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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the penalty order under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of addition on account of late payment of Provident Fund and Employee's State Insurance under Section 36(1)(va), was vitiated for having been passed without granting adequate opportunity of hearing.
1.2 Consequentially, whether the matter relating to penalty on such addition required remand to the competent authority for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of penalty order under Section 270A in absence of adequate opportunity of hearing
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court considered the imposition of penalty under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in relation to an addition made under Section 36(1)(va) towards late payment of PF and ESI, arising out of a show-cause notice.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court recorded that two other additions forming part of the impugned penalty order, namely disallowance under Section 14A and disallowance of depreciation on goodwill under Section 32(1), had already been deleted by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, leaving only the issue of addition on account of late payment of PF and ESI under Section 36(1)(va) as surviving for consideration in relation to penalty.
2.3 It was noted that the assessee had requested that the penalty proceedings be kept in abeyance owing to pendency of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal and that the penalty order was alleged to have been passed without granting any further or effective opportunity to controvert the proposed penalty on the surviving addition.
2.4 Counsel for the revenue fairly stated before the Court that a fresh opportunity would be afforded to the assessee in respect of the penalty pertaining to the said addition of Rs. 1,46,79,870/- under Section 36(1)(va).
2.5 In view of this statement and the circumstances on record, the Court accepted that the impugned penalty order should not stand and that a fresh decision was warranted after granting adequate opportunity of hearing and considering the assessee's reply/representation.
Conclusions
2.6 The impugned penalty order and consequential demand notice, to the extent they related to penalty under Section 270A founded on the addition for late payment of PF and ESI under Section 36(1)(va), were quashed and set aside.
2.7 The matter was remitted to the concerned authority to pass a fresh order under Section 270A, confined to the said addition of Rs. 1,46,79,870/-, strictly in accordance with law and after affording adequate opportunity of hearing and considering the assessee's reply/representation/explanation.
2.8 The Court directed that the entire exercise of fresh adjudication be completed within 12 weeks from the date of receipt of the order, and that the assessee shall fully cooperate with the department in the proceedings.
Issues: (i) whether the Assessing Officer, after remand, could travel beyond the appellate directions and decide the petitioner's entitlement to set-off of entry tax; (ii) whether the impugned assessment order was liable to be set aside for being in excess of jurisdiction and contrary to the binding appellate order.
Issue (i): Whether the Assessing Officer, after remand, could travel beyond the appellate directions and again decide the petitioner's entitlement to set-off of entry tax.
Analysis: The appellate order had already accepted the petitioner's eligibility for set-off under the relevant Government Orders and remanded the matter only for quantification of the entry tax paid. The remand, therefore, was confined to working out the amount due and did not reopen the substantive entitlement that had already been decided in the petitioner's favour. A subordinate authority could not sit in appeal over the appellate determination or re-examine the correctness of the relief already granted.
Conclusion: The Assessing Officer could not exceed the limited scope of remand and had no authority to deny the set-off once the appellate authority had decided the issue in principle.
Issue (ii): Whether the impugned assessment order was liable to be set aside for being in excess of jurisdiction and contrary to the binding appellate order.
Analysis: The impugned order disregarded the appellate directions by re-deciding the very entitlement that had been settled, instead of restricting itself to quantification. Such a course was inconsistent with judicial discipline and the binding effect of superior appellate orders on subordinate authorities. Since the proper function on remand was confined to computation and implementation, the order was legally unsustainable.
Conclusion: The impugned order was in excess of jurisdiction and was correctly set aside.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded, and the Assessing Officer was directed to comply with the appellate order only to the extent of quantifying the relief already recognised.
Ratio Decidendi: When an appellate authority has conclusively decided entitlement to a tax relief and remands the matter only for quantification, the subordinate authority cannot reopen the merits of that entitlement and must confine itself to the limited scope of remand.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether CENVAT credit is admissible on Service Tax paid under reverse charge in 2008 on technological and operational services rendered by an overseas service provider during 1998-1999.
1.2 Whether CENVAT credit is admissible on Service Tax paid on e-auction services used for sale of scrap generated in the manufacturing process.
1.3 Whether the extended period of limitation was validly invoked for recovery of the disputed CENVAT credit, in view of the disclosures made in statutory returns and audit proceedings.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: CENVAT credit on Service Tax paid under reverse charge for overseas services rendered in 1998-1999 but invoiced/paid in 2008
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court noted the law laid down in Indian National Shipowners Association v. Union of India, affirmed by the Supreme Court, to the effect that no Service Tax was payable on services rendered by overseas entities prior to 17.04.2006.
2.2 It was noted that reverse charge mechanism for such overseas services was introduced subsequent to the period 1998-1999 and was in force in 2008 when the payment was made and tax was discharged.
2.3 It was further noted that the Department did not dispute that the technological and operational services in question qualify as "input service" under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The Court accepted that though the services were rendered in 1998-1999, the commercial negotiations regarding the amount payable continued and concluded only in 2008, when the overseas entity raised an invoice and payment was made.
2.5 By 2008, the reverse charge mechanism for taxable services received from abroad had already been prescribed. The Court held that in these circumstances, the assessee cannot be faulted for discharging Service Tax on reverse charge basis on the 2008 payment.
2.6 While acknowledging that, technically, no Service Tax was exigible in 1998-1999 as per the Indian National Shipowners ruling, the Court observed that if the Department's stand was that no tax was payable for that period, it ought not to have accepted the tax payment made on reverse charge basis in 2008.
2.7 As the Department did not contend that the nature of the services was outside the scope of "input service" under Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the credit could not be denied on that ground.
Conclusions
2.8 CENVAT credit of Service Tax paid in 2008 on overseas technological and operational services rendered during 1998-1999 is admissible, there being no dispute on the input service nature of the services and no valid basis to deny credit once tax has been accepted by the Department; the demand of Rs. 34,61,434/- was set aside.
Issue 2: CENVAT credit on e-auction services used for sale of scrap
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.9 The Court referred to Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, under which all services used directly or indirectly, in or in relation to the manufacture of final products, are eligible as "input service".
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 The Court found that scrap is generated in the course of manufacture and must be cleared from time to time to enable the continuation of manufacturing activities.
2.11 The e-auction services were used for organizing sale of this scrap from the factory premises, which the Court treated as integrally connected with the manufacturing and clearance operations.
2.12 On this basis, the Court rejected the Department's contention that such e-auction services were unrelated to manufacturing activity.
Conclusions
2.13 E-auction services used for sale of scrap generated in the manufacturing process and cleared from the factory qualify as "input service" under Rule 2(l); CENVAT credit on such services is admissible on merits. The demand of Rs. 25,82,950/- was set aside.
Issue 3: Validity of invocation of extended period of limitation for recovery of CENVAT credit
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.14 The Court proceeded on the basis of the extended period provisions requiring suppression, mis-statement, or similar contumacious conduct by the assessee for invocation of a longer limitation period.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.15 The Court noted that the assessee had consistently declared the CENVAT credit taken in its monthly returns.
2.16 It was specifically observed that departmental audit had already pointed out the alleged ineligibility of the disputed credits in December 2009.
2.17 In this backdrop, the Show Cause Notice issued on 24.09.2013 was considered to have been issued after an inordinate delay of more than three years from the audit objection, despite full disclosure in returns.
2.18 The Court held that, in such circumstances, there was no material to sustain an allegation of suppression or willful mis-statement against the assessee so as to justify invocation of the extended limitation period.
Conclusions
2.19 The extended period of limitation was not validly invoked, as no case of suppression or similar misconduct was made out; the confirmed demands were therefore also liable to be set aside as time-barred.
2.20 Consequently, all demands, interest and penalties arising from the impugned order were set aside, and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether delay of 19 days in e-filing the audit report in Form 10BB, though filed before the return of income and available on record at the time of processing under Section 143(1), warranted denial of exemption under Sections 11 and 12.
1.2 Whether the prescribed timelines for furnishing audit reports in Form 10BB are mandatory or directory in nature, particularly in light of CBDT circulars and condonation powers under Section 119(2)(b).
1.3 Whether, in appellate proceedings, the appellate authority can and ought to condone delay in e-filing Form 10BB and direct consideration of the assessee's claim of exemption under Sections 11 and 12 on merits.
1.4 Consequentially, whether the adjustments made in intimation under Section 143(1) disallowing amounts claimed under Sections 11(1)(a), 11(2) and capital expenditure as application of income could be sustained once delay in filing Form 10BB is condoned.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Effect of delayed filing of Form 10BB and nature (mandatory/directory) of time limit
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court noted the requirement under Rule 12(2) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 for furnishing audit report in Form 10BB, one month prior to the due date of filing the return of income under Section 139(1), and the extension of such due dates by CBDT from time to time.
2.2 Reference was made to CBDT Circular No. 16/2024 dated 18-11-2024 issued under Section 119(2)(b), whereby:
(a) Pr. Commissioners/Commissioners of Income Tax are authorized to admit and deal with applications for condonation of delay in filing Forms 9A/10/10B/10BB for AY 2018-19 and subsequent years where delay is up to 365 days; and
(b) Pr. Chief Commissioners/Chief Commissioners/Director Generals of Income Tax are authorized to admit and deal with such applications where delay exceeds 365 days, subject to satisfaction regarding reasonable cause and genuine hardship.
2.3 The Court also referred to a Co-ordinate Bench decision which, following High Court authority and CBDT Circular No. 2/2020, had held that the requirement of filing audit report along with the return is directory and not mandatory, and that exemption under Section 11 cannot be denied merely on account of technical delay in uploading Form 10B when audit is completed in time.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 It was undisputed that for the relevant assessment year:
(a) the extended due date for filing the return under Section 139(1) was 15-11-2024;
(b) the assessee filed its return on 13-11-2024 within the extended due date;
(c) Form 10BB was e-filed on 04-11-2024, i.e., before the return filing date but 19 days after the extended due date for Form 10BB (15-10-2024); and
(d) the return was processed under Section 143(1) on 28-01-2025 when Form 10BB was already on record.
2.5 The Court observed that though time limits are specified for furnishing audit reports, CBDT itself has been extending such time limits and has provided a structured mechanism for condonation of delay through circulars, indicating that the rigour of the prescribed timelines is not absolute.
