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Issues: Whether the delay in filing the appeal under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 could be condoned by excluding the time spent in pursuing a review application, and whether such pursuit furnished sufficient cause under the Limitation Act, 1963.
Analysis: The appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period, but the appellant had first pursued a review remedy against the impugned order. The review was prosecuted with notice to the opposite party, hearing on merits, and a reasoned dismissal. The governing principle applied was that where a litigant has acted with due diligence and in good faith in pursuing a proper remedy, the period spent in that proceeding may be excluded by applying the principle underlying Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for the purpose of judging sufficient cause under Section 5. The Court found that the review proceeding arose from the same cause of action, was pursued bona fide, and failed on a ground akin to defect of jurisdiction because the review was held not maintainable on the grounds urged. Liberal construction of sufficient cause also supported condonation.
Conclusion: The delay in filing the appeal was rightly condoned and the time spent in the review proceeding was excluded for limitation purposes.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a party prosecutes an statutory remedy with due diligence and in good faith, and that proceeding fails on a ground akin to defect of jurisdiction, the period so spent may be excluded in assessing sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.