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Issues: (i) Whether organising neurology conferences, seminars and workshops constituted "education" within the meaning of section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (ii) Whether the receipts from delegate fees and sponsorships attracted the proviso to section 2(15) so as to deny exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Issue (i): Whether organising neurology conferences, seminars and workshops constituted "education" within the meaning of section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: The assessee's dominant activity was the conduct of seminars, conferences and workshops in neurology for dissemination of medical knowledge and continuing education of professionals. The expression "education" is not confined to formal schooling and includes systematic dissemination of knowledge through educational programmes. The activities were held to fall within the educational limb of the definition of charitable purpose.
Conclusion: The assessee's activities constituted "education" within section 2(15), in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the receipts from delegate fees and sponsorships attracted the proviso to section 2(15) so as to deny exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: The surplus generated from the conferences was applied towards the objects of the trust and there was no material to show private diversion or profit motive. The proviso to section 2(15) was found inapplicable because the activities were already within the independent head of education, and in any event the threshold condition for treating the receipts as disqualifying commercial receipts was not satisfied on the facts accepted by the Tribunal. The consistent acceptance of exemption in earlier and later years also supported the assessee's claim.
Conclusion: The proviso to section 2(15) did not apply and exemption under section 11 could not be denied, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The additions made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the first appellate authority were unsustainable, and the assessee remained entitled to charitable exemption for the year under appeal.
Ratio Decidendi: Systematic dissemination of specialised knowledge through conferences and workshops can amount to "education" under section 2(15), and surplus from such activity does not defeat charitable status when applied to the trust's objects without private profit motive.
Issues: (i) Whether the duty drawback amounts directed to be processed and released in the judgment dated 13 February 2025 should be released to the petitioner and (ii) Whether statutory interest for the previous period is payable to the petitioner where the drawback amounts have not been released despite final dismissal of the Department's SLP.
Issue (i): Whether the duty drawback amounts directed by this Court in its judgment dated 13 February 2025 are to be processed and released to the petitioner.
Analysis: The Court noted that its earlier judgment quashed the CBIC Clarifications and directed processing of individual drawback claims. The Department's challenge was dismissed by the Supreme Court and the three-month period for processing (as contemplated in the earlier order) has expired without payment to the petitioner. The Court observed absence of any lawful reason for withholding the drawback amounts after final disposal of the SLP and recorded that the Customs Department must process the claims in accordance with law.
Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to release of the duty drawback amounts as directed by the judgment dated 13 February 2025; the Customs Department is required to process and release the eligible drawback amounts in accordance with law.
Issue (ii): Whether statutory interest for the previous period is payable to the petitioner where the drawback amounts were not released despite finality of the earlier judgment.
Analysis: The earlier judgment declined interest for the previous period because of an acknowledged ambiguity in the legal position. After dismissal of the Department's SLP and expiry of the period allowed for compliance, the Court found no justification for continued non-payment. The Court therefore expressed its inclination to grant interest for the past period and directed the responsible official to appear with instructions; consideration of statutory interest was reserved to the next hearing.
Conclusion: The Court inclined to award statutory interest for the previous period in favour of the petitioner and directed the Customs Department to explain non-payment and process interest on eligible drawback amounts in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The Court directed the Customs Department to comply with the earlier judgment by processing and releasing the eligible duty drawback amounts and to address payment of statutory interest for the past period; the matter was remitted to the Department for compliance and listed for further consideration.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an administrative clarification contrary to the Court's interpretation has been quashed and the Department's challenge has been finally dismissed, eligible duty drawback claims must be processed and released in accordance with law and statutory interest may be payable for the period of delay once the Department fails to comply within the time fixed by the Court.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the seized imported products, alleged by Customs to be mis-declared and to "appear to be" sex toys/sex foreplay cards, were liable to be provisionally released when the record disclosed no stated reason for their continued seizure and similar products had been cleared for other importers.
(ii) What conditions and directions ought to govern such provisional release, and whether Customs should remain at liberty to initiate statutory proceedings (including issuance of a show cause notice) notwithstanding provisional release.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Provisional release of seized goods alleged to be mis-declared/"sex toys"
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court considered provisional release in the context of the statutory mechanism invoked by Customs for provisional release of seized goods (the order on record reflected release under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 for the non-disputed part of the consignment).
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court examined the provisional release order already passed for the remainder of the consignment and noted that, as per that order, no reason had been provided to justify the continued seizure of the subject products. The Court further treated as significant the undisputed position that similar products imported by other companies had been permitted for clearance by the Customs Department, undermining the justification for continued retention of the petitioner's goods at this stage. The Court also took into account that, in related matters involving similar goods, the competent policy-making authority had been directed to take a stand/policy decision on the importability of such products and that an inter-ministerial consultation was stated to be underway. In that backdrop, the Court considered provisional release appropriate pending policy clarity and further adjudicatory steps.
Conclusion: The Court held that the subject imported products were liable to be provisionally released.
Issue (ii): Conditions for provisional release and preservation of Customs' enforcement powers
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court directed provisional release by requiring a bond and payment of applicable customs duty, reflecting the balance contemplated in provisional release mechanisms.
Interpretation and reasoning: To balance the importer's interest in release with Customs' interest in securing revenue and ensuring compliance, the Court ordered release subject to furnishing a bond "in the appropriate form and manner" and payment of applicable duty, and fixed a time-bound schedule for completion of release. Simultaneously, the Court clarified that provisional release would not preclude statutory action on merits and expressly preserved Customs' ability to proceed in accordance with law.
