Issues: Whether excise duty paid during the disputed period was to be treated as having been paid under protest, thereby excluding the limitation applicable to the refund claim.

Analysis: Although the appellant could not produce protest letters, RT-12 returns or challans for the disputed period, the record showed that protest letters for the periods immediately before and after it had been accepted. The appellant had consistently contested its liability to duty on the ground that its activities did not amount to manufacture, and that position had attained finality. In the peculiar circumstances, including the age of the records and the continuous dispute over liability, the duty payment during the intervening period was properly regarded as payment under protest under Rule 233B.

Conclusion: The duty paid during the disputed period is deemed to have been paid under protest; the refund claim is not barred by limitation and the appellant is entitled to refund.

Issues: (i) Whether the contractual price for batteries supplied under a buyback arrangement could be accepted as the assessable value despite being below the cost of manufacture; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand; (iii) Whether penalties under Section 11AC and Rule 15 of the CENVAT Credit Rules were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the contractual price for batteries supplied under a buyback arrangement could be accepted as the assessable value despite being below the cost of manufacture.

Analysis: The batteries were supplied to manufacturers who were contractually required to produce torches to prescribed specifications, co-pack the batteries with those torches, and sell the finished products back exclusively to the appellant. Identical batteries transferred to the appellant's own unit were valued under the cost-based CAS-4 method at substantially higher values. The contractual prices to the torch manufacturers were below the cost of manufacture and could not represent an arm's length price or a price for which price was the sole consideration.

Conclusion: The contractual prices were not acceptable as assessable values; valuation based on the cost of manufacture was sustained. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand.

Analysis: The appellant was registered, filed prescribed returns, and the agreements and relevant facts were on record and known to the Revenue. The material did not support suppression or other grounds required to invoke the extended period. The later demands were, however, issued within the normal limitation period.

Conclusion: The demand raised by invoking the extended period was time-barred, while demands within the normal period, with applicable interest, were sustained. This issue was decided partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties under Section 11AC and Rule 15 of the CENVAT Credit Rules were sustainable.

Analysis: As the extended period was not invocable, the basis for penalty under Section 11AC did not survive. Further, Rule 15 of the CENVAT Credit Rules concerns wrongful availment or utilisation of CENVAT credit, was not invoked in the notices, and was inapplicable to an allegation of undervaluation.

Conclusion: The penalties imposed under Section 11AC read with Rule 15 of the CENVAT Credit Rules were set aside. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The time-barred demand and all penalties were eliminated, while the duty demands falling within the normal limitation period and consequential interest remained enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: A transaction price continuously below manufacturing cost under a buyback arrangement cannot be accepted as assessable value where it is not an arm's length price and price is not the sole consideration; extended limitation requires legally sustainable grounds of suppression or equivalent default.

Issues: (i) Whether delayed deposit of Foreign Travel Tax before issuance of a show-cause notice constitutes failure to pay tax attracting penalty under Section 38(3) of the Finance Act, 1979, and whether penalty is automatic; (ii) Whether penalty could be substantially enhanced upon de novo adjudication following the assessee's appeal.

Issue (i): Whether delayed deposit of Foreign Travel Tax before issuance of a show-cause notice constitutes failure to pay tax attracting penalty under Section 38(3) of the Finance Act, 1979, and whether penalty is automatic.

Analysis: Section 38(3) applies where a carrier fails to pay, namely does not pay, Foreign Travel Tax to the credit of the Central Government. In a fiscal provision, the expression cannot be expanded to equate delayed payment with non-payment. Payment made before issuance of a show-cause notice is delayed payment, whereas payment after such notice remains non-payment. Delayed deposit and delayed filing of returns fall within Section 38(4), read with Rules 4 and 9 of the Foreign Travel Tax Rules, 1979. The Collector of Customs may condone delay upon sufficient cause under those Rules.

Analysis: The show-cause, representation and hearing process under Rule 12 preserves adjudicatory discretion. The presence of the word "shall" and a prescribed minimum quantum do not make levy of penalty automatic; the authority may decline penalty where the explanation and circumstances show that it is unwarranted. The brief delays caused despite timely procurement of demand drafts, and the explained longer delay, did not justify penalty.

