Issues: Whether an adjudication order under Section 74, passed without a personal hearing after the date originally fixed for hearing, was valid.

Analysis: Section 75(4) mandates an opportunity of personal hearing. No hearing was held on the scheduled date, no subsequent date was communicated, and the adjudication order was passed more than nine months later without recording any opportunity of hearing. Section 75(5) permits limited adjournments, but no adjournment had been sought by the petitioner. The absence of a fresh hearing opportunity constituted a complete breach of the principles of natural justice and an incurable procedural deficiency.

Conclusion: The adjudication order was invalid for denial of the mandatory opportunity of personal hearing; fresh notice and adjudication after affording such opportunity were required.

Issues: Whether cancelled GST registration could be restored upon payment of outstanding penalty and statutory interest and filing of defaulted returns.

Analysis: The registration had been cancelled for non-furnishing of GST returns for six months, and penalty had been imposed. Revenue raised no objection to revival if the outstanding penalty with statutory interest was paid and the defaulted returns were filed within the time stipulated.

Conclusion: The registration may be restored upon compliance with the stipulated payment and return-filing requirements.

Issues: Whether an appellate authority may dismiss a GST appeal solely for non-prosecution without determining the grounds of appeal on merits and recording reasons.

Analysis: Section 107(12) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires an appellate order to be in writing and to state the points for determination, the decision on those points, and the reasons for that decision. Dismissal merely for non-prosecution, without considering the appeal grounds and record, framing points for determination, or giving a reasoned decision on merits, fails to comply with that mandatory requirement and amounts to an abdication of appellate jurisdiction.

Conclusion: An appeal cannot be dismissed solely for non-prosecution; the appellate authority must adjudicate it on merits through a reasoned and speaking order after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition should be declined because a condonation application was pending before the CBDT? (ii) Whether the 30-day delay in filing Form No. 10B for Assessment Year 2020-21 warranted condonation under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition should be declined because a condonation application was pending before the CBDT?

Analysis: The pending application before the CBDT was an alternate statutory remedy for a delayed condonation request. In the particular circumstances, immediate exercise of writ jurisdiction was appropriate because the short delay, its bona fide explanation, and the resulting hardship were capable of final resolution.

Conclusion: The assessee was not required to pursue the pending CBDT application before relief could be granted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the 30-day delay in filing Form No. 10B for Assessment Year 2020-21 warranted condonation under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

Analysis: Section 12A(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 required the audit report in Form No. 10B to be furnished one month before the return due date, a requirement newly advanced for the relevant assessment year. The 30-day delay resulted from a bona fide understanding that the report could be furnished with the return, amid the COVID-19 period and extensions of compliance timelines. Section 119(2)(b) permits condonation to avert genuine hardship; denial of the Section 11 exemption solely for this short, non-deliberate delay would cause such hardship. Substantial justice therefore outweighed technical default.

Conclusion: The 30-day delay in filing Form No. 10B was condoned, and the rejection of condonation and the intimation denying exemption were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Form No. 10B must be treated as having been filed within time, and the return of income must be processed afresh in accordance with law on that basis.

Ratio Decidendi: A short, bona fide compliance delay that would otherwise deny a statutory exemption and cause genuine hardship should be condoned under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to advance substantial justice.

Issues: Whether the statutory foundation for invoking the reverse burden under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 was established in respect of the seized gold bangle and whether the claimant's evidence of domestic acquisition discharged that burden.

Analysis: Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 places the burden of proving that notified goods are not smuggled upon the claimant only after seizure on the basis of a reasonable belief supported by tangible material and cumulative surrounding circumstances. Neither an inland seizure nor absence of foreign markings is individually conclusive. The evidence must be evaluated with reference to the manner of carriage, concealment, admissions, markings, documentary provenance, accounting trail and other incriminating circumstances. A claimant's burden may be discharged on a preponderance of probabilities through reliable documentary and circumstantial material; proof of uninterrupted physical identity of fungible gold is not invariably required. The seized article was a gold bangle transported through a domestic courier, without concealment, foreign markings, incriminating admissions, or material disproving the identified tax invoices for domestic purchases of 999-purity gold. In the absence of a finding that the invoices were false or lacked nexus with the business stock, the documentary explanation could not be rejected on conjecture.

