Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires proof of intent to evade tax; (ii) Whether the six-day expiry of the e-way bills justified detention and penalty despite the asserted vehicle breakdown and stock-transfer nature of the movement; and (iii) Whether the alleged procedural lapses and the cited circulars invalidated the penalty proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires proof of intent to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 129(1) is attracted where goods are transported in contravention of the Act or Rules. Its text does not make tax evasion or mens rea a precondition for detention or penalty. The provision imposes civil consequences for breach of statutory obligations, for which guilty intention is not an essential ingredient.

Conclusion: Proof of intent to evade tax is not required for imposition of penalty under Section 129(1)(a), against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the six-day expiry of the e-way bills justified detention and penalty despite the asserted vehicle breakdown and stock-transfer nature of the movement.

Analysis: Rule 138(10) permits extension of e-way-bill validity within eight hours of expiry. The e-way bills had expired six days before interception, and no reliable repair records or other evidence substantiated the claimed breakdown. Neither the supplier, recipient nor transporter sought amendment or extension during that period. Interstate stock transfer and accompanying invoices did not create an exemption from the obligation to maintain a valid e-way bill. Withholding available supporting evidence warranted an adverse inference.

Conclusion: Transportation under e-way bills that remained expired for six days constituted contravention warranting penalty under Section 129(1)(a), against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the alleged procedural lapses and the cited circulars invalidated the penalty proceedings.

Analysis: Any asserted deficiency concerning notice, hearing or prescribed forms caused no prejudice because full opportunity was available before the final fact-finding forum to produce explanations and evidence. Circular No. 64/38/2018-GST protects specified minor discrepancies where a valid e-way bill accompanies the consignment; it does not cover transportation with an expired e-way bill.

Conclusion: The alleged procedural lapses and cited circulars did not invalidate the penalty proceedings, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme governing transit documentation applied to the movements in question, and the prolonged failure to maintain valid e-way bills attracted the prescribed civil consequences.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under Section 129(1) follows from transportation of goods in contravention of statutory transit-document requirements and does not depend on proof of an intention to evade tax.

Issues: Whether accumulated Compensation Cess input tax credit on coal used in manufacturing leather products for domestic supplies not liable to Compensation Cess qualifies for refund under the inverted tax structure category.

Analysis: Section 54(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 confines refund of unutilised input tax credit to the specified statutory categories. For refund on account of an inverted duty structure, the accumulation must arise from the rate of tax on inputs being higher than that on output supplies, subject to the exclusion relating to nil-rated or fully exempt supplies. Accumulation resulting from Compensation Cess on coal and absence of Compensation Cess on domestic outward supplies does not, by itself, establish satisfaction of that test. Eligibility to avail input tax credit under Sections 16 and 17(5), its restricted utilisation under the proviso to Section 11(2) of the Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act, 2017, and entitlement to refund are distinct matters. The utilisation restriction does not by itself absolutely bar refund, but neither does it create an independent refund entitlement. Rule 89(5) provides a computation mechanism only after the substantive conditions under Section 54(3) are fulfilled. The cited circulars concern qualifying zero-rated supplies and do not establish refund eligibility for the domestic supplies in question.

Conclusion: The accumulated Compensation Cess input tax credit was not shown to meet the statutory conditions for refund under Section 54(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and was not refundable under the inverted tax structure category.

Ratio Decidendi: Availability of input tax credit and its restricted utilisation do not, without fulfilment of the independent conditions prescribed for refund, confer a right to refund unutilised credit.

Issues: (i) Whether the plea of non-service of FORM GST MOV-07 was sustainable and whether procedural deficiencies permitted affirmation of the existing adjudication; (ii) Whether a confined fresh adjudication by the original adjudicating authority was legally warranted; and (iii) Whether the payment made for release constituted a waiver or final determination of liability.

Issue (i): Whether the plea of non-service of FORM GST MOV-07 was sustainable and whether procedural deficiencies permitted affirmation of the existing adjudication.

