Statutory cooling-off period in mutual consent divorce cannot be bypassed by extraordinary constitutional relief where process is abused.

Article 142 relief cannot be used to bypass the statutory cooling-off period for mutual consent divorce, because complete justice powers remain exceptional and cannot override substantive statutory requirements. Where a party seeks immediate dissolution without special circumstances, discretionary intervention is not warranted. Parallel pursuit of identical matrimonial relief in different proceedings may also amount to abuse of process, and that conduct can disentitle a litigant to equitable relief. On these principles, the petition was rejected and no waiver of the waiting period was granted.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to entertain the petition and grant relief from the statutory waiting period for a mutual consent divorce. (ii) Whether the conduct of pursuing parallel proceedings for the same matrimonial relief justified refusal of equitable relief.

Issue (i): Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to entertain the petition and grant relief from the statutory waiting period for a mutual consent divorce.

Analysis: The power under Article 136 is discretionary and extraordinary, and Article 142 cannot be used to bypass substantive statutory provisions. Relief may be granted to do complete justice only in exceptional situations and not merely because a party seeks an immediate divorce or relies on sympathy. The statutory cooling-off period in mutual consent divorce serves a legislative purpose and cannot be ignored as a matter of course.

Conclusion: The request for extraordinary relief was not accepted and the Court declined to grant the waiver or entertain the petition on that basis.

Issue (ii): Whether the conduct of pursuing parallel proceedings for the same matrimonial relief justified refusal of equitable relief.

Analysis: The petitioner had already pursued matrimonial proceedings at Gurgaon and then sought the same relief through mutual consent proceedings at Delhi while the earlier case remained pending. Such parallel pursuit of identical relief amounted to abuse of the process of court and showed no special circumstance warranting intervention under Article 142. No question of general public importance or grave injustice was made out.

Conclusion: Equitable intervention was refused because the petitioner's conduct disentitled him to discretionary relief.

Final Conclusion: The Court held that its extraordinary powers cannot be used to override statutory requirements or to reward abuse of process, and the petition was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: Article 142 cannot be invoked to grant relief that is contrary to substantive statutory provisions, and discretionary constitutional relief will be declined where the litigant's conduct amounts to abuse of process or no exceptional circumstances are shown.

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