2.6 It was held that in cases where:
(a) there is substantial compliance in terms of completion of audit and issuance of audit report,
(b) the contents of the audit report are not disputed, and
(c) the delay in uploading the report is only procedural,
the delay should be condoned and such delay cannot be made the sole basis for denial of substantive exemption under Sections 11 and 12.
2.7 The Court reasoned that the timelines for filing Form 10BB, viewed in light of CBDT's own extensions and condonation instructions, are to be treated as directory rather than mandatory, particularly when no mala fides or adverse material is alleged by the Revenue.
Conclusions
2.8 The delay of 19 days in filing Form 10BB, which was filed prior to the filing of the return and was on record at the time of processing under Section 143(1), was held to be a mere procedural lapse.
2.9 The prescribed time limit for furnishing Form 10BB was treated as directory in the facts of the case, and non-compliance with such time limit could not by itself justify denial of exemption under Sections 11 and 12.
2.10 The delay in filing Form 10BB was condoned.
Issue 3: Power and role of appellate authority in condoning delay and directing consideration of exemption
Legal framework (as discussed)
3.1 The Court considered the appellate powers under Section 251, noting that the appellate authority can examine issues connected with the assessment and grant appropriate relief.
3.2 The Court also relied on judicial precedents holding that filing of Form 10B/10BB is a procedural requirement and delay therein can be condoned, and that exemption under Sections 11 and 12 cannot be denied solely for such delay when audit is otherwise completed and undisputed.
Interpretation and reasoning
3.3 The Court noted that, although the assessee had not approached the competent authority under Section 119 for condonation of delay in filing Form 10BB, it had approached the appellate authority (CIT(A)) challenging non-consideration of the audit report by CPC.
3.4 It was held that in such appellate proceedings, the CIT(A), in exercise of powers under Section 251, was competent to condone the delay in filing Form 10BB and to consider the audit report for adjudicating the assessee's claim for exemption under Sections 11 and 12.
3.5 The Court observed that Co-ordinate Benches and High Courts have consistently treated the requirement of filing such forms as procedural and have condoned delay even where the forms were filed at a later stage, thereby recognizing that the substantive right to exemption should not be defeated by technical defaults.
Conclusions
3.6 The appellate authority had the power to condone the delay in filing Form 10BB and ought to have done so instead of sustaining denial of exemption merely on account of belated filing.
3.7 The Court itself condoned the delay in filing Form 10BB and directed the Assessing Officer to consider the audit report and decide the assessee's claim of exemption under Sections 11 and 12 in accordance with law, after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing.
Issue 4: Sustainability of adjustments under Section 143(1) post condonation of delay
Interpretation and reasoning
4.1 The disallowances made in the intimation under Section 143(1) related to:
(a) amount accumulated/set apart under Section 11(1)(a);
(b) amount accumulated/set apart under Section 11(2); and
(c) capital expenditure claimed as application of income under Section 11,
all arising solely from the perceived invalidity of the exemption claim due to delayed filing of Form 10BB.
4.2 Having held that the delay in filing Form 10BB is condonable and stands condoned, the very foundation for the disallowances in the intimation under Section 143(1) ceased to exist.
Conclusions
4.3 The disallowances made while processing the return under Section 143(1), being consequential to non-acceptance of Form 10BB on account of delay, could not be sustained once such delay was condoned.
4.4 The matter was restored to the file of the Assessing Officer to recompute income after considering Form 10BB and adjudicating the assessee's entitlement to exemption under Sections 11 and 12 in accordance with law, with the appeal allowed for statistical purposes.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in respect of a completed/unabated assessment, additions can be made in proceedings under Section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in the absence of incriminating material found during search under Section 132.
1.2 Whether a "base note" received from foreign authorities and materials gathered post-search, including correspondence with a foreign bank and statements recorded, can be treated as incriminating material "found during the course of search" for the purposes of Section 153A.
1.3 Whether, on the facts, the assessee could be treated as a beneficiary/beneficial owner of foreign bank accounts and taxed on the peak balances under Section 69 solely on the basis of the base note and in the face of denial by the assessee and confirmation from the foreign bank of no relationship.
1.4 Whether, in light of the settled legal position on Section 153A, any substantial question of law arose in the appeal under Section 260A.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Scope of Section 153A and nature of "incriminating material" in completed/unabated assessments
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court examined Section 153A in the context of search under Section 132 and the concept of completed/unabated assessments. The Court relied on the authoritative interpretation by the Supreme Court which held that: (i) Section 153A is linked to search/requisition and is intended to bring to tax undisclosed income found during search; (ii) only pending assessments/reassessments abate; (iii) in case incriminating material is found, the Assessing Officer may assess/reassess "total income" even for completed/unabated years; and (iv) in the absence of incriminating material unearthed during search, no addition can be made for completed/unabated assessments under Section 153A, though such years can be reopened, if at all, under Sections 147/148 subject to statutory conditions.
2.2 The Court also referred to a prior Division Bench decision following the above Supreme Court view, holding that when no incriminating material is found during search, no question of law arises in an appeal under Section 260A on such additions.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 It was noted as an undisputed factual position that, during the search under Section 132, no incriminating material was found against the assessee linking him to the alleged foreign bank accounts.
2.4 The Court observed that the assessment in question was a completed/unabated assessment, and therefore, as per the settled law, additions under Section 153A could only be justified if based on incriminating material unearthed during the search.
2.5 The Court found that the "base note" on which the Revenue relied was not a document recovered in the course of the search; it was a document available post-search. Similarly, other materials such as correspondence with HSBC Geneva and letters from the Investigation Wing were gathered in post-search proceedings.
2.6 The Tribunal had correctly framed the issue as whether the base note, statements recorded under Section 132(4), and materials gathered post-search could constitute "incriminating materials found during search." Both the Tribunal and the Court answered this in the negative, holding that only material actually unearthed during search qualifies.
2.7 The Court emphasized that to allow additions in such circumstances would contradict the Supreme Court's construction of Section 153A, render the statutory scheme on abatement redundant, and impermissibly allow reassessment of completed years without the statutory safeguards of Sections 147/148.
Conclusions
2.8 For a completed/unabated assessment, the Assessing Officer cannot make additions in proceedings under Section 153A in the absence of incriminating material found during the course of search under Section 132 or requisition under Section 132A.
2.9 The base note and other materials obtained or generated post-search do not constitute incriminating material "found during search" and hence cannot sustain additions under Section 153A for such years.
Issue 3: Taxability of alleged undisclosed income from foreign bank accounts and reliance on base note
Interpretation and reasoning
3.1 The Assessing Officer had added peak balances from bank accounts of foreign companies (Sulay Trading Ltd. and Laptis Trading Company Ltd.) held with HSBC Bank (Suisse) SA Geneva as unexplained money under Section 69, treating the assessee as a beneficiary/beneficial owner solely based on the base note.
3.2 The Court noted that:
(a) The assessee consistently denied, including in his statement under Section 132(4) and on oath under Section 131, having any bank account with HSBC Geneva or being a beneficial owner of the concerned accounts.
(b) The assessee produced a letter from HSBC Geneva categorically stating that he had no account with, nor any transactions in, that bank.
(c) On direct queries from the Department, HSBC Geneva confirmed issuance and correctness of the said letter.
(d) No material was found during search to contradict the bank's confirmation or to establish any nexus between the assessee and the foreign accounts.
3.3 The Court held that in the absence of a "clear and unimpeachable nexus" based on acceptable material linking the assessee to the accounts of the said entities, it was impermissible for the Assessing Officer to derive a relationship or beneficial ownership merely on the premise of the base note.
3.4 The Court implicitly rejected the Revenue's contention that foreign secrecy laws or non-disclosure by the bank regarding other entities could themselves be treated as incriminating material against the assessee, in the absence of corroborative material found during search.
Conclusions
3.5 The addition of peak balances in the foreign bank accounts of third-party entities in the assessee's hands as unexplained money under Section 69, based solely on the base note and without corroborative incriminating material found during search, was unsustainable in law and on facts.
3.6 The Tribunal was correct in setting aside the additions, and there was no error in its appreciation of the evidentiary value of the base note and related materials.
Issue 4: Existence of a substantial question of law under Section 260A
Interpretation and reasoning
4.1 Applying the settled legal position of the Supreme Court on the scope of Section 153A and the requirement of incriminating material for completed/unabated assessments, the Court found that the Tribunal's decision was in conformity with binding precedent.
4.2 Given the admitted factual position that no incriminating material was found during search and that the base note was a post-search document, the application of law to facts was straightforward and did not give rise to any debatable legal issue.
Conclusions
4.3 No substantial question of law arose for consideration under Section 260A; the appeal by the Revenue was accordingly dismissed.
4.4 The Court clarified that its adjudication was confined to the above issues and that all other issues and pending proceedings, if any, remained unaffected and all contentions of the parties in that regard were kept open.
Issues: Whether the impugned order could validly block input tax credit beyond the ITC available in the electronic credit ledger, and whether the remaining challenge to the order warranted immediate final adjudication.
Analysis: The impugned order purported to block ITC in excess of the amount available in the petitioner's electronic credit ledger on the date of the order. The Court followed its earlier decisions holding that under Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, blocking cannot extend beyond the ITC available in the ledger as on the date of the impugned order. As to the balance challenge, the Court did not finally decide the merits and instead permitted the petitioner to make a detailed representation to the appropriate authority for a reasoned decision.
Conclusion: The order was invalid to the extent it effected negative blocking of ITC beyond the available credit and was quashed to that extent. The remaining grievance was left to be pursued by representation, with no final determination on merits.
Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded only to the extent of the impermissible negative blocking of input tax credit, while the rest of the controversy was left open for consideration by the competent authority.
Ratio Decidendi: Under Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, blocking of input tax credit cannot exceed the ITC available in the electronic credit ledger as on the date of the order.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the pre-conditions for reopening the assessment under Sections 147 and 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for AY 2017-18 were satisfied, particularly the requirement of "reason to believe" that income had escaped assessment.
1.2 Whether the impugned reopening was vitiated as being based on a mere "change of opinion" after a completed scrutiny assessment under Section 143(3) of the Act.