Analysis: Section 160(2) applies where the recipient has acted upon the notice. The contemporaneous MOV records recorded service, and the appeal materials and written representation evidenced a response to the notice in the detention proceeding. The absence of a copy of MOV-07 in the appellate record did not displace that cumulative material. However, Sections 129(3) and 129(4) require notice, an opportunity of hearing, and reasoned adjudication of the explanation. The unidentified enclosure to MOV-09, unresolved primary records, and material errors in the appellate chronology prevented reliance on the existing findings as a reliable determination of the defence.

Conclusion: The service objection to FORM GST MOV-07 was rejected against the assessee, but the existing adjudication could not be affirmed without a proper determination of the representation and procedural safeguards.

Issue (ii): Whether a confined fresh adjudication by the original adjudicating authority was legally warranted.

Analysis: Section 113(1) of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorises a direct reference to the original adjudicating authority, whereas Section 107(11) does not confer that power on the first appellate authority. The actual movement, route, destination, timing of the alleged diversion, and the point at which e-way bill compliance was required could not be reliably resolved without contemporaneous primary material. Later e-way bills cannot retrospectively cure an established breach, but neither can liability be founded on disputed secondary recitals. An independent mens rea requirement is not built into Section 129; nevertheless, penalty is not automatic and requires an assessment of the established breach, bona fides, and whether any lapse was technical or substantive.

Conclusion: A confined fresh adjudication by the original adjudicating authority was legally warranted on the existing notice and original allegation, with disclosure of relied-upon contemporaneous material and a reasonable opportunity of hearing; the merits of liability remain undecided.

Issue (iii): Whether the payment made for release constituted a waiver or final determination of liability.

Analysis: Payment made to secure release after submission of objections does not displace the statutory requirement of adjudication or extinguish the challenge to the demand. Section 129(5) does not convert such payment into a waiver of the statutory remedy or a conclusive determination of liability.

Conclusion: The release payment was neither a waiver nor a final determination of liability and must be reconciled against the fresh determination, with consequential adjustment or refund if due.

Final Conclusion: The service objection is closed, while the existence and character of any transit contravention and the resulting fiscal liability must be resolved through a procedurally fair, evidence-based determination of the original defence.

Ratio Decidendi: Detention penalty under Section 129 requires an established transport contravention and reasoned consideration of the assessee's explanation; independent proof of intent to evade is unnecessary, but penalty is not automatic.

Issues: (i) Whether delayed additional invoices and bilties were sufficient to establish the genuineness of transportation of the goods; (ii) Whether the appellant established that the goods belonged to genuine buyers or sellers and were moved from Delhi to Gwalior via Uttar Pradesh; (iii) Whether the transit-state precedent relied upon by the appellant applied to the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether delayed additional invoices and bilties were sufficient to establish the genuineness of transportation of the goods.

Analysis: The legal framework requires goods in transit to be supported by reliable accompanying documents. The documents initially produced did not cover the goods found on physical verification, and the driver had stated that all documents in his possession had been produced. The subsequently produced invoices and bilties lacked corroboration connecting them to the undeclared goods; their delayed production, discrepancies in invoicing and transport documents, and the absence of reliable supporting evidence undermined their credibility.

Conclusion: The delayed invoices and bilties did not establish that the undeclared goods were genuinely covered by valid transportation documents. This issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant established that the goods belonged to genuine buyers or sellers and were moved from Delhi to Gwalior via Uttar Pradesh.

Analysis: The asserted inter-State movement required credible proof of the identity and business credentials of the buyers and sellers, their connection with the consignment, and the stated destination. No buyer or seller acknowledged the transaction or claimed the goods, and no satisfactory material established their genuineness, authority, or business presence. The documentary material did not reliably establish either ownership or the claimed out-of-State destination.

Conclusion: The appellant failed to prove that the goods belonged to genuine transacting parties or were genuinely being transported from Delhi to Gwalior through Uttar Pradesh. This issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the transit-state precedent relied upon by the appellant applied to the facts of the case.

Analysis: The relied-upon precedent concerned documented transactions involving identifiable registered parties, acknowledged transactions and an established destination outside the transit State. Those foundational facts were absent here because the goods were found undeclared and the later documents were not shown to be genuine or connected with the consignment. The precedent was therefore factually distinguishable.

