Article 226 cannot enforce lease contract claims where disputed facts and civil remedies exist; royalty-free timber use was limited.

A writ petition under Article 226 was treated as unsuitable for enforcing rights arising from a lease contract or recovering royalty paid under protest, because the claim flowed from the contract, involved disputed facts, and could be pursued through civil remedies; a company also could not invoke Article 19(1)(g) as a citizen's fundamental right. On construction of the lease clause and Rule 37, royalty-free timber removal was confined to use connected with exploitation of the very grant from which it was cut. Timber taken for tea gardens outside the leased area did not qualify, even if those gardens belonged to the same company.

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Issues: (i) Whether a writ petition under Article 226 was maintainable for enforcement of rights arising from a lease contract and recovery of royalty paid under protest. (ii) Whether, on a true construction of the lease clause and the relevant rule, the respondent was entitled to cut and remove timber without payment of royalty for use in tea gardens outside the leased area.

Issue (i): Whether a writ petition under Article 226 was maintainable for enforcement of rights arising from a lease contract and recovery of royalty paid under protest.

Analysis: The relief claimed was found to flow from the lease deed and not from an independent statutory right. The clause in the lease, though reflecting the substance of the proviso to Rule 37, had become a contractual term, and the dispute therefore concerned enforcement of contractual obligations. The Court held that such rights ordinarily have to be worked out in a civil court through a suit for specific performance or damages, particularly where the claim involves disputed questions of fact and factual investigation. The respondent company also could not rely on Article 19(1)(g), because a company is not a citizen and cannot claim that fundamental freedom.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable in respect of the contractual claim and should not have been entertained.

Issue (ii): Whether, on a true construction of the lease clause and the relevant rule, the respondent was entitled to cut and remove timber without payment of royalty for use in tea gardens outside the leased area.

Analysis: The Court held that the relevant clause and Rule 37 permitted royalty-free removal only when timber was used for purposes connected with the exploitation of the very grant from which it was cut. Timber taken from the leased area for use in another tea garden situated outside the grant, and in a different division, did not satisfy that requirement. The fact that both gardens belonged to the same company did not make the use connected with exploitation of the grant; otherwise the benefit would extend to any place where the company carried on business, which was inconsistent with the clause.

Conclusion: The respondent was not entitled to remove timber without payment of royalty for use in tea gardens outside the leased area.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's order was unsustainable both on maintainability and on merits, and the writ petition was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ petition under Article 226 cannot ordinarily be used to enforce a contractual term or recover money arising from a contract, especially where the claim turns on disputed facts and an adequate civil remedy exists.

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