used for storing trading inventory. The business of trading in bulky iron and steel goods reasonably required an open storage yard. Further, the assessee's capital and interest-free loans exceeded the investment, supporting the presumption that the land was financed from interest-free funds. No defect in, or adverse verification of, the supporting documents was shown.

Conclusion: The interest disallowance under Section 36(1)(iii) was not sustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether, for completed or unabated assessments, additions under Section 153A may be made on material unconnected with incriminating material found during the search.

Analysis: Section 153A provides a search-linked assessment mechanism. Pending assessments abate, whereas a completed or unabated assessment may be disturbed only to the extent supported by incriminating material unearthed in the search. The existence of incriminating material does not permit reassessment of unrelated matters using non-incriminating material already available to the Assessing Officer. The reassessment mechanism under Sections 147 and 148 remains available, subject to its statutory conditions, where no incriminating material supports the proposed addition.

Conclusion: Additions for unexplained cash credits and related interest expenditure founded on non-incriminating material are impermissible under Section 153A in respect of completed or unabated assessments.

Ratio Decidendi: In a completed or unabated assessment, the jurisdiction under Section 153A extends only to additions having a nexus with incriminating material found during the search and cannot be used to reassess unrelated material.

Issues: Whether the enhanced 60% tax rate under the amended Section 115BBE was applicable to income relating to the assessment year 2017-18.

Analysis: The amendment enhancing the rate under Section 115BBE took effect from 01.04.2017 and applied to transactions undertaken from that date, rather than transactions in the preceding financial year relevant to assessment year 2017-18. In the absence of a jurisdictional High Court ruling and amid conflicting non-jurisdictional views, the beneficial interpretation of the taxing provision was adopted in favour of the assessee.

Conclusion: The enhanced 60% rate was inapplicable. Tax liability was required to be computed at the pre-amendment rate of 30%.

Issues: (i) Whether the entirety of unaccounted on-money receipts from flat sales is taxable, or only the embedded profit; (ii) Whether the entirety of non-genuine purchase invoices may be disallowed, or only the embedded profit; (iii) Whether seized electronic records and search statements were admissible and reliable despite the assessee's retraction and evidentiary objections.

Issue (i): Whether the entirety of unaccounted on-money receipts from flat sales is taxable, or only the embedded profit.

Analysis: Unaccounted sale receipts in a real-estate business represent gross collections and not, by themselves, taxable income. In the absence of material showing that the corresponding cost or investment was also undisclosed, income had to be confined to the profit component. The earlier determination arising from the same search had accepted the assessee's offer of 20% of the receipts as a fair estimate, and no new material was produced to justify a higher estimate.

Conclusion: Only the profit embedded in the unaccounted sale receipts was taxable; the 20% income already offered was adequate and no further addition was warranted. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the entirety of non-genuine purchase invoices may be disallowed, or only the embedded profit.

Analysis: Although the invoices were not fully supported and were treated as accommodation bills, the supplier was an actual steel supplier and the corresponding consumption, construction activity, sales and overall book results were not rejected. The circumstances supported a finding that materials had been procured from the grey market while invoices were obtained from another supplier. A full disallowance would consequently produce distorted profits; only the saving or profit embedded in the impugned purchases could be estimated.

Conclusion: The full value of the impugned purchases could not be disallowed; only the embedded profit was assessable, and the estimate already adopted was fair. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether seized electronic records and search statements were admissible and reliable despite the assessee's retraction and evidentiary objections.

Analysis: The electronic material had been seized after compliance with the certification requirement under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The project-wise electronic data and communications were corroborated by statements recorded during search under Section 132(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The employees had not retracted their statements, and the managing director's delayed retraction was unsupported by cogent evidence disproving the admitted facts.

Conclusion: The seized electronic records and corroborating search statements were admissible and reliable; the unsupported retraction did not displace their evidentiary value. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Taxability of the undisclosed receipts and impugned purchases was restricted to their respective estimated profit components, while the evidentiary challenge to the search material failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where undisclosed business receipts or non-genuine invoices arise in an ongoing business and the corresponding sales or consumption are accepted, assessment must be confined to the profit embedded therein rather than the gross receipt or purchase value.

Issues: Whether delayed furnishing of Form No. 68 defeats the assessee's claim for immunity from penalty under Section 270AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The substantive conditions for immunity were found to have been satisfied: the assessed tax and interest were paid and no appeal had been filed against the quantum assessment. Although Form No. 68 was filed belatedly, the tax payment substantially within the relevant period demonstrated an intention to claim immunity. The delay in filing the prescribed form was a technical and venial procedural lapse which could not override the substantive right to immunity. The impugned order did not disclose why the assessee was ineligible for immunity or identify any condition under Section 270AA that remained unfulfilled.

Conclusion: Delayed filing of Form No. 68 does not, by itself, bar immunity under Section 270AA where the substantive conditions are fulfilled; the application for immunity must be reconsidered by the Assessing Officer after hearing the assessee.

Issues: Whether long-term capital gains could be assessed for the relevant assessment year on execution of a joint development agreement and permission to the developer to undertake construction.

Analysis: The registered joint development agreement pertained to the financial year 2012-13, whereas the impugned addition was made for assessment year 2014-15. The agreement conferred authority upon the developer to construct the building and obtain approvals, while the assessee was to receive her share after construction. The arrangement did not amount to a transfer under Section 2(47)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Mere execution of the agreement and construction-related access did not create taxable capital gains in the impugned year.

Conclusion: No long-term capital gain arose to the assessee in the impugned assessment year; the capital-gains addition was deleted.