Issues: (i) Taxability of pre-July 2012 construction services and entitlement to abatement and recipient-side tax liability; (ii) Valuation of post-July 2012 works contract services under Rule 2A and entitlement to abatement and recipient-side tax liability; (iii) Inclusion of free-of-cost materials supplied by customers in the taxable value of works contracts; (iv) Classification of the services treated as exclusive service contracts; (v) Appropriation of service tax allegedly deposited during investigation; (vi) Validity of penalty for non-payment of service tax and non-filing of returns.

Issue (i): Taxability of pre-July 2012 construction services and entitlement to abatement and recipient-side tax liability.

Analysis: Construction of a hospital is commercial or industrial construction service unless evidence establishes that it was intended to be a charitable hospital. The applicable abatement had already been extended, and the tax liability was correspondingly reduced wherever the recipient was required to discharge part of the tax.

Conclusion: The demand for the pre-July 2012 period was sustained; against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Valuation of post-July 2012 works contract services under Rule 2A and entitlement to abatement and recipient-side tax liability.

Analysis: Rule 2A of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 permits exclusion of the actual value of goods where established, or valuation on the prescribed presumptive basis. The assessment had allowed the applicable abatement and reduced provider-side liability wherever reverse-charge liability applied. No material established that the actual value of goods exceeded the abatement already allowed.

Conclusion: The valuation and demand for the post-July 2012 works contract services were sustained; against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Inclusion of free-of-cost materials supplied by customers in the taxable value of works contracts.

Analysis: Materials supplied free of cost by customers do not form part of the gross amount charged for determining the taxable value of a works contract.

Conclusion: The service tax demand attributable to free-of-cost customer-supplied materials was set aside; in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Classification of the services treated as exclusive service contracts.

Analysis: The assertion that the services classified as exclusive service contracts were works contracts was unsupported by material in the appeal.

Conclusion: The classification and corresponding demand were sustained; against the assessee.

Issue (v): Appropriation of service tax allegedly deposited during investigation.

Analysis: The alleged deposits require verification as to whether they were paid as service tax.

Conclusion: Any amounts verified as service tax deposits shall be appropriated against the confirmed demand; in favour of the assessee to that extent.

Issue (vi): Validity of penalty for non-payment of service tax and non-filing of returns.

Analysis: The assessee neither paid service tax nor filed returns or declared the services, and the transactions emerged only through investigation.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 76 of the Finance Act, 1994 was sustained; against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tax component attributable to customer-supplied free-of-cost materials is excluded, while the remaining valuation, classification, and penalty findings stand, with adjustment of verified tax deposits.

Ratio Decidendi: Free-of-cost materials supplied by the recipient cannot be included in the gross amount charged for valuation of works contract service.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was entitled to additional depreciation under Section 32(1)(iia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for new plant and machinery installed in captive and wind power plants; and (ii) Whether revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was validly invoked to revise the assessment allowing that claim.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee was entitled to additional depreciation under Section 32(1)(iia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for new plant and machinery installed in captive and wind power plants.

Analysis: Section 32(1)(iia) allows additional depreciation where new plant or machinery is acquired and installed after 31.03.2005 by an assessee engaged in manufacture or production of an article or thing. The new machinery was admittedly acquired and installed after the prescribed date. Electricity is movable property capable of transmission, transfer, delivery and possession; its generation constitutes production. The assessee was also engaged in manufacturing mineral products, and the power generated through the captive and wind power plants was used in its manufacturing operations.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to additional depreciation under Section 32(1)(iia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. This issue was decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was validly invoked to revise the assessment allowing that claim.

Analysis: Revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263(1) requires the assessment order to be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue; both conditions must coexist. Since the additional depreciation claim was legally allowable and had been correctly accepted in assessment, the assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.

Conclusion: Invocation of revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was invalid. This issue was decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment allowing additional depreciation remains effective, while the revisional order setting it aside has no legal basis.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee satisfies the conditions for additional depreciation on new machinery used in manufacture or production, the allowance is legally sustainable and cannot be revised under Section 263(1) absent an assessment order that is both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.

