Charge-framing requires admissible investigation material; a co-accused confession alone cannot sustain conspiracy or abetment charges.

At the charge-framing stage, the court may rely only on materials collected during investigation that are legally admissible, and not on evidence that may emerge later at trial. The text states that witness statements showing only an unrelated meeting were insufficient to infer a criminal conspiracy or abetment, because a conspiracy cannot be built on another presumption. It further notes that a co-accused's confession, by itself, cannot sustain charges unless supported by independent material, and that a self-exculpatory statement is not admissible as a confession. The result described is that the charges against both appellants were quashed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the materials relied upon were sufficient to frame charges for criminal conspiracy and abetment against the first appellant. (ii) Whether the confessional statements relied upon were admissible and could be used to frame charges against the second appellant.

Issue (i): Whether the materials relied upon were sufficient to frame charges for criminal conspiracy and abetment against the first appellant.

Analysis: The witness statements recorded during investigation did not speak of any conspiracy to commit the murder. They only disclosed a meeting on an unrelated no-confidence motion, and no foundation existed for drawing an inference that the murder was discussed there. A presumption of conspiracy could not be drawn from another presumption. The confession of one co-accused could not be used because that accused had already been discharged and was not being jointly tried, and the charge-framing court could consider only materials collected during investigation that could legally become evidence, not additional evidence that might be led later at trial. The remaining confession, even if admissible, could not by itself support the charge in the absence of independent material.

Conclusion: The charge of conspiracy and related offences against the first appellant could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the confessional statements relied upon were admissible and could be used to frame charges against the second appellant.

Analysis: The statement attributed to the second appellant was self-exculpatory and therefore not admissible as a confession. Once excluded, the confessions of other accused persons could not, in the absence of independent material connecting the second appellant with the alleged offence, form the basis of charges. A co-accused confession can at best lend assurance to other evidence, but it cannot stand alone as the foundation for framing charges.

Conclusion: The charges against the second appellant also could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The impugned charges were quashed and both appellants were discharged, as the materials on record did not legally justify proceeding to trial against them.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of framing charges, the court may rely only on material collected during investigation that is legally admissible in evidence, and a confession of a co-accused cannot by itself sustain a charge unless it is used only to lend assurance to independent evidence already available against the accused.

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