Issues: (i) Whether repair, reconstruction, improvement and maintenance of irrigation canals involving transfer of property in goods could be taxed as Management, Maintenance or Repair Service; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the Management, Maintenance or Repair Service demand; (iii) Whether the demand for Manpower Recruitment and Supply Agency Service was sustainable where the taxable value was below the applicable threshold exemption.

Issue (i): Whether repair, reconstruction, improvement and maintenance of irrigation canals involving transfer of property in goods could be taxed as Management, Maintenance or Repair Service.

Analysis: The contracts involved both labour and materials, with VAT paid on the transfer of goods. The statutory scheme distinguished service contracts simpliciter from composite works contracts. A composite contract involving transfer of property in goods could not be subjected to service tax under the category of Management, Maintenance or Repair Service.

Conclusion: The demand under Management, Maintenance or Repair Service was unsustainable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the Management, Maintenance or Repair Service demand.

Analysis: The appellate authority had found no deliberate suppression or intention to evade tax and had consequently set aside the penalty. Payment of VAT was also evidenced by the relevant certificate. These circumstances did not justify invocation of the extended limitation period.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was unsustainable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the demand for Manpower Recruitment and Supply Agency Service was sustainable where the taxable value was below the applicable threshold exemption.

Analysis: Though the one-time manpower supply activity was taxable in nature, its value was below the applicable taxable threshold after excluding the other exempted values.

Conclusion: The demand under Manpower Recruitment and Supply Agency Service was unsustainable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demands under both disputed categories could not be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A composite contract involving transfer of property in goods is not taxable under a service category meant for service contracts simpliciter, and the extended limitation period requires deliberate suppression or intent to evade tax.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petition was dismissed, with four weeks granted to pursue the statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether adjudication and appellate orders could stand where the show-cause notice was uploaded only under the portal tab 'Additional Notice and Orders', without separate intimation, resulting in the assessee being unable to respond.

Analysis: The notice was uploaded only in the specified portal tab and no separate intimation was given. The assessee was consequently unable to file a reply to the show-cause notice. Since the appellate authority had dismissed the appeal solely on limitation and had not considered the merits, the denial of an effective opportunity to respond constituted a breach of principles of natural justice warranting interference.

Conclusion: The adjudication and appellate orders could not be sustained; the assessee must be afforded an opportunity to reply to the show-cause notice and receive a fresh reasoned determination after hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether input tax credit blocked under Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 can be appropriated towards the statutory pre-deposit under Section 107(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the statutory appellate remedy should be preserved after rectification of an erroneous FORM GST DRC-07 and portal-related filing difficulties.

Issue (i): Whether input tax credit blocked under Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 can be appropriated towards the statutory pre-deposit under Section 107(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(6) requires payment of the prescribed pre-deposit, while Section 49(4) permits utilisation of credit in the electronic credit ledger subject to statutory restrictions. A restriction under Rule 86A prevents debit of the blocked credit for discharge of liability; blocking neither constitutes payment nor appropriation against an adjudicated demand. The adjudication order contained no appropriation of the petitioner's blocked credit. The subsisting restrictions were imposed by an authority not impleaded in the writ proceedings, and the underlying orders, recorded reasons, and current running credit balance were unavailable for review.

Conclusion: Against the assessee, the blocked credit could not be treated as payment of, or appropriated towards, the statutory pre-deposit unless the competent authority removes or modifies the Rule 86A restriction. Credit otherwise lawfully available and capable of debit may be used for the pre-deposit.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory appellate remedy should be preserved after rectification of an erroneous FORM GST DRC-07 and portal-related filing difficulties.

Analysis: The erroneous summary order had caused the portal to compute the pre-deposit on the combined tax and penalty amount, and the error was rectified only after the petitioner had attempted to file its appeal and pursued rectification. The merits of the input tax credit demand involve disputed factual questions requiring consideration by the statutory appellate authority.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the petitioner was permitted to file the statutory appeal within four weeks without rejection on limitation, subject to compliance with Section 107(6). Necessary electronic filing assistance was directed, with manual filing available if the portal continued to prevent filing despite compliance.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the tax demand and to the validity of the Rule 86A restrictions remains open for adjudication before the competent forum, while the petitioner's access to the statutory appeal is protected.

Ratio Decidendi: Input tax credit blocked from debit under Rule 86A cannot satisfy a statutory pre-deposit requirement merely because it is unavailable to the registered person; it must be lawfully debit-able or the restriction must first be removed or modified by the competent authority.