Issues: Whether the pending first appeals for the relevant assessment years were required to be decided expeditiously notwithstanding the priority framework under the departmental circular.

Analysis: Section 250(6A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 contemplates disposal of appellate proceedings within one year from the end of the financial year in which the appeal is filed or transferred, where possible. The departmental circular prescribing priority categories for disposal of appeals cannot prevail over the statutory framework where the appeals have remained undecided despite compliance with notices.

Conclusion: The National Faceless Appeal Centre appellate authority must decide the pending appeals within three months after affording proper and reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessees.

Issues: (i) Whether, under the amended Section 270AA, an application for waiver of penalty may be entertained where the penalty concerns under-reporting of income in consequence of misreporting of income; and (ii) Whether a second waiver application filed after receipt of a penalty order is maintainable despite an earlier application having been rejected under the pre-amendment provision.

Issue (i): Whether, under the amended Section 270AA, an application for waiver of penalty may be entertained where the penalty concerns under-reporting of income in consequence of misreporting of income.

Analysis: The Finance Act, 2026 substituted Section 270AA with effect from 1 March 2026. The amended provision permits waiver of a penalty already levied, including a penalty arising in the circumstances specified in Section 270A(9), provided the conditions in Section 270AA(1), including payment of the prescribed additional income-tax under Section 270AA(1)(b), are fulfilled. Section 270AA(3) makes grant of waiver mandatory upon fulfilment of those conditions and expiry of the statutory appeal period.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee. Misreporting of income does not bar consideration or grant of waiver under the amended Section 270AA.

Issue (ii): Whether a second waiver application filed after receipt of a penalty order is maintainable despite an earlier application having been rejected under the pre-amendment provision.

Analysis: Amended Section 270AA(2) permits an application within one month from the end of the month in which the assessment or reassessment order and the penalty order are received. This introduced a new entitlement to seek waiver after receipt of a penalty order, which was unavailable under the earlier provision. The fulfilment of the statutory conditions was undisputed.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee. The second application was timely and maintainable, and the earlier rejected application did not preclude it.

Final Conclusion: The refusal of waiver was inconsistent with the amended statutory scheme; waiver of the penalty and immunity from proceedings under Sections 276C and 276CC were required to be granted.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee fulfils the conditions of amended Section 270AA, the Assessing Officer must grant waiver of penalty, including for misreporting of income, and an earlier application under the unamended provision does not bar a timely post-penalty application created by the amendment.

Issues: (i) Whether penalties under section 270A and section 271AAC(1) survive after the quantum additions forming their basis are wholly deleted and tax liability is recomputed at nil; (ii) Whether the penalty under section 272A(1)(d) for non-compliance with notices is liable to be sustained in the circumstances.

Issue (i): Whether penalties under section 270A and section 271AAC(1) survive after the quantum additions forming their basis are wholly deleted and tax liability is recomputed at nil.

Analysis: Sections 270A and 271AAC(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 operate upon the determination of under-reported or unexplained income and the resulting tax liability. The additions on which the penalties were founded were wholly deleted in the subsequent quantum proceedings, and the giving-effect order determined income only at the interest amount with nil tax liability. The foundation for the consequential penalty proceedings had therefore ceased to exist.

Conclusion: The penalties under sections 270A and 271AAC(1) are unsustainable and are deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty under section 272A(1)(d) for non-compliance with notices is liable to be sustained in the circumstances.

Analysis: Section 272A(1)(d) concerns failure to comply with statutory notices and stands on a footing distinct from penalties linked to quantum additions. However, the assessee subsequently participated in the appellate proceedings, furnished the required details, and the reassessment additions were ultimately deleted. These peculiar circumstances warranted deletion of the penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 272A(1)(d) is deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: All the impugned penalties are unsustainable, and the appellate orders dismissing the penalty appeals are set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Where quantum additions constituting the basis of penalties for under-reported or unexplained income are wholly deleted and no tax liability remains, the consequential penalties cannot survive.