1.3 Whether the material derived from a search under Section 132 in the case of a third party (Invent Assets Securitization and Reconstruction Private Limited) constituted tangible material or a live link to justify reopening the petitioner's assessment.
1.4 Whether the Assessing Officer's own uncertainty regarding the existence and quantum of alleged escapement of income rendered the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 invalid.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Validity of reopening under Sections 147/148; allegation of "change of opinion"
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court)
2.1 The Court referred to the settled legal principle, including the decision in Lambda Therapeutic Research Limited, that reopening under Section 147 is not permissible where: (i) there is no failure on the part of the assessee to make a full and true disclosure; and (ii) the original assessment has been thoroughly examined and accepted after detailed scrutiny. In such circumstances, reopening is treated as based on a mere change of opinion, which is impermissible.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The assessment for AY 2017-18 had been completed under Section 143(3), after issuance of notices under Sections 143(2) and 142(1), and after the assessee furnished detailed replies and documents, including ledger of Ruchita Chemicals LLP, contra ledger, sample bills and details of purchases and trade payables.
2.3 The Court recorded that the original Assessing Officer had accepted the return of income after detailed scrutiny of the very transactions with Ruchita Chemicals LLP, including purchases amounting to Rs. 58,05,69,466/-, and that there was no dispute about the assessee having furnished all relevant particulars.
2.4 It was specifically noted that in the reopening proceedings, the purchases of Rs. 58,05,69,466/- from Ruchita Chemicals LLP had not been questioned; only the payment of Rs. 7,00,00,000/- to the same party was being doubted, even though it formed part of the same set of business transactions already examined in the original assessment.
2.5 Relying on the rationale in Lambda Therapeutic Research Limited, the Court held that once the claim/transaction has been examined in detail in the original assessment after calling for and considering all relevant material, the Assessing Officer cannot reopen the assessment merely because he now takes a different view on the same facts; such reopening is a prohibited change of opinion.
Conclusions
2.6 The Court concluded that there was no failure on the part of the assessee to make a full and true disclosure and that the assessment had been "threadbare examined" and approved under Section 143(3). Accordingly, the attempt to reopen the assessment in respect of the same set of transactions with Ruchita Chemicals LLP amounted to a mere change of opinion and was impermissible in law.
Issue 3: Sufficiency and nexus of material arising from search under Section 132 on a third party
Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 The reopening was purportedly based on information obtained in a search under Section 132 carried out in the case of Invent Assets Securitization and Reconstruction Private Limited, where a statement of its CEO allegedly disclosed a modus operandi of fund diversion using group entities, including reference to Ruchita Chemicals LLP and Pioneer Management and Finance Consultancy.
2.8 The Court noted that the entire case of the revenue rested on presumptions drawn from the search on Invent Assets, and on the fact that, as per the bank statement of Ruchita Chemicals LLP, credits from the petitioner were followed on the same day by transfers to Pioneer Management and Finance Consultancy.
2.9 The Court held that the respondents had "miserably failed" to point out any concrete material connecting the petitioner with Invent Assets or establishing that the petitioner was part of the alleged dubious or colourable arrangements described in the search material.
2.10 It was emphasized that purchases of Rs. 58,05,69,466/- from Ruchita Chemicals LLP were not questioned, and the allegation regarding Rs. 7,00,00,000/- was based purely on presumption without any specific incriminating material linking the petitioner to the alleged modus operandi.
Conclusions
2.11 The Court found that there was no tangible material or live link between the search in the case of Invent Assets and any alleged escapement of income in the hands of the petitioner. The reliance on such presumptive material could not justify the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147.
Issue 4: Effect of Assessing Officer's uncertainty about existence and quantum of escapement
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 In the communication dated 03.02.2025 disposing of the assessee's objections, the Assessing Officer stated that the information/documents from the search "revealed that income of the assessee has escaped assessment. However, exact quantum of escapement, if any will be finalized only upon completion of assessment proceedings."
2.13 The Court considered this language and held that the Assessing Officer was himself unsure whether any income had actually escaped assessment, as evidenced by the use of the phrase "if any" and the postponement of determination of escapement to the completion of the reassessment.
2.14 The Court reasoned that such a state of uncertainty showed that the formation of "reason to believe" was not firm or founded on concrete material but was in a "state of flux", and that initiation of reassessment on this basis could not be sustained.
Conclusions
2.15 The Court held that, particularly in light of the completed detailed scrutiny and acceptance of the assessee's return, such vague and tentative observations by the Assessing Officer could not justify reopening. The absence of a clear, definite belief of escapement rendered the assumption of jurisdiction invalid.
Overall conclusion on all issues
2.16 On an overall appreciation of the facts and material on record, the Court held that: (i) there was no concrete nexus between the search material in the case of Invent Assets and any escapement of income in the hands of the petitioner; (ii) the transactions with Ruchita Chemicals LLP, including the impugned payment, had already been scrutinized in the original assessment; and (iii) the reopening was based on presumptions and a mere change of opinion, with the Assessing Officer himself being unsure of any escapement.
2.17 Consequently, the impugned notice dated 31.03.2024 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was quashed and set aside, and the writ petition was allowed without any order as to costs.
Issues: Whether the reopening notice and the connected order under the reassessment regime were liable to be quashed on the ground that the assessee, being a co-operative society and not a co-operative bank, was entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(d) on interest income earned from investments with co-operative banks.
Analysis: The petitioner was treated as a co-operative society whose banking licence had been cancelled, and the issue was held to be covered by the binding precedent relied upon by the Court. The governing principle applied was that section 80P(2)(d) allows deduction of interest or dividend income derived by a co-operative society from investments with other co-operative societies, and the exclusion in section 80P(4) is confined to co-operative banks functioning as banks and does not deny the benefit under section 80P(2)(d) to a co-operative society. The Court therefore accepted that the petitioner's claim was legally sustainable and that the impugned reassessment action, founded on a contrary view, could not stand.
Conclusion: The challenge succeeded and the reassessment notice, the order under section 148A(3), and the show-cause notices under section 148A(1) were quashed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether immovable property standing in the name of a separate company, controlled by the accused director and having no genuine business activity, can be attached as "value of such property" under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, in connection with money-laundering involving another company.
1.2 Whether a property acquired prior to the period of commission of the scheduled offence can be attached as "the value of any such property" within the definition of "proceeds of crime" under Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, where the actual proceeds of crime are not available.
1.3 Whether the appellants discharged the statutory burden under Section 8(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, to prove the legitimate source of acquisition of the attached property.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Attachment of property held by a separate company controlled by the accused
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court recorded as an admitted fact that the common individual (Sh. Luv Bhardwaj) was a director in both the borrower company (against whom the scheduled offences and diversion of funds are alleged) and the appellant company in whose name the attached property stands.
2.2 In his statement under Section 50 of the Act, the said individual categorically stated that he was the major shareholder of the appellant company and that the other director had been inducted only to complete quorum and sign documents.
2.3 Investigations revealed that the appellant company had no business activity during the relevant period. On these facts, the Court concurred with the respondent's contention that the appellant company was a "shell company" and that the other director was merely a dummy director installed by the controlling individual.
2.4 The Court noted that the Adjudicating Authority had treated the attached property not as "direct proceeds of crime" but as "value of such property," in view of the diversion of large sums from the borrower company and the flow of funds to related or offshore entities, while the appellant company itself had no legitimate business operations.
Conclusions
2.5 The Court held that, in the circumstances where the appellant company was found to be a shell entity controlled by the accused director of the borrower company, its property was liable to be proceeded against and attached as "value of such property" and the objection that it was a distinct legal entity not implicated in the predicate offence was rejected.
Issue 2 - Attachment of property acquired prior to the commission of the scheduled offence as "value of such property"
Legal framework as discussed
2.6 The Court relied upon prior detailed judgments of the Tribunal and higher courts interpreting Section 2(1)(u) of the Act, particularly as examined in earlier Tribunal decisions and in light of the judgments in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, Axis Bank, Prakash Industries, and other authorities.
2.7 Section 2(1)(u) defining "proceeds of crime" was noted, as construed in the Tribunal's earlier decisions, to have three distinct limbs separated by the word "or": (i) property derived or obtained directly or indirectly from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence; (ii) "the value of any such property"; and (iii) in case such property is taken or held outside the country, "property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad."
2.8 The Court adopted the reasoning that the second limb ("the value of any such property") authorises attachment of property of equivalent value when the directly traceable proceeds of crime are not available or have been siphoned off or vanished, and that this power is not confined to cases where the property has been taken outside India.
2.9 The Court endorsed the position that restricting the definition to only properties acquired after commission of crime, or ignoring the second limb, would render the middle part of the definition redundant and frustrate the object of the Act by enabling accused persons to dissipate or conceal the tainted property.
2.10 The Court referred to the detailed analysis in prior Tribunal and High Court decisions which rejected the contrary view taken in certain High Court judgments (including those holding that properties acquired prior to the crime could not be attached), on the ground that such views overlook the full import of Section 2(1)(u) as interpreted in light of paragraph 68 of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and the concept of "deemed tainted property" explained in Axis Bank and Prakash Industries.
2.11 The Court accepted that, as clarified in these authorities, properties acquired even prior to the commission of the scheduled offence may fall within "the value of any such property" and be attachable of equivalent value when: (i) the person accused of money-laundering had an interest in such property at least till the time of the proscribed criminal activity, and (ii) the directly traceable proceeds of crime are unavailable, having been siphoned off or vanished.
Conclusions
2.12 Applying the above legal position, the Court held that the fact that the subject property was purchased prior to the period of commission of the alleged bank fraud does not by itself immunise it from attachment as "value of such property" under Section 2(1)(u), when the actual proceeds of crime are not available.
2.13 The Court therefore rejected the argument that the temporal precedence of the acquisition of the property, vis-à-vis the scheduled offence, barred its attachment and found no legal infirmity in treating it as "value of such property."
Issue 3 - Burden under Section 8(1) to prove legitimate source of acquisition
Legal framework as discussed
2.14 The Court referred to the express language of Section 8(1) of the Act, under which the onus is entirely upon the noticee to explain the sources of income, earnings or assets out of which the attached property has been acquired, and to produce the evidence relied upon to establish legitimate acquisition.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.15 During the appellate proceedings, the Court specifically requested the appellants to state how they had discharged their burden of proving the legitimate sources for acquisition of the subject property, and what explanation, if any, had been tendered before the Adjudicating Authority on this aspect.