Conclusion: The evidentiary foundation for treating the seized gold bangle as smuggled was not established, and the claimant's explanation of domestic acquisition could not be rejected; confiscation and penalty were unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether Protector Tube is classifiable under CTH 39172310 and eligible for the preferential notification benefit; (ii) Whether Bracket is classifiable under CTH 87089900 rather than CTH 83025000 or CTH 73269099; (iii) Whether Connector Part No. K94478.02000 is excluded from Chapter 39 as an automobile part; (iv) Whether the extended period and penalties were invocable for the incorrect self-assessment.

Issue (i): Whether Protector Tube is classifiable under CTH 39172310 and eligible for the preferential notification benefit.

Analysis: Classification was determined with reference to the Harmonised System of Nomenclature and the specific entry principle. The undisputed supplier catalogue identified the Protector Tube as made of 100% PVC, and no contrary material was produced. The absence of a test report did not displace the catalogue evidence. The benefit under Customs Notification No. 46/2011-Cus dated 01.06.2011, claimed on the declared rubber heading, could not apply after classification under the PVC heading.

Conclusion: Protector Tube is classifiable under CTH 39172310 and is not eligible for the notification benefit; against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Bracket is classifiable under CTH 87089900 rather than CTH 83025000 or CTH 73269099.

Analysis: Section Note 1(g) of Section XV excludes articles of Section XVII, while Section Note 3 of Section XVII requires application of the principal use test to vehicle parts and accessories. The Bracket was used in brake hose assemblies, was declared as an automobile part, and was not shown to be an article of general use or otherwise excluded from Section XVII.

Conclusion: Bracket is classifiable under CTH 87089900, and the consequential differential duty is sustainable; against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether Connector Part No. K94478.02000 is excluded from Chapter 39 as an automobile part.

Analysis: Chapter Note 2(t) to Chapter 39 excludes parts of vehicles of Section XVII. The Connector was specifically designed for integration into automobile brake systems to regulate brake-fluid flow and was not a generic plastic plumbing fitting. Its classification under Chapter 39 was therefore inconsistent with its automobile-specific function.

Conclusion: The Connector is excluded from Chapter 39, and its classification as an automobile part is sustained; against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the extended period and penalties were invocable for the incorrect self-assessment.

Analysis: Self-assessment under Section 46(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 requires true and correct classification. The earlier use of the classifications later asserted by the Department, followed by changed declarations that caused short payment of duty, together with the admitted discrepancies and voluntary differential-duty payments, supported intentional misdeclaration. These circumstances justified extended limitation under Section 28(4) and the penal consequences.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation and penalties are sustainable; against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reclassification-based customs liabilities and related penal consequences stand sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Classification of imported goods follows the specific tariff entry determined by their material composition and sole or principal vehicular use, and deliberate incorrect self-assessment causing duty short payment permits recovery by invoking the extended period.

Issues: Whether the Excalibur Hybrid X archery crossbow is classifiable under Customs Tariff Item 9506 99 90 as sports or outdoor-game equipment, or under Customs Tariff Item 9304 00 00 as other arms.

Analysis: Rule 1 of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the Import Tariff requires classification according to the headings and relevant Chapter Notes. Note 1(e) to Chapter 93 excludes bows and arrows from that Chapter, while the HSN Explanatory Notes to Heading 9506 specifically include archery equipment such as bows, arrows and targets. The product propels bolts or arrows through stored mechanical energy in its limbs and string, rather than through explosive charge, compressed air, gas or firearm mechanism. Applying Rule 6 at the sub-heading level, it falls within the residual sub-heading for other sports or outdoor-game equipment.

Conclusion: The Excalibur Hybrid X archery crossbow is classifiable under Customs Tariff Item 9506 99 90 and not under Customs Tariff Item 9304 00 00. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether Clause 24 of the Deed of Guarantee restricted the personal guarantors' liability to the market value of their mortgaged properties; (ii) Whether the repayment plans could be approved despite failing to secure the prescribed creditor voting threshold.

