Charge stage quashing refused where corruption material disclosed strong suspicion and no official-duty sanction protection applied.
Protection under Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act was unavailable because the provision had already been struck down as unconstitutional and could not bar investigation or prosecution. Sanction under Section 197 CrPC was unnecessary because the alleged conspiracy and corruption were not shown to arise out of official duty or bear a direct nexus with public functions. At the charge stage, the court found that recorded conversations, recovery of money and the approver's statement disclosed sufficient material to raise a strong suspicion; disputed issues on demand, acceptance, electronic evidence and credibility were matters for trial. The challenge to the charge and the request to quash the proceedings therefore failed, and the trial was allowed to continue.
Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner could claim protection under Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946; (ii) whether sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was necessary for the alleged offences; (iii) whether the order on charge and the charge framed were liable to be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Issue (i): Whether the petitioner could claim protection under Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.
Analysis: The provision requiring prior approval for inquiry or investigation against certain senior public servants had already been held unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Once struck down, it could not be invoked to bar investigation or prosecution.
Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to protection under Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.
Issue (ii): Whether sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was necessary for the alleged offences.
Analysis: The alleged acts of criminal conspiracy and corruption were not part of the discharge of official duty and had no direct nexus with official functions. Sanction under Section 197 is required only where the offence complained of is attributable to, or directly connected with, official duty.
Conclusion: No sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was required.
Issue (iii): Whether the order on charge and the charge framed were liable to be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: At the stage of framing charge, the court is concerned only with whether the material discloses a strong suspicion and not with a meticulous appraisal of disputed facts or credibility of evidence. The recorded conversations, recovery of money, and approver statement constituted material sufficient to proceed to trial. The objections regarding demand, acceptance, admissibility of electronic evidence, and the approver's statement raised factual disputes for trial.
Conclusion: The challenge to the order on charge failed and the petition was not liable to be quashed.
Final Conclusion: The proceedings were held fit to continue and the petitioner was left to face trial on the existing charge material.
Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of framing charge or considering quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the court does not conduct a mini-trial and will interfere only where the material fails to disclose a strong suspicion or legal basis for proceeding; alleged corruption and conspiracy involving recovery and recorded material ordinarily warrant trial rather than quashing.