Costs against a non-party require statutory power, notice, and fair hearing; otherwise the order may be quashed.

A statutory appeal under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 was not available to a stranger to the proceeding, so the writ petition remained maintainable. The Industrial Tribunal had general power to award costs and, in appropriate cases, that power could extend to a non-party; however, the discretion had to be exercised on sound judicial principles and not capriciously. Because the employer was fastened with liability without notice or an opportunity of hearing, the order violated natural justice and was liable to be quashed in certiorari. The cost orders were therefore set aside and the petitioner was relieved from liability.

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Issues: (i) whether a person who was not a party to the proceedings could be required to pursue an appeal under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 instead of seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution; (ii) whether the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction to direct a non-party employer to pay costs and expenses incurred by employee representatives; (iii) whether the impugned order, having been made without notice and in breach of natural justice, was liable to be quashed.

Issue (i): whether a person who was not a party to the proceedings could be required to pursue an appeal under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 instead of seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution;

Analysis: The right of appeal is purely statutory and is available only to a party aggrieved or to such persons as the statute expressly authorises. On the language of the appellate provision, a stranger to the proceeding had no right to appeal against the Tribunal's order. Since the petitioner was not a party to the underlying proceeding, the statutory appellate remedy was not available.

Conclusion: The objection based on alternate statutory remedy failed, and the writ petition was maintainable in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): whether the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction to direct a non-party employer to pay costs and expenses incurred by employee representatives;

Analysis: The Tribunal's power to award costs was broad and extended to determining by whom and to what extent costs were to be paid. That width of language was sufficient to include, in appropriate cases, a person who was not a party to the proceeding. However, such power had to be exercised on sound judicial principles and not on a capricious or self-created basis. The expenses directed to be paid were treated as incidental costs of the proceeding, but the order disclosed an unsound exercise of discretion in fastening liability on an employer who had neither participated in nor controlled the proceedings.

Conclusion: The Tribunal had general jurisdiction to award costs against a non-party, but the impugned order was not a proper exercise of that jurisdiction and was bad in law.

Issue (iii): whether the impugned order, having been made without notice and in breach of natural justice, was liable to be quashed;

Analysis: An order determining liability for costs against a stranger to the proceeding was quasi-judicial in character and required observance of basic procedural fairness. The petitioner was not given an opportunity of being heard before the original order was made. The later hearing did not cure the defect, because the petitioner had still not been made a party to the proceeding and the order had been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Such an order was amenable to certiorari.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were quashed as having been made without jurisdiction and in breach of natural justice.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded, the Tribunal's cost orders were set aside, and the petitioner was relieved from liability under those orders.

Ratio Decidendi: A quasi-judicial order imposing costs on a non-party must be founded on statutory power and exercised consistently with natural justice; where a stranger is not afforded notice and hearing, the order is liable to be quashed in certiorari.

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