Issue (i): Whether Clause 24 of the Deed of Guarantee restricted the personal guarantors' liability to the market value of their mortgaged properties.

Analysis: Clauses 1, 6 and 9 imposed joint and several liability for the full principal amount, interest, costs and charges, irrespective of enforcement or realisation of securities. On harmonious construction, Clause 24 concerned the security arrangement and did not override the primary liability undertaken under the earlier clauses. A final and unchallenged debt-recovery adjudication had already crystallised the guarantors' liability, which could not be reopened through collateral proceedings under Section 114.

Conclusion: Clause 24 did not cap the personal guarantors' liability at the value of their mortgaged properties; they remained jointly and severally liable for the crystallised debt. The issue is against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the repayment plans could be approved despite failing to secure the prescribed creditor voting threshold.

Analysis: Under Sections 111 and 114, approval required affirmative votes representing the statutory 66% voting share. The repayment plans did not obtain that threshold. The Adjudicating Authority could not substitute its own view for the creditors' commercial decision or independently approve an unapproved plan.

Conclusion: The repayment plans could not be approved without the requisite 66% creditor approval, and their rejection remained effective. The issue is against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The finality of the guarantors' full liability and the creditors' rejection of repayment plans lacking statutory approval govern the insolvency process.

Ratio Decidendi: A finally determined personal-guarantee liability cannot be re-agitated in collateral repayment-plan proceedings, and a repayment plan lacking the statutory creditor majority cannot be independently approved.

Issues: (i) Whether the respondent could claim the monetary-threshold exemption under the first proviso to Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. (ii) Whether the bail granted under that proviso was liable to cancellation.

Issue (i): Whether the respondent could claim the monetary-threshold exemption under the first proviso to Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Section 3 covers knowing assistance in processes connected with proceeds of crime, while Section 23 provides for a presumption in interconnected transactions. The first proviso to Section 45(1), which exempts an accused of laundering less than one crore rupees from the twin conditions for bail, is discretionary. Its application turns on the sum of money-laundering attributable to the particular accused, rather than automatically on the total proceeds of crime alleged against all accused. The available money trail confined the respondent's alleged role to conversion and transfer of Rs. 12.88 lakhs; no material connected him, directly or vicariously, with the balance of the alleged proceeds or a larger laundering activity.

Conclusion: The respondent was entitled to seek the monetary-threshold exemption under the first proviso to Section 45(1), in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the bail granted under that proviso was liable to cancellation.

Analysis: Cancellation required a showing that the Special Court's exercise of discretion was perverse, fallacious, or prejudicial to a fair investigation. Continued custody was not shown to be necessary, and the stringent bail conditions sufficiently addressed the asserted flight risk and ensured availability for investigation and trial.

Conclusion: No ground was established for cancellation of bail or interference with the bail order, in favour of the respondent.

Final Conclusion: The statutory exemption from the twin conditions was properly applied because the alleged laundering attributable to the respondent was below one crore rupees, and the existing safeguards adequately protected the investigation.

Ratio Decidendi: For the monetary-threshold proviso to Section 45(1), the amount of laundering attributable to the individual accused must be assessed separately and cannot be mechanically equated with the total proceeds of crime alleged against the wider group; grant of its benefit remains subject to judicial discretion.

Issues: (i) Whether insurance premium collected from borrowers and remitted in full to the insurer formed part of the taxable value of the appellant's service under Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was justified; and (iii) Whether penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether insurance premium collected from borrowers and remitted in full to the insurer formed part of the taxable value of the appellant's service under Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: Section 67(1)(i) confines taxable value to the gross amount charged for the service actually provided. This requires a nexus between the consideration retained by the service provider and that service. The premium was collected solely for full onward remittance to the insurer, without mark-up or retention, and was not remuneration for the appellant's service. The administrative charge constituted separate consideration and had already been subjected to tax and interest. The pre-amendment statutory position did not permit inclusion of a pass-through amount lacking the required nexus with the taxable service.

Conclusion: The insurance premium remitted in full to the insurer is excluded from the taxable value, and the service-tax demand on that component is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether invocation of the extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was justified.