Conclusion: The Court directed provisional release within one week of furnishing the bond and payment of applicable duty, and held that Customs remained free to issue a show cause notice and pursue proceedings under law; all rights and remedies were kept open.
Outcome: The writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty as prayed for, and all pending applications were disposed of.
Issues: (i) whether the fire loss was an accidental fire covered by the policies and the insurer could repudiate the claim on the basis of an inconclusive survey report; (ii) whether the expression "FFF" in the policy covered furniture, fixtures and fittings; and (iii) whether the insured proved the stock loss and whether the surveyor's assessment could displace the insured's documentary evidence, including the consequential question of interest.
Issue (i): whether the fire loss was an accidental fire covered by the policies and the insurer could repudiate the claim on the basis of an inconclusive survey report.
Analysis: The fire policies indemnified loss by fire and did not make liability contingent upon proof of the exact cause of ignition. Actual fire damage was supported by the police report, preliminary survey, photographs and other contemporaneous material. The final survey report did not record fraud, intentional setting of fire, or any finding that the insured caused the fire; it only disputed a short-circuit theory and suggested multiple seats of fire. In the absence of a finding of exclusionary conduct by the insured, the cause of fire was treated as immaterial and the insurer's repudiation as unsupported.
Conclusion: The fire was held to be accidental and the repudiation based on the survey report was rejected.
Issue (ii): whether the expression "FFF" in the policy covered furniture, fixtures and fittings.
Analysis: The policy description expressly referred to "FFF". That expression was read in the commercial context of the policy and could only mean furniture, fixtures and fittings. Ambiguity in a coverage clause had to be construed broadly in favour of the insured, while exclusionary reasoning could not be used to deny a risk plainly covered by the policy wording.
Conclusion: The policy was held to cover furniture, fixtures and fittings, and the insured was entitled to be compensated under that head.
Issue (iii): whether the insured proved the stock loss and whether the surveyor's assessment could displace the insured's documentary evidence, including the consequential question of interest.
Analysis: The insured produced stock statements, cost sheets, purchase orders, production movement records, cancellation emails, VAT returns, balance sheets and related contemporaneous business records. These materials were treated as sufficient base documents under the Evidence Act and were found to corroborate the claimed loss. The surveyor's uniform per-unit valuation, exclusion of non-identifiable goods, and deduction for depreciation and salvage were found to be unreasoned and perverse on the facts. The interest award granted by the National Commission was, however, modified in amount and commencement.
Conclusion: The insured's stock loss was accepted, the surveyor's contrary valuation was disbelieved, and the interest component was modified.
Final Conclusion: The insurer's challenge failed, the insured succeeded on the principal claim, and the only modification was to the rate and commencement of interest.
Ratio Decidendi: In a fire insurance claim, once actual fire damage is proved and there is no finding that the insured caused the fire or that an exclusion applies, the precise origin of the fire is immaterial; coverage clauses must be construed broadly, and contemporaneous business records may establish the quantum of loss where a surveyor's contrary assessment is unreasoned or perverse.
Issues: Whether the impugned demand order under Section 73 of the Assam Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was sustainable when no proper prior show cause notice under Section 73(1) had been issued and only a summary in FORM GST DRC-01 together with an attachment showing determination of tax had been served.
Analysis: The governing scheme under Section 73 of the Assam Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires the proper officer to serve a show cause notice under sub-section (1), followed where appropriate by a statement under sub-section (3), and thereafter to pass an order under sub-section (9). Rule 142(1)(a) of the Assam Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 contemplates service of a summary in FORM GST DRC-01 along with the notice, but the summary is not a substitute for the statutory show cause notice. The Court found that the record disclosed only a summary of show cause notice and an attachment to determination of tax, without a valid prior notice under Section 73(1). In these circumstances, the initiation of proceedings and the resulting order could not be treated as compliant with the mandatory statutory procedure. The Court also relied on the requirement of compliance with Section 75(4) where hearing is required.
Conclusion: The impugned order was held unsustainable in law and was set aside and quashed for want of a proper prior show cause notice and non-compliance with the statutory procedure.
Issues: Whether the rejection of the section 9 insolvency application on the ground of pre-existing dispute, without adequate reasons or analysis of the pleadings, could be sustained.
Analysis: The appellate body found that material had been placed to indicate absence of a pre-existing dispute at the stage of admission, yet the adjudicating authority dismissed the application without examining the rival pleadings or recording reasons showing why the dispute was genuine and existing. An order rejecting insolvency initiation must disclose logical reasoning and application of mind, particularly when the existence of a dispute is the basis for refusal to admit the petition.
Conclusion: The impugned orders were unsustainable and were quashed. The appeals were allowed and the matters were remitted for fresh consideration on merits.
Final Conclusion: The insolvency applications are to be reconsidered afresh by the adjudicating authority on the existing record without being influenced by the appellate observations.
Ratio Decidendi: A rejection of a section 9 insolvency application on the ground of pre-existing dispute must be supported by reasoned findings based on application of mind to the pleadings and material on record.
Issues: Whether the provisional attachment of property of equivalent value under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was sustainable where the tainted amount was alleged to have been routed through business activities and the appellants claimed that execution responsibility lay with the subcontractor.