2.16 Despite repeated queries, the appellants were unable to explain the legitimate sources of acquisition of the property or indicate any cogent explanation or supporting evidence furnished before the Adjudicating Authority.
Conclusions
2.17 The Court held that the appellants had failed to discharge the statutory burden under Section 8(1) to prove the lawful source of acquisition of the attached property, both before the Adjudicating Authority and before the Appellate Tribunal.
2.18 In view of (i) the finding that the appellant company was a shell entity controlled by the accused director, (ii) the settled legal position that properties acquired prior to the scheduled offence can be attached as "value of such property" when the proceeds of crime are not available, and (iii) the appellants' failure to discharge the burden under Section 8(1), the Court found no reason to interfere with the confirmation of attachment and dismissed the appeals.
Issues: (i) Whether losses of eligible software technology park units could be set off against income from other units while computing total income; (ii) whether payments made to Sprint USA for international private leased circuits were royalty and therefore liable to disallowance for non-deduction of tax at source; (iii) whether the non-discrimination clause in the India-USA DTAA prevented disallowance under section 40(a)(i); (iv) whether miscellaneous income from interest on staff loans and sale of scrap qualified for deduction under section 10A/10B; and (v) whether interest was chargeable under section 234D.
Issue (i): Whether losses of eligible software technology park units could be set off against income from other units while computing total income.
Analysis: The deduction under section 10A is to be worked out at the stage of the eligible undertaking itself, and the Court applied the Supreme Court's interpretation that the eligible unit must be computed independently before the general aggregation and set-off provisions operate. The earlier contrary view could not govern the assessment years in question.
Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether payments made to Sprint USA for international private leased circuits were royalty and therefore liable to disallowance for non-deduction of tax at source.
Analysis: The Court held that the later explanations inserted in section 9(1)(vi) by the Finance Act, 2012 could not be applied retrospectively to fasten royalty liability for the relevant assessment years. The definition of royalty under the applicable DTAA controlled the matter, and on that basis the payment for IPLC did not amount to royalty so as to attract section 40(a)(i).
Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the non-discrimination clause in the India-USA DTAA prevented disallowance under section 40(a)(i).
Analysis: The Court held that Article 26(3) requires deductible payments to a resident of the other Contracting State to be allowed under the same conditions as if paid to a resident. Since the domestic disallowance operated only in the case of non-resident payments for the relevant years, the provision was discriminatory and could not be invoked to sustain the disallowance.
Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether miscellaneous income from interest on staff loans and sale of scrap qualified for deduction under section 10A/10B.
Analysis: The Court applied the principle that incidental income arising in the ordinary course of the export-oriented business and integrally connected with the undertaking forms part of the eligible profits. Interest on staff loans and scrap sale were treated as having the requisite nexus with the undertaking's business.
Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (v): Whether interest was chargeable under section 234D.
Analysis: In view of the retrospective amendment to the provision and the dates of assessment, the levy of interest on excess refund was held to be legally sustainable.
Conclusion: The issue was decided against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed in respect of the set-off loss issue, the IPLC royalty and withholding-tax issues, and the miscellaneous income deduction issue, while the levy of interest under section 234D was sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: For the relevant assessment years, the scope of royalty under a DTAA cannot be enlarged by retrospective domestic amendments, eligible undertaking deductions under section 10A/10B are computed at the undertaking level, and the non-discrimination article bars a disallowance mechanism that applies only to non-resident payments on less favourable terms.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the earlier order dismissing the writ petition required recall in view of the subsequent authoritative exposition of law in the decisions interpreting reassessment notices issued under the unamended and amended provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
1.2 Whether the notice issued on 30.06.2021 under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (old regime) for Assessment Year 2016-2017, and the consequential proceedings under sections 148A(d) and 148 (new regime), were barred by limitation under section 149 read with section 151 of the Act and the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Recall of earlier dismissal order in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions
Legal framework
2.1 The Court considered paragraph 28 of the decision in Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal and paragraphs 112 and 114 of the decision in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, which re-examined and clarified the legal position concerning reassessment notices issued under the old and new regimes of sections 147-151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the effect of the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court noted that the earlier dismissal order dated 04.11.2025 had been passed before closely examining the above authoritative pronouncements and, upon reconsideration of the relevant passages, a doubt arose regarding the correctness of the earlier conclusion.
2.3 Having perused the documents, list of dates and events, and the binding ratio of the Supreme Court in the above decisions, the Court found it necessary, for fair adjudication, to recall the earlier order and decide the writ petition afresh in accordance with the clarified legal position.
Conclusions
2.4 The order dated 04.11.2025 dismissing the case was recalled to enable a fresh decision in conformity with the law laid down in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal.
Issue 2 - Limitation and validity of reassessment proceedings under sections 148, 148A, 149, 151 and TOLA
Legal framework
2.5 The Court applied the ratio of paragraph 28 of Ashish Agarwal, under which all notices issued under unamended section 148 between 01.04.2021 and 30.06.2021 are deemed to be notices under section 148A(b) of the Act (new regime), and the Assessing Officer is required within thirty days to provide information and material relied upon, giving two weeks to the assessee to respond.
2.6 The Court relied on paragraph 114 of Rajeev Bansal which, inter alia, held that: (a) after 01.04.2021, the Act must be read with the substituted provisions; (b) TOLA continues to apply where relevant time limits fall between 20.03.2020 and 31.03.2021; (c) section 3(1) of TOLA overrides section 149 only to relax the time limit for issuing notices under section 148; (f) directions in Ashish Agarwal extend to all reassessment notices issued under the old regime between 01.04.2021 and 30.06.2021; (g) the period from issuance of such deemed show-cause notices till supply of information and two weeks for reply is to be excluded; and (h) reassessment notices under the new regime must be issued within the surviving limitation under the Act read with TOLA, and any notice beyond such period is time barred.
2.7 The Court further relied on the illustration at paragraph 112 of Rajeev Bansal explaining computation of the surviving period under section 149 after giving effect to the exclusions and deeming fiction introduced through Ashish Agarwal and TOLA.
2.8 The Court also took note of the fourth proviso to section 149 of the Act (as amended with effect from 01.04.2021), which allowed a maximum of seven days beyond the surviving period in a specified situation.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 For Assessment Year 2016-2017, as the alleged income escaping assessment was less than Rs. 50,00,000/-, the outer time limit under section 149 of the Act to issue a notice under section 148 (old regime) would have expired on 31.03.2020. By virtue of TOLA extensions, this date stood extended up to 30.06.2021.
2.10 In the present case, the notice under section 148 (old regime) was in fact issued on 30.06.2021, the last date of limitation as extended by TOLA.
2.11 Applying the deeming fiction in Ashish Agarwal, this notice dated 30.06.2021 under the old regime had to be treated as a notice under section 148A(b) under the new regime. Consequently, by virtue of paragraph 28 of Ashish Agarwal and paragraph 114(g) of Rajeev Bansal, the period from issuance of such deemed show-cause notice until (i) supply of information and material by the Assessing Officer and (ii) the further two-week period granted to the assessee to respond stood excluded, during which time the notices were deemed to be stayed.
2.12 The relevant chronology showed that: (i) the old-regime notice under section 148 was issued on 30.06.2021; (ii) the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Ashish Agarwal on 04.05.2022; (iii) notice under section 148A(b) was issued on 20.05.2022; (iv) reply by the assessee was given on 03.06.2022; and (v) order under section 148A(d) and fresh notice under section 148 (new regime) were issued on 28.07.2022.
2.13 Since the original old-regime notice was itself issued on the last possible extended date, 30.06.2021, the Court held that, after excluding the thirty days allowed to the Department to furnish material and the further two weeks allowed to the assessee to respond, there was no residual time left under section 149 read with TOLA for issuance of a fresh notice under section 148 of the new regime, save and except the seven days contemplated by the fourth proviso to section 149.
2.14 On this basis, the Court reasoned that, in the facts of the present case, the Assessing Officer had, at best, only seven days from the date of receipt of the assessee's reply on 03.06.2022 to issue a valid reassessment notice under the new regime. Therefore, any notice under section 148 (new regime) ought to have been issued on or before 10.06.2022.
2.15 As the notice under section 148 (new regime) was actually issued only on 28.07.2022, the Court held that it was beyond the surviving limitation period as computed in terms of section 149 read with TOLA and the binding interpretations in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal.
Conclusions
2.16 The Court concluded that the notice dated 30.06.2021 issued under section 148 (old regime) is to be treated as a deemed notice under section 148A(b) in the new regime, but that, after giving effect to all statutory and judicially mandated exclusions and the fourth proviso to section 149, there was no valid time left beyond seven days from 03.06.2022 to issue a notice under section 148 (new regime).
2.17 As the notice under section 148 (new regime) and the order under section 148A(d), both dated 28.07.2022, were issued beyond the permissible limitation, they were held to be time barred and liable to be set aside.
2.18 Consequently, the entire reassessment proceedings initiated by the notice dated 30.06.2021, continued by the notice under section 148A(b) dated 20.05.2022, and culminating in the order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148 dated 28.07.2022, were quashed as being beyond time, and the writ petition challenging these proceedings was allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the assessment order was bad in law and without jurisdiction, including on account of alleged violation of CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011, and whether the assessee could validly raise a jurisdictional objection at the appellate stage.
1.2 Whether the appellate authority erred in relying on the remand report without affording the assessee an opportunity to rebut it, and the consequent validity of the confirmation of addition on account of long-term capital gains.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Objection to jurisdiction and validity of assessment order
Legal framework
2.1 The Tribunal referred to section 124 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, particularly sub-sections (3) and (4), governing when and how an assessee may call in question the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer.
2.2 Section 124(3)(a) provides that where the assessee has made a return under section 139(1), he is not entitled to question the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer after the expiry of one month from the date on which he was served with a notice under section 142(1) or section 143(2), or after completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier.
