Bribery conviction requires proof of knowing acceptance; uncorroborated and infirm complainant evidence was insufficient here.

In a bribery prosecution, demand alone is insufficient; the prosecution must prove knowing acceptance of illegal gratification by reliable evidence. Where the complainant's account of handing over the tainted money is infirm, unsupported by independent evidence, and the defence version that the money was placed in the drawer without the accused's knowledge is plausible, corroboration is required before guilt can be recorded. On those facts, the conviction could not be sustained and the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt.

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Issues: Whether the conviction for bribery could be sustained on the basis of the complainant's uncorroborated evidence when the defence version that the tainted money was placed in the drawer without the accused's knowledge was found plausible.

Analysis: The prosecution had to establish both demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. The only direct evidence on the crucial act of handing over the money came from the complainant, whose version contained infirmities and was not supported by any independent witness or surrounding circumstance. The other trap witnesses did not clearly support the prosecution on the decisive question whether the accused knowingly received the money or whether it was placed in the drawer without his knowledge. In bribery cases, where the accused sets up a probable explanation and the prosecution evidence on acceptance is shaky, corroboration becomes necessary before guilt can be safely recorded.

Conclusion: The conviction could not be sustained and the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Ratio Decidendi: In a bribery prosecution, demand alone is insufficient; acceptance of illegal gratification must be proved by reliable evidence, and where the complainant's evidence on acceptance is infirm, corroboration is necessary before conviction can follow.

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