Constructive excise liability requires approved agency and proof of personal role; an uncharged abetment theory cannot sustain conviction.

Constructive liability under the Central Excise Rules could not be fastened on a firm manager absent approved agency showing him as a deemed owner, and mere management did not prove personal involvement in the removal of bonded tobacco or evasion of duty. A conviction could not be sustained on an uncharged abetment basis under section 9(d) when the case had proceeded only on clauses (a) and (b), because introducing that theory at appeal would prejudice the defence. No retrial was directed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the respondent, being only the manager of the firm, could be held liable under clauses (a) and (b) of section 9 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 for contraventions of the excise rules and alleged removal of tobacco from the bonded warehouse. (ii) Whether the respondent's conviction could be sustained, or the matter remitted for retrial, on the footing that he was an abettor under clause (d) of section 9 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944.

Issue (i): Whether the respondent, being only the manager of the firm, could be held liable under clauses (a) and (b) of section 9 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 for contraventions of the excise rules and alleged removal of tobacco from the bonded warehouse.

Analysis: Liability for the alleged contraventions under clause (a) depended on the extent to which the respondent could be treated as the owner for purposes of the rules framed under section 37 of the Act. Rule 3 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 deemed a person to be the owner only where the authorisation by the owner as agent had been approved by the Collector. No material showed such approved agency in the respondent's case. For the allegation under clause (b), there was no evidence connecting the respondent personally with the removal of the 80 bags or with any act of evasion of duty. Mere management of the business was insufficient to fasten liability for either contravention.

Conclusion: The respondent was not liable under clauses (a) or (b) of section 9 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944.

Issue (ii): Whether the respondent's conviction could be sustained, or the matter remitted for retrial, on the footing that he was an abettor under clause (d) of section 9 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944.

Analysis: The complaint and the trial proceeded only on the basis of clauses (a) and (b), and the respondent was never called upon to meet a case of abetment under clause (d). Introducing that basis at the appellate stage would have caused prejudice in defence. In view of the lapse of time since the alleged offence and the earlier acquittal, a retrial was considered inappropriate.

Conclusion: The conviction could not be sustained on the basis of abetment, and no retrial was directed.

Final Conclusion: The appellate challenge failed because the respondent was not shown to be liable under the charged excise contraventions and the alternative abetment theory could not be newly introduced at the appellate stage.

Ratio Decidendi: Constructive liability under excise law cannot be imposed beyond the limits fixed by the governing rules, and a conviction cannot be sustained on an uncharged alternative basis that would prejudice the accused's defence.

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