Conclusion: Delayed payment did not attract Section 38(3), and penalty was not imposable on the assessee on the facts of the case. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty could be substantially enhanced upon de novo adjudication following the assessee's appeal.

Analysis: The principle of no reformatio in peius forms part of fair procedure, natural justice and equity. Resort to an appellate remedy cannot aggravate the appellant's position. Enhancement of the penalty from the originally imposed amount to a substantially higher amount on remand, solely after the assessee invoked the appellate process, impermissibly placed the assessee in a worse position.

Conclusion: The enhanced penalty could not be sustained because the assessee could not be made worse off for having pursued its appeal. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The penalty for the six instances of delayed Foreign Travel Tax deposit was invalid; the penalty orders and consequential demands were nullified, with refund of amounts paid towards penalty and discharge of the bank guarantee.

Ratio Decidendi: In a fiscal penalty provision, delayed payment made before issuance of a show-cause notice cannot be equated with failure to pay, and a statutory adjudicatory process requiring notice and hearing preserves discretion not to impose penalty notwithstanding a prescribed minimum quantum.

Issues: Whether penalty under section 271AAB could be sustained on surrendered income relating to fees for technical services where the expenditure was recorded in the regular books and no material established that the entry was false.

Analysis: Section 271AAB applies only to income falling within the statutory definition of undisclosed income. A disclosure or surrender during search does not, by itself, establish undisclosed income. For an expense entry recorded in regular books to fall within the definition, it must be shown to be false and such falsity must have emerged because of the search. The expenditure on fees for technical services was recorded in the books and supported by bank payments, bills and tax deduction. No incriminating material, false document, forged bill, non-existent supplier, or absence of actual services was established. Mere non-verifiability of the expenditure did not prove that the recorded transaction was false.

Conclusion: The surrendered amount did not constitute undisclosed income under section 271AAB; consequently, the penalty sustained in respect of fees for technical services was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether, for computing capital gains arising from a joint development agreement, the full value of consideration could be determined with reference to the developer's construction cost incurred over subsequent years rather than the fair market value of the property on the date of transfer.

Analysis: The transfer was treated as having occurred on the date of the development agreement, whereas the construction cost adopted by the Assessing Officer was incurred by the developer over later financial years. Such subsequent cost, without reliable authentication, was not an appropriate basis for determining consideration. Section 50D of the Income-tax Act, 1961 supports adoption of the fair market value on the transfer date where consideration is not ascertainable. The analogous valuation principle underlying Section 45(5A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 also supported valuation with reference to the date of transfer. In a joint development arrangement involving exchange, the agreed consideration or fair market value on the agreement date represents the relevant value for capital-gains computation.

Conclusion: The fair market value of the property on the date of transfer, and not the developer's subsequent construction cost, was required to be adopted as the full value of consideration; the additional long-term capital-gains addition was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether receipts reflected in Form No. 26AS, claimed to pertain to the successor entity after transfer of the digital-content business, were taxable in the assessee's hands; and (ii) Whether advertisement expenditure incurred for promotion of the assessee's websites and mobile applications was allowable as a business deduction.

Issue (i): Whether receipts reflected in Form No. 26AS, claimed to pertain to the successor entity after transfer of the digital-content business, were taxable in the assessee's hands.

Analysis: The business-transfer agreement provided that income, expenditure and liabilities of the digital-content business after the effective transfer date belonged to the successor entity, notwithstanding that documents under subsisting third-party arrangements could continue in the assessee's name. The reconciliation and confirmation identified the disputed post-transfer invoices and asserted that the receipts were accounted for and assessed in the successor entity's hands, while the assessee had not claimed the related TDS credit. Form No. 26AS is relevant evidence of the PAN against which tax was deducted, but is not conclusive of income accrual where contemporaneous material indicates that the underlying business and revenue had transferred. Since the successor entity's complete return, financial statements and assessment records were not available, verification was necessary.

Conclusion: The issue is restored for limited verification. If the receipts are verified as having been accounted for and taxed in the successor entity's hands and the assessee has not received the corresponding TDS credit, the addition must be deleted; any duplicate TDS credit must be appropriately regulated.

Issue (ii): Whether advertisement expenditure incurred for promotion of the assessee's websites and mobile applications was allowable as a business deduction.