Issues: Whether payments made towards rural infrastructure and road development levy and forest transit fee were taxes exempt from service tax or fees for services liable to service tax under the reverse charge mechanism.

Analysis: Service tax is not leviable on statutory taxes paid to a State Government, but is payable where the payment constitutes consideration or a fee for services. Following the binding decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the payments were characterised as fees for services and not taxes. As reverse-charge payment entitled the appellant to corresponding Cenvat credit, no mala fides were attributable; the demand was confined to the normal limitation period. Any Cenvat credit accruing after payment is refundable in cash under Section 142 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: The payments are fees for services and are liable to service tax under the reverse charge mechanism, against the assessee.

Issues: Whether a service-tax demand against a subcontractor could be sustained by invoking the extended period where the main contractor had discharged tax on the entire contract value.

Analysis: Invocation of the extended period requires suppression, misstatement, fraud, collusion, or a similar default with intent to evade tax. The subcontractor entertained a bona fide belief that no separate liability arose because tax had already been paid by the main contractor on the full contract consideration. The taxability of subcontractors was subject to conflicting views, and no ingredient warranting the extended period was established.

Conclusion: The extended-period demand was unsustainable and barred by limitation.

Issues: Whether the writ challenge to summons seeking information and documents during GST proceedings was premature.

Analysis: The summons sought information and documents, and the petitioner had responded by representation with copies of the relevant records. The record did not establish coercive recovery, a threat of arrest, or any adverse order arising from the impugned summons.

Conclusion: The writ challenge was premature and no interference with the summons was warranted.

Issues: Whether deletion of the addition under Section 69A, based on uncorroborated search and survey material and a retracted statement, gave rise to a substantial question of law.

Analysis: Although technical rules of evidence do not strictly govern income-tax proceedings, additions must rest on relevant material and cannot be founded on suspicion, conjecture or surmise. The underlying evidentiary principles and principles of natural justice require corroborative evidence for an adverse inference. The material obtained in the brokers' search related to a period preceding the relevant financial year; the prompt retraction of the survey statement was not displaced by independent evidence; and the alleged cash-loan entries were unsupported by statements of the identified brokers or other material establishing investment or interest income. The factual finding that the documentary material did not corroborate the alleged unexplained money was neither irregular nor perverse.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose, and the deletion of the Section 69A addition was sustained.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal's deletion of the addition under Section 68 in respect of unlisted-share sale proceeds gave rise to a substantial question of law under Section 260A.

Analysis: Section 260A permits interference only on a substantial question of law and does not authorise reassessment of evidence or substitution of a plausible factual view reached by the Tribunal. A factual finding is open to interference only where it is perverse, based on no evidence, ignores material evidence, or rests on inadmissible material. The Tribunal evaluated the disclosed investments, sale and purchase documents, bank records, purchaser confirmations, financial statements, income-tax returns and replies to notices under Section 133(6). The Revenue did not establish that this material was unreliable or that the sale proceeds represented the respondent's undisclosed money. Although surrounding circumstances and the test of human probabilities are relevant to a Section 68 inquiry, they cannot sustain an addition founded only on suspicion or general allegations. Earlier acceptance of investments was not treated as an estoppel, but as relevant evidentiary material along with the entire record.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose; the deletion of the Section 68 addition stood affirmed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether refund of customs duty paid twice can be denied for non-production of the first challan, where the challan was not generated because of a system failure, and whether statutory interest is payable on the delayed refund.

Analysis: Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962 and Public Notice No. 62/2012 treat a double or multiple duty payment, after acceptance in the system, as a deposit refundable through the prescribed procedure. The Public Notice requires the importer to furnish banking and transaction documents, while verification through PAO/e-PAO and the ICEGATE challan inquiry is assigned to departmental officers. The documentary record established both payments against the same bill of entry and confirmed that the first payment was never reversed. Requiring production of a challan that the ICEGATE system itself failed to generate imposed an impossible condition and was not a requirement under the Public Notice. Interest on an eligible refund is governed by Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1962 where payment is not made within the statutory period.