Outcome: Application for condonation of delay and the Special Leave Petition dismissed.

Issues: Whether unconditional return of a detained yellow metal chain could be directed in writ jurisdiction on the asserted non-issuance of notice within the period under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The statutory safeguards under Sections 110(2) and 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 must operate according to the applicable factual and procedural record. Article 226 of the Constitution of India confers discretionary and equitable jurisdiction, which is not ordinarily exercised where there is unexplained delay and laches, suppression of material facts, and disputed questions of fact requiring statutory adjudication. The delayed petition omitted the contemporaneous statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, which recorded non-declaration of the article, acceptance of departmental appraisement, and waiver of written notice and personal hearing. The article's nature as used personal jewellery, its composition, value, baggage treatment, and consequential customs liability remained disputed and required determination through the statutory process. Article 300A of the Constitution of India does not warrant unconditional release while lawful customs proceedings remain to be completed.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to an unconditional writ for return of the article or to annul its detention; appraisement and consequential proceedings are to be completed under the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: Whether NOIDA's time-extension charges for delay in completing the housing projects could be imposed on the successful resolution applicant and homebuyers as Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process costs.

Analysis: The time-extension charges under the lease and the subsequent policy were penal charges intended to deter a defaulting developer and secure timely completion. The developer's default led to insolvency, while the homebuyers funded continuation of construction and the successful resolution applicant was to implement an approved resolution plan. Requiring them to bear charges arising from the corporate debtor's past default would penalise parties not responsible for the delay and defeat the developmental purpose of the lease and completion of the housing projects.

Conclusion: In the peculiar facts, NOIDA's time-extension penalty charges cannot validly be imposed on the successful resolution applicant or homebuyers as Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process costs, including charges claimed beyond three years.

Issues: Whether bail could be granted despite the restrictive bail regime under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, owing to prolonged pre-trial incarceration and the unlikelihood of an early conclusion of trial.

Analysis: Article 21 protects an undertrial against detention becoming punitive merely because of delay in trial. The restrictive rigours governing bail under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 may be relaxed where continued custody infringes personal liberty. The petitioner had remained incarcerated for over a year, had obtained bail in the scheduled offences, the matter remained at the pre-cognizance stage, and the documentary evidence was already in the Enforcement Directorate's custody, leaving little scope for tampering. The prospect of an early completion of trial was remote.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to conditional bail on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, without any determination on the merits of the money-laundering allegations.

Issues: (i) Whether the service-tax demand under the reverse charge mechanism, founded on the appellant's expense heads and accounting records, was sustainable; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation and penalty for suppression with intent to evade were invocable where reverse-charge tax was available as Cenvat credit.

Issue (i): Whether the service-tax demand under the reverse charge mechanism, founded on the appellant's expense heads and accounting records, was sustainable.

Analysis: The expense heads of business promotion, conveyance, legal expenses and freight had been examined, classified and quantified in the appellate order. Comparison of ST-3 returns with the assessee's own balance sheets and Form 26AS was a valid basis for verification. Where the returns did not reconcile with those records and adequate particulars were not furnished despite requisitions, determination on the available material was justified.

Conclusion: The reverse-charge service-tax demand is sustainable against the assessee, but only for the normal limitation period.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation and penalty for suppression with intent to evade were invocable where reverse-charge tax was available as Cenvat credit.

Analysis: Tax paid under reverse charge would have been available as Cenvat credit, correspondingly reducing the cash liability under forward charge. This revenue-neutral position negated an intent to evade, which is an essential requirement both for invoking the proviso to Section 73(1) and for imposing penalty under Section 78.

Conclusion: The extended-period demand and the penalty under Section 78 are unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tax liability is confined to the normal period with applicable interest, and the liability must be recomputed accordingly; the remaining penalty is retained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where reverse-charge tax is fully available as Cenvat credit to the same taxable person, revenue neutrality negates the intent to evade required for the extended limitation period and the corresponding suppression penalty.

Issues: (i) Whether CSR-related payments, disallowed while computing business income under Explanation 2 to section 37(1), may independently qualify for deduction under section 80G; (ii) Whether revisionary jurisdiction under section 263 was validly invoked in respect of allowance of such deduction.

Issue (i): Whether CSR-related payments, disallowed while computing business income under Explanation 2 to section 37(1), may independently qualify for deduction under section 80G.