2.3 Section 124(4) mandates that, subject to section 124(3), when an assessee objects to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer, the Assessing Officer, if not satisfied, shall refer the matter for determination in terms of section 124(2) before making the assessment.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The Tribunal noted that the assessee voluntarily filed its return of income with the specified Assessing Officer (Ward-1(1)(1)), and thereafter the first notice under section 143(2) was issued on 03.08.2016, followed by several notices under section 142(1), none of which were responded to by the assessee.
2.5 Applying section 124(3)(a), the Tribunal held that the assessee could have questioned the jurisdiction only within one month from service of the first statutory notice (i.e., before 03.09.2016), and only before the Assessing Officer. No such objection was raised either before the Assessing Officer or before the first appellate authority.
2.6 The Tribunal held that, in view of section 124(3), the assessee was not entitled to raise the jurisdictional objection for the first time before the Tribunal by way of an additional ground after completion of assessment and appellate proceedings.
2.7 The Tribunal further held that section 124 constitutes a self-contained mechanism on jurisdiction, and that the case law relied upon by the assessee did not deal with section 124, particularly sub-section (3), and therefore did not assist the assessee.
2.8 As regards the reliance on CBDT Instruction/Circular No. 1/2011, the Tribunal observed that since the assessee itself filed the return of income before the concerned Assessing Officer, the contention that the assessment was without jurisdiction on the basis of that Instruction did not arise on the facts.
Conclusions
2.9 The Tribunal concluded that the assessee had no locus standi to question the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction at this stage in view of section 124(3)(a), and rejected the additional ground challenging the assessment as bad in law, illegal, or without jurisdiction, including the plea based on CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011.
Issue 2: Opportunity to rebut remand report and confirmation of long-term capital gain addition
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 The Tribunal examined the appellate order and noted that the appellate authority had called for and relied upon a detailed remand report from the Assessing Officer, which was adverse to the assessee and formed the basis for confirming the addition on account of long-term capital gains.
2.11 It was observed that, although the remand report was relied upon extensively, the assessee was not given an effective opportunity to rebut or respond to the findings and discrepancies recorded therein.
2.12 The Tribunal found force in the assessee's contention that non-grant of such opportunity violated the principles of natural justice, particularly when the remand report was determinative in sustaining the addition.
Conclusions
2.13 The Tribunal held that the confirmation of the addition of Rs. 5,80,85,164/- on account of long-term capital gains, without affording the assessee an opportunity to controvert the remand report, was not sustainable.
2.14 In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the matter to the file of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, directing that one more opportunity of hearing be given to the assessee to substantiate its claim relating to long-term capital gains and supporting documentation.
2.15 The Tribunal clarified that the assessee must effectively utilise this final opportunity and that the Assessing Officer shall pass a fresh order on the merits of the case after providing due opportunity of being heard.
2.16 The appeal was accordingly treated as allowed for statistical purposes, with the quantum addition on long-term capital gains remitted for de novo consideration and not decided on merits at this stage.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the reassessment proceedings initiated under sections 147 and 148, beyond four years from the end of the assessment year, on the very same income and material already considered in the original assessment under section 143(3), were valid in law.
1.2 Whether, in the facts of the case, the reasons recorded for reopening constituted a mere "change of opinion" without any fresh tangible material or specific allegation of failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Validity of reassessment under sections 147/148; absence of fresh material; change of opinion; reopening beyond four years
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal noted the statutory requirements of section 147, including the necessity of "reason to believe" that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, and, where more than four years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, the additional condition of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment.
2.2 The Tribunal referred to judicial principles laid down by the jurisdictional High Court and the Supreme Court, inter alia, that:
(a) It is impermissible for an Assessing Officer to reopen an assessment based on the very same material with a view to take another view once one view is conclusively taken.
(b) A mere change of opinion does not constitute "reason to believe".
(c) A general or vague statement regarding failure to disclose is insufficient; the Assessing Officer must indicate what material fact was not fully and truly disclosed.
(d) Once a query is raised during original assessment and replied to by the assessee, that issue is deemed to have been considered, even if not discussed in the assessment order.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Tribunal recorded that the assessee's original assessment was completed under section 143(3), wherein:
(i) The interest income from investments in co-operative banks and the related deduction under section 80P were examined and allowed; and
(ii) The other incomes (e.g., receipts from certain companies and service tax credited to the income and expenditure account) were also considered and adjudicated, with additions made and partially deleted by the first appellate authority relying on a coordinate bench decision and the principle of mutuality.
2.4 The reasons recorded for reopening under section 148 specifically relied on:
(a) Interest received from fixed deposits with co-operative banks and a nationalised bank allegedly not eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d); and
(b) Certain receipts from companies and service tax credited to the income and expenditure account allegedly not covered by the principle of mutuality.
2.5 The Tribunal found that these very items of income and the eligibility of deduction under section 80P had already been examined during the original assessment proceedings, and the corresponding additions had been dealt with in appeal. The Tribunal held that there was no new or additional tangible material brought on record by the Assessing Officer at the time of recording reasons for reopening.
2.6 The assessee, in response to the section 148A(b) notice, specifically pointed out that:
(a) The original assessment had been completed after detailed inquiries and submissions; and
(b) There was no change in facts or any new tangible material to justify reopening; and
(c) The purported escapement was only on account of re-examination of the same issues, amounting to a change of opinion.
2.7 The Assessing Officer, in the order under section 148A(d), reiterated the same reasoning as in the recorded reasons, namely that interest from co-operative banks was not eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d), without identifying any fresh material or any specific failure of disclosure by the assessee.
2.8 The Tribunal noted that:
(i) The reassessment was clearly founded on the same material and the same heads of income considered earlier;
(ii) The Assessing Officer had not demonstrated which material fact was not truly and fully disclosed by the assessee in the original assessment; and
(iii) The reassessment was therefore an attempt to review or revisit an earlier concluded view, which the settled law does not permit.
2.9 In support, the Tribunal relied on:
- The jurisdictional High Court decision holding that reopening on the very same material, to take another view, is impermissible and that a mere change of opinion cannot justify reopening; and
- The principle that once queries are raised and answered in original assessment, the issue is deemed to have been considered, and reopening on that very issue constitutes a change of opinion.
2.10 The Tribunal also noted that the legal position regarding deduction under section 80P(2)(d) on interest from co-operative banks has since been conclusively settled by the Supreme Court, but emphasized that, even independently of that, the reassessment fails at the threshold for want of fresh tangible material and for being a change of opinion.
Conclusions
2.11 The Tribunal held that:
(a) The reassessment was initiated on the very same grounds and income items that were already examined and concluded during the original assessment proceedings;
(b) No fresh tangible material was brought on record to justify reopening under section 147;
(c) The reasons recorded amounted to a mere change of opinion of the Assessing Officer; and
(d) The mandatory condition, in a case beyond four years, of demonstrating failure by the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts was not satisfied.
2.12 Consequently, the Tribunal declared the reassessment proceedings invalid in law and quashed the reassessment order passed under section 147 read with section 144B. The appeal was allowed on this legal ground, rendering further adjudication on merits unnecessary.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the reassessment notice and proceedings were vitiated for want of proper sanction under section 151 in the context of the substituted reassessment regime, TOLA, and the legal fiction created by the Supreme Court in respect of notices issued between 01.04.2021 and 30.06.2021.
1.2 Whether reassessment under section 147, leading to additions under sections 69B and 69C on account of alleged "on-money" for land and construction, could be sustained when a prior assessment under section 153A had already examined the same property transaction and when the additions were based solely on an unsigned third-party Excel sheet and general disclosure by the developer group, without independent corroboration or nexus to the assessee.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Validity of sanction under section 151 for reassessment notice issued in the transitional period
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.1 The Tribunal considered the substituted provisions of sections 147-151, the effect of the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA), and the Supreme Court decisions in Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal and Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, in light of the binding judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Dhanraj Govindram Kella v. ITO.
2.2 The High Court in Dhanraj Govindram Kella held that where reassessment notices issued under the old law between 01.04.2021 and 30.06.2021 are saved by the legal fiction created by the Supreme Court, the sanction obtained from the authority under section 151(1)(i) (Principal Commissioner / Principal Director / Commissioner / Director) is to be treated as valid, provided the three-year limitation from the end of the relevant assessment year fell within the extended window covered by TOLA. Approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner is not mandatory in such cases.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.3 The assessee's additional grounds challenged jurisdiction on (i) the alleged incompetence of the sanctioning authority under section 151 and (ii) the contention that the Revenue ought to have invoked section 263 instead of section 147.
2.4 The Tribunal noted that the assessee's contentions as to invalidity of approval under section 151 were "identical" to those rejected by the Gujarat High Court in Dhanraj Govindram Kella, and that the factual matrix of the present case fell within the framework explained in that judgment, namely: the notice was issued in the covered period and the approval had been obtained from an authority falling under section 151(1)(i) within the TOLA-extended limitation.
2.5 Applying the ratio of Dhanraj Govindram Kella, the Tribunal held that the approval obtained by the Assessing Officer under section 151(1)(i) satisfied the statutory requirement and could not be assailed on the ground that sanction of the Principal Chief Commissioner was necessary.
Conclusions:
2.6 The additional grounds of the assessee challenging the validity of the reassessment on the basis of want of proper sanction under section 151, and generally questioning the jurisdiction to proceed under section 147, were rejected and dismissed.
Issue 2 - Sustainability of additions under sections 69B and 69C based on third-party unsigned digital data and general group disclosure, in the backdrop of prior scrutiny under section 153A
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.7 The Tribunal referred to judicial principles laid down inter alia in:
(a) PCIT v. Kaushik Nanubhai Majithia (Guj.), holding that an unsigned Excel sheet seized from a third party has no evidentiary value against an assessee unless it is duly corroborated and specifically linked to the assessee;
(b) ITO v. Bharat A. Mehta (Guj.), where it was held that notings in the books or records of another person reflecting alleged on-money payments cannot justify additions in the hands of an assessee absent clear evidence of actual payment by the assessee;
(c) Various Tribunal decisions (including Kiritkumar Champaklal Shah v. ITO; Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Central v. Mahalaxmi Infracontract Ltd.; Pradeep Amrutlal Runwal; Regency Mahavir Properties; Vinit Ranawat) consistently holding that loose papers, unsigned Excel sheets, or digital data seized from third parties cannot, without independent corroboration and opportunity of cross-examination, form the sole basis for additions under sections 69, 69B, or 69C.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.8 The Tribunal noted that, for the year in question, the assessee had purchased only an open plot of land (Plot/Unit No. 117 in the Kalhaar Blues & Greens project) under a registered deed dated 04.08.2016. There was no purchase of a constructed villa by the assessee during the year.