Conclusion: The importer is entitled to refund of the unadjusted first payment of customs duty with applicable statutory interest.

Issues: (i) Whether the monitoring committee was a person aggrieved entitled to maintain the appeal and whether the appellate forum could consider the Supreme Court judgment not placed before the adjudicating authority; (ii) What legal effect the Supreme Court judgment had on the landholding special-purpose company, its leasehold land and the project; (iii) Whether a distinct subsisting default existed on the admission date to support a separate corporate insolvency resolution process and whether the earlier threshold ruling precluded that inquiry; and (iv) Whether continuing that process was compatible with the restored resolution plan and the Code.

Issue (i): Whether the monitoring committee was a person aggrieved entitled to maintain the appeal and whether the appellate forum could consider the Supreme Court judgment not placed before the adjudicating authority.

Analysis: Section 61(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 permits an appeal by any person whose legal rights or interests are prejudicially affected. The monitoring committee was constituted to supervise and implement the restored plan, while admission of the landholding entity to insolvency placed the project land under the interim resolution professional and the statutory moratorium. The binding Supreme Court judgment pre-dated the admission order and directly concerned the same project. Its binding force under Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution of India required the appellate forum to give effect to it, notwithstanding that it had not been placed before the adjudicating authority.

Conclusion: The monitoring committee had standing as a person aggrieved, and the binding Supreme Court judgment was required to be considered.

Issue (ii): What legal effect the Supreme Court judgment had on the landholding special-purpose company, its leasehold land and the project.

Analysis: The Supreme Court had lifted the corporate veil on the finding that the holding company was the real driving force behind development and the landholding special-purpose company was only a front. The restored resolution plan was directed to proceed for completion of the project from the stipulated date. Lifting the corporate veil required the holding company and landholding entity to be treated as one economic entity for project resolution, thereby bringing the leasehold land and project within the restored plan.

Conclusion: The leasehold land and project stood comprehended within, and were required to be dealt with under, the restored resolution plan.

Issue (iii): Whether a distinct subsisting default existed on the admission date to support a separate corporate insolvency resolution process and whether the earlier threshold ruling precluded that inquiry.

Analysis: Admission under Section 7(5)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 requires a financial debt and a default; under Section 3(12), the debt must be due and payable and remain unpaid. Section 31(1) makes an approved resolution plan binding on creditors and stakeholders. The allottees' claims arose from the same project and were addressed through the restored plan, which provided for project completion and delivery of units. Following corporate veil lifting, no separate claim against the landholding entity survived independently of the claim resolved under that plan. The earlier ruling addressed only the threshold condition for filing under the second proviso to Section 7(1) and expressly left merits, including subsisting default at admission, open.

Conclusion: No distinct debt of the landholding entity was due and payable on the admission date, and thus no separate default existed to found another insolvency process; the earlier threshold ruling did not bar that determination.

Issue (iv): Whether continuing that process was compatible with the restored resolution plan and the Code.

Analysis: Admission triggered the moratorium under Section 14(1)(b), vested management and control of the landholding entity in the interim resolution professional, and would lead to an independent resolution process over the same land. This conflicted directly with the binding direction for implementation of the restored plan over that very land. Enforcement of the restored plan and remedies for non-compliance lie before the adjudicating authority in the existing insolvency process under Section 60(5), rather than through a parallel process that fragments resolution of the same real-estate project.

Conclusion: Continuation of the separate insolvency process was incompatible with the restored resolution plan and could not be permitted.

Final Conclusion: The project, its leasehold land, and the allottees' claims are to be resolved under the restored plan as a consolidated insolvency resolution; remedies of allottees lie in enforcement of that plan within the existing insolvency process.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a binding restored resolution plan, after lifting the corporate veil, comprehends the project land and allottee claims, no distinct default remains for a separate insolvency process against the landholding entity, and a parallel process that impedes implementation of the plan is impermissible.