Analysis: Under Section 37(1), expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for business is allowable where it is not capital, personal or prohibited expenditure. The invoices, published newspaper and magazine copies, payment evidence and TDS deduction established actual publication of advertisements promoting the assessee's revenue-generating digital platform. Invoice abbreviations and publication codes recorded the relevant editions, cities, dimensions, placement and release particulars. Rate differences were explained by materially different publication coverage, editions and placement, and no comparable analysis established that the payments were excessive. Related-party status, absence of a separate agreement, media plan or board resolution, and lack of an immediate proportionate increase in revenue could not displace direct evidence of actual services and business nexus. No excessive portion was identified under Section 40A(2).

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee. The advertisement expenditure was allowable under Section 37(1), and the disallowance of Rs. 2,38,00,000 actually made in the assessment was directed to be deleted.

Final Conclusion: The advertising-expense claim stands allowed, while the taxability of the disputed receipts is confined to verification of whether the same income and related TDS credit have already been dealt with in the successor entity's assessment.

Ratio Decidendi: Taxability and business-expenditure deductibility must be determined from substantive evidence of income ownership and actual business services, rather than PAN-linked TDS reporting, related-party status, or absence of a separate agreement alone.

Issues: Whether the direction for de novo assessment of the entire assessment was sustainable, or had to be confined to the disputed unsecured loans aggregating to Rs.5,57,45,050.

Analysis: The assessment was made under Section 143(3), not as an ex parte best judgment assessment under Section 144. The assessment record showed that replies and supporting material had been furnished, and that the adverse inference was confined to specified unsecured loans of Rs.5,57,45,050, while the balance loans had been accepted. An appellate remand must bear a rational nexus to the issue requiring reconsideration and cannot unsettle matters already accepted without adverse findings.

Conclusion: The wholesale remand was modified to a limited restoration for examination of unsecured loans aggregating to Rs.5,57,45,050; the accepted findings regarding the balance unsecured loans cannot be reopened or disturbed.

Issues: Whether a works contractor that discharged the additional GST liability arising from the replacement of the VAT regime is entitled to reimbursement of the differential tax amount from the State as recipient of the works-contract service.

Analysis: The applicable legal position for works contracts attributes the differential tax burden caused by the introduction of the GST regime to the recipient of the service. The State and its departments, as beneficiaries of the executed works, have a corresponding obligation to reimburse the differential GST paid by the contractor, subject to verification of records and computation of the amount payable in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The contractors are entitled to reimbursement by the State of the verified differential GST liability attributable to the introduction of the GST regime.

Issues: (i) Whether a statement recorded under Section 50 and the admitted exhaustion of cash proceeds justified attachment of an FD representing equivalent value; (ii) Whether Section 5(1)'s likelihood-of-concealment requirement permitted attachment of property already in CBI custody or under bank mortgage; (iii) Whether legitimate sources were established for the two properties acquired in the spouse's name; (iv) Whether legitimate sources were established for the property acquired in the son's name.

Issue (i): Whether a statement recorded under Section 50 and the admitted exhaustion of cash proceeds justified attachment of an FD representing equivalent value.

Analysis: Statements recorded under Section 50 were treated as admissible evidence. The allegation of coercion was unsupported and no prompt formal retraction was established. The admitted cash receipt had been spent on family expenses, and the FD was voluntarily offered in substitution. The definition of proceeds of crime was applied to include property representing the equivalent value of direct proceeds that were no longer available. The recorded reasons supported the apprehension that the substitute asset could otherwise be alienated. Challenges to the scheduled-offence investigation were outside the scope of attachment proceedings, and the constitutional challenge to the statutory attachment process was rejected.

Conclusion: The FD attachment as property of equivalent value was sustained, against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 5(1)'s likelihood-of-concealment requirement permitted attachment of property already in CBI custody or under bank mortgage.

Analysis: Section 5(1) requires not only possession of proceeds of crime but also a reasoned apprehension that the property is likely to be concealed, transferred, or otherwise dealt with so as to frustrate confiscation. Assets already under CBI seizure or court-directed custody, and property already mortgaged to a bank, were outside the effective control of the persons proceeded against. Accordingly, no legitimate apprehension of their alienation or concealment existed. The Directorate could invoke its powers afresh if the existing restraint or mortgage ceased and the statutory preconditions subsequently arose.