Conclusion: The transit-state precedent was inapplicable to the facts of the case. This issue was decided against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The finding that the goods were undeclared and unsupported by reliable evidence justified sustaining the penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: A claim of inter-State transit cannot defeat action concerning undeclared goods unless the transporter establishes, through reliable contemporaneous evidence, the genuineness of the documents, transacting parties and stated destination.

Issues: (i) Whether intention to evade tax is a jurisdictional pre-condition under Section 129(1); (ii) The effect of Section 10(1)(b) to the claimed onward sale during transit, and the movement-document requirements; (iii) Whether the still-live first e-way bill covered the movement after diversion from Bhilai towards the location of interception or Raipur; (iv) Whether the second e-way bill truthfully and validly corresponded to that movement, having regard to its Bhilai dispatch declaration, expiry and the interception location; (v) Whether the cumulative defects were merely technical or constituted substantive contravention; and (vi) The effect of DRC-03 payment and whether the impugned order calls for interference.

Issue (i): Whether intention to evade tax is a jurisdictional pre-condition under Section 129(1).

Analysis: Section 129(1) is attracted where goods in transit are transported or stored in contravention of the Act or the rules. Unlike confiscation provisions, it does not make intention to evade tax an independent condition. Nevertheless, the explanation for the alleged contravention must be considered, and penalty cannot follow automatically from every minor discrepancy.

Conclusion: Intention to evade tax is not an independent jurisdictional pre-condition for penalty under Section 129(1).

Issue (ii): The effect of Section 10(1)(b) to the claimed onward sale during transit, and the movement-document requirements.

Analysis: Section 10(1)(b) of the IGST Act permits an intermediate purchaser to make an onward supply during transit without first taking physical delivery. That place-of-supply deeming provision does not alter the actual destination in existing transport records or dispense with Section 68 and the requirements under Rules 138 and 138A that movement documents accurately correspond to the physical movement.

Conclusion: The onward sale during transit was legally permissible, but it did not exempt the movement from valid and accurate e-way-bill documentation.

Issue (iii): Whether the still-live first e-way bill covered the movement after diversion from Bhilai towards the location of interception or Raipur.

Analysis: The first e-way bill remained valid in time and correctly described the original dispatch from Visakhapatnam to Bhilai. The contemporaneous movement record, subsequent invoice and second e-way bill produced at interception established that the destination had changed towards Raipur. Temporal validity alone could not make the first e-way bill correspond to the diverted movement.

Conclusion: The first e-way bill did not cover the altered movement merely because it had not expired.

Issue (iv): Whether the second e-way bill truthfully and validly corresponded to that movement, having regard to its Bhilai dispatch declaration, expiry and the interception location.

Analysis: The second e-way bill described a regular movement originating from Bhilai although the goods admittedly never reached Bhilai. It had expired before interception, with no extension, replacement document, exceptional circumstance, or contemporaneous transport record explaining the continued movement. The recorded interception location and route were not displaced by the alternative map evidence.

Conclusion: The second e-way bill was materially inaccurate as to its physical origin and was invalid on account of expiry at the time of interception.

Issue (v): Whether the cumulative defects were merely technical or constituted substantive contravention.

Analysis: The original e-way bill retained the displaced Bhilai destination, while the onward e-way bill falsely declared dispatch from Bhilai and had expired. The actual route was unsupported by contemporaneous time-stamped transport material. Matching goods description, quantity and vehicle number did not reconcile the conflicting origin and destination declarations or establish an uninterrupted movement.

Conclusion: The combined defects constituted substantive contravention of the movement-document requirements, not a technical or venial breach.

Issue (vi): The effect of DRC-03 payment and whether the impugned order calls for interference.

Analysis: Payment through DRC-03 to procure release of goods and conveyance neither constituted a conclusive admission nor extinguished the statutory right of appeal. On independent scrutiny, the established substantive contraventions attracted the prescribed penalty; the payment remained liable to be appropriated against that liability.

Conclusion: The payment did not bar appellate review, but no interference with the penalty was warranted.