Issues: Whether the alleged personal land transactions of the company's directors could prima facie be attributed to the company for proceedings concerning money-laundering.

Analysis: The order noted that liability of a company requires material connecting the company itself with the alleged activity under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002. Personal acts of directors are not automatically attributable to the company merely by reason of their office. Further consideration was found necessary on whether the requisite evidentiary connection existed on the stated facts.

Outcome: Notice was issued and the impugned order and consequential proceedings were stayed, insofar as they concern the petitioner, until the next hearing. No final adjudication has taken place.

Issues: (i) Whether the extended-period service-tax demand was sustainable where the assessee failed to pay tax after amendment of the exemption notification due to claimed ignorance of that amendment; (ii) Whether an equal penalty under section 78 was sustainable for the post-2015 period despite the claimed absence of intent to evade tax.

Issue (i): Whether the extended-period service-tax demand was sustainable where the assessee failed to pay tax after amendment of the exemption notification due to claimed ignorance of that amendment.

Analysis: The services were exempt only up to the relevant pre-amendment period, and the lower authorities had already granted the available exemption and abatement while confining the demand to taxable services. Under the proviso to section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994, ignorance of a change in an exemption notification could not excuse non-payment. A registered service provider claiming an exemption was required to keep track of amendments affecting its availability.

Conclusion: The extended-period service-tax demand was sustainable; against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an equal penalty under section 78 was sustainable for the post-2015 period despite the claimed absence of intent to evade tax.

Analysis: The reasonable-cause protection under section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 was unavailable for the disputed post-2015 period. The claimed ignorance of the amended exemption could not displace the statutory consequence under section 78.

Conclusion: The equal penalty under section 78 was mandatory and sustainable; against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The surviving service-tax liability, interest and equal penalty, after giving effect to available exemption and abatement, remain enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: Ignorance of an amendment to an exemption notification does not excuse non-payment of service tax or preclude the extended period and statutory penalty where the reasonable-cause protection is unavailable.

Issues: Whether additional documentary evidence may be brought on record after closure of the complainant's evidence under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 confers broad power to permit evidence at any stage where it is essential to a just decision. The controlling consideration is the materiality and necessity of the evidence, rather than the stage of the proceedings. The proposed invoice and related payment records bore a direct nexus to the payment relied upon in the defence and were relevant to explain whether that payment related to the liability in issue. Producing such material to explain a fact arising from defence evidence is distinct from impermissibly filling a lacuna in the original case. Closure of evidence does not by itself bar material evidence, particularly where the opposing party is afforded an opportunity to contest it.

Conclusion: The additional documents were permitted to be placed on record, with full opportunity to the respondent to contest their admissibility, authenticity and evidentiary value.

Outcome: Applications for condonation of delay and the special leave petition were dismissed.

Issues: Whether the landowner's unilateral revocation of the joint development agreement and power of attorney warranted exclusion of the subject land from the corporate insolvency resolution process, and whether interim preservation of the land was warranted pending disposal of the appeal.

Analysis: The joint development agreement and power of attorney prima facie created irrevocable and non-determinable development rights in favour of the corporate debtor. The contractual period for construction was reckoned from the approvals and the subsequent agreement, and had not expired when termination was asserted. The purported termination was not accepted; the alleged no-objection communication was conditional upon repayment of the proportionate project loan and amounted to a counter-offer. Existing mortgage rights and possible third-party rights could not be conclusively ruled out at this stage.

Outcome: The landowner was permitted to intervene, exclusion of the subject land from the corporate insolvency resolution process was not granted at this stage, and the parties were directed to maintain status quo pending hearing of the appeals.

Outcome: The special leave petition was disposed of as premature, with liberty to seek adjournment before the Adjudicating Authority.

Outcome: Special Leave Petitions dismissed and pending applications disposed of.