2.9 In assessment under section 153A read with section 143(3), the Assessing Officer had already scrutinized the same transaction in depth: calling for the purchase deed, source of funds, bank statements and other details, and, after examination, accepted the transaction without any addition.
2.10 The subsequent reassessment additions under sections 69C (Rs. 1,05,00,000 as alleged unexplained expenditure towards construction) and 69B (Rs. 35,01,500 as alleged unexplained investment in land) were founded solely on an unsigned Excel sheet stated to have been recovered from the laptop of a third party (an employee of the developer group) and on the fact of a general disclosure by that group before the Settlement Commission.
2.11 The Tribunal emphasized that the Assessing Officer had not:
(i) demonstrated that the Excel sheet belonged to the assessee;
(ii) established that the specific entries in the sheet related to transactions of the assessee; or
(iii) produced any independent evidence to show that the assessee actually paid any on-money to the developer.
2.12 There was also no opportunity afforded to the assessee to cross-examine any person whose statements or data were relied upon, and no corroborative material such as bank trail, cash flow, or contemporaneous records linking the alleged on-money to the assessee was brought on record.
2.13 On the contrary, the registered sale deed dated 22.01.2021, placed on record, showed that construction on the said plot was carried out entirely by the developer at its own cost, and at the time of ultimate sale the purchasers made separate payments-land consideration to the assessee and construction consideration directly to the developer. This factual position negatived the allegation that the assessee had borne construction cost or paid any "construction on-money".
2.14 In light of the above, and following the binding precedents that unsigned, third-party digital data and loose documents, without corroboration and nexus, cannot form the sole basis of additions, the Tribunal concurred with the CIT(A)'s view that the impugned additions were based on presumptions and conjectures, rather than on legally sustainable evidence.
Conclusions:
2.15 The Excel sheet relied upon by the Assessing Officer was held to be an unsigned, unverified third-party digital document, with no established nexus to the assessee, and insufficient in law to sustain additions under sections 69B and 69C.
2.16 Having regard to the prior detailed scrutiny of the same transaction in the section 153A assessment, the absence of any independent corroborative evidence of on-money, and the clear documentary record showing that construction was neither carried out nor funded by the assessee, the Tribunal upheld the deletion of the additions of Rs. 1,05,00,000 under section 69C and Rs. 35,01,500 under section 69B.
2.17 The Revenue's appeal on merits was dismissed, and the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) deleting the additions was affirmed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether transfer pricing adjustment under section 92C/92CA on account of corporate guarantee fee charged to associated enterprises was justified, in light of earlier years' acceptance of the same transaction as being at arm's length and the principle of consistency.
1.2 Whether the appellate authority could admit and allow an additional claim that export incentives received under the Merchandise Exports from India Scheme (MEIS) were capital receipts, without the assessee having revised its return of income.
1.3 Whether MEIS receipts are capital in nature and therefore not taxable under the normal provisions and also excludible from "book profit" for the purposes of section 115JB.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Transfer pricing adjustment on corporate guarantee fee
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The matter arose from an adjustment made by the Transfer Pricing Officer under sections 92C and 92CA on the basis of external Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) data obtained from banks under section 133(6), leading to an arm's length rate of 1.5% for corporate guarantee commission. The assessee relied on internal CUPs (0.20%-0.30%) and on the fact that similar guarantees had been accepted at arm's length in earlier assessment years.
2.2 The appellate authority referred to the "Principle of Consistency" and relied on the ratio of decisions which hold that, where a fundamental aspect permeating different assessment years has been decided one way and allowed to attain finality, it should not be disturbed in a subsequent year in the absence of a change in facts or law.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The appellate authority found that the very same international transaction of provision of corporate guarantee had been examined and accepted as being at arm's length in earlier assessment years (AYs 2015-16, 2016-17, 2018-19) by the transfer pricing authorities and the Assessing Officer.
2.4 It was specifically recorded that there were no material or fundamental changes in the facts pertaining to the corporate guarantee transaction in the year under consideration as compared to those earlier years.
2.5 Applying the principle of consistency, and relying on judicial precedents which deprecate reopening or re-litigating settled positions in subsequent years absent change in facts or law, the appellate authority held that the transfer pricing adjustment for guarantee commission in the current year was a deviation from the established treatment and thus impermissible.
2.6 The Tribunal noted that co-ordinate benches had already adjudicated the issue of corporate guarantee fee in favour of the assessee in the assessee's own case for earlier years (AYs 2015-16, 2016-17, 2018-19, and another year referenced), and that the factual matrix and legal position remained unchanged.
Conclusions
2.7 The Tribunal upheld the appellate authority's deletion of the upward transfer pricing adjustment on corporate guarantee fee, solely on the ground that the issue stood settled in earlier years in the assessee's favour and no change in facts or law was demonstrated. The Revenue's grounds challenging rejection of external CUP data, alleged violation of Rule 10C, and reliance on other decisions were rejected by declining to interfere with the order of the appellate authority.
Issue 2 - Power of appellate authority to admit additional claim of MEIS receipts as capital without revised return
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.8 The assessee did not claim MEIS receipts as capital in the original return but raised the claim during assessment proceedings by letter, and further before the first appellate authority. The Assessing Officer did not accept or specifically deal with the claim, relying on the principle that fresh claims could not be entertained except through a revised return and on the decision that limited the Assessing Officer's power in this respect.
2.9 The appellate authority referred to section 254 (as interpreted in case law) and to judicial precedents holding that appellate authorities (Commissioner (Appeals) and Tribunal) have plenary powers co-terminous with those of the Assessing Officer, including the power to admit new grounds or claims not made in the return, where relevant facts are on record and the issue is a question of law.
2.10 The appellate authority relied on decisions holding that the limitation in entertaining fresh claims without a revised return applies only to the Assessing Officer and does not curtail the powers of appellate authorities, and also on earlier orders in the assessee's own case where additional grounds had been admitted and decided on merits.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 It was found that the assessee's claim regarding the nature of MEIS receipts required only application of law to facts already on record; no new factual investigation was necessary.
2.12 The appellate authority emphasised that the purpose of assessment and appellate proceedings is to correctly determine tax liability according to law, and that no tax can be imposed without sanction of law. Hence, bona fide legal claims affecting taxability of amounts already disclosed in the accounts and return should not be rejected merely on technical or procedural grounds relating to absence of a revised return.
2.13 The appellate authority also noted that, in the assessee's own earlier year, a similar additional ground (on a different issue) had been admitted by the Commissioner (Appeals), upheld by the Tribunal, and not challenged by the Revenue before the High Court on the point of admissibility, indicating acceptance of the principle that such additional legal grounds could be entertained.
2.14 The appellate authority therefore held that the additional ground/claim seeking to treat MEIS receipts as capital receipts was admissible and should be adjudicated on merits, notwithstanding the absence of a revised return.
Conclusions
2.15 The Tribunal, while not separately re-reasoning this point, affirmed the order of the appellate authority and directed that the assessee's additional claim regarding MEIS receipts be allowed, implying acceptance of the appellate authority's view that such a claim can be entertained and granted without a revised return when it is a pure question of law on admitted facts.
Issue 3 - Characterization of MEIS receipts as capital receipts and their treatment under section 115JB
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.16 The appellate authority examined:
(a) The definition of "income" in section 2(24), particularly clause (xvi) (subsidy, grant, etc.), and section 28.
(b) The Foreign Trade Policy (2015-2020) and the stated objective of MEIS: "to offset infrastructural inefficiencies and associated costs involved in export of goods/products... thereby enhancing India's export competitiveness."
(c) The judicially developed "purpose test" for determining whether a subsidy or incentive is a capital or revenue receipt, as laid down by higher courts: the nature of the receipt is determined by the object for which the subsidy is granted, not by its form, source, timing, or mode of computation.
(d) Section 115JB and the limited scope for adjustment to net profit as per the Explanation, as well as case law on the powers of the Assessing Officer to verify whether the profit and loss account is prepared in accordance with the Companies Act and to exclude items which are not in the nature of "income."
Interpretation and reasoning - Nature of MEIS receipts under normal provisions
2.17 The appellate authority analysed the MEIS scheme and held that the incentive is aimed at offsetting infrastructural inefficiencies and associated costs of exports, and at improving competitiveness, employment generation, and the development of robust infrastructure and capabilities to meet international standards.
2.18 Applying the "purpose test," it was held that the object of the MEIS scheme is to promote and strengthen the capital base and export capabilities of the industry rather than to provide general operational assistance in the ordinary course of business. Therefore, the incentives have the character of capital assistance.
2.19 It was further reasoned that MEIS benefits are granted in the form of non-cash duty credit scrips that can only be utilized for payment of specified duties or transferred, and are not in the nature of direct cash subsidy or reimbursement of specific expenditures. The appellate authority viewed these as "rewards" aimed at building export competitiveness and infrastructure, not as trading receipts.
2.20 The appellate authority concluded that such MEIS scrips do not fall within section 2(24)(xvi) or section 28, and hence are not "income" chargeable under section 4. Therefore, although they are connected with the business, they are capital receipts, not taxable under the normal computation of income.
2.21 The appellate authority supported this conclusion by referring to judgments where similar export-linked incentives and subsidies, granted for promoting industrial development or exports, were held to be capital receipts based on their purpose, even where the quantum was computed with reference to turnover or power consumption.
Interpretation and reasoning - MEIS receipts under section 115JB
2.22 On the question whether MEIS receipts, even if capital, could still be included in "book profit" under section 115JB, the appellate authority noted that:
(a) Under sections 4 and 2(45), the subject matter of tax is "total income," which consists of items falling within the statutory concept of "income" under section 2(24).
(b) If a receipt is not "income" at all, it cannot be brought to tax under section 115JB, since that section operates as a mechanism of computing tax on income by reference to book profit, not as an independent charging provision for non-income items.