Final Conclusion: A change in the actual destination during transit must be supported by valid movement documents that truthfully describe the physical journey; an expired e-way bill containing a materially incorrect dispatch point attracts penalty under Section 129(1)(a) without separate proof of mens rea.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 129(1) applies where the e-way bill fails to validly and truthfully correspond to the actual movement of goods, and proof of intention to evade tax is not an independent requirement for such civil penalty.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires proof of intent to evade tax. (ii) Whether the penalties for transporting goods with e-way bills expired for six days were sustainable on the facts.

Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires proof of intent to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 129(1) is attracted where goods are transported in contravention of the Act or the Rules. Its text makes the contravention the trigger for detention and penalty, without making actual tax evasion or guilty intention a condition. The penalty is adjudicatory for breach of a civil obligation; consequently, mens rea is not an essential ingredient.

Conclusion: Proof of intent to evade tax is not required for penalty under Section 129(1)(a); this issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalties for transporting goods with e-way bills expired for six days were sustainable on the facts.

Analysis: The third proviso to Rule 138(10) permits extension of an e-way bill within eight hours of its expiry. The e-way bills had expired six days before interception, and no repair records or other cogent evidence substantiated the asserted vehicle breakdown. Neither the supplier, recipient nor transporter sought extension during that period. Stock transfer, invoices and e-invoices did not dispense with the obligation to maintain valid e-way bills. The exception in Circular No. 64/38/2018-GST applies where a valid e-way bill accompanies the goods and was therefore inapplicable. The alleged procedural deficiencies caused no prejudice because a full opportunity to produce explanation and evidence was available before the Tribunal.

Conclusion: The prolonged expiry of the e-way bills and absence of substantiated justification established statutory contravention; the penalties were sustainable against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Transportation under e-way bills that have ceased to be valid, without substantiated justification or timely extension, attracts the statutory detention-and-penalty consequences even where the movement is by stock transfer.

Ratio Decidendi: For penalty under Section 129(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, transportation in contravention of the statutory requirements is sufficient; proof of intent to evade tax is unnecessary.

Issues: (i) Whether an e-way bill was legally required for the movement in question; (ii) Whether the penalty could be sustained on the basis of the adjudication undertaken under Section 129; and (iii) What consequential order was appropriate under Section 113.

Issue (i): Whether an e-way bill was legally required for the movement in question.

Analysis: Rule 138(14)(d) of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Rules, read with Notification No. F 10-31/2018/CT/V(46) dated 19.06.2018, retained the e-way bill requirement for specified beverages moving between districts in Chhattisgarh where the consignment value exceeded the prescribed threshold. The movement fell within that retained e-way bill requirement. No e-way bill had been generated, and the claimed portal failure and business urgency lacked contemporaneous supporting material on the existing record.

Conclusion: The movement was prima facie subject to the e-way bill requirement and no e-way bill was generated; this issue is against the assessee, without a final determination of penalty liability.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty could be sustained on the basis of the adjudication undertaken under Section 129.

Analysis: Section 129(4) mandates an effective opportunity of hearing before determination of penalty. This safeguard requires a reasoned order addressing the relevant explanation and material. The notice allowed seven days for a response, but the penalty order followed the next day and contained unselected alternatives and drafting placeholders without a clear determination of the explanation, accompanying documents, or basis of penalty. Payment through DRC-03 to obtain release did not amount to waiver of the statutory challenge, and non-appearance in the first appeal did not cure the defective original adjudication.

Conclusion: The penalty could not be sustained on the defective adjudication under Section 129; the issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): What consequential order was appropriate under Section 113.

Analysis: Section 113(1) authorises referral to the original adjudicating authority for a fresh decision. As the defect originated in the original adjudication and the explanation for non-generation of the e-way bill required factual consideration, fresh adjudication by the original authority was appropriate. The scope of remand is confined to the allegation in the existing notice, without any new factual foundation or charge, and liability to penalty remains open.

Conclusion: The appellate order and penalty order were set aside, and the original adjudicating authority was directed to undertake fresh adjudication within the existing scope of the notice.