Conclusion: The attachment of the asset in CBI custody and the mortgaged property could not be sustained, in favour of the appellants concerned.

Issue (iii): Whether legitimate sources were established for the two properties acquired in the spouse's name.

Analysis: Evidence produced in response to the notice under Section 8(1) had to be assessed on merits and could not be rejected merely because it had not been furnished during investigation. The balance sheet and contemporaneous banking material established availability of Rs. 4,00,000 from the spouse's capital account for the first property. However, the remaining Rs. 1,00,000 claimed as savings or stridhan was unsupported. For the second property, the alleged forfeited earnest money rested on an unregistered and unnotarised agreement lacking witness signatures and bank proof of payment. The burden to establish legitimate source for that acquisition remained undischarged.

Conclusion: Attachment of the first property was restricted to Rs. 1,00,000, while attachment of the second property was confirmed; the issue was partly decided in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iv): Whether legitimate sources were established for the property acquired in the son's name.

Analysis: The reverse burden under the PMLA required proof of legitimate acquisition. The father had stated that he funded the purchase and that the son had no income or savings. The consideration was paid in cash, without corresponding withdrawals or reliable receipts, and the asserted loan and other funding sources were not corroborated. Filing income-tax returns did not by itself establish that the funds were untainted. Attachment could extend to proceeds of crime held by a person who was not named in the scheduled-offence case or the money-laundering prosecution.

Conclusion: The appellant failed to establish legitimate sources, and the attachment was confirmed, against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: Attachment may extend to the value of dissipated proceeds where the statutory burden remains unmet, but the statutory requirement of a real likelihood of concealment or transfer prevents attachment of assets already secured or held beyond the holder's control.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 5(1) requires a demonstrable likelihood that property may be concealed, transferred, or dealt with to frustrate confiscation; that requirement is not met where the property is already under lawful seizure, court custody, or bank mortgage.

Issues: Whether Section 43CA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied to reciprocal conveyances of equivalent plots executed pursuant to a pre-existing arrangement between landowners.

Analysis: Section 43CA applies where consideration received or accrued on transfer of land or building held as stock-in-trade is less than its stamp-duty value. The impugned deeds formed integral parts of a memorandum of understanding providing for mutual exchange of equivalent plots to consolidate fragmented ownership after development of the layout. Each conveyance by the assessee was matched by a reciprocal conveyance of equivalent land by the other landowner in favour of the assessee's nominees. The exchanged lands carried identical guideline, stamp-duty and fair-market values; hence, the deeds were supported by valuable reciprocal consideration despite recording nil monetary consideration. No finding established that the consideration received was lower than the stamp-duty value.

Conclusion: Section 43CA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was inapplicable, and the addition made under that provision was deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether the financial creditor's admitted claim and the corporate guarantor's creditor status were correctly reflected in the information memorandum; (ii) Whether the statutory land-owning authority had locus to challenge the resolution plan; (iii) Whether termination of the lease during the moratorium rendered the plan infeasible; (iv) Whether the successful resolution applicant's conditional assurance to pay the authority's "legitimate" claim created an obligation to pay its entire demand; (v) Whether approval by a committee whose sole financial creditor was itself in insolvency was vitiated; (vi) Whether a plan based on assumed SEZ de-notification and unapproved change of land use was feasible and viable; and (vii) Whether the bare-reference disposal of the statutory authority's plan objection was adequately reasoned.

Issue (i): Whether the financial creditor's admitted claim and the corporate guarantor's creditor status were correctly reflected in the information memorandum.

Analysis: A final adjudication concerning the same loan transaction had quantified the creditor's claim after disallowing capitalised penal interest. A financial creditor could separately invoke Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against the principal borrower and the guarantor, but the amount recoverable from the principal borrower required credit for the amount already recovered from the guarantor. The resolution professional's obligation to collate and verify claims required reconciliation with the final judicial determination; it was not an adjudicatory exercise barred by approval of the plan by the committee. Under Section 140 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the guarantor's subrogation extended to the amount actually paid to the creditor.