Analysis: Extended limitation requires fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax. The dispute concerned the interpretational treatment of premium under the valuation provisions. No positive act of deliberate concealment or wilful suppression was established, and voluntary payment of tax and interest on the administrative charges before issuance of the notice negated an intent to evade.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended limitation period was unjustified, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 was sustainable.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 78 requires the same culpable elements as extended limitation. No tax remained payable on the premium component, and no fraud or wilful suppression was established. The liability relating to administrative charges had been voluntarily discharged with interest before the notice, without an independent basis for penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 78 is unsustainable and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Service-tax valuation is confined to actual consideration for the taxable service; the premium collected solely for onward remittance, and the consequential interest and penalty, are not enforceable, while the tax and interest voluntarily paid on administrative charges remain undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the pre-amendment Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, an amount collected solely for full onward remittance to a third party, without constituting consideration for the service provider's own service, cannot be included in taxable value.

Issues: (i) Whether TDS borne by the service recipient from its own funds is includible in the taxable value under reverse charge, and whether remand on that question was justified; (ii) Whether service tax under reverse charge was payable at 12% based on the date of receipt of service rather than 10% based on the date of payment; and (iii) Whether interest and penalties survive on the disputed demands.

Issue (i): Whether TDS borne by the service recipient from its own funds is includible in the taxable value under reverse charge, and whether remand on that question was justified.

Analysis: Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 does not make Section 35A(3) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 applicable to service-tax appeals. Section 85(4) of the Finance Act, 1994 empowers the Commissioner (Appeals) to pass such order as considered fit, including an order of remand. That power of remand, however, should not be exercised where the material fact is already conclusively established. The record showed that tax deducted at source was borne from the service recipient's own funds and was not deducted from the consideration payable to the foreign service provider. Such payment is not consideration for taxable service and cannot form part of the taxable value under Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: The Commissioner (Appeals) possessed remand jurisdiction, but the remand was unjustified; self-borne TDS is not includible in taxable value and attracts no service tax. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service tax under reverse charge was payable at 12% based on the date of receipt of service rather than 10% based on the date of payment.

Analysis: Under the reverse charge mechanism in Section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994, the applicable rate of tax is fixed by the date of receipt of service, not by the later date of invoice or payment. Payment made after a reduction in the rate does not alter the rate applicable to services received before that reduction.

Conclusion: The differential service-tax demand at 12%, being the rate applicable when the services were received, is sustainable. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest and penalties survive on the disputed demands.

Analysis: Interest follows the surviving differential tax demand. No penalty is leviable on the demand relating to the excluded TDS component, and the rate-related short payment arose from an interpretational dispute.

Conclusion: Interest is payable only on the surviving rate-differential demand, while penalties are not leviable. This issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Self-borne TDS is excluded from the service-tax base; the date of receipt of service controls the applicable rate under reverse charge; and only consequential interest remains payable on the rate-differential liability.

Ratio Decidendi: Tax deducted at source paid by a service recipient from its own funds, without deduction from the amount payable to the foreign service provider, is not consideration and cannot be included in taxable value under reverse charge.

Issues: (i) Whether the notional value of designs and drawings supplied free of cost by customers was includible in the assessable value of motor vehicle cabins? (ii) Whether addition of 0.98% of the value of cabins constituted a valid determination of value? (iii) Whether remand was permissible to cure the absence of evidentiary and valuation foundations in the show cause notice? (iv) Whether the extended period of limitation and equivalent penalty were invocable?

Issue (i): Whether the notional value of designs and drawings supplied free of cost by customers was includible in the assessable value of motor vehicle cabins?

Analysis: Section 4 preserves Transaction Value where the buyer and assessee are unrelated and price is the sole consideration. Section 4(1)(b) and Rule 6 permit addition only upon proof that the free supply is Additional Consideration, is used in or necessary for production, has an ascertainable apportioned value, and has not already been included in the price. The Burden of Proof rested on the Revenue. The record did not establish the character of the drawings, their use or necessity in production, or that their value was excluded from negotiated prices. Specifications communicating a buyer's requirements, as distinct from detailed production drawings, are not a Buyer's Assist requiring valuation addition.