Final Conclusion: The defective penalty determination and its appellate confirmation were nullified, while the question whether any penalty is ultimately payable remains open for lawful determination after an effective hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty determination under Section 129 cannot rest on a non-speaking order issued without an effective statutory hearing, and payment made to secure release of goods does not cure that defect or waive the right to challenge it.

Issues: Whether accumulated Compensation Cess input tax credit on coal used for manufacturing domestic outward supplies not liable to Compensation Cess qualifies for refund under the inverted tax structure category.

Analysis: Section 54(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 confines refund of unutilised input tax credit to the prescribed categories. A claim under the inverted tax structure category requires establishment that the accumulation results from a higher rate of tax on inputs than on output supplies and that the statutory exclusions do not apply. Eligibility to avail Compensation Cess credit under Section 16, and the absence of a blocked-credit restriction under Section 17(5), are distinct from entitlement to obtain that credit as a cash refund.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 11(2) of the Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act, 2017 restricts utilisation of Compensation Cess credit to payment of Compensation Cess. Although that restriction is not by itself an absolute bar to every refund, inability to utilise the credit against other liabilities does not independently create a refund entitlement. Rule 89(5) supplies a computation mechanism only after the substantive conditions of Section 54(3) are met. The cited circulars concern qualifying zero-rated supplies and do not establish refund eligibility for domestic outward supplies merely because the finished product is not subject to Compensation Cess.

Conclusion: The accumulated Compensation Cess credit attributable to the domestic supplies was not shown to satisfy the independent statutory requirements for refund under Section 54(3); the refund claims were therefore not admissible. This conclusion is against the assessee.

Issues: Whether costs could be imposed on the department while allowing its application to summon and examine a witness and place additional documents on record under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: Section 311 confers discretion to summon, examine, recall or re-examine a witness at any stage of proceedings, and mandates such exercise where the evidence is essential to a just decision. The additional documents were found necessary for deciding the facts in issue, and their proof was necessary after they were permitted to be brought on record. The provision operates to secure truth and justice without favouring either side.

Conclusion: Costs could not be imposed on the department in the circumstances while granting its application under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an application under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is allowed on a finding that the proposed evidence is necessary for deciding the facts in issue, costs are unwarranted in the circumstances merely for permitting its production and proof.

Issues: (i) Whether a prescribed income-tax authority may issue a notice under Section 143(2) despite centralisation of the assessee's case with a designated Assessing Officer; and (ii) whether writ interference is warranted against notices issued under Section 142(1) at the information-gathering/show-cause stage.

Issue (i): Whether a prescribed income-tax authority may issue a notice under Section 143(2) despite centralisation of the assessee's case with a designated Assessing Officer.

Analysis: Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 recognises both the Assessing Officer and the prescribed income-tax authority as authorities empowered to issue a notice. Rule 12E of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 enables the Board to prescribe such an authority. The prescribed status of the issuing authority was admitted, and the notification conferring that status was neither challenged nor shown to exclude the assessee's case. The expression "as the case may be" does not restrict a prescribed income-tax authority to a residual role or exclude its competence merely because the case is centralised with an Assessing Officer.

Conclusion: A duly prescribed income-tax authority may issue a notice under Section 143(2) notwithstanding centralisation of the case with an Assessing Officer; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether writ interference is warranted against notices issued under Section 142(1) at the information-gathering/show-cause stage.

Analysis: Notices under Section 142(1) seek information and do not determine liability or finally prejudice rights. The assessee has an opportunity to raise jurisdictional and factual objections in the assessment proceedings and, if required, through the statutory appellate framework. Writ jurisdiction is not intended to supervise preliminary steps in an assessment when effective statutory remedies remain available.

Conclusion: Writ interference at the preliminary information-gathering/show-cause stage is unwarranted; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Centralisation with an Assessing Officer does not displace the authority of a duly prescribed income-tax authority, and objections may be pursued through the assessment and statutory appellate framework.

Issues: Whether interest paid on import duty is refundable where timely duty payment was not reflected on the ICEGATE portal because of technical glitches, although the Bills of Entry were filed after 13.04.2023.