Conclusion: The admission of the financial creditor's claim without reconciliation to the adjudicated amount was improper. Its recoverable claim had to be computed from Rs. 241.27 crore after crediting Rs. 38.87 crore already recovered, and the corporate guarantor was entitled to recognition and ranking as a secured financial creditor to the extent of Rs. 38.87 crore. This issue was decided in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory land-owning authority had locus to challenge the resolution plan.

Analysis: The authority was not merely an operational creditor; it was also the owner and statutory regulator of the land constituting the corporate debtor's essential asset. Its objection concerned the legality and feasibility of using the regulated land without requisite permissions, engaging Section 30(2)(e) and the appellate grounds under Section 61(3) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Regulation 38(3) of the CIRP Regulations required a plan to demonstrate feasibility, viability, and provision for necessary approvals. Such objections were not barred as a challenge to the committee's commercial wisdom.

Conclusion: The statutory land-owning authority had locus to maintain the challenge to the plan and to the dismissal of its objections. This issue was decided in favour of that authority.

Issue (iii): Whether termination of the lease during the moratorium rendered the plan infeasible.

Analysis: The lease termination occurred during the Section 14 moratorium. Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 gave the Code overriding effect, and the termination and consequential eviction proceedings had been quashed in separate proceedings. An infeasibility challenge could not be founded on a termination undertaken contrary to the moratorium and subsequently nullified.

Conclusion: The lease termination did not render the plan infeasible. This issue was decided against the statutory land-owning authority.

Issue (iv): Whether the successful resolution applicant's conditional assurance to pay the authority's "legitimate" claim created an obligation to pay its entire demand.

Analysis: The assurance was made in the specific context of a proposed withdrawal of objections, which did not occur. Its reference to a "legitimate" or "acceptable" claim was conditional and outside the terms of the plan; it could not be converted into an unconditional undertaking to discharge the entire demand.

Conclusion: The assurance did not bind the successful resolution applicant to pay the authority's entire demand. This issue was decided against the statutory land-owning authority.

Issue (v): Whether approval by a committee whose sole financial creditor was itself in insolvency was vitiated.

Analysis: The ground had not been specifically pleaded in the original plan objection. The record showed that the financial creditor's affairs were thereafter administered through an authorised administrator and that the relevant acts had been ratified. No basis established that participation by a sole committee member undergoing insolvency was, by itself, invalid.

Conclusion: Approval of the plan was not independently vitiated because the sole committee member was itself undergoing insolvency. This issue was decided against the statutory land-owning authority.

Issue (vi): Whether a plan based on assumed SEZ de-notification and unapproved change of land use was feasible and viable.

Analysis: The lease permitted conversion of SEZ land to another industrial use only with the prior consent or approval of the lessor and compliance with applicable regulatory requirements. The required consent and the formal regulatory completion of de-notification had not been obtained. Regulation 37(j) of the CIRP Regulations, which permits changes in the portfolio of goods or services, did not authorise a change in the sanctioned use of statutorily regulated land. The plan nevertheless assumed that de-notification stood or would stand approved and proposed non-SEZ development and sub-leasing. Further, the information memorandum omitted the pending and incomplete de-notification process, although the plan reflected granular knowledge of it. That omission deprived prospective applicants of a level informational footing and impaired informed commercial decision-making.

Conclusion: A plan founded on assumed de-notification and unapproved land-use conversion, and invited through an incomplete information memorandum, was not feasible or viable and could not be sustained. This issue was decided in favour of the statutory land-owning authority.

Issue (vii): Whether the bare-reference disposal of the statutory authority's plan objection was adequately reasoned.

Analysis: The objection raised specific questions concerning statutory approvals, the status of regulated land, and plan feasibility. A general reference to the committee's commercial wisdom did not address those legally material objections, particularly after their restoration for fresh consideration. Commercial wisdom limits review of business decisions but does not dispense with the requirement to give reasons on statutory feasibility objections.

Conclusion: The bare-reference dismissal of the plan objection was inadequately reasoned and could not be sustained. This issue was decided in favour of the statutory land-owning authority.

Final Conclusion: The approved plan could not remain operative because the information memorandum materially misstated creditor claims and omitted essential regulatory facts concerning the corporate debtor's sole asset. The insolvency process must proceed from a fresh invitation of expressions of interest on a corrected and complete information memorandum, under a newly appointed resolution professional.

