Arbitral award is not a decree or order under insolvency law, so no insolvency notice can rest on it.

An arbitral award is neither a decree nor an order within the meaning of section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, because those expressions bear their ordinary CPC sense and refer to formal judicial determinations by a civil court. The statutory fiction that an award is enforceable "as if" it were a decree operates only for enforcement and cannot be expanded to other statutes. An insolvency notice also cannot be issued under section 9(2) on the basis of an arbitral award, since the provision is strict and confined to judicial decrees or orders.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether an arbitral award is a decree or order for the purpose of section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909; (ii) Whether an insolvency notice can be issued under section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 on the basis of an arbitral award.

Issue (i): Whether an arbitral award is a decree or order for the purpose of section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909.

Analysis: The expression "decree" and "order" in the insolvency law were construed in their ordinary CPC sense. A decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requires a formal adjudication by a civil court in a suit, and an order is the formal expression of a civil court decision which is not a decree. An arbitral award is made by an arbitrator and not by a court; the statutory language treating an award as enforceable "as if" it were a decree creates only a limited legal fiction for enforcement and does not convert the award into a decree or order for all purposes.

Conclusion: An arbitral award is neither a decree nor an order within the meaning of section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909.

Issue (ii): Whether an insolvency notice can be issued under section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 on the basis of an arbitral award.

Analysis: Section 9(2) was held to be a strict provision with serious civil consequences and therefore could not be extended by implication. The statutory scheme, the use of the words "decree or order", the reference to proceedings in which the decree or order was made, and the form and rules governing insolvency notices all pointed to judicial decrees or orders and not arbitral awards. The limited enforceability of an award under the arbitration law did not amount to enforcement under the insolvency law, and the legal fiction could not be expanded beyond its purpose.

Conclusion: An insolvency notice cannot be issued under section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 on the basis of an arbitral award.

Final Conclusion: The insolvency notice founded on the arbitral award was unsustainable and the challenge to the notice succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory fiction that makes an arbitral award enforceable as if it were a decree operates only for enforcement purposes and cannot be extended to treat the award as a decree or order under a different statute unless the latter expressly so provides.

---