Analysis: The appeals arose from confirmation of provisional attachment based on allegations of submission of fake bitumen invoices and generation of proceeds of crime quantified at Rs. 1,08,95,583/-. The Tribunal held that the contractual responsibility for execution of the road work remained with the appellant company, and the plea that the subcontractor alone was responsible was not supported by reliable documentary proof. The Tribunal further held that the definition of proceeds of crime is not confined to property directly derived from the scheduled offence, but extends to the value of such property where the tainted property is unavailable, thereby permitting attachment of property of equivalent value. It also found no merit in the challenge based on the earlier High Court order or on the allegation that the adjudicating order was mechanical.
Conclusion: The challenge to the provisional attachment failed, and the attachment of equivalent value was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The appellants remained liable for the alleged laundering-linked loss, and the impugned attachment order stood sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: Where proceeds of crime are not traceable, the authority may attach property of equivalent value, and a subcontracting arrangement does not by itself displace the principal contractor's responsibility absent cogent proof.
Issues: (i) Whether additions made under section 153A of the Income tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2013 14 (an unabated/completed year) on the basis of material seized from third parties and third party statements, without any incriminating material seized from the assessee's own possession, are sustainable.
Analysis: The legal framework distinguishes between abated/pending assessments and unabated/completed assessments for the purposes of section 153A of the Income tax Act, 1961. For unabated years, jurisdiction to make additions under section 153A is conditioned upon discovery and seizure of incriminating material belonging to the assessee that has a direct nexus to the assessment year being reassessed. Third party documents or statements qualify as incriminating material against an assessee only where they are corroborated by material seized from the assessee or are properly transferred/handed over in terms of the prescribed hand over procedure (enabling initiation of proceedings under the separate provision for third party material). Post search investigation reports, third party Whatsapp chats, or a later quashed adjudication order cannot substitute for incriminating material seized from the assessee or for compliance with the hand over procedure. Applying these principles to the facts, the assessment order and the appellate order record that no seized papers or seized electronic records from the assessee's premises were relied upon to map any incriminating material to AY 2013 14; the Assessing Officer relied solely on material seized from third parties and on third party statements and post search findings.
Conclusion: Additions made under section 153A for AY 2013 14 on the basis of third party seized material and third party statements without any incriminating material seized from the assessee's own possession, and without following the hand over/transfer procedure, are unsustainable and the impugned assessments are quashed in respect of those additions.
Issues: (i) Whether a pre-deposit made by debiting the electronic cash/credit ledger through form DRC-03 constitutes a valid pre-deposit for purposes of preferring an appeal; (ii) Whether the appeal requires remand to the Commissioner (Appeals) for de novo hearing because the Commissioner (Appeals) did not decide the merits as required under Section 35A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 85(5) of the Finance Act, 1994.
Analysis: Deposits made through form DRC-03 by debiting the electronic cash or credit ledger, when made prior to 28.10.2022, are to be treated as valid pre-deposits under the statutory scheme governing pre-deposit requirements. The statutory framework applicable to Service Tax matters recognises Section 35F as governing pre-deposit obligations, and Section 35A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (read with Section 85(5) of the Finance Act, 1994 as applicable) requires the appellate authority to state points for determination, decisions thereon and reasons in its order; where this has not been done, the appellate process is procedurally defective and merits reconsideration. Established judicial decisions accept pre-deposits made in alternate prescribed forms as valid and require that appeals not be dismissed on hyper-technical grounds where a pre-deposit in substance has been made.
Conclusion: (i) The deposit made through DRC-03 by debiting the electronic cash/credit ledger is a valid pre-deposit. (ii) The matter is remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) for de novo hearing and fresh decision on merits in accordance with Section 35A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as applied to Service Tax matters under Section 85(5) of the Finance Act, 1994.
Issues: Whether the residues emerging in the course of refining crude sunflower oil, namely sunflower mud, soap stock, gums, wax, fatty acids and spent earth, are excisable products liable to central excise duty.
Analysis: The residues arose incidentally during the refining process and the dispute turned on whether their saleability and proposed tariff classification as Heading 1522 00 20/90 could make them dutiable goods. The same dispute had already been decided in the assessee's own case, where the Tribunal had held that such residue is waste and not a manufactured product, and that mere saleability does not convert waste into excisable goods. That view had also been affirmed by the Supreme Court and followed again in a later Tribunal order involving the same assessee.
Conclusion: The residues are not liable to central excise duty and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Ratio Decidendi: Mere saleability of an incidental residue does not by itself constitute manufacture or create excisability; such waste remains non-dutiable unless it is shown to be a manufactured product.
Issues: Whether a primary agricultural cooperative society can claim deduction under section 80P of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for A.Y.2017-18 where the return claiming the deduction was filed belatedly on 28.11.2019 during assessment proceedings.
Analysis: Section 80A(5) requires that a claim for specified deductions must be made in the return of income, but does not prescribe that the return must be filed within the due date. Section 80AC, as amended w.e.f. A.Y.2018-19, conditions certain Chapter-C deductions on filing the return on or before the due date under section 139(1); that amendment is prospective and applies only to assessment years commencing on or after 1 April 2018. For A.Y.2017-18 the amended condition in section 80AC(ii) is not applicable. The assessee made an express claim for deduction under section 80P in the belated return filed during assessment proceedings. The matter was remitted to the Assessing Officer for examination of the claim on merits since the statutory bar introduced from A.Y.2018-19 does not operate retrospectively to deny the 80P claim for A.Y.2017-18.
Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to have the deduction under section 80P considered despite filing the return belatedly for A.Y.2017-18; the matter is remanded to the Assessing Officer for adjudication of the claim on merits in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes and the issue of entitlement to deduction under section 80P for A.Y.2017-18 is restored to the Assessing Officer for merits determination.