Ratio Decidendi: A resolution plan founded on a materially inaccurate information memorandum or contingent statutory approvals affecting the corporate debtor's essential asset fails the statutory feasibility requirement, and the committee's commercial wisdom cannot cure that defect.

Issues: Whether the assessee could adopt the stamp-duty value prevailing on the date of an earlier booking agreement under the provisos to section 56(2)(vii)(b) for a flat registered with a redevelopment developer in 2016.

Analysis: The statutory benefit applies only where an agreement preceding registration fixes the consideration for the immovable property ultimately transferred and consideration, or part thereof, is paid through a non-cash mode on or before that agreement. The earlier booking concerned a different flat in the old building for a separate consideration, whereas the registered agreement for the redeveloped flat independently fixed the consideration at Rs. 97,65,000. No prior agreement fixing that consideration for the transferred flat, or legally established linkage between the earlier payments and the new agreement, was shown. The condition concerning non-cash payment towards the consideration under the relevant agreement was also not established.

Conclusion: The assessee was not entitled to invoke the provisos to section 56(2)(vii)(b), and the addition representing the excess of stamp-duty value over the registered consideration was sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned provisional attachment, seizure, retention, and freezing orders could be sustained on subsequent FIRs, an ECIR addendum, and a prosecution complaint not forming part of the underlying attachment, reasons to believe, original complaint, or original application? (ii) Whether quashing of the original FIR meant that no predicate offence remained?

Issue (i): Whether the impugned provisional attachment, seizure, retention, and freezing orders could be sustained on subsequent FIRs, an ECIR addendum, and a prosecution complaint not forming part of the underlying attachment, reasons to believe, original complaint, or original application?

Analysis: The statutory attachment and seizure framework requires the action and its adjudicatory confirmation to rest on the material forming the basis of the provisional attachment order, the recorded reasons to believe, the original complaint, and the original application. Those foundational materials referred only to the original FIR. The subsequent FIRs, their allegations, the quantified proceeds allegedly involved therein, and the role attributed under them were absent from those materials. An ECIR addendum and a subsequently filed prosecution complaint could provide a basis for separate action, but could not retrospectively validate the existing measures.

Conclusion: The impugned attachment, retention, and freezing measures could not be sustained by relying on the subsequent FIRs, ECIR addendum, or subsequent prosecution complaint. This issue is in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether quashing of the original FIR meant that no predicate offence remained?

Analysis: Subsequent FIRs disclosed predicate offences and were incorporated through an addendum to the ECIR. Their existence meant that the quashing of the original FIR did not, by itself, establish that no predicate offence remained. However, those subsequent FIRs could not be considered for confirming the challenged measures because they were not part of the original complaint or original application.

Conclusion: Quashing of the original FIR did not by itself mean that no predicate offence remained. This issue is against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: Statutory attachment, retention, and freezing action founded solely on the original FIR cannot be validated by later, unincorporated allegations; any action based on the subsequent FIRs requires an independent statutory foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: Provisional attachment and consequential retention or freezing measures must be justified by the material and proceeds of crime identified in their statutory foundation and cannot be retrospectively sustained through subsequent FIRs or materials not forming part of that foundation.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) is leviable on disclosed claims for executive retirement scheme, cash discount and contractual bonus merely because the deductions were disallowed in quantum proceedings; (ii) Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) is leviable for exclusion of profits of the Sri Lankan and Bangladesh branches on a disclosed, bona fide treaty-based claim; (iii) Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) survives after the transfer-pricing adjustment forming its basis has been deleted in quantum proceedings; (iv) Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) is leviable on a MODVAT-credit closing-stock adjustment arising from the valuation methodology under section 145A.

Issue (i): Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) is leviable on disclosed claims for executive retirement scheme, cash discount and contractual bonus merely because the deductions were disallowed in quantum proceedings.

Analysis: The legal framework requires strict construction of penal provisions and a specific charge of either concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars. The penalty orders did not distinctly identify either charge and proceeded principally because the quantum disallowances had been sustained. Full disclosure of material facts, the contractual and accounting basis for the claims, and the bona fide character of the claims were established. Mere rejection of a claim does not by itself constitute furnishing of inaccurate particulars.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, no penalty under section 271(1)(c) is leviable on the executive-retirement-scheme, cash-discount or bonus claims.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) is leviable for exclusion of profits of the Sri Lankan and Bangladesh branches on a disclosed, bona fide treaty-based claim.

