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Issues: Whether a second writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was maintainable after an earlier writ petition challenging the same order had been dismissed in limine for non-exhaustion of the statutory alternative remedy before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal.
Analysis: The availability of a special statutory forum for service disputes ordinarily requires the aggrieved employee to pursue that remedy before invoking writ jurisdiction. Where an earlier writ petition on the same subject-matter has been dismissed for bypassing the statutory forum, the subsequent exercise of writ jurisdiction by another judge of the same High Court would render the earlier order redundant and undermine judicial discipline and finality. The statutory scheme of the U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 showed that the Tribunal was an adequate and efficacious forum for such claims.
Conclusion: The second writ petition ought not to have been entertained, and the impugned order allowing it was unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on the ground of maintainability, the order of the single judge was set aside, and the writ petition stood dismissed, leaving the respondent free to pursue the statutory tribunal remedy if otherwise available in law.
Ratio Decidendi: A second writ petition challenging the same subject-matter should not be entertained by the same High Court after an earlier writ petition has been dismissed for non-exhaustion of an adequate statutory alternative remedy, as doing so would defeat judicial finality and orderly exercise of writ jurisdiction.