2.23 Relying on judicial authority that distinguished the Supreme Court's decision limiting the Assessing Officer's power to recast book profit, the appellate authority observed that where an item credited to the profit and loss account is not in the nature of "income," it cannot form part of book profit for section 115JB, notwithstanding the absence of an explicit exclusion in the Explanation.
2.24 It was further held, based on case law, that the Assessing Officer has an implied mandate to verify whether the profit and loss account is prepared in accordance with the Companies Act and to adjust for items that are not permissible or not in the nature of income, and that this power is not curtailed where the adjustment is required to bring the computation in line with the statute.
2.25 The appellate authority thus concluded that MEIS receipts, being capital and not "income," must be excluded from book profit for the purposes of section 115JB.
Tribunal's affirmation
2.26 The Tribunal noted that the identical issue regarding characterization of MEIS receipts and their treatment under normal provisions and under section 115JB had already been adjudicated in the assessee's favour by co-ordinate benches for earlier assessment years (AYs 2018-19 and 2020-21).
2.27 The Tribunal further recorded reliance on decisions of the Supreme Court concerning subsidy characterization and application of the "purpose test," and observed that there was no change in the factual matrix or legal position in the year under consideration.
Conclusions
2.28 The Tribunal upheld the appellate authority's finding that MEIS receipts are capital receipts, not taxable as income under the normal provisions of the Act.
2.29 The Tribunal also upheld the direction to exclude MEIS receipts from the computation of book profit under section 115JB, treating them as not forming part of "income" that can be subjected to minimum alternate tax.
2.30 Accordingly, the appellate authority's direction to reduce MEIS receipts from both normal total income and book profit was confirmed, and the Revenue's appeal on this issue was dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the adjudicating authority, in the remand proceedings, acted in defiance of the directions of the Tribunal by relying on statements of witnesses who were not cross-examined and by ignoring the depositions of witnesses who were cross-examined.
1.2 How Section 138-B of the Customs Act, 1962 governs the admissibility and relevancy of statements of witnesses in adjudication proceedings, particularly where some witnesses remain unavailable for cross-examination despite opportunities.
1.3 Whether the impugned adjudication order, based on selective reliance on witness statements and without the requisite findings and safeguards under Section 138-B, could be sustained in law.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Compliance with the Tribunal's remand directions regarding cross-examination
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Tribunal had set aside the earlier order on the ground that six witness statements had been relied upon without granting cross-examination under Section 138-B, and remanded the matter "for fresh adjudication after granting the appellant due opportunity for cross-examination", keeping all issues open.
2.2 On remand, three witnesses (Prahladbhai Indarmal Jhaver, Suresh Gangdas Patel and Sanjay Notandas Gandhi) appeared, were cross-examined and deposed in favour of the petitioners. Three other witnesses (Ankit Changani, Anand Patel and Dineshbhai Changani) did not appear despite four opportunities.
2.3 The adjudicating authority, in the impugned order, relied on the statements of the non-appearing three witnesses (recorded earlier without cross-examination) and ignored the evidence of the three witnesses who were actually examined and cross-examined in the remand proceedings.
2.4 The Tribunal's directions were to provide the petitioners an opportunity for cross-examination. Since three witnesses did not avail of the opportunity, the Court held that the adjudicating authority was not per se in breach of the remand directions; the question was how their statements could be treated under Section 138-B in such circumstances.
Conclusions
2.5 The Tribunal's remand was complied with to the extent that opportunities for cross-examination were extended to all six witnesses; non-appearance of three witnesses did not by itself constitute violation. However, the manner of using their earlier statements had to conform strictly to Section 138-B and principles of natural justice, which the adjudicating authority failed to observe.
Issue 2: Scope and application of Section 138-B of the Customs Act, 1962
Legal framework as discussed
2.6 The Court reproduced Section 138-B, which deals with relevancy of statements made before a gazetted customs officer, and noted that sub-section (2) extends its application to proceedings other than before a court.
2.7 Clause (b) of sub-section (1) covers situations where the person who made the statement is examined as a witness and the court (or authority) admits the statement in the interests of justice.
2.8 Clause (a) of sub-section (1) covers situations where the person is dead, cannot be found, is incapable of giving evidence, is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or whose presence cannot be obtained without unreasonable delay or expense.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The Court held that clause (b) necessarily envisages that the witness is available during the inquiry or proceedings and offers herself/himself for cross-examination; only then can the statement be admitted in evidence in the interests of justice. Without cross-examination, such statements are inadmissible, as denial of cross-examination violates principles of natural justice and fair play.
2.10 Clause (a) was construed as analogous to Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (now Section 26 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), dealing with statements of persons not available to testify. However, the Court underscored that such unavailability must be affirmatively established.
2.11 The Court held that under clause (a), the authority may treat the statement as relevant only when it records a clear finding that the circumstances prescribed in clause (a) are satisfied and that it is impossible, despite reasonable efforts, to secure the presence of the witness.
2.12 Reasonable attempts must be made within a reasonable time to secure the presence of the witness, and the process should not be unduly delayed. During this process, an opportunity should also be provided to the assessee to secure the presence of the witness at the assessee's own expense.
2.13 Even when a witness is unavailable and clause (a) is invoked, the assessee must be confronted with the statement and given full opportunity to respond to and rebut it. The bare statement cannot be relied upon blindly; corroborative material must be present, and reasons based on the material must be recorded for treating the statement as reliable and relevant.
2.14 The Court concluded that, whether under clause (a) or clause (b), the evidence must satisfy the "test of admissibility in the interest of justice", which includes observance of natural justice, consideration of corroboration, and reasoned findings.
Conclusions
2.15 Statements of witnesses available for examination can be relied upon only after affording cross-examination under clause (b).
2.16 Statements of witnesses not produced for cross-examination may be treated as relevant under clause (a) only if the conditions of unavailability are specifically established, a clear finding is recorded, attempts to secure presence (including with the assessee's assistance) have failed within a reasonable time, and the assessee is duly confronted with such statements and allowed to rebut them. Corroboration and reasoned evaluation are mandatory.
Issue 3: Validity of the impugned order in light of Section 138-B and the evidentiary record
Interpretation and reasoning
2.17 The adjudicating authority relied on statements of three witnesses who did not appear on remand and were never cross-examined, and simultaneously ignored the testimonies of three witnesses who did appear and deposed in favour of the petitioners after cross-examination.
2.18 The respondents did not dispute that the impugned order selectively relied on non-cross-examined statements and disregarded the cross-examined evidence favourable to the petitioners.
2.19 The Court held that, in the remand proceedings, the adjudicating authority was required to consider: (i) the evidence of the three witnesses who were examined and cross-examined; and (ii) the statements of the three witnesses who did not appear, by applying the structured approach required under Section 138-B, particularly clause (a), as elaborated by the Court.
2.20 The adjudicating authority failed to undertake the required exercise: it did not properly weigh statements of all six witnesses with corroborative material and the assessee's defence, nor did it record the necessary findings on unavailability, attempts to secure presence, or provide a proper opportunity for the petitioners to meet the statements of the non-appearing witnesses in the manner mandated.
Conclusions
2.21 The impugned order did not conform to the requirements of Section 138-B and principles of natural justice, as it was based on selective and improper reliance on untested statements and exclusion of cross-examined evidence favourable to the petitioners.
2.22 The writ petition was allowed; the impugned order was quashed and set aside, and the matter remanded to the adjudicating authority for fresh adjudication in accordance with the Court's interpretation of Section 138-B, to be completed within a stipulated time, with all rights and contentions kept open and no opinion expressed on merits.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in an appeal by the Revenue, the assessee could invoke Rule 27 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 to support the relief granted by the first appellate authority on an independent legal ground challenging the validity of the notice issued under section 148 of the Act.
1.2 Whether the reassessment notices issued under section 148 on 27.07.2022, pursuant to original notices dated 30.06.2021 (falling in the period 01.04.2021 to 30.06.2021), were time-barred in view of the "surviving time" doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the context of TOLA, the Finance Act, 2021 regime, and the decisions in Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal and Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal.
1.3 Whether the statutory time-frame under section 148A(d) (one month from end of the month of the assessee's reply) could extend or override the "surviving period" of limitation available to the Assessing Officer as per the law declared by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal.
1.4 Consequentially, whether the reassessment orders passed under section 147 read with section 144B, and the additions made therein, could survive if the notices under section 148 were found to be time-barred.
1.5 Whether, the facts and chronology for A.Y. 2015-16 being identical to A.Y. 2014-15, the same legal conclusion on limitation and validity of notice under section 148 would follow mutatis mutandis.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Invocation of Rule 27 by the assessee to challenge validity of section 148 notice
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.1 The assessee had raised a legal ground on the validity of the reopening under section 147 before the first appellate authority, which was rejected, though the additions were deleted on merits.
2.1.2 In the appeal filed by the Revenue, the assessee moved an application under Rule 27 to support the order of the first appellate authority on the independent legal ground that the notice under section 148 was time-barred.
2.1.3 The Tribunal held that the legality of notice under section 148 goes to the root of the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction and therefore must be examined first. The assessee was entitled, under Rule 27, to support the ultimate appellate relief on a ground decided against it.
Conclusion
2.1.4 The Tribunal entertained the assessee's challenge to the validity and limitation of the section 148 notice under Rule 27 and proceeded to decide it as a preliminary jurisdictional issue.
2.2 Validity and limitation of reassessment notice under section 148 dated 27.07.2022 in light of TOLA, Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal
Legal framework as discussed
2.2.1 The original notice under section 148 was issued on 30.06.2021 under the old regime within extended time as per the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA).
2.2.2 In Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal, the Supreme Court held that all notices issued under section 148 between 01.04.2021 and 30.06.2021 under the old regime would be deemed to be show-cause notices under section 148A(b) of the new regime, and directed that:
(i) the Revenue shall within 30 days supply the material/information relied on; and
(ii) the assessee shall be given 15 days (later addressed as two weeks) to respond before passing an order under section 148A(d) and issuing notice under section 148.