Analysis: The branch profits were disclosed in the accounts and excluded in the computation on the stated basis that they were taxable in the host country under Articles 5 and 7 of the applicable tax treaty; taxes were also paid abroad and foreign-tax credit was allowed. The place of taxability of overseas-branch profits was a debatable issue involving treaty interpretation. The absence of a specific penalty charge, coupled with disclosure and a bona fide treaty-based claim, precluded penalty; the same reasoning applied to the Bangladesh branch.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, penalty under section 271(1)(c) is not leviable on the excluded overseas-branch profits.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) survives after the transfer-pricing adjustment forming its basis has been deleted in quantum proceedings.

Analysis: The transfer-pricing adjustment did not survive after appellate relief on merits, and the residual figure resulted from arithmetical errors in giving effect to that relief. No independent finding established concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. A consequential penalty cannot subsist without a sustainable quantum addition.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the penalty relating to the transfer-pricing adjustment does not survive.

Issue (iv): Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) is leviable on a MODVAT-credit closing-stock adjustment arising from the valuation methodology under section 145A.

Analysis: The assessee consistently followed an exclusive method for valuing stock, purchases and sales, and the adjustment arose from the application of section 145A rather than any non-disclosure. The corresponding opening-stock adjustment and the resulting timing difference demonstrated revenue neutrality. The penalty order did not specify the applicable charge under section 271(1)(c), while the valuation question involved an interpretative accounting issue supported by disclosed records.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, no penalty under section 271(1)(c) is leviable on the MODVAT-credit closing-stock adjustment.

Final Conclusion: The penalty regime under section 271(1)(c) is inapplicable to the disclosed bona fide claims, debatable treaty and valuation issues, and the non-surviving transfer-pricing adjustment.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty under section 271(1)(c) cannot be imposed merely because a disclosed claim is disallowed; a clearly identified statutory charge and circumstances amounting to concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars are indispensable.

Issues: (i) Whether the 8% ad hoc addition on purchases accepted as genuine could be sustained; (ii) Whether the enhanced addition under section 69A could be sustained; (iii) Whether deletion of disallowances of staff and labour welfare, rent, and vehicle expenses under section 37 was justified.

Issue (i): Whether the 8% ad hoc addition on purchases accepted as genuine could be sustained.

Analysis: Section 69C applies where the source of expenditure is not explained satisfactorily. The purchases were recorded in the regular books, payments were through disclosed banking channels, the books were not rejected under section 145(3), and corresponding sales remained undisputed. The purchase invoices, ledgers, bank records, GST material and E-way bills constituted corroborative evidence. Once the purchases and vendors were accepted as genuine, neither an addition for unexplained expenditure nor an ad hoc estimation of additional profit could rest merely on suspicion or conjecture without a specific defect in the accounts or evidence of additional profit.

Conclusion: The 8% ad hoc purchase addition was deleted; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the enhanced addition under section 69A could be sustained.

Analysis: Section 251(2) requires a reasonable opportunity before enhancement, and the record did not establish that such opportunity was afforded before the addition was enhanced. Independently, section 69A requires that the assessee be found to be the owner of unrecorded money or other valuable article. No unexplained cash or asset was found from the assessee. WhatsApp communications found on an employee's device were not authenticated as electronic evidence and lacked independent corroboration of receipt or ownership of cash by the assessee. Statements under section 132(4) could not substitute for such corroborative evidence. The presumptions under sections 132(4A) and 292C are rebuttable and could not, without further material, establish ownership by a person other than the person from whose possession the electronic material was found.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69A, including its enhancement, was deleted; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether deletion of disallowances of staff and labour welfare, rent, and vehicle expenses under section 37 was justified.

Analysis: The staff and labour welfare expenditure was supported by details showing its connection with site-based construction and fabrication activities. Rent agreements and payment details established that the accommodation expenditure was incurred for workers at project locations and was not shown to be personal. The vehicle-expense disallowance was made on an ad hoc assumption of personal use without identification of any personal or non-business expenditure. The expenses were therefore shown to have been incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes.

