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Issues: (i) Whether an accused in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can seek comparison of handwriting on the body of the cheque on the ground that he did not fill it up himself. (ii) Whether the petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was maintainable in view of the bar against a second revision.
Issue (i): Whether an accused in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can seek comparison of handwriting on the body of the cheque on the ground that he did not fill it up himself.
Analysis: The cheque was admitted to bear the accused's signatures and was complete in all material particulars. The statutory scheme of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 emphasises the maker's or drawer's signature, not that the entire body of the instrument must be written by the drawer personally. A cheque may be valid even if its contents are filled by another person, and the mere fact that the handwriting on the body differs from the drawer's handwriting does not show absence of consent or rebut the statutory presumptions. The proposed handwriting comparison would therefore not advance the defence in the cheque dishonour proceedings.
Conclusion: The accused was not entitled to seek handwriting comparison of the cheque body on that ground, and the refusal to permit such comparison was justified.
Issue (ii): Whether the petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was maintainable in view of the bar against a second revision.
Analysis: The petitioner had already availed a revision against the trial court's order. The challenge under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was, in substance, a second revision seeking reappreciation of the same issue. The inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to do indirectly what is barred directly, particularly where no illegality, perversity, or abuse of process in the subordinate orders is shown.
Conclusion: The petition was not maintainable as a second revision in the guise of an inherent-powers petition.
Final Conclusion: The orders of the courts below were upheld and the petition was dismissed, with no ground made out for interference.
Ratio Decidendi: In a cheque dishonour case, the validity of the cheque depends on the drawer's signature and the statutory presumptions, not on whether the drawer personally filled the body of the cheque; and the inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked to circumvent the statutory bar on a second revision.