Trial court powers and sessions prosecution scheme upheld; private complainant cannot bypass Public Prosecutor in sessions trials.

The trial court's powers to summon material witnesses, ask relevant questions, direct production of documents, and alter or add charges were treated as broad enough to meet the ends of justice, so writ interference with an ongoing trial was not justified. The prosecution scheme for sessions trials was also upheld: the State acts through a Public Prosecutor, and the complainant's role cannot displace that statutory arrangement. Section 302 was read as confined to Magistrates' courts, and the challenge to the validity of the prosecution provisions failed. The petition was therefore found to lack merit.

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Issues: (i) Whether the trial court could rely on its powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Evidence Act to summon material witnesses and add or alter charges, and whether the writ court should interfere with the pending trial on that basis. (ii) Whether Sections 225 and 301(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are unconstitutional, and whether a private counsel can conduct prosecution in a Court of Session under Section 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): Whether the trial court could rely on its powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Evidence Act to summon material witnesses and add or alter charges, and whether the writ court should interfere with the pending trial on that basis.

Analysis: The statutory scheme confers wide powers on the trial court to summon any person as a witness at any stage when such evidence is essential to a just decision. The judge also has power under the Evidence Act to ask any question and order production of documents to discover relevant facts. Likewise, the trial court may alter or add a charge before judgment and recall witnesses if the charge changes. In view of these powers, the alleged defects in investigation and charge framing did not justify writ interference while the trial was continuing.

Conclusion: The challenge on this ground failed, and no writ relief was warranted against the ongoing trial proceedings.

Issue (ii): Whether Sections 225 and 301(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are unconstitutional, and whether a private counsel can conduct prosecution in a Court of Session under Section 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The Court held that in serious offences prosecuted before a Court of Session, the State prosecutes through a Public Prosecutor, whose role is independent and bound by fairness to the Court, the accused, and the public interest. The distinction between the accused's right to defence by counsel of choice and the complainant's limited role in prosecution is founded on a reasonable classification and does not offend equality. Section 302 is confined to Magistrates' courts by its plain language, and cannot be extended to sessions trials so as to bypass the mandate of Sections 225 and 301(2).

Conclusion: Sections 225 and 301(2) were held to be constitutionally valid, and a private counsel could not conduct prosecution in a Court of Session under Section 302.

Final Conclusion: The petition was found devoid of merit because the trial court retained adequate statutory powers, the constitutional challenge to the prosecution provisions failed, and the requested reliefs were not made out.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute expressly assigns sessions prosecution to the Public Prosecutor and grants the trial court ample powers to summon evidence and modify charges during trial, a private complainant cannot displace that scheme by invoking equality or seek writ interference absent a legal infirmity in the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction.

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