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Issues: Whether the appellants, accused under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, were entitled to bail in view of the statutory restriction under Section 43-D(5), the material collected against them, and the prolonged period of pre-trial incarceration.
Analysis: The Court applied the bail framework under Section 43-D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and the accused-specific inquiry articulated by the Supreme Court, requiring examination of whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, disclosed a prima facie nexus between the individual role attributed and the alleged unlawful activity. It noted that the appellants were alleged mainly to have participated in social media groups, exchanged digital content, and made limited calls to a co-accused, but there was no allegation that they created the groups or disseminated objectionable material as such. The Court also considered the long custody period, the uncertain duration of trial, the limited nature of the attributed role, the absence of conclusive corroboration from a key witness as against one appellant, and the medical condition of the other appellant as relevant to the overall Article 21 assessment.
Conclusion: The Court held that the statutory threshold for continued detention was not met on the facts placed before it and that continued incarceration would not serve the ends of justice. Bail was therefore granted to the appellants on stringent conditions.