Analysis: Explanation 2 to section 37(1) only excludes CSR expenditure from computation of business income. Section 80G operates independently under Chapter VI-A, allowing deduction from gross total income subject to its own conditions. Where the entire CSR outlay has been added back under section 37(1), deduction under section 80G does not result in double deduction. The express exclusion of CSR contributions only for specified funds demonstrates that there is no blanket statutory bar against deduction for every CSR-related donation. Statutory CSR spending requirements do not negate the character of a payment as a donation where there is no quid pro quo and the conditions of section 80G are otherwise satisfied.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: CSR-related donations may qualify for deduction under section 80G, subject to satisfaction of its conditions, notwithstanding their disallowance under section 37(1).

Issue (ii): Whether revisionary jurisdiction under section 263 was validly invoked in respect of allowance of such deduction.

Analysis: The assessment record showed that relevant information, donation receipts and supporting material were called for and furnished, and part of the claimed deduction was disallowed. This established application of mind and enquiry. A concise assessment order does not establish lack of enquiry. Revision under section 263 requires both a demonstrable error and prejudice to the Revenue; it cannot rest on a different view of a legally permissible claim or be used for a roving enquiry. No defect in the receipts, approvals, payment mode or computation, nor any applicable specific exclusion, was identified.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the conditions for invoking section 263 were not satisfied, as the assessment reflected enquiry and adoption of a legally sustainable view.

Final Conclusion: The revisionary order was quashed and the completed assessment was restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Disallowance of CSR expenditure under section 37(1) does not by itself bar an otherwise eligible section 80G deduction, and revision cannot be invoked where the Assessing Officer has made enquiry and adopted a permissible legal view without demonstrable error and prejudice.

Issues: Whether the landowner's receipts under a joint development arrangement represented consideration for a taxable transfer of development rights or proceeds from sale of immovable property.

Analysis: Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 excludes transactions concerning land and benefits arising out of land from the scope of service. The arrangement was a joint venture for development and joint sale of residential flats, and the landowner received its agreed share of sale proceeds from the flats. The development rights were inseparable from the land and constituted immovable property; the arrangement did not establish a separate taxable supply of development rights to the developer.

Conclusion: The receipts were attributable to sale of immovable property and were not consideration for a taxable service; no service tax or penalty was payable.

Issues: Whether the Revenue established a mistake apparent from the record warranting rectification of the Tribunal's earlier order under section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Rectification is confined to an obvious and patent error capable of being identified without long-drawn reasoning or fresh examination of facts. The earlier order had substantively considered the limitation issue, including dispatch, postal records, service at an incorrect address, and the notice-server material. The subsequently relied-on dispatch records, approval material, legal authorities and contentions would require reappreciation of disputed evidence and reconsideration of an already adjudicated issue. A debatable issue or an alternative view cannot be pursued through rectification.

Conclusion: No mistake apparent from the record was established; the Revenue's request amounted to an impermissible review under section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether penalty could be imposed on the appellant under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002.

Analysis: Rule 26 applies where a person deals with excisable goods known or believed to be liable to confiscation, or issues documents enabling another person to obtain an ineligible benefit. The seized goods had not been held liable to confiscation, and no material established that the appellant issued any invoice or document capable of enabling an ineligible benefit.

Conclusion: The statutory ingredients for imposition of penalty under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 were not satisfied; the penalty imposed on the appellant was set aside.

Issues: Whether a retrospective statutory amendment introduced after the original appellate order, and a subsequent Supreme Court order, constitute a mistake apparent from the record permitting recall or modification under Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The rectification jurisdiction under Section 254(2) is confined to an apparent mistake existing when the original order was passed. A later legislative amendment, notwithstanding its retrospective operation, and a subsequent judicial order were not part of the legal position available when the original order was made. Treating either subsequent development as a rectifiable mistake would impermissibly enlarge rectification into a power of review of a concluded decision.

Conclusion: Neither the retrospective insertion of Section 147A nor the subsequent Supreme Court order constituted a mistake apparent from the record; recall or modification under Section 254(2) was unavailable.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice issued after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year was valid when the Revenue failed to produce evidence of prior sanction under Section 151.

Analysis: A notice issued under Section 148 after the prescribed four-year period required prior approval of the competent authority under Section 151. Once the assessee challenged the existence of such statutory sanction, the Revenue bore the burden of producing the relevant record to establish the jurisdictional fact of valid approval. The mere assertion in the assessment order that approval had been obtained, or an inference from proceedings for another assessment year, did not establish approval for the relevant year. Despite repeated opportunities, the Revenue could not produce the approval record.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 was invalid for want of proof of valid prior approval under Section 151, and the consequential reassessment order was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether renewal of registration under section 12AB can be denied to a public charitable educational institution solely because it lacks a formal trust deed or memorandum of association.

