Writ disclosure and SEZ approval limits: suppression of material facts and valid Approval Committee jurisdiction defeated the challenge.

Full and frank disclosure is mandatory in writ jurisdiction; the Court treated suppression of material facts, including undisclosed contractual and correspondence material, as fatal to the petition. Availability of an alternative remedy did not by itself bar judicial review because the challenge went to statutory competence and validity. On the SEZ issue, a short gas pipeline intended only for supply to a particular unit was held not to be an infrastructure facility requiring prior Board of Approval clearance. The Approval Committee's approval was therefore treated as within the statutory framework, and the challenge failed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition was liable to be dismissed for suppression of material facts and lack of candour; (ii) whether availability of alternative remedies barred the writ petition; and (iii) whether the approval granted for laying the gas pipeline within the SEZ required prior approval of the Board of Approval, or whether the impugned approval by the Approval Committee was valid.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition was liable to be dismissed for suppression of material facts and lack of candour.

Analysis: The writ remedy is discretionary and equitable, and a petitioner must place all material facts before the Court. The petition did not disclose the gas transmission agreement, capacity tranche arrangements, correspondence concerning additional gas booking, and the later amendment agreement, all of which were directly relevant to the controversy. The Court found that these omissions materially affected the presentation of urgency and the factual basis of the challenge.

Conclusion: The petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of suppression of material facts and incorrect disclosure.

Issue (ii): Whether availability of alternative remedies barred the writ petition.

Analysis: The existence of a statutory or contractual alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction, particularly where the challenge is to jurisdictional competence and statutory validity. Since the petition questioned the authority of the Approval Committee and the Development Commissioner, the matter was not rejected merely on the ground of alternate remedy.

Conclusion: The petition was not rejected solely for availability of alternative remedy.

Issue (iii): Whether the approval granted for laying the gas pipeline within the SEZ required prior approval of the Board of Approval, or whether the impugned approval by the Approval Committee was valid.

Analysis: The expressions defining infrastructure facilities under the SEZ Act and Rules were construed as referring to facilities necessary for development, operation, and maintenance of the Special Economic Zone itself, not facilities intended only for supply to one unit. The proposed short pipeline for additional gas supply to a particular unit was held not to be an infrastructure facility requiring approval by the Board of Approval under the statute. The Approval Committee's action was therefore treated as within the statutory framework.

Conclusion: The impugned approval was upheld and the challenge to the Approval Committee's jurisdiction failed.

Final Conclusion: The petition failed, both because of the petitioner's suppression of material facts and because the statutory challenge to the approval process was not established, and the interim protection was vacated.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ petitioner must make full and frank disclosure of all material facts, and a facility intended only for supply to a particular unit in an SEZ is not, by that reason alone, an infrastructure facility requiring approval of the Board of Approval under the SEZ framework.

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