Conclusion: The notional value of the designs and drawings was not includible in the assessable value, and Rule 6 was inapplicable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether addition of 0.98% of the value of cabins constituted a valid determination of value?

Analysis: A valuation under Section 4(1)(b) must follow the prescribed rules. Where Rule 6 cannot determine the money value of alleged additional consideration, Rule 11 requires Valuation by Reasonable Means consistent with the statutory principles. The 0.98% figure was only a suggested percentage, related to tractor development rather than cabin drawings, applied indiscriminately to all customers, and calculated on the value of cabin clearances rather than the value of the alleged free supply. It was neither evidence of the value of drawings nor a rule-based computation.

Conclusion: Addition of 0.98% was not a lawful determination of value and could not sustain the demand. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether remand was permissible to cure the absence of evidentiary and valuation foundations in the show cause notice?

Analysis: The Show Cause Notice as Foundation contained no evidence of value apart from material stating that the value was not ascertainable. Remand to collect fresh evidence and devise a valuation methodology would permit reconstruction of a case not made in the notice, rather than completion of an existing evidentiary inquiry.

Conclusion: Remand to redetermine the alleged amortised cost was impermissible and the remand direction is set aside. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the extended period of limitation and equivalent penalty were invocable?

Analysis: Extended Limitation requires fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, Wilful Suppression, or contravention with intent to evade duty. Periodical returns, audit of the assessee's records, absence of any identified concealment or misdeclaration, and the interpretational nature of the valuation dispute negated such intent. Revenue Neutrality, arising from availability of credit to the recipients, further supported absence of intent to evade. The requirements for penalty were the same as those for invoking the extended period.

Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable and the equivalent penalty was not imposable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The duty demand, interest and equivalent penalty founded on the proposed valuation fail for the entire period in dispute.

Ratio Decidendi: Where Revenue seeks to add buyer-supplied drawings to transaction value, it must prove their production nexus and ascertainable apportioned value; a speculative percentage cannot constitute a rule-based valuation or be repaired through remand.

Issues: Whether alleged excess collection of GST from buyers of affordable apartments could be treated as profiteering under Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 171 requires an actual benefit arising from a reduction in the GST rate or from input tax credit to be passed on through a commensurate reduction in price. The project commenced after the introduction of GST, with no pre-GST sales or CENVAT-credit baseline for comparison. The amount treated as profiteering represented alleged excess GST collection, whereas GST had been deposited at 12% and a lesser amount was charged from buyers. Such collection did not constitute a saving arising from a tax-rate reduction or input tax credit, and had no relevance to anti-profiteering computation under Section 171.

Conclusion: Alleged excess collection of GST cannot be classified as profiteering under Section 171; the quantified profiteering amount is unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether retaining the pre-reduction cum-tax cinema-ticket prices by increasing the base price after the GST rate reduction contravened Section 171(1), notwithstanding State-regulated maximum fares; (ii) Whether the DGAP's computation of the profiteered amount and its deposit into Consumer Welfare Funds, where recipients were unidentifiable, was sustainable; (iii) Whether penalty was leviable for the period from 01.01.2019 to 31.10.2019.

Issue (i): Whether retaining the pre-reduction cum-tax cinema-ticket prices by increasing the base price after the GST rate reduction contravened Section 171(1), notwithstanding State-regulated maximum fares.

Analysis: The GST rate for cinema admission tickets priced at one hundred rupees or less was reduced from 18% to 12% with effect from 01.01.2019. Section 171(1) required the resulting benefit to be passed to recipients through a commensurate reduction in price. The State fare regime fixed only a maximum permissible fare and did not prohibit a reduction in ticket price. The admitted retention of the cum-tax ticket prices through an increased base price, without cogent evidence justifying such increase, amounted to retention of the tax benefit and unjust enrichment. The absence of invoices did not alter the character of cinema admission as a taxable supply of services.

Conclusion: The retention of the tax-rate benefit by increasing the base price contravened Section 171(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the DGAP's computation of the profiteered amount and its deposit into Consumer Welfare Funds, where recipients were unidentifiable, was sustainable.