Analysis: Rule 17A(2) distinguishes between an applicant created under an instrument and one created otherwise than under an instrument. While the former must furnish the creating instrument, the latter may furnish documents evidencing its creation or establishment; treating a formal deed as indispensable would render Rule 17A(2)(b) otiose. Statutory records maintained under the law governing public trusts, including the registration certificate and records before the Charity Commissioner, were substantive evidence of the institution's creation, public character, objects and continued existence. Those records were corroborated by its long-standing tax registration, educational recognition and continuous charitable educational activity. The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 does not apply to public charitable endowments, and its requirements for private trusts could not be imported to impose an additional condition under section 12AB.

Conclusion: The absence of a formal trust deed or memorandum of association was not a valid ground to refuse renewal; renewal of registration under section 12AB was required to be granted.

Issues: (i) Whether a scrutiny notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, issued by the Assessment Unit rather than the National Faceless Assessment Centre, is valid; (ii) Whether ESOP expenditure of Rs. 7,00,54,349 claimed under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is allowable; and (iii) Whether 30% of compensation paid for extinguishment of a right to sue could be disallowed under section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for non-deduction of tax at source.

Issue (i): Whether a scrutiny notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, issued by the Assessment Unit rather than the National Faceless Assessment Centre, is valid.

Analysis: Section 143(2) permits issuance of a scrutiny notice by the Assessing Officer or prescribed income-tax authority. Under the faceless assessment framework, an Assessment Unit is empowered to perform functions of the Assessing Officer, including issuance of statutory notices. The National Faceless Assessment Centre is not the sole authority competent to issue such notice.

Conclusion: The notice issued by the Assessment Unit was valid and the jurisdictional challenge fails against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether ESOP expenditure of Rs. 7,00,54,349 claimed under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is allowable.

Analysis: ESOP cost incurred to attract, retain and compensate employees constitutes employee compensation incurred wholly and exclusively for business. The reimbursement obligation towards the foreign holding company, coupled with valuation and recognition in the accounts, established an accrued and ascertainable liability. Liability accrues as employees render services during the vesting period; future exercise, allotment, lapse or forfeiture affects discharge or subsequent adjustment, not the accrual of expenditure. A valuation report prepared after year-end does not by itself alter the period to which the expense relates, and the absence of comparable listed companies cannot render the valuation or expenditure non-existent.

Conclusion: The ESOP expenditure attributable to the relevant year is allowable under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether 30% of compensation paid for extinguishment of a right to sue could be disallowed under section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for non-deduction of tax at source.

Analysis: A disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) requires establishment that tax was deductible under a specified provision of Chapter XVII-B. The payment for giving up a right to sue was not shown to be consideration for work, commission or brokerage, professional or technical services, or a non-compete fee. No applicable withholding provision was identified. Section 195 applies to a non-resident payment only where the amount is chargeable to tax in India, and no finding of such chargeability was recorded. A lower or nil deduction certificate was not a prerequisite where no withholding obligation was established.

Conclusion: No tax was deductible at source on the impugned payment on the facts found; the disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) is deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment remains jurisdictionally valid, but the taxable loss must be recomputed after allowing the ESOP cost and removing the disallowance founded on alleged withholding default.

Issues: Whether anti-dumping duty under the applicable notification can be levied on Gear Boxes as a whole when Castings form part of those Gear Boxes.

Analysis: Notification No. 42/2017-Customs (ADD) dated 30.08.2017 imposes anti-dumping duty on Castings for Wind Operated Electricity Generators, including Castings in raw, finished or sub-assembled form or forming part of a sub-assembly, equipment or component. Its scope extends the levy to Castings contained in such equipment, but does not extend the levy to the entire equipment or component. The unchallenged interpretation of the notification by the Tribunal, having attained finality, was binding on the customs authorities. Subsequent assessments of identical imports, limiting duty to Castings, also accorded with that interpretation.

Conclusion: Anti-dumping duty is leviable only on the Castings forming part of the Gear Boxes and cannot be imposed on the Gear Boxes as a whole; the assessment imposing such duty on the Gear Boxes lacked statutory authority.