Analysis: Section 47 of the Customs Act, 1962 and the Customs (Waiver of Interest) 3rd Order dated 17.04.2023 were applied in the context of the Electronic Cash Ledger technical failure. The advisory dated 27.07.2023 acknowledged that the ICEGATE system inability continued until that date. The date limitation in the waiver order did not defeat relief where the importer had initiated payment in time and the delay in reflecting credit resulted from the portal malfunction.

Conclusion: Interest paid because of the ICEGATE technical failure is refundable, and waiver of interest is available notwithstanding that the Bills of Entry were filed after 13.04.2023.

Issues: Whether a show-cause notice issued under Section 74 could be quashed in writ jurisdiction on grounds concerning limitation and alleged inclusion of another entity's turnover.

Analysis: A challenge to a show-cause notice is maintainable only where the issuing authority lacks competence. The notice afforded an opportunity to submit a reply and avail personal hearing, while the objections concerning limitation and attribution of turnover required determination by the competent authority. No lack of jurisdiction of the issuing authority was alleged.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice was not liable to be interfered with in writ jurisdiction; the objections may be raised before the competent authority.

Issues: (i) Whether a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction under Section 10(1)(b) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is legally valid; (ii) Whether the supply in question was a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction supported by valid invoices and e-way bills; (iii) Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central and Chhattisgarh GST Acts, 2017 was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction under Section 10(1)(b) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is legally valid.

Analysis: Section 10(1)(b) contemplates a supply in which goods are delivered by the supplier to a recipient or other person on the direction of a third person, who is deemed to have received the goods. Such a transaction involves an original supplier, an intermediate buyer, and an ultimate consignee. Direct dispatch to the consignee, coupled with onward invoicing by the intermediate buyer, is a recognised arrangement where the transactions are genuine, documented, accounted for, and taxed in accordance with law.

Conclusion: A genuine and duly documented Bill-to/Ship-to transaction is legally permissible.

Issue (ii): Whether the supply in question was a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction supported by valid invoices and e-way bills.

Analysis: The original supplier's e-invoices identified the intermediate buyer as the Bill-to party and the ultimate recipient as the Ship-to party. The onward e-invoices identified the ultimate recipient, and the e-way bills corresponded with those invoices and were generated before interception. Under Rule 138(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, the person causing movement, including the consignor or consignee as applicable, may generate the e-way bill. The transport arrangement and factory-gate records supported genuine movement of the goods.

Conclusion: The supply was a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction supported by valid e-invoices and e-way bills, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central and Chhattisgarh GST Acts, 2017 was sustainable.

Analysis: The e-way bills had been generated by the person responsible for arranging the transport before the vehicle was intercepted. Therefore, the original supplier's alleged failure to generate the e-way bill could not independently justify detention when the goods were accompanied by the requisite documentary evidence.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable and Section 129(1)(a) did not apply, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Detention and penal action cannot be sustained merely because the original supplier did not generate the e-way bill where a genuine Bill-to/Ship-to supply is evidenced by valid invoices and an e-way bill generated by the person causing movement.

Ratio Decidendi: In a genuine and documented Bill-to/Ship-to supply, Rule 138(2) is satisfied when the person causing movement generates the e-way bill; penalty under Section 129 cannot rest solely on the original supplier not generating it.

Issues: Whether a departmental GST appeal involving a disputed penalty below the prescribed monetary threshold could be admitted without establishing an applicable exception under the departmental litigation policy.

Analysis: Section 120 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorises monetary limits for departmental appeals. The applicable circular fixed a threshold of Rs. 20,00,000 for appeals before GSTAT. As the dispute concerned only penalty, the disputed amount was Rs. 3,35,286, which was below that threshold. An exception to the threshold had to be specifically pleaded and supported by material. Authorisation under Section 112(3) was distinct from compliance with the monetary-limit policy and did not itself establish an exception. No material established a recurring legal issue, any other specified exception, or a case-specific and reasoned exercise of the Commissioner's residual power to contest the matter.

Conclusion: The departmental appeal was not maintainable for want of an established exception to the applicable monetary-limit policy.