Analysis: The computation was based on the admitted increase in base prices following the rate reduction. Costing elements such as electricity, maintenance and security charges were immaterial to the examination of whether the tax reduction had been passed on. No specific challenge was made to the DGAP's methodology, figures, or the original and supplementary reports; the computation therefore stood unrebutted. Since the recipients were unidentifiable, Rule 133(3)(c) applied.

Conclusion: Profiteering of Rs. 10,19,280, together with applicable interest at 18%, was sustained and directed to be deposited equally in the Central Consumer Welfare Fund and the Telangana State Consumer Welfare Fund, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty was leviable for the period from 01.01.2019 to 31.10.2019.

Analysis: The penalty provision came into force only on 01.01.2020. It could not be applied retrospectively to profiteering for the investigated period.

Conclusion: No penalty was leviable for the period from 01.01.2019 to 31.10.2019, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A supplier must pass on a GST rate-reduction benefit by reducing the price charged to consumers; a regulatory maximum fare does not justify retention of that benefit through an enhanced base price.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory maximum-price regime does not excuse a supplier from passing on a GST rate-reduction benefit by commensurately reducing the price; maintaining the cum-tax price through an increased base price violates Section 171(1).

Issues: Whether the supplier contravened the anti-profiteering requirement by failing to pass on the benefit of the reduction in GST rate on cinema admission tickets through commensurate reduction in prices during the investigated period.

Analysis: Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires the benefit of a tax-rate reduction to be passed to recipients by a commensurate reduction in price. Although the GST rate on relevant tickets was reduced from 18% to 12%, the inclusive ticket prices for first-class and second-class categories remained unchanged because the base prices were increased. The subsequent reduction in prices from 11.03.2019 supported limiting the inquiry to the preceding period. Commercial considerations relating to particular films, demand, weekends, holidays, or ticket-price ranges could not override the statutory obligation to pass on the tax-rate benefit. The supplier produced no cogent evidence to justify the increased base prices or rebut the presumption against it, and did not dispute the DGAP's methodology or computation.

Conclusion: The supplier contravened Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 by not passing on the GST-rate reduction to recipients; profiteering of Rs. 81,722, inclusive of GST, was established for the investigated period, against the assessee.

Issues: Whether an ex parte GST demand order should be set aside to afford an effective opportunity of hearing where the proprietor's medically supported pregnancy prevented participation in the adjudication and the statutory appeal period had expired.

Analysis: The demand arose from adjudication under the Section 73 framework of the GST enactments. Medical records supported the proprietor's inability to participate during the relevant period due to pregnancy. As the order had been passed ex parte and the appellate remedy under Section 107 was no longer available owing to limitation, an effective opportunity to submit a reply and supporting documents was warranted.

Conclusion: The ex parte demand could not be sustained without affording the petitioner an opportunity to place her reply and relevant material before the adjudicating authority.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay in filing an appeal beyond the outer limit prescribed by Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could maintain its appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the registrations; (iii) Whether expiry of the period under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred recourse to the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay in filing an appeal beyond the outer limit prescribed by Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary limitation for an appeal, while Section 107(4) permits condonation only for the further statutorily limited period on sufficient cause. The First Appellate Authority, as a statutory authority, could exercise jurisdiction only within those limits. Orders of a High Court granting relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the particular facts of writ proceedings could not enlarge the Authority's statutory power. Equitable considerations cannot override an express limitation provision.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the outer statutory limit; this issue was decided in favour of Revenue and against the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could maintain its appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the registrations.

Analysis: The Department had acted upon the impugned orders, restored the registrations, and thereby enabled the assessees to resume business and undertake transactions. That implementation was a material subsequent event which crystallised the parties' position. The Department could not seek annulment of the same orders without addressing the consequences of the restoration, and no effective relief could be granted through the appeals.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain the challenges in the circumstances after implementing the impugned orders; this issue was decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (iii): Whether expiry of the period under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred recourse to the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Since the common portal did not permit an application for revocation after expiry of the prescribed period, compliance with Rule 23 was not practically available. The remedy of appeal under Section 107 operated independently, and non-availment of revocation under Rule 23 did not extinguish the right to challenge cancellation through an appeal.

