Writ review in tender procurement is limited where exclusion is contractual, non-arbitrary, and no separate hearing is required.

Writ interference in a non-statutory procurement tender is limited: a court will not ordinarily disturb exclusion from supply unless the decision is arbitrary, mala fide, or contrary to law, and the challenge to the tender-based procurement direction therefore failed. On natural justice, the Court held that the requirement of a prior hearing is context-specific and may be flexible where the impugned action is a regulatory direction tied to tender terms and disclosure of a pending criminal case rather than an adjudication of an independent right. The plea of denial of hearing was rejected, and the procurement restriction was upheld.

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Issues: (i) whether the petitioner could invoke writ jurisdiction to challenge exclusion from the medicine supply tender on the basis of a pending CBI case and the impugned procurement direction; (ii) whether absence of a prior hearing vitiated the impugned action.

Issue (i): whether the petitioner could invoke writ jurisdiction to challenge exclusion from the medicine supply tender on the basis of a pending CBI case and the impugned procurement direction.

Analysis: The dispute arose out of a procurement arrangement governed by the tender terms and the State purchase policy. The Court relied on the settled principle that contractual obligations, when non-statutory and purely governed by the contract, are ordinarily not amenable to writ interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It noted that judicial review in contractual and policy matters is limited and is not available merely because another view of the tender decision or procurement policy may be possible. Interference is justified only where the action is shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, or contrary to law.

Conclusion: The challenge to the procurement decision was not maintainable on merits, and the impugned exclusion from supply could not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction.

Issue (ii): whether absence of a prior hearing vitiated the impugned action.

Analysis: The Court held that principles of natural justice are flexible and depend on the context, the nature of the action, and the surrounding facts. In a matter concerning procurement regulation based on the pending criminal case and the contractual terms requiring disclosure of such cases, the Court found that the action was not one requiring a separate individualized hearing in the facts of the case. The Court also treated the impugned order as a regulatory direction to officers within the State administration rather than an adjudicatory order curtailing an independent right.

Conclusion: The plea of violation of natural justice was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition failed on both maintainability and fairness grounds, and the impugned procurement restriction was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ court will not ordinarily interfere in a non-statutory contractual or tender matter unless the decision is shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, or contrary to law, and the requirements of natural justice are applied flexibly in light of the facts and the nature of the administrative action.

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