Limitation for avoiding voidable leases: judicial cancellation was required before possession could be claimed.

A suit seeking to avoid leases alleged to have been procured by undue influence and to recover possession was treated as falling within Article 91 of the Limitation Act. The article was applied because the possession claim depended on first cancelling or setting aside the impugned instrument, so limitation for the avoidance relief could not be bypassed by combining it with a possession claim. The reasoning also states that a voidable lease cannot be displaced by mere unilateral repudiation when possession is sought as plaintiff; judicial rescission or cancellation is required. Trusts Act and Contract Act arguments were held insufficient to remove that requirement. The consequence stated is that the possession claim was time-barred because the leases had not been set aside within limitation.

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Issues: (i) Whether a suit to avoid leases alleged to have been procured by undue influence and to recover possession was governed by Article 91 of the Limitation Act; (ii) whether the plaintiff could recover possession without first obtaining a judicial decree setting aside the leases, and whether unilateral repudiation or the Trusts Act displaced that requirement.

Issue (i): Whether a suit to avoid leases alleged to have been procured by undue influence and to recover possession was governed by Article 91 of the Limitation Act.

Analysis: The cause of action fell within the class of suits for cancellation or setting aside of an instrument. The reasoning treated undue influence as a recognised ground for avoidance within the scope of Article 91, and rejected the contention that the article was inapplicable because the suit also sought possession. The authorities relied upon showed that limitation for the avoidance relief could not be displaced by framing the action as one for possession when the possession claim depended upon first getting rid of the instrument.

Conclusion: Article 91 applied, and the suit was barred by limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether the plaintiff could recover possession without first obtaining a judicial decree setting aside the leases, and whether unilateral repudiation or the Trusts Act displaced that requirement.

Analysis: The reasoning held that a voidable transfer or lease could not be treated as eliminated by a mere unilateral repudiation when the plaintiff came forward as plaintiff for possession. The instrument had to be judicially rescinded or otherwise validly set aside before possession could be claimed. The provisions of the Trusts Act and the Contract Act were held not to override that requirement, because they did not dispense with the need to invoke the court within the period of limitation. The constructive-trust arguments were rejected as insufficient to confer an immediate, enforceable title without judicial declaration.

Conclusion: A judicial setting aside of the leases was necessary, and unilateral repudiation did not suffice.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the relief of possession was dependent on setting aside the impugned leases, and the suit to obtain that result was time-barred.

Ratio Decidendi: Where relief of possession depends on avoiding a voidable instrument, the party seeking relief must obtain judicial rescission or cancellation within the prescribed limitation period, and a unilateral repudiation does not substitute for that decree.

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