2.2.3 In Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, the Supreme Court considered the interplay of Ashish Agarwal, the amended sections 147-151, and TOLA, and held:
(a) The legal fiction in Ashish Agarwal treated the earlier section 148 notices as deemed section 148A(b) show-cause notices and "stopped the clock of limitation" from the date of issuance of the old notice.
(b) The period from the date of deemed notice until supply of material/information, and the further two weeks granted to the assessee to reply, is excluded from limitation.
(c) The "clock started ticking" for the Revenue only after receipt of the assessee's reply to the deemed section 148A(b) notice.
(d) Thereafter, the Assessing Officer had to: consider the reply under section 148A(c), pass an order under section 148A(d), and, if appropriate, issue a notice under section 148 of the new regime-"within the surviving time limit".
(e) The "surviving time limit" was defined as the balance limitation available under the Income Tax Act read with TOLA, computed as the number of days between the date of issuance of the original (deemed) notice and 30.06.2021.
(f) Any new regime notice under section 148 issued beyond this surviving time limit is time-barred and invalid.
2.2.4 The Tribunal also noted the Gujarat High Court decision in Dhanraj Govindram Kella, where the High Court, applying Rajeev Bansal, computed "surviving time" case-wise and held that notices under section 148 issued beyond such surviving time were invalid.
Application to facts and reasoning
2.2.5 In the present case (A.Y. 2014-15), the chronology was:
- 30.06.2021: Original notice issued under section 148 (old regime).
- 06.05.2022: Final order of jurisdictional High Court on writ against said notice.
- 31.05.2022: Notice issued under section 148A(b) (pursuant to Ashish Agarwal).
- 07.06.2022: Assessee's reply to section 148A(b).
- 27.07.2022: Order under section 148A(d) and fresh notice under section 148 (new regime).
2.2.6 Since the original notice under section 148 (old regime) was dated 30.06.2021, the surviving time available as per the Supreme Court's formulation in Rajeev Bansal (i.e., days between date of original notice and 30.06.2021) was only one day.
2.2.7 The Tribunal held that, in conformity with the Supreme Court's directions, this surviving one day was effectively extended to seven days from the date of the assessee's reply to the section 148A(b) notice. The assessee's reply was filed on 07.06.2022; hence, the Assessing Officer had only up to 14.06.2022 to:
- consider the reply under section 148A(c);
- pass order under section 148A(d); and
- issue a notice under section 148 (new regime).
2.2.8 The Assessing Officer, however, passed the order under section 148A(d) and issued the new notice under section 148 on 27.07.2022, i.e., beyond the seven-day surviving period (beyond 14.06.2022), rendering the notice time-barred under the principle laid down in Rajeev Bansal.
Conclusion
2.2.9 The Tribunal held that, in view of the binding law declared by the Supreme Court in Rajeev Bansal and followed by the jurisdictional High Court in Dhanraj Govindram Kella, the notice under section 148 dated 27.07.2022 was issued beyond the "surviving time" and was therefore invalid and time-barred.
2.3 Whether section 148A(d) one-month time-frame could extend or override the surviving limitation period
Legal framework as discussed
2.3.1 The Revenue argued that under section 148A(d), the Assessing Officer is required to pass the order within one month from the end of the month in which the assessee's reply to section 148A(b) is received; and that the order under section 148A(d) and the consequent section 148 notice dated 27.07.2022 were within that prescribed period.
2.3.2 The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's discussion in Rajeev Bansal on Article 142, where the Court held that its directions in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal were issued to do "complete justice", supplement existing legal framework, and could, in appropriate circumstances, override strict statutory timelines to prevent inequitable results.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.3 The Tribunal reasoned that the Supreme Court had explicitly mandated that all further actions-including passing order under section 148A(d) and issuing notice under section 148 of the new regime-must be completed within the surviving time under the Income Tax Act read with TOLA.
2.3.4 Consequently, the specific period of one month from the end of the month of receipt of reply, as mentioned in section 148A(d), could not be construed to enlarge or override the surviving period of limitation fixed by the Supreme Court under Article 142.
2.3.5 The Tribunal concluded that, to the extent of conflict, the law declared by the Supreme Court in Rajeev Bansal, operating under Article 142, prevails over the literal application of section 148A(d)'s time-frame for passing the order and issuing the section 148 notice.
Conclusion
2.3.6 The Revenue's contention that compliance with section 148A(d)'s one-month time-limit validated the notice was rejected. The controlling limitation is the surviving period as defined in Rajeev Bansal, and the impugned notice dated 27.07.2022, having been issued beyond that period, was held to be invalid.
2.4 Consequential validity of reassessment proceedings and assessment order
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4.1 Once the notice under section 148 dated 27.07.2022 was held invalid and time-barred, the very jurisdiction to reassess under section 147 stood vitiated.
2.4.2 The Tribunal noted that a reassessment notice issued without complying with the preconditions of limitation and procedure is invalid and affects the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Rajeev Bansal.
2.4.3 Consequently, all proceedings taken pursuant to an invalid section 148 notice, including the assessment order passed under section 147 read with section 144B on 29.05.2023, cannot survive.
Conclusion
2.4.4 The proceedings initiated under section 148 were quashed as time-barred. Accordingly, the consequential assessment order dated 29.05.2023 was also quashed and set aside for A.Y. 2014-15.
2.4.5 As the reassessment itself was annulled on jurisdictional grounds, the grounds raised by the Revenue on merits of the addition under section 69A and on the nature of alleged accommodation entries became infructuous and were not adjudicated.
2.5 Application of the same reasoning to A.Y. 2015-16
Interpretation and reasoning
2.5.1 For A.Y. 2015-16, the material dates were:
- 30.06.2021: Original notice under section 148 (old regime);
- 24.05.2022: Notice under section 148A(b);
- 06.06.2022: Assessee's reply to section 148A(b);
- 27.07.2022: Order under section 148A(d) and fresh notice under section 148.
2.5.2 The Tribunal recorded that the facts and sequence of events for this year were identical in principle to A.Y. 2014-15. The original notice under section 148 was again dated 30.06.2021, giving the Assessing Officer only one-day "surviving time" under the Act read with TOLA, subject to the same seven-day extension logic after the assessee's reply.
2.5.3 The impugned notice under section 148 dated 27.07.2022 was thus also issued beyond the surviving period available post reply dated 06.06.2022, and hence equally hit by limitation as per Rajeev Bansal and the Gujarat High Court's approach in Dhanraj Govindram Kella.
Conclusion
2.5.4 Applying mutatis mutandis the reasoning and conclusion reached for A.Y. 2014-15, the Tribunal held the notice under section 148 dated 27.07.2022 for A.Y. 2015-16 to be invalid and time-barred.
2.5.5 The reassessment proceedings and assessment order for A.Y. 2015-16 were quashed and set aside, and the Revenue's appeal for this year was dismissed, the legal ground of the assessee being allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the writ jurisdiction should be exercised to interfere with an adjudication order under the Customs Act despite the availability of an alternative statutory remedy of appeal under Section 129, on the ground of alleged breach of principles of natural justice.
1.2 Whether the circumstances of the case warranted protection to the petitioner in relation to limitation for filing an appeal before the Appellate Authority.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Writ jurisdiction versus alternative statutory remedy under Section 129 of the Customs Act, in the context of alleged breach of natural justice
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Court noted that an appeal lies against the impugned adjudication order under Section 129 of the Customs Act, which constitutes an alternate and statutory remedy.
2.2 The petitioner attempted to avoid the alternate remedy by asserting that it was prevented from leading evidence and that there was a breach of natural justice which, according to the petitioner, could not be cured in appeal.
2.3 During arguments, it was further urged that none of the petitioner's contentions were considered and that the petitioner's defence had been confused with that of other parties, amounting to a gross violation of principles of natural justice and attracting an exception to the rule of exhaustion of alternate remedies.
2.4 The Court perused the impugned order with the assistance of counsel and found it to be detailed. Prima facie, the Court did not accept the allegation that none of the petitioner's contentions had been considered; the order also referred to certain admissions attributed to the petitioner.
2.5 The Court held that, at this stage, it was not required to determine whether such admissions were actually made or to assess the correctness of the Commissioner's view on merits.
2.6 The Court characterised the allegations of breach of natural justice as casually made and held that the assertion that none of the petitioner's defences were considered could not, at least prima facie, be accepted. On such a basis, it would not be proper to depart from the normal rule requiring exhaustion of statutory remedies.
2.7 The Court observed that a detailed review would be necessary even to determine whether there was any breach of natural justice and, if so, whether any prejudice had been caused. It emphasised that a mere or technical breach of natural justice is not always sufficient to grant final relief; prejudice must be pleaded and established.
2.8 The Court relied on its earlier decision in a batch of matters (including one involving Oberoi Construction Ltd.), where the law on exhaustion of alternate remedies, as settled by the Supreme Court, had been considered. Applying that reasoning, the Court held that the petition ought not to be entertained in the face of an efficacious appellate remedy.
2.9 The Court also referred to a recent decision of the Supreme Court highlighting the importance of exhausting alternate remedies and not bypassing them unless well-settled exceptions applied. The Court held that none of the recognised exceptions, including those based on egregious breach of natural justice, were attracted in the present case.
Conclusions
2.10 The Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction and refused to entertain the petition, holding that the petitioner must be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy under Section 129 of the Customs Act.
2.11 The Court clarified that it had not examined the matter on merits and that all contentions of all parties on merits were kept open for consideration by the Appellate Authority.
Issue 2: Protection regarding limitation for filing appeal before the Appellate Authority
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 The Court noted that the petition was instituted on 17 March 2025, which was within the period prescribed for filing an appeal against the impugned order.
2.13 Since the petitioner had approached the Court within the appellate limitation period and was now being relegated to the alternate remedy, the Court considered it appropriate to protect the petitioner from any adverse consequence of limitation before the Appellate Authority.
Conclusions
2.14 The Court directed that, if the petitioner files an appeal before the Appellate Authority after complying with all prescribed formalities within four weeks from the date of the order, the Appellate Authority shall consider such appeal on its own merits without adverting to the issue of limitation.
2.15 The Court further clarified that any observations in its order are only for deciding whether an extraordinary case existed to deviate from the rule of exhaustion of alternate remedies and shall not influence the Appellate Authority in deciding the appeal on merits.
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