Computation of time in a decree excludes the first day, making a deposit timely under fifteen clear days.

The phrase "within fifteen days from this day" in a decree was construed as excluding the day on which the order was made, so the period comprised fifteen clear days. Although Section 9 of the General Clauses Act did not apply directly to a judicial order, the same rule of time computation was applied for uniformity, and the words used in the order controlled over any stated intention of the trial judge. On that construction, the deposit made on February 7, 1936 was in time, and the default basis accepted by the lower courts could not stand.

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Issues: Whether the expression "within fifteen days from this day" in the decree required exclusion of the day on which the order was made, so that the deposit made on February 7, 1936 was in time.

Analysis: The temporal expression used in the decree was construed by applying the same principle that governs statutory computation of time. The phrase "from this day" excludes the first day, and the period therefore consists of fifteen clear days. Although Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 did not apply in terms to a judicial order, the Court held that the same interpretation should be adopted for uniformity. The meaning of the words used in the order controlled, not any stated intention of the trial Judge.

Conclusion: The deposit was made within time, the default basis adopted by the lower Courts was , and the appellant succeeded.

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