2018 (4) TMI 1098 - AT - Service Tax

Amendment of Cause Title to Reflect Correct Jurisdiction and Service Tax Liability Absolved

The department sought to amend the cause title in the appeal to reflect a change in jurisdiction, alleging the appellants provided services as a 'Video ... Renting of Immovable Property service - Video Production Agency - the appellants contended that they are in no way concerned or connected with the activities of the firm who are primarily engaged in the production of video and as such do not fall under the definition of such services - Held that: - Admittedly, in the present case, the appellants have simplicitor rented out their premises and in no way provided their services to the tenant for recording of the video and in other activities connected with the recording - the service of giving the studio on rent would fall under the category of 'Renting of Immovable Property Service', which came on the statute book with effect from 01.06.2007 and the appellants have been rightly discharging their liability accordingly. Extended period of limitation - Held that: - the said fact of renting of studio was brought to the notice of Revenue and there is no evidence indicating any malafide intention on the part of the assessee - extended period not invocable. Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant. Issues:Amendment to cause title in the appeal, classification of services provided by the appellant, liability to pay service tax, interpretation of definitions under the Finance Act, 1994, applicability of Video Production Agency definition, scope of Video Tape Production Service, correct categorization of services provided by the appellant, appeal limitation period assessment.Amendment to Cause Title:The department filed a miscellaneous application seeking an amendment to the cause title in the appeal to reflect the change in jurisdiction. The appellants were initially registered under the category of 'Renting of Immovable Property' from 01.06.2007. Subsequently, a show-cause notice was issued alleging that the services provided by the appellants fell under the category of 'Video Production Agency,' leading to a demand for service tax prior to 01.06.2007. The appellants contended that they only rented out the premises and were not involved in video production activities. The Revenue accepted the rental service categorization but imposed demands, interest, and penalties, which the authorities below confirmed.Interpretation of Definitions under Finance Act, 1994:The judgment analyzed the definitions of 'Video Production Agency' and 'videotape production' under section 65 of the Finance Act, 1994. The scope of services related to video production was expanded over time to include various activities such as editing, cutting, dubbing, and post-production work. The CBEC clarified that facilitation activities related to videotape production, including providing studios, equipment, technical personnel, and other services, were taxable. The lower adjudicating authority's findings regarding the applicability of facilitation activities under 'Video Tape Production Service' were deemed correct and valid.Correct Categorization of Services Provided:The judgment emphasized that the definitions of 'Video Production Agency' and 'videotape production' primarily applied to individuals involved in video recording processes. In the case at hand, the appellants solely rented out their premises without engaging in video recording or related activities with the tenant. Therefore, the service of renting out the studio was correctly classified as 'Renting of Immovable Property Service,' effective from 01.06.2007, and the appellants had discharged their tax liability accordingly.Appeal Limitation Period Assessment:While ruling in favor of the assessee on the merits of the case, the judgment noted that the appeal was barred by limitation. However, since there was no evidence of malafide intention on the part of the assessee and the fact of renting the studio was disclosed to the Revenue, the longer period of limitation was not invoked. Consequently, the appeal was allowed on both merits and the limitation point, leading to the setting aside of the impugned order.