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Issues: (i) Whether a petition for enforcement of a foreign award is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and whether delay in filing such petition can be condoned under Section 5 of that Act; (ii) Whether the award was liable to refusal of enforcement on the ground that it was in conflict with the public policy of India; (iii) Whether the Malaysian seat court was justified in applying Malaysian law while deciding the challenge to the award.
Issue (i): Whether a petition for enforcement of a foreign award is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and whether delay in filing such petition can be condoned under Section 5 of that Act
Analysis: The enforcement petition under Sections 47 and 49 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a substantive petition under the Act and not an application under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. A foreign award does not become a decree of an Indian civil court; it becomes a deemed decree only after the court is satisfied about enforceability. Article 136 therefore does not apply. The residuary Article 137 applies, and the period begins when the right to apply accrues. Section 5 is available because the filing is not an application under Order XXI.
Conclusion: The petition for enforcement was within limitation under Article 137, and in any event delay was condonable under Section 5. This issue was decided in favour of the respondents.
Issue (ii): Whether the award was liable to refusal of enforcement on the ground that it was in conflict with the public policy of India
Analysis: Enforcement of a foreign award is not an appeal on merits. Under Section 48, the court cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its own interpretation of the contract. The public policy defence must be construed narrowly in line with Renusagar and Shri Lal Mahal, and refusal is confined to fundamental policy of Indian law, interests of India, or justice and morality under the unamended regime. The tribunal's construction of the production sharing contract was held to be a plausible view, and no violation of the basic notions of justice was made out. The amended Section 48 did not apply to these proceedings.
Conclusion: The award was not contrary to the public policy of India and enforcement could not be refused on that ground. This issue was decided in favour of the respondents.
Issue (iii): Whether the Malaysian seat court was justified in applying Malaysian law while deciding the challenge to the award
Analysis: The law governing the seat court's supervisory jurisdiction is the curial law of the seat, whereas the enforcement court in India independently examines enforceability under Section 48. The governing law of the contract and the law of the arbitration agreement are distinct from the curial law. Since Kuala Lumpur was the juridical seat, the Malaysian courts were justified in applying Malaysian curial law to the setting-aside challenge.
Conclusion: The Malaysian courts were justified in applying Malaysian law for the seat-court challenge. This issue was answered against the appellant.
Final Conclusion: The foreign award remained enforceable in India, the limitation objection failed, and the public policy challenge was rejected; the civil appeal was dismissed and the enforcement order was affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi: A foreign award does not become a decree of an Indian civil court until enforcement is ordered, so limitation for enforcement is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and enforcement may be refused under Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 only on the narrow statutory grounds without any review on merits.