Issues: Whether a departmental appeal involving disputed tax below the prescribed monetary limit was maintainable without establishing a recognised exception.

Analysis: Section 120 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorises monetary-limit instructions regulating departmental appeals. The applicable circular fixed a threshold of Rs. 20,00,000 before the Tribunal and required only the aggregate disputed tax, rather than interest or penalty, to be considered where tax is in dispute. The disputed CGST and SGST components together were below that threshold. Section 112(3) permits the Commissioner to direct an application to the Tribunal, but such authorisation does not dispense with compliance with the monetary-limit policy. A recognised exception had to be specifically pleaded and supported; where the residual exception based on the interests of justice or revenue was invoked, the record had to disclose the Commissioner's case-specific reasoned opinion. No such exception or material was established. The departmental monetary-limit instructions were binding upon the Revenue, and maintainability had to be determined before entering upon the merits.

Conclusion: The departmental appeal was not maintainable and could not be admitted for adjudication on the merits because no recognised exception to the applicable monetary limit was established.

Issues: Whether the assessment could be made without granting the assessee an effective opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses after the Assessing Officer issued a second notice for cross-examination.

Analysis: The earlier judicial direction required the witnesses to be made available for cross-examination and a fresh assessment to be made after giving due regard to that exercise, in conformity with principles of natural justice. Although the assessee failed to attend at the originally fixed time, the subsequent issuance of notices to the assessee and both witnesses for another date amounted to condonation of that lapse. As the assessee and counsel attended on the subsequent date but the witnesses did not, the Assessing Officer could not treat the earlier missed opportunity as exhaustion of the right to cross-examine.

Conclusion: The assessment made without providing effective cross-examination was vitiated; the assessee must be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine both witnesses before a fresh assessment, subject to payment of the stipulated witness costs.

Issues: (i) Whether interest under Section 132B(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was payable on requisitioned cash from the expiry of 120 days after requisition until completion of assessment; (ii) Whether compensatory interest was payable for retention of requisitioned cash after assessment despite no express statutory provision.

Issue (i): Whether interest under Section 132B(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was payable on requisitioned cash from the expiry of 120 days after requisition until completion of assessment.

Analysis: Section 132B(4)(a) provides for simple interest at one-half per cent for every month or part of a month, and Section 132B(4)(b) fixes the period from the day immediately following expiry of 120 days after execution of the requisition to completion of assessment. The 120-day period expired on 25.04.2012 and the assessment was completed on 20.03.2014.

Conclusion: Simple interest at one-half per cent for every month or part thereof was payable from 26.04.2012 to 20.03.2014.

Issue (ii): Whether compensatory interest was payable for retention of requisitioned cash after assessment despite no express statutory provision.

Analysis: Section 132B(3) requires the forthwith release of seized assets remaining after discharge of liabilities. As no tax liability was determined, continued retention after assessment was contrary to that mandate. The absence of an express provision for post-assessment interest did not displace the restitutionary principle or preclude compensatory interest in writ jurisdiction. Whether the Revenue earned interest on the retained cash was immaterial, since compensation addresses deprivation of the use of money.

Conclusion: Interest at 6% per annum was payable from 21.03.2014 until actual release of the cash on 15.01.2017.

Final Conclusion: The statutory entitlement for the pre-assessment period and restitutionary compensation for the unjustified post-assessment retention together required payment of interest for the entire period of delayed release.

Ratio Decidendi: Where seized cash is required to be forthwith released after assessment determines no tax liability, unjustified retention warrants compensatory interest on restitutionary principles notwithstanding the absence of an express statutory provision for the post-assessment period.

Issues: Whether an order imposing penalty under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be passed while the assessee's appeal against the relevant assessment order was pending before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 253 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 275(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires penalty proceedings to remain in abeyance where the relevant assessment order is the subject of a pending appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The appeal had been filed and remained pending when the penalty order was made; whether the Assessing Officer had been intimated of the appeal was immaterial.

Conclusion: The penalty order passed during the pendency of the Tribunal appeal contravened Section 275(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and could not stand, in favour of the assessee.