Issues: Whether the appellant could disown the filing of the appeal and sustain allegations that the counsels had acted without instructions and with misconduct, so as to disturb the earlier dismissal of the appeal for non-compliance under the NCLAT Rules, 2016.
Analysis: The records showed the appellant's signature on the memorandum of appeal and supporting affidavits, along with a vakalatnama in favour of counsel. The subsequent denial of instruction was found to be vague and unsupported by any contemporaneous complaint or reliable material. The tribunal accepted the explanation that the appeal had been filed through counsel engaged by the appellant and that no professional misconduct was established against the counsels. The allegations were viewed as an attempt to falsely implicate the advocates after the appeal had already been dismissed for failure to cure defects under Rule 26(3) and Rule 26(4) of the NCLAT Rules, 2016.
Conclusion: The challenge to the dismissal order was rejected, the allegations against the counsels were disbelieved, and the dismissal of the appeal was affirmed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether ad hoc disallowance of 10% of commission expenses was justified in the absence of rejection of books of account or specific defects in the supporting evidence.
1.2 Whether ad hoc disallowance of 10% of land development expenses was justified where substantial payments were made to statutory and regulatory authorities through banking channels and books of account were not rejected.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Ad hoc disallowance of commission expenses
2.1.1 Interpretation and reasoning
The Tribunal noted that the assessee, a real estate developer, had claimed commission expenses and furnished details including names of agents, addresses, PAN, TDS deduction under section 194H, and proof of payments through banking channels. The auditor under section 44AB had not reported any discrepancies in the books, and the Assessing Officer had not rejected the books of account nor demonstrated any specific instance of non-genuineness or incorrectness of the commission expenditure. The disallowance was made solely on the ground that corresponding sale deeds/sale invoices and the basis of commission payment were not furnished to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal held that, in the absence of rejection of books of account and without pointing out any specific discrepancy or defect in the commission expenditure, resorting to an arbitrary or ad hoc disallowance of 10% was not permissible. Where the assessee has substantiated payments with relevant particulars and banking and TDS evidence, a mere general doubt or perception of "unreasonableness" of quantum is insufficient to sustain an ad hoc disallowance.
2.1.2 Conclusions
The Tribunal concluded that the 10% ad hoc disallowance of commission expenses was unjustified and directed deletion of the addition made on this account.
2.2 Ad hoc disallowance of land development expenses
2.2.1 Interpretation and reasoning
The assessee had claimed substantial land development expenses, comprising (i) major payments to statutory and regulatory authorities (including Yadadri Temple Development Authority, local municipality and State Real Estate Regulatory Authority) towards land conversion and development charges, and (ii) purchase of materials and service charges like carpentry, electrical work, JCB and tractor hire, etc. The assessee produced ledger accounts, bank statements, demand notes and orders from authorities in support of significant payments, including specific amounts paid to Yadadri Temple Development Authority, the municipality and the regulatory authority, all through banking channels. For some items, especially purchases from unorganised sectors (e.g. bricks, sand), full supporting bills and vouchers could not be produced.
The Tribunal observed that the Assessing Officer did not reject the assessee's books of account, did not identify any particular item of expenditure as bogus or inflated, and did not make any specific finding as to incorrectness of entries. The disallowance was made by applying an ad hoc rate of 10% to the total land development expenses on the ground of general non-satisfaction and lack of complete vouchers. The Tribunal held that, when the majority of expenses are supported by documentary evidence and payments to government and regulatory bodies are through identifiable banking channels, and when books of account are neither rejected nor any concrete defects pointed out, a flat ad hoc disallowance merely for non-production of some vouchers for certain items is not justified. Expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for business cannot be disallowed in an arbitrary percentage without specific identification of unsupported or unverifiable items.
2.2.2 Conclusions
The Tribunal held that the 10% ad hoc disallowance of land development expenses, without identifying particular unsupported or non-genuine items and without rejection of books of account, was unsustainable, and directed deletion of the addition.
2.3 Overall result
On both issues, the Tribunal set aside the order of the appellate authority and directed the Assessing Officer to delete the additions made on account of ad hoc disallowance of commission and land development expenses.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether the amount shown as "lease rent income" in the appellant's books of account, arising solely from application of Ind AS-17 to a contract manufacturing arrangement, constituted taxable consideration for a "declared service" of renting / lease under the Finance Act, 1994.
(2) Whether, on the facts, the underlying activity between the appellant and its principal was in the nature of manufacture covered by the negative list / exemption for processes amounting to manufacture, thereby excluding the transaction from service tax.
(3) Whether entries in financial statements and the method of accounting, by themselves and without evidence of a leasing or renting arrangement, could be made the sole basis for levy and demand of service tax.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Taxability of "lease rent income" under declared service / renting
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The demand was raised solely on the basis that a portion of the consideration received under the contract manufacturing agreement had been accounted for as "lease rent income" pursuant to Ind AS-17, and was therefore treated by the Department as consideration for a declared service under section 66E(f).
(b) The Tribunal relied on its earlier decision in an identically structured contract manufacturing arrangement for the same principal, where it was held that:
* For levy of service tax, there must be an "activity for a consideration" within a contractual relationship, and the payment must be attributable to a specific taxable service.
* Components such as "interest" and "depreciation", carved out of conversion charges and disclosed as "rental income" for accounting-standard compliance, did not constitute consideration for renting or leasing, as there was no service of renting / leasing being provided.
