Rebuttable presumption in cheque dishonour cases fails where probable defence and weak proof of debt leave acquittal undisturbed.

In a prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the presumption under Section 139 is rebuttable, and once the accused raises a probable defence the burden shifts back to the complainant to prove the legally enforceable debt and the circumstances of cheque issuance. Here, the accused's case that the cheque was given to a third person in a committee transaction, together with gaps in the complainant's evidence, including non-examination of witnesses, non-production of the alleged agreement, and failure to prove financial capacity and actual loan advancement, rebutted the presumption. In appeal against acquittal, interference is justified only if the trial court's view is perverse, illegal, or wholly unsustainable; the trial court's view was plausible, so the acquittal was left undisturbed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the complainant proved the existence of a legally enforceable debt and whether the statutory presumption stood rebutted; (ii) Whether the acquittal recorded by the trial court called for interference in appeal.

Issue (i): Whether the complainant proved the existence of a legally enforceable debt and whether the statutory presumption stood rebutted.

Analysis: The presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is rebuttable. Once the accused raises a probable defence, the burden shifts back to the complainant to prove the debt and the circumstances of issuance of the cheque. In the present case, the accused set up a specific defence that the cheque had been given to a third person in connection with a committee transaction and not towards any liability to the complainant. The complainant's version also suffered from gaps, including non-examination of the alleged witnesses to the loan transaction, non-proof of the agreement, and failure to produce convincing material showing financial capacity and actual advancement of the loan.

Conclusion: The complainant failed to establish a legally enforceable debt, and the presumption stood rebutted in favour of the accused.

Issue (ii): Whether the acquittal recorded by the trial court called for interference in appeal.

Analysis: In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the strengthened presumption of innocence and should interfere only where the trial court's view is perverse, illegal, or wholly unsustainable. The trial court had examined the evidence, identified contradictions and deficiencies, and returned a plausible view on the record. No perversity, misreading of evidence, or legal infirmity was shown so as to justify reversal of the acquittal.

Conclusion: No interference with the acquittal was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed on merits because the accused had raised a probable defence and the complainant did not prove the debt or financial capacity to lend the amount; the acquittal therefore remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, once a probable defence is raised, the complainant must affirmatively prove the legally enforceable debt and the appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal unless the trial court's view is perverse or unsustainable.

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