Successive bail applications need fresh grounds, while prolonged incarceration and trial delay can justify bail despite strict anti-terror restrictions.

Successive bail applications cannot be allowed merely because some prosecution witnesses have since been examined or turned hostile; earlier rejection orders on merits must be addressed, and fresh grounds are required before departing from them. The note also states that, even under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, prolonged custody and inordinate trial delay can justify bail where the right to a speedy trial under Article 21 is being defeated and the trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time. On the stated facts, prolonged incarceration outweighed the statutory bail restriction, and stringent conditions were treated as sufficient to protect the trial.

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Issues: (i) whether a successive bail application, after earlier rejection on merits, could be allowed merely because some prosecution witnesses had since been examined and some had turned hostile; (ii) whether prolonged incarceration and an inordinate delay in trial could justify grant of bail notwithstanding the rigours of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

Issue (i): whether a successive bail application, after earlier rejection on merits, could be allowed merely because some prosecution witnesses had since been examined and some had turned hostile.

Analysis: The earlier bail refusals had recorded findings that the accusations were prima facie true. Those reasons were required to be considered before taking a different view. Mere examination of 49 witnesses, or the fact that some witnesses turned hostile, did not constitute a fresh ground for reopening the merits. Successive bail applications cannot be used to re-agitate the same issue on half-baked evidence or to derail the trial. The impugned order also failed to advert to the binding effect of the earlier rejection orders.

Conclusion: This ground for bail was not sustainable and the finding in favour of the accused on merits was set aside.

Issue (ii): whether prolonged incarceration and an inordinate delay in trial could justify grant of bail notwithstanding the rigours of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

Analysis: The accused had remained in custody for more than six years, while the prosecution had examined only a limited number of witnesses and many more remained. The right to speedy trial under Article 21 was applicable even in prosecutions under special statutes. The Court applied the principle that the restrictions on bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 may relax where the trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time and the incarceration already undergone is substantial. On the facts, continued custody was unjustified, and strict conditions could address apprehensions of interference with the trial.

Conclusion: Bail was justified on the ground of delay and prolonged custody, with stringent conditions.

Final Conclusion: The bail order was sustained only on the ground of constitutional delay and prolonged incarceration, while the merits-based reasoning of the trial court was rejected; the accused was directed to remain on bail subject to strict conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: In a subsequent bail application, the court must consider the reasons for earlier rejections and can depart from them only on genuine fresh grounds, but even under a stringent anti-terror statute, bail may be granted where the right to speedy trial is being defeated by prolonged incarceration and there is no likelihood of trial concluding within a reasonable time.

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