(c) It was emphasised that the appellant was not providing any service of renting of immovable property or lease of plant and machinery to the principal; the arrangement was for manufacture and sale of goods, carried out in the appellant's own factory using its own assets, over which the appellant retained exclusive and effective control.
(d) The Tribunal adopted the reasoning that mere description of certain components as "rental income" in the Profit and Loss Account or balance sheet, in compliance with Ind AS-17, cannot convert the manufacturing arrangement into a leasing / renting transaction for purposes of service tax.
Conclusions
(e) The amount shown as "lease rent income" in the appellant's books did not represent consideration for any declared service of renting or lease under the Finance Act, 1994, and was not exigible to service tax on that basis.
Issue (2): Nature of activity - manufacture covered by negative list / exemption
Legal framework (as discussed)
(a) The Tribunal, referring to the earlier decision it followed, noted section 66D(f) of the Finance Act, 1994, which includes in the negative list "services by way of carrying out any process amounting to manufacture or production of goods...".
(b) It also noted the continued exemption, via the relevant exemption notification, for "services of any process amounting to manufacture or production of goods".
Interpretation and reasoning
(c) The agreement between the appellant and the principal was examined in the earlier followed decision and held to be "solely and exclusively for the purpose of manufacturing of goods" (including related activities such as packaging) by the contract manufacturer for the brand owner.
(d) The Tribunal applied that reasoning to the present appeal, noting that the appellant similarly manufactured goods in its own factory, paid central excise duty and VAT on the entire consideration for the sale of goods, and there was no separate service element of leasing / renting property or assets.
Conclusions
(e) The dominant and real nature of the arrangement was manufacture of goods, an activity covered by the negative list / exemption, and not a taxable service of renting or leasing; therefore, no service tax could be demanded on the consideration received under such manufacturing arrangement.
Issue (3): Effect of accounting treatment and balance sheet entries on taxability
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The impugned orders proceeded on the footing that once the appellant itself had shown "lease income" in its accounts following Ind AS-17, it could not dispute taxability on that footing.
(b) The Tribunal, following its prior detailed analysis, reiterated that:
* Accounting standards (AS-19 / Ind AS-17) are designed to ensure accurate and comparable financial reporting; they may require treating certain arrangements "in substance" as leases for accounting purposes even where there is no lease in the legal sense.
* Such accounting treatment and presentation in the balance sheet or profit and loss account are "book entries" and cannot, by themselves, create or define a taxable service under the Finance Act, 1994.
* Balance sheet entries cannot be treated as "consideration" or "gross amount charged" for a taxable service under section 67 without independent evidence of a corresponding taxable transaction or service actually rendered.
(c) The Tribunal accepted and adopted the view that figures and classifications in financial statements (including those mandated by Ind AS-17) are not determinative of the nature of the transaction for service tax purposes, and cannot be the sole basis for raising a demand.
(d) It was specifically noted that the appellant had paid central excise duty and VAT on the entire consideration for the sale of manufactured goods, and that the "lease income" arose only from the internal accounting reclassification required by Ind AS-17.
Conclusions
(e) The Department could not rely merely on the "lease income" entry in the financial statements to re-characterise a manufacturing arrangement as a leasing / renting service and to raise service tax demand; method of accounting and book entries do not determine taxability in the absence of proof of an underlying taxable service.
(f) As the demand was founded exclusively on such accounting entries, without establishing a taxable renting / leasing service, the demand of service tax, interest and the consequential penalty was held to be unsustainable, and the impugned order was set aside with consequential relief.
Issues: (i) Whether the appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, filed by a shareholder and preference shareholder of the corporate debtor, was maintainable in law. (ii) Whether the order admitting the corporate debtor into CIRP under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, suffered from any legal infirmity.
Issue (i): Whether the appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, filed by a shareholder and preference shareholder of the corporate debtor, was maintainable in law.
Analysis: The appeal was filed by the appellant in its capacity as a shareholder, with pleadings showing that it was a passive investor with no independent business, assets, employees, or operational role. The Tribunal held that shareholder interest is only reflective or derivative and does not amount to a direct legal injury for the purposes of being a person aggrieved under Section 61. The plea that preference shares conferred creditor status was rejected in the absence of any debt-creating agreement or contractual clause converting the investment into financial debt. The Tribunal relied on the principle that shareholders, even majority shareholders, do not acquire appellate locus merely because CIRP may affect the value of their investment.
Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable, and the appellant was not a person aggrieved under Section 61.
Issue (ii): Whether the order admitting the corporate debtor into CIRP under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, suffered from any legal infirmity.
Analysis: The Tribunal found that the financial creditor had extended facilities to the borrower and that the corporate debtor had executed a corporate guarantee securing those facilities. On default by the borrower, the guarantor's liability crystallised, and such liability was coextensive with that of the principal debtor under the law of suretyship. The scope of Section 7 inquiry was confined to the existence of financial debt and default, both of which stood established. The Tribunal held that the creditor was not required to exhaust remedies first against the principal borrower and that the corporate debtor's description as a passive entity or its participation in an AOP did not negate the legal effect of the guarantee.
Conclusion: The admission order disclosed no legal infirmity and was under Section 7.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the CIRP admission failed on both maintainability and merits, and the insolvency proceedings against the corporate debtor were upheld.
Ratio Decidendi: A shareholder whose interest is merely reflective or derivative, without direct legal injury, has no locus under Section 61 to challenge CIRP admission, and a corporate guarantor may be proceeded against under Section 7 on default of the guaranteed debt because its liability is coextensive with that of the principal debtor.
Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 45 days in refiling the appeal could be condoned. (ii) Whether the delay of 12 days in filing the appeal could be condoned. (iii) Whether the inordinate delay of 953 days in filing the claim before the liquidator could be condoned and the claim entertained.
Issue (i): Whether the delay of 45 days in refiling the appeal could be condoned.
Analysis: The delay in refiling was explained as having occurred due to difficulty in obtaining records, preparing the file, and rectifying defects pointed out by the Registry. The explanation was accepted as sufficient for the limited delay in refiling.
Conclusion: The delay of 45 days in refiling the appeal was condoned in favour of the Appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the delay of 12 days in filing the appeal could be condoned.
Analysis: The certified copy was applied for within time and the period spent in obtaining it was excluded. The appeal was also found to have been filed within the outer limit prescribed under the insolvency statute, and the explanation for the short delay was accepted.
Conclusion: The delay of 12 days in filing the appeal was condoned in favour of the Appellant.
Issue (iii): Whether the inordinate delay of 953 days in filing the claim before the liquidator could be condoned and the claim entertained.
Analysis: The claim was filed far beyond the last date fixed in the liquidation process and long after commencement of liquidation. The explanation for the delay was found vague and unsupported by exceptional circumstances. Inordinate delay in lodging the claim was held not to deserve condonation, and the claim was treated as rightly rejected.
Conclusion: The delay of 953 days in filing the claim was not condoned and the rejection of the claim was upheld against the Appellant.
Final Conclusion: The appeal failed on merits because the belated claim before the liquidator could not be revived, although the delay in refiling and in filing the appeal itself was excused.
Ratio Decidendi: A highly belated claim in liquidation proceedings cannot be entertained in the absence of a credible and exceptional explanation for the delay, even where short procedural delays in refiling or filing the appeal are condoned.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether initiation and continuation of civil contempt proceedings for alleged disobedience of the order dated 21.10.2024 was justified in light of subsequent conduct and payments made by the appellant.
1.2 Whether delayed compliance and dishonour of cheques, later substituted by bank drafts and further payments, constituted wilful disobedience warranting contempt at the present stage.
1.3 Whether, upon setting aside the impugned contempt order, liberty should be reserved to the respondent to initiate fresh contempt or other appropriate proceedings if future circumstances so require.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Justification for contempt proceedings; effect of subsequent compliance and delay
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court noted that the appellant had earlier given an undertaking before the Adjudicating Authority on 21.10.2024 to pay 20% of the amount to 19 allottees by 30.11.2024, to complete MoUs with homebuyers, and to individually issue post-dated cheques to settle the matter by 31.03.2025.
2.2 It was observed that contempt proceedings were triggered because cheques issued in pursuance of the undertaking were dishonoured, leading the Adjudicating Authority to direct initiation of contempt proceedings by order dated 22.08.2025.
2.3 The Court recorded the appellant's explanation that there was always an intention to settle with all allottees; settlements were completed with 9 out of 19 allottees; and for the remaining 10, MoUs could not be finalized due to issues regarding the final amount, not due to any intention to disobey the order.
2.4 The Court further took note of statements that the appellant would hand over bank drafts for the 20% amount to remaining allottees whose cheques were not honoured, and would endeavour to enter MoUs for final settlement, resulting in an interim order that the Adjudicating Authority should not proceed further with the contempt at that stage.
2.5 In a subsequent order, the Court recorded that demand drafts had been prepared for certain respondents; some allottees could not be contacted and cheques were ready for them; there was a dispute regarding lesser amounts in proposed drafts; and the appellant undertook to pay as per amounts reflected in the original cheques, with any differential amount to be paid by demand draft or RTGS within three days.
2.6 At the final hearing, the Court noted the appellant's statement that the entire 20% (cheque amount) had been paid to all 9 allottees as contemplated by order dated 21.10.2024, and that dishonoured cheques had been made good by bank drafts.
2.7 While the respondent argued that payments were delayed and not made within the time stipulated by the Court, allegedly showing lack of truthfulness, the Court focused on the overall sequence of events, the steps taken towards settlement, and the actual payment of the 20% amount as directed.
2.8 On this basis, the Court found that the material on record did not establish wilful disobedience of the order of the Adjudicating Authority warranting continuation of contempt proceedings "at this stage".
Conclusions
2.9 The Court held that, having regard to the subsequent compliance and conduct of the appellant, this was not a fit case for initiation or continuation of contempt proceedings for disobedience of the order dated 21.10.2024 at the present stage.
2.10 The order dated 22.08.2025 of the Adjudicating Authority directing initiation of contempt proceedings was set aside.
Issue 3: Liberty to initiate future proceedings
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 While setting aside the impugned contempt order, the Court clarified that it was proceeding on the basis of the current factual position, including payment of the 20% amount as stated, and without examining the merits of the underlying claims.
2.12 The Court considered it appropriate not to foreclose the respondent's remedies in case circumstances in future disclose grounds for contempt or other proceedings.
Conclusions
2.13 The Court granted liberty to the respondent to take such proceedings, including contempt proceedings, if future circumstances so arise.
2.14 The Court expressly clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the substantive claims of any party and disposed of the appeal accordingly.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in a dispute over movable assets lying in leased premises and in possession of the liquidator, the burden of proving ownership lay on the liquidator or on the lessor claiming third-party ownership.