Conclusion: Deletion of the disallowances under section 37 was upheld; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disputed purchase-profit and unexplained-money additions could not be retained, and the claimed business-expense deductions remained allowable.

Issues: Whether the value of materials supplied free of cost by the service recipient forms part of the gross value for determining service tax liability and entitlement to 67% abatement.

Analysis: Service tax is leviable on the taxable service and, in computing the gross amount charged, the value of goods or materials supplied free of cost by the recipient cannot be added unless specifically included by the Legislature. The binding ruling on valuation of free supplies applied to the disputed contracts.

Conclusion: The value of free-of-cost materials supplied by the recipient does not form part of the gross value of taxable services; denial of the 67% abatement on that basis is unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the petitioners' bank accounts could remain frozen after the expiry of the provisional attachment orders.

Analysis: Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 limits a provisional attachment to one year, while Rule 159 prescribes the form and procedure for attachment. The adopted interpretation treats provisional attachment as a revenue-protection measure, not a recovery mechanism, and does not permit renewal after expiry by efflux of time. No subsequent attachment orders were issued, and the petitioners were not recipients of the demand-cum-show-cause notice.

Conclusion: The attachments had ceased to have effect, and the four bank accounts must be de-frozen and made operable, in favour of the petitioners.

Ratio Decidendi: A provisional attachment under Section 83 ceases by operation of law one year after the attachment order; continued restraint cannot be sustained on the expired order.

Issues: Whether tax timely remitted under the CGST and SGST heads due to a clerical error, instead of under the IGST head, could be appropriated towards the IGST liability without requiring fresh payment and a subsequent refund claim.

Analysis: Section 77 addresses cases in which tax is paid on an intra-State basis but the supply is subsequently held to be inter-State, and contemplates refund of the tax wrongly paid without interest. Although the provision does not directly cover a clerical error in selecting the tax head, its underlying principle applied because the entire tax liability had been discharged within the prescribed period. Requiring a further payment under the IGST head followed by refund of the amounts already paid would unjustifiably penalise the taxable person.

Conclusion: The amounts inadvertently paid under the CGST and SGST heads shall be appropriated towards the IGST liability upon application, and the taxable person may seek refund of the earlier deposit in accordance with the directions.

Issues: Whether a penalty under Section 271D for alleged contravention of Section 269SS is sustainable where the Assessing Officer did not record satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings in the assessment order.

Analysis: Section 271D imposes penalty for contravention of Section 269SS, while the power to impose that penalty lies with the Joint Commissioner. Binding jurisdictional precedent, applied in conformity with the Supreme Court ruling, requires the Assessing Officer to record satisfaction regarding the alleged violation in the assessment order before penalty proceedings can validly be initiated. As no such satisfaction was recorded, the penalty lacked a valid jurisdictional foundation.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee; the penalty under Section 271D is unsustainable for want of recorded satisfaction by the Assessing Officer.

Issues: (i) Whether the cash deposits treated as unexplained money under section 69A required fresh factual examination; and (ii) Whether penalty under section 271AAC(1) could survive before determining the unexplained portion of those deposits.

Issue (i): Whether the cash deposits treated as unexplained money under section 69A required fresh factual examination.

Analysis: The deposits were made in a current account used by a banking correspondent for accepting customer deposits and making customer withdrawals through a customer service point. The receipt of commission subject to tax deduction supported the stated nature of the activity. The assessee had not participated in the assessment proceedings because the registered email address and mobile number were stated not to belong to him. The available circumstances required an opportunity to produce supporting documents and establish whether the deposits represented customer transactions rather than unexplained money under section 69A.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69A requires a de novo factual determination after allowing the assessee to furnish evidence, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under section 271AAC(1) could survive before determining the unexplained portion of those deposits.

Analysis: Liability to penalty under section 271AAC(1) depended upon a determination that the bank deposits, or any part of them, constituted unexplained money. As that foundational issue required fresh examination, the existing penalty was premature.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 271AAC(1) was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The character of the bank deposits must be determined afresh on evidence, and the existing penalty cannot stand without that foundational determination.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the factual basis for treating deposits as unexplained money requires de novo determination, a consequential penalty for unexplained income cannot be sustained beforehand.