Conclusion: Expiry of the Rule 23 period did not bar the assessees from pursuing the appellate remedy; this issue was decided in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: Although the condonation of delay beyond the statutory limit was declared jurisdictionally impermissible, the restored registrations and the legal position resulting from their implementation were not unsettled.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot extend an expressly prescribed outer limit for condonation of delay by relying on equitable relief granted by a High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could maintain its challenge after implementing the appellate orders and restoring the registrations; and (iii) Whether failure to pursue revocation under Rule 23(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred the taxpayers from pursuing the statutory appellate remedy.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary limitation for an appeal, while Section 107(4) permits condonation only within the additional period expressly stipulated. A statutory appellate authority has no inherent or equitable power to extend this outer limit. Relief moulded by a High Court in exercise of Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not enlarge the statutory appellate jurisdiction of the First Appellate Authority. Equity follows the law; condonation beyond the legislatively prescribed limit is coram non judice and ultra vires.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit; this issue is decided in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could maintain its challenge after implementing the appellate orders and restoring the registrations.

Analysis: The Department restored the registrations pursuant to the impugned appellate orders, enabling the taxpayers to continue business and undertake subsequent transactions. This material subsequent development altered the parties' legal and commercial position. Having implemented the orders, the Department could not seek their invalidation without addressing the consequences of restoration, and no effective relief could result from the challenge.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain its challenge to orders that it had already implemented; this issue is decided in favour of the Assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether failure to pursue revocation under Rule 23(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred the taxpayers from pursuing the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The common portal did not practically permit an application for revocation after expiry of the prescribed period. The revocation mechanism under Section 30 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the appeal under Section 107 operate as independent statutory remedies. Inability to invoke the former does not extinguish the right to pursue the latter.

Conclusion: The taxpayers were not barred from pursuing the appellate remedy because they had not obtained revocation under Rule 23(1); this issue is decided against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: Although the First Appellate Authority exceeded its statutory jurisdiction in condoning the delay, the Department's prior implementation of the orders and restoration of registrations prevented it from reopening the settled position through these proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot condone delay beyond an express outer limit prescribed by legislation, and equitable relief granted by a constitutional court under Article 226 cannot enlarge that authority's statutory jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay in filing appeals beyond the outer condonable period under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department's appeals remained maintainable after it had implemented the impugned orders and restored the respondents' registrations; and (iii) Whether the taxpayers' inability or failure to pursue revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred their statutory appeals under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay in filing appeals beyond the outer condonable period under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary limitation for an appeal and Section 107(4) permits condonation only within the further period expressly stipulated. The First Appellate Authority, being a statutory authority, possesses no inherent or equitable power to extend that outer limit. Relief granted by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the peculiar facts of a writ proceeding cannot enlarge the statutory appellate jurisdiction. Equity follows the law, and a statutory limitation cannot be overridden through reliance on constitutional-court directions.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the outer statutory limit; this issue is decided in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department's appeals remained maintainable after it had implemented the impugned orders and restored the respondents' registrations.

Analysis: The Department implemented the impugned orders by revoking the registration cancellations, following which the taxpayers resumed business and their registrations remained active. This subsequent development materially altered the parties' legal and commercial position. The Department could not seek annulment of orders whose consequences it had voluntarily implemented, particularly where no effective or workable relief could thereafter be granted without unsettling intervening genuine transactions.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain its challenge after implementing the impugned orders; this issue is decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessees.

Issue (iii): Whether the taxpayers' inability or failure to pursue revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred their statutory appeals under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Once the prescribed period had elapsed, the common portal did not permit applications for revocation under Rule 23. The statutory remedy of revocation under Section 30 and the appellate remedy under Section 107 operate independently. Inability to avail revocation therefore did not extinguish or prejudice the taxpayers' right to challenge cancellation through an appeal.

Conclusion: Non-availment of the revocation route did not bar the taxpayers' appeals; this issue is decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: Although the First Appellate Authority's condonation beyond the statutory limit was jurisdictionally defective, the Department's implementation of the resulting restoration of registrations precluded it from unsettling that relief in the circumstances of these matters.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot condone delay beyond an expressly prescribed outer limit by relying on relief moulded by a constitutional court in exercise of writ jurisdiction.