1.2 Whether the lessor established ownership or superior rights over the disputed movable assets through the share purchase agreement, the unexecuted draft premise-use agreement, historical lists, and SAP records.
1.3 Whether the lessor's prolonged inaction and failure to object during CIRP and liquidation, despite public notices and inspections, constituted acquiescence and justified inclusion of the assets in the liquidation estate under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
1.4 Whether the auction sale of the assets and the consequent direction permitting the liquidator and successful auction purchaser to access the premises and remove all movable assets were legally sustainable.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Burden of proof regarding ownership of movable assets in leased premises
Legal framework
2.1 The judgment considers Sections 18(1)(f), 34, 35 and 36 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, and the general rules on burden of proof under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
2.2 Section 18(1)(f) empowers the resolution professional to take control and custody of assets over which the corporate debtor has ownership rights. Sections 35(1)(b) and (c) mandate the liquidator to take into custody all assets of the corporate debtor and sell them. Section 36 provides that assets over which the corporate debtor has ownership rights form part of the liquidation estate, and third-party owned assets are to be excluded.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court noted that the resolution professional, upon commencement of CIRP, took control and custody of assets at the leased premises under Section 18(1)(f), after preparing a detailed inventory of 1,874 items, countersigned by the ex-CEO of the corporate debtor, and after audit by statutory auditors.
2.4 The premises remained under lock and key with the liquidator during CIRP and liquidation. The Adjudicating Authority found, and the Court affirmed, that the liquidator had lawful and continuous possession and legal custody of the assets during the insolvency process.
2.5 The Court held that where movable property is in the lawful possession and custody of the liquidator as assets of the corporate debtor, and no contrary ownership is asserted in time, a presumption under Section 36 of the Code operates that such assets form part of the liquidation estate.
2.6 Applying general evidentiary principles under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, the Court held that the burden of proving ownership lies on the person asserting ownership contrary to the party in possession. Thus, once the liquidator is in possession claiming the assets of the corporate debtor, the burden to displace this presumption rests on the third party (here, the lessor) asserting a competing title.
2.7 The Court approved the Adjudicating Authority's reasoning that it was "misplaced" for the lessor to demand ownership proof from the liquidator instead of producing its own purchase memos, asset register, books of account or financial statements.
Conclusions
2.8 The burden of proving ownership over the disputed movable assets lay on the lessor (Appellant) and not on the liquidator. The liquidator was not required to further prove title in the face of mere assertions unaccompanied by cogent evidence from the lessor.
Issue 2 - Whether the lessor established ownership through SPA, Draft Agreement, lists and SAP records
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The Court examined the share purchase agreement dated 27.11.2017 and found that the Appellant was not a party or signatory to it. Any rights or claims based on that agreement properly lay with the signatory company (RCL), which is itself in liquidation. The liquidator of RCL had never raised any claim over the assets.
2.10 The Draft Agreement for premise use (relied on by the lessor to show installation of its own assets such as rack space, power, HVAC and other infrastructure) was found to be unsigned, undated, inchoate, and lacking an effective date. It was treated as a mere draft annexed to the SPA, evidencing only a contemplated service arrangement, not a concluded contract conferring title.
2.11 The Court held that neither the SPA nor the Draft Agreement expressly conferred ownership or title over specific movable assets in favour of the lessor, nor did they identify any item-wise list of such assets within the leased premises.
2.12 The Court noted that the list of assets relied upon by the lessor (purportedly as of 2017):
(a) did not specifically correlate to the assets lying inside the premises occupied by the corporate debtor,
(b) mixed items allegedly belonging to the lessor and to RCL,
(c) included assets of common use in common areas (e.g., roof installations) distinct from fixtures installed inside the leased premises by the corporate debtor, and
(d) was therefore incomplete and insufficient as a foundational basis to establish specific ownership.
2.13 On SAP records, the Court recorded the contention that they are internal, editable and self-generated documents. It further held that the SAP records were not placed before the Adjudicating Authority and that even before the Appellate Tribunal, the underlying invoices referred to in the SAP system, which could have substantiated ownership, were admittedly not filed.
2.14 Given (i) the lack of any executed agreement conferring specific asset-wise ownership, (ii) the absence of a clear, demarcated and substantiated list correlated to the disputed inventory, and (iii) the failure to produce purchase documents or financial statements evidencing ownership, the Court held that the Appellant had failed to discharge the burden of proof.
Conclusions
2.15 The lessor did not establish ownership or superior title to the movable assets lying in the leased premises. The SPA and unexecuted Draft Agreement did not confer enforceable rights over the disputed inventories, and the lists and SAP records filed were inadequate and unproven.
Issue 3 - Effect of the lessor's inaction and acquiescence during CIRP and liquidation
Legal framework
2.16 The Court considered the conduct of parties in the context of Sections 18, 35 and 36 of the Code, the time-bound nature of CIRP and liquidation, and the public auction process under the Liquidation Regulations.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.17 The corporate debtor entered CIRP on 26.02.2020. The resolution professional repeatedly visited the premises, took inventory and control, and conducted statutory audits. Emails were sent to RCL (a party to the SPA) in July 2020 seeking information; RCL's reply of 28.07.2020 did not raise any objection or conflicting claim of ownership over the assets.
2.18 During CIRP, no objection or competing ownership claim was raised by either RCL or the Appellant regarding assets lying in the leased premises.
2.19 Upon commencement of liquidation on 17.03.2023, the liquidator issued several public e-auction notices (June 2023, August 2023, September 2024 and October 2024) and repeatedly sought access to the premises for inspection and valuation. The Appellant was fully aware that inspections were being carried out for the purpose of auction.
2.20 The Court noted that the Appellant's first objection (July 2023) concerned non-payment of rent, not ownership. In IA No. 4065 of 2023, the Adjudicating Authority on 06.11.2023 directed that rent be paid on ALV basis and directed the Appellant to allow inspections. Even at this stage, the Appellant raised no dispute about ownership of the inventory.
2.21 In a separate application for recovery of outstanding rent and maintenance (IA No. 1342 of 2023), the Appellant itself pleaded that it had permitted inspections by potential bidders of "goods/assets of ITV lying in the building", again without asserting any contrary ownership.
2.22 The Court emphasised that:
(a) despite repeated communications from the liquidator in February and June 2024 requesting access for inspection and valuation, the Appellant did not seek joint inspection for ownership determination;
(b) the first demand for proof of ownership and claim that some assets belonged to the Appellant and RCL was raised only on 24.12.2024, after completion of the auction, issuance of the sale certificate (10.12.2024), and full payment by the successful auction purchaser; and
(c) the proposal for a joint inspection from the Appellant came as late as February 2025, long after the auction had concluded.
2.23 On these facts, the Court agreed with the Adjudicating Authority that the Appellant's prolonged silence and failure to object during both CIRP and most of the liquidation process amounted to tacit acquiescence to the treatment of the assets as belonging to the corporate debtor.
2.24 The Court held that once the inventory was found in the leased premises, in the possession of the resolution professional and then the liquidator, and no contrary claims were timely received, inclusion of the assets in the liquidation estate under Section 36 operated in favour of the liquidator.
Conclusions
2.25 The lessor's conduct during CIRP and liquidation-raising no timely ownership claim while being fully aware of inspections and auctions-constituted acquiescence. This justified treating the movable assets as part of the liquidation estate and placed the onus firmly on the lessor to prove any contrary entitlement, which it failed to do.
Issue 4 - Validity of auction sale and direction permitting removal of assets
Legal framework
2.26 The Court considered the objectives of the Code and the Liquidation Regulations, especially provisions requiring value maximisation, time-bound completion, and distribution of sale proceeds (including Regulation 42(2) of the Liquidation Regulations).
2.27 The Appellant relied on a precedent holding that a liquidator cannot confer a better title than the company itself had, and that sale of property with defective title may be voidable. The Court examined that proposition in context.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.28 The Court accepted the legal proposition that a liquidator cannot transfer better title than that of the corporate debtor and that buyers should be cautious about title. However, it distinguished the precedent relied on by the Appellant as involving assignment of a lease requiring statutory permission which was absent there; the factual matrix was held to be different from the present case.
2.29 Here, there was:
(a) no concrete evidence that the assets were not owned by the corporate debtor;
(b) continuous lawful custody and control by the resolution professional and liquidator;
(c) timely, public and multiple auction notices;
(d) completion of auction on "as is where is, as is what is and no recourse" basis, with the successful bidder paying the full consideration of Rs. 4.18 crore, and issuance of a sale certificate and possession memo specifying 1,874 units; and
(e) distribution of sale proceeds to stakeholders in terms of Regulation 42(2).
2.30 The Court noted that the Appellant had not challenged the conduct of the auction itself, the declaration of the highest bidder, or the fairness of the process. Its objection arose only after sale completion, focusing on ownership without supportive evidence.
2.31 Emphasising that liquidation is a time-bound process and that undue interference post-completion of auction and distribution of proceeds would derail the insolvency resolution framework, the Court held that there were no grounds to unsettle the sale or to deny access to the successful auction purchaser.
2.32 The Court endorsed the Adjudicating Authority's finding that insisting on proof of ownership from the liquidator and obstructing access without producing any credible contrary evidence amounted to unlawful obstruction of the liquidator's statutory duties.
Conclusions
2.33 The auction sale of the movable assets was valid and unimpeached. The liquidator lawfully sold assets forming part of the liquidation estate, and the proceeds were already distributed. The direction permitting the liquidator and successful auction purchaser to access the premises and remove all movable assets and restraining the lessor from causing obstruction was held to be correct. The appeal challenging that direction was dismissed as devoid of substance.
Issues: Whether an order under Section 73 of the Assam Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is sustainable when no prior show cause notice is issued and the taxpayer is served only with a summary of the show cause notice in Form GST DRC-01 and an attachment styled as determination of tax.
Analysis: The order was challenged on the footing that proceedings under Section 73 had been initiated without a proper prior notice under sub-section (1), and that the summary in Form GST DRC-01 together with the attachment to determination of tax could not take the place of the statutory show cause notice. The Court noted the earlier common judgment holding that a summary of show cause notice is not a substitute for the notice required under Section 73(1), and that the statement under Section 73(3), the order under Section 73(9), and the summaries in DRC forms are all distinct statutory steps to be taken by the proper officer. Compliance with the statutory sequence and the requirement of prior notice were treated as conditions precedent to a valid order under Section 73.
Conclusion: The absence of a proper prior show cause notice rendered the impugned order unsustainable in law. The writ petition was allowed and the order was set aside and quashed, with liberty to the authorities to proceed afresh in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: Proceedings under Section 73 cannot be sustained on the basis of a summary notice alone where the statute requires a prior show cause notice issued by the proper officer.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory demand order under Section 73 is invalid unless the mandatory prior show cause notice and the prescribed procedural steps are